🌲UNDER YOUR TREE: A GIFT 🎁 FROM “SIR JEFFREY” CHASE OF THE ROUND TABLE 🛡️— “Asylum In The Time Of M-R-M-S-“ — “One reaction to this decision would have involved explaining that the Board’s illogical holding was reached not by error but by design, in furtherance of a restrictionist agenda; asking why the current administration hasn’t changed the makeup of a BIA specifically constructed to do exactly that . . . . But such talk would be of no practical help. What those representing asylum applicants and those in government deciding those claims need now is a path to negotiate this latest obstacle and still reach the correct result.”

Four Horsemen — “Sir Jeffrey” tells us how to use “the law as a sword” to defend against the BIA’s anti-asylum precedent in M-R-M-S-. Don’t let yourself and your clients be “shredded and trampled” by BIA panels wielding deadly, hyper-technical, counterintuitive, overly restrictive asylum precedents designed to promote and support “any reason to deny!”
Albrecht Dürer, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons

https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2023/12/24/asylum-in-the-time-of-m-r-m-s-2

JEFFREY S. CHASE | OPINIONS/ANALYSIS ON IMMIGRATION LAW

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Asylum in the Time of M-R-M-S-

Introduction

In 2017, while Matter of L-E-A-1 was pending before the BIA, I attended an immigration law conference at which Professor Jon Bauer posed the following “thought experiment”:

A Nazi official threatens to kill all the Jews in a town unless a Jewish criminal, who has committed several robberies and murders and is suspected to be hiding in the area, is turned over to the authorities or turns himself in.

Is this persecution on account of religion?

The answer is obviously yes. Those in the town find themselves at risk of persecution on account of their religion. It would seem impossible for anyone possessing knowledge of our asylum laws (or just plain common sense) not to understand this.

However, with its decision in Matter of M-R-M-S-,2 the Board of Immigration Appeals has managed to create a test for nexus that would lead to the opposite conclusion.

One reaction to this decision would have involved explaining that the Board’s illogical holding was reached not by error but by design, in furtherance of a restrictionist agenda; asking why the current administration hasn’t changed the makeup of a BIA specifically constructed to do exactly that; bemoaning the fact that regulations that are more than two years overdue could have prevented this; and suggesting that the correct course of action for the Attorney General to take at this point would be to vacate this decision in anticipation of said forthcoming rulemaking.

But such talk would be of no practical help. What those representing asylum applicants and those in government deciding those claims need now is a path to negotiate this latest obstacle and still reach the correct result. I hope that some of what follows will prove helpful, and that it will encourage further thought and conversation on this topic.

Legal Strategies in light of M-R-M-S-

Distinguish your case based on the facts

In M-R-M-S-, the Board chose for its precedent a case surprisingly devoid of facts. The entire factual summary consists of three sentences. A criminal cartel forced the respondents off of their land “because the cartel wanted the land for its own purpose. The cartel killed the lead respondent’s grandson for unknown reasons, although the respondents believe it was related to the cartel’s efforts to obtain their land. The cartel also forced other families off of land in the same area.”

This summary makes no mention of how family membership might have been a factor; it only says the cartel wanted the land for its own unstated purpose. It can be argued that the decision simply establishes that cases asserting mixed motives need to present more than one motive.

Instead, the Board leaped to a much broader and more damaging conclusion that wasn’t even suggested by the above facts, namely, that targeting members of a family for purposes of achieving another non-protected ground renders the family membership “incidental or subordinate,” and thus lacking the nexus required for asylum or withholding of removal protection.

Tip: Distinguish your facts from those in M-R-M-S-.

Emphasize how family or another protected ground played a significant role in the applicant being targeted for persecution. Note that merely mentioning that other family members were also harmed does not in itself establish a nexus on account of family membership.

Tip: Employ the Board’s test in Matter of S-P- when applicable.

In Matter of S-P-,3, the BIA looked at when government prosecution might actually be persecution on account of political opinion. And one of the warning signs it mentioned occurs when the punishment is clearly out of proportion to the conduct in question. So under S-P-’s test, if someone charged with jaywalking is detained at length and beaten by the police, the reasonable conclusion is that the punishment wasn’t actually about the jaywalking.

One can transpose this approach to the particular social group consisting of family by arguing that the same logic applies to gang punishment for failing to pay extortion. Particularly where the amount being sought by the gang or cartel isn’t that much, when the response to the failure to pay is to threaten to severely harm or kill a family member of the target of extortion, a reasonable conclusion under S-P- would be that this isn’t simply about the money. A gang or cartel can seek a financial goal, but at the same time can develop an animosity against a family resistant to its demands.

Moving on, the use of the word “subordinate” in the Board’s most recent holding is of interest, for the following reasons.

The fall and rise of the Board’s “subordination” criteria for nexus

In its first attempt to define the “one central reason” language adopted by Congress in 2005, the BIA in Matter of J-B-N- & S-M-4 recognized in the last paragraph of page 212 of that decision that the standard did not require a central reason to be “dominant” in relation to other reasons for persecution. In fact, in a footnote, the Board further explained: “The problem in classifying one motive as “dominant” or “central” is that it renders all other motives, regardless of their significance to the case, secondary and therefore ultimately irrelevant.”

Yet two pages after rejecting a hierarchical approach to nexus, the Board defined the new standard as a reason that “cannot be incidental, tangential, superficial, or subordinate to another reason for harm.”

The problem with the inclusion of the word “subordinate” is obvious. It means that once an adjudicator finds a reason they consider to be the dominant one, their inquiry is over, and, as the Board itself warned, all other motives become irrelevant.

The Third Circuit, in Ndayshimiye v. Attorney General of U.S.5 rejected the Board’s standard for precisely this reason: its use of the word “subordinate” was found by the court to be no different from the “dominance” test that the Board purported to reject. To quote the Third Circuit:

This plain language indicates that a persecutor may have more than one central motivation for his or her actions; whether one of those central reasons is more or less important than another is irrelevant. The BIA acknowledged this in refusing to define a central reason within the meaning of § 208 as a “dominant” motivation. Id. at 212. The same logic forbids an interpretation that would impose a mirror image of the rejected “dominance” test: the requirement that a protected ground, even if a “central” reason for persecution, not be subordinate to any other reason.

Interestingly, following this rejection of its standard, the BIA reacted by dropping the word “subordinate” from its stated legal standard. For example, in a subsequent (2011) precedent, Matter of N-M-, 6 the Board cited its earlier decision in J-B-N & S-M-, but made no mention of that case’s incidental/tangential/superficial/subordinate language at all. Rather, the Board said:

In cases arising under the REAL ID Act, the “protected ground cannot play a minor role in the alien’s past mistreatment or fears of future mistreatment.” Matter of J-B-N- & S-M-, 24 I&N Dec. at 214. Instead, a [noncitizen] must demonstrate that the persecutor would not have harmed the applicant if the protected trait did not exist.7

The italicized sentence states a “but for” causation standard which we will discuss further below. In fact, it seems to be an identical standard to that employed by the Fourth Circuit, whose approach the Board criticized in M-R-M-S-.

Years later, in the aforementioned Matter of L-E-A- (decided in 2017), the Board amended its earlier language in J-B-N- & S-N- as follows:

The protected trait, in this case membership in the respondent’s father’s family, “cannot play a minor role”—that is, “it cannot be incidental [or] tangential . . . to another reason for harm.”8

Notice how an ellipsis is used to drop the word “subordinate” from the definition. So the Board seemed to understand for quite some time that the legal standard it enunciated could not include a dominance test (although it would then proceed to apply a dominance test in practice, as numerous circuit court reversals have demonstrated)

But now, without explaining the reason for its sudden reversal, the Board has in M-R-M-S- reverted to its original flawed standard. Here’s the quote:

A protected ground that is “incidental, tangential, superficial, or subordinate to another reason for harm” does not satisfy this standard. Matter of J-B-N- & S-M-, 24 I&N Dec. at 214. 9

Furthermore, the Board chose to reassert its dominance requirement in a case in which the facts mention only one reason, and a vague one at that – that “the cartel wanted the land for its own purpose.” A dominance test is meaningless where there is only one reason asserted for the persecution.

But what if the revived dominance test were to be applied to Prof. Bauer’s hypothetical? Presumably, the Board would find the dominant reason for the threatened persecution to be the Nazi authorities’ desire to bring a criminal to justice. The targeting of the suspect’s coreligionists as a means to achieve that primary objective would, under the Board’s test, become “subordinate” to that goal, and would thus render the murdering of the town’s Jews “irrelevant.” Applying the Board’s “logic,” religion would not be one central reason for the murders.

As the above example demonstrates, the Board’s test will lead to truly absurd results. It is therefore not surprising that the Board’s standard is at odds with the approach of most circuits.

The reinstituted dominance test conflicts with most circuit case law

Tip: Argue the inapplicability of M-R-M-S- where it conflicts with prevailing circuit law.

While not exhaustive, the following selection of circuit court case law should provide a basis for arguing that the Board’s standard for determining nexus is inapplicable in many courts located within the jurisdiction of those circuits

Third Circuit

It should certainly be argued in cases arising within the jurisdiction of the Third Circuit that the new decision’s reiteration of the exact legal standard that was rejected in Ndayshimiye (as discussed above) means that M-R-M-S- cannot be followed. The BIA actually recognized the conflict in footnote 6 of its decision, stating:

Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit generally agrees with the Board’s interpretation of the “one central reason” standard, it has rejected the requirement that a protected ground not be subordinate to another reason for harm. See Ndayshimiye v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 557 F.3d 124, 130–31 (3d Cir. 2009).

The Board thus seemed to acknowledge by way of this footnote the inapplicability of its decision in the Third Circuit.

Fourth Circuit

The BIA in M-R-M-S- does not contest that its requirement for nexus is at odds with the long-established “but for” standard employed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.

In Hernandez-Avalos v. Lynch,10 the Fourth Circuit explained that even though a gang threatened the petitioner for the purpose of recruiting her son, the applicant was nevertheless targeted “on account of” her family ties because her “relationship to her son is why she, and not another person, was threatened….” The court has repeated the “why she, and not another person” test in other decisions.11

The Fourth Circuit has more recently pointed to an oft-repeated error of the Board in “incorrectly focusing on why the gang targeted Petitioner’s family, rather than on why they targeted Petitioner herself.”12 In another published decision, the Fourth Circuit stated that “‘once the right question is asked’ — that is, why was Petitioner being targeted — the conclusion is quite clear: ‘whatever [the gang]’s motives for targeting [her] family, [Petitioner herself] was targeted because of [her] membership in that family.’”13

The fact that the Board in M-R-M-S- states that it prefers the approach of the Tenth Circuit, which “does not agree with the Fourth Circuit’s approach,”14 does not change the fact that the standard enunciated in the above-captioned Fourth Circuit decisions remains the standard for nexus applicable in Immigration Courts and Asylum Offices located within that circuit’s jurisdiction.

Cases being heard remotely by an IJ located within the Fourth Circuit

A decision of the Fourth Circuit issued last year provides a strong argument for applying that court’s nexus standard in lieu of the M-R-M-S- approach in cases geographically outside of the circuit’s jurisdiction which are heard remotely by Immigration Judges sitting in Virginia, Maryland, or North Carolina.

In Herrera-Alcala v. Garland 15, the Fourth Circuit held that under a plain reading of the statute, jurisdiction is determined by the geographic location of the immigration judge at the time the judge completed the proceedings.

The BIA subsequently issued a conflicting precedential opinion, Matter of Garcia.16 But as the Fourth Circuit’s ruling in Herrera-Alcala was based on its clear reading of the statutory language, the lack of a finding of statutory ambiguity would preclude deference to the Board’s view under either Chevron or Brand X.

In cases in which the Immigration Judge is sitting within the Fourth Circuit while the respondent is appearing in an immigration court elsewhere, the argument should be made that Fourth Circuit case law should apply. Claims constructed using Fourth Circuit precedent should be presented below, as in case the claim is denied by the agency, the applicant will ultimately be able to seek review before the Fourth Circuit.

Cases arising under the jurisdiction of other circuits

Fifth Circuit

Outside of the obvious examples of the Third and Fourth Circuits, be highly aware of the case law of the prevailing circuit regarding nexus. Most circuits have rejected the Board’s approach to some degree. Furthermore, the BIA misrepresented the holdings in some of the circuit decisions it cited in M-R-M-S-, a point that should be brought to the attention of judges or asylum officers.

The Fifth Circuit provides us with an example. In M-R-M-S-, the BIA cited the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Guevara-Fabian v. Garland17 as an example of a court employing an analysis of nexus consistent with its own approach.18 However, the court in Guevara-Fabian simply found that there was substantial evidence that the petitioner was targeted “because she owned a profitable business,” and not due to her family membership. This is quite different from the Board’s holding that being targeted due to one’s family membership is insufficient to establish a nexus where such family-based targeting is used as a means to achieving another non-protected goal.

Furthermore, four days after the issuance of M-R-M-S-, the Fifth Circuit published its decision in Argueta-Hernandez v. Garland.19 The facts in that case did not involve a family-based particular social group, but in addressing the subject of nexus, the court’s opinion rejected the agency’s general approach of rejecting all but the dominant reason for persecution.

Specifically, the Fifth Circuit found that in concluding threats by MS-13 were motivated “by criminal intent, personal vendettas, or monetary gain, which do not establish the required nexus,” the BIA disregarded that the petitioner “needed only to present ‘some particularized connection between the feared persecution’ and the protected ground in which his application for relief relies.” The court then referenced an earlier decision in which it had rejected the Board’s employment of an “either-or” approach to nexus in a mixed motive case, and said that the Board had acted similarly here by suggesting that Argueta was targeted for economic reasons “instead” of for a protected ground.20

So in cases arising in the Fifth Circuit, it should be argued that Guevara-Fabian did not support the Board’s approach in M-R-M-S-, as it was distinguishable on its facts, and that the court’s subsequent rejection in Argueta-Hernandez of the type of dominance approach and “either-or” test employed in M-R-M-S- puts the Board’s view of nexus in conflict with circuit law.

Sixth Circuit

On December 8 (i.e. 7 days after the publication of M-R-M-S-), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit issued its decision in Sebastian-Sebastian v. Garland 21. In that case, the petitioner, who suffered domestic violence at the hands of her husband, and, following his death, at the hands of his mother, claimed persecution on account of particular social groups which included “Guatemalan Chuj [w]omen in domestic relationships who are unable to leave,” and “Guatemalan Chuj [w]omen who are viewed as property by virtue of their positions within a domestic relationship.” But the IJ found, and the Board affirmed, that the abuser acted based on a personal vendetta, and therefore found no nexus to a particular social group.

As the record contained ample evidence that “cultural expectations dictated that a Guatemalan Chuj woman in her position—both viewed as property and unable to leave by virtue of her domestic relationship—must stay with her in-laws and have nowhere else to go,” the Sixth Circuit determined there was “sufficient evidence for the BIA to conclude that Sebastian-Sebastian’s membership in these groups ‘underlay[s] all of [her persecutors’] actions.’”22 The court thus concluded that the Board’s failure to consider whether, in light of the above, the personal motives and particular social group membership were “inextricably intertwined” constituted reversible error.

The Sixth Circuit thus held (post-M-R-M-S-) that even where the primary reason for the persecution is a non-protected one (in this case, personal animosity), the fact that membership in a particular social group put and kept the asylum applicant in harm’s way is sufficient to render it sufficiently intertwined to satisfy the “one central reason” test. I believe a strong argument can be made that applying this approach to a family-based PSG would require a finding that even if the ultimate motive is extortion, if family membership is what put and kept the asylum applicant in harm’s way, there is sufficient nexus.

Seventh Circuit

In Gonzalez Ruano v. Barr,23 the Seventh Circuit explicitly rejected an approach essentially the same to that underlying the Board’s decision in M-R-M-S-. The petitioner suffered persecution by a criminal cartel whose leader viewed the petitioner’s wife as “property” that he sought to “possess.” The petitioner thus argued that his familial relationship to his wife was at least one central reason for his persecution.

On review, the Seventh Circuit specifically rejected the government’s argument that the persecution of the petitioner “was simply a ‘means to an end,’ making [the petitioner]’s relationship to his wife incidental.”24 The court found support in the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Hernandez-Avalos v. Lynch, adopting the Fourth Circuit’s test under which a nexus exists because the petitioner’s “relationship to his wife was the reason he, and not someone else, was targeted.”25

As the Seventh Circuit is in accord with the Fourth Circuit’s test that specifically rejects the Board’s approach to nexus (a conflict readily admitted by the Board in M-R-M-S-), the Board’s nexus standard is necessarily inapplicable in cases in which Seventh Circuit case law applies. It should be emphasized that the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Hernandez-Avalos which the Seventh Circuit positively cites is the specific decision mentioned by the Board in M-R-M-S- as an example of how the Fourth Circuit’s approach differs from its own.26

Eleventh Circuit

The Eleventh Circuit in Perez-Sanchez v. U.S. Att’y Gen.27 also applied a “but for” approach to nexus in a case involving family, determining that the persecutor’s monetary motivation did not render the petitioner’s family membership merely incidental where a criminal cartel targeted the petitioner because his father-in-law owed the cartel money. This is the exact scenario the Board rejected in M-R-M-S-, in which a family member is targeted as a means to a monetary end.

However, exactly as the Fourth Circuit had done in Hernandez-Avalos, the Eleventh Circuit stated that “In Mr. Perez-Sanchez’s case, it is impossible to disentangle his relationship to his father-in-law from the Gulf Cartel’s pecuniary motives: they are two sides of the same coin.” The court concluded that “the family relationship was one central reason, if not the central reason, for the harm.”28

Thus, the M-R-M-S- standard is at odds with Eleventh Circuit case law as well.

Ninth and Second Circuits

The approach of these two circuits relates to the “but-for” standard. The Ninth Circuit applies a “but-for cause” test in determining nexus. As that court recently noted, to satisfy that standard, an asylum applicant “must first show that ‘the persecutor would not have harmed [her] if such motive did not exist,’… that is, but-for cause, see But-for Cause, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (“The cause without which the event could not have occurred.”).29

Interestingly, in M-R-M-S-, the BIA quoted this but-for cause language from Parussimova without mentioning that the standard was in conflict with its own.30

It should therefore be argued in cases arising in the Ninth Circuit that applying that court’s “but-for cause” test would lead to a quite different result than the standard enunciated in M-R-M-S-.

The Second Circuit’s standard is less clear, but the court seems to view the “one central reason” requirement an even lower bar for establishing nexus than a but-for cause test. In Quituizaca v. Garland,31 the court noted the need to predict future persecution in withholding of removal claims, as opposed to other areas of law that employ a but-for causation test to past actions only. The court noted that where an adverse action has already occurred, there is an implication that “whatever evidence to establish but-for causation or refute it exists too.”

By contrast, the court noted that because of the predictive nature of future persecution in withholding claims, “[a] but-for standard in this context would seemingly require the applicant have insight into the motivations of the hypothetical future persecutor that sufficiently removes any doubt that the persecutor would be motivated by anything else,” adding that “[a]t a minimum, the proof that can be marshalled to rectify past conduct appears to us distinct from that which would be needed to establish a persecutor’s potential future conduct.”

While the Quituizaca decision is not even mentioned in M-R-M-S-, the Board does reference another Second Circuit case, Garcia-Aranda v. Garland,32 but essentially misrepresents that decision’s holding. In Garcia-Aranda, the facts established that although family members had also been harmed, the petitioners were targeted for persecution because of their own perceived wealth. Whether or not they were related to others who suffered harm would not change the outcome. Thus, in Garcia-Aranda, the court did not address, much less reject, the proposition that no nexus is established under a Hernandez-Avalos type of fact pattern.

A quick note regarding the Tenth Circuit

M-R-M-S- arose within the jurisdiction of the Tenth Circuit, and the Board lauded that court’s decision in Orellana-Recinos v. Garland33 as setting forth its preferred standard for nexus.34

It is worth noting that in Orellana-Recinos, “Petitioners did not challenge, or even cite, Matter of L-E-A- in their brief to this court. And at oral argument they cited it as authority. As previously noted, they dispute only the BIA’s factual findings in their case, not the legal framework it applied.”35

What about the standard applied in discrimination cases?

The Supreme Court recently addressed the question of nexus outside of the asylum context in Bostock v. Clayton County,36 a case involving employment discrimination under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The Court explained in Bostock that the statutory term in question, “because of,” carries the same legal meaning as “on account of,” (i.e. the standard used in asylum cases).

The Court continued that the standard requires a court to apply the “simple” and “traditional” “but-for” test. As the Court explained, “a but-for test directs us to change one thing at a time and see if the outcome changes. If it does, we have found a but-for cause.”37

The Court recognized that the “but-for” standard is a “sweeping” one, acknowledging that “[o]ften, events have multiple but-for causes.” The Court further observed that “[w]hen it comes to Title VII, the adoption of the traditional but-for causation standard means a defendant cannot avoid liability just by citing some other factor that contributed to its challenged employment decision.”38

This leads to the following question: if “on account of” is not a term specific to asylum, and if the Supreme Court has told us that there is a simple and traditional test for “on account of” that is none other than the “but-for” test being applied by several circuits as described above, can the BIA simply ignore this in creating its own definition for the term “on account of” applicable to asylum claims? M-R-M-S- makes no mention of Bostock. If the Board doesn’t believe that case to be applicable, why not explain its reasoning for reaching that conclusion?

Tip: There is thus an argument to be made in all jurisdictions that the Supreme Court’s standard in Bostock should be the prevailing one.

I have discussed Bostock and offered my views on its applicability to asylum in more detail here.

Emphasize other BIA precedents

Even in the absence of conflicting circuit or Supreme Court case law, an Immigration Judge or asylum officer is left to sort through the several BIA precedents mentioned above. Matter of S-P- (which has not been overruled) did not conclude that because an asylum applicant faced criminal prosecution, there was nothing further to consider. Instead, the Board in that case set forth a test requiring adjudicators to continue their inquiry, taking into account circumstantial evidence and applying common sense to see if another motive for the persecution might be inferred from the facts of record.

As noted above, Matter of N-M- set out a “but-for” standard that seems identical to the one employed by the Fourth Circuit. And even Matter of L-E-A- dropped the word “subordinate,” and thus the application of the dominance test, from its stated legal standard.

Tip: Note that these other BIA precedents remain binding as precedent.

These other cases should therefore be cited and explained, and the degree to which they conflict with M-R-M-S- should be emphasized. It can be argued that M-R-M-S-’s applicability should be limited to cases in which family members are merely mentioned in passing, without further elucidation from the record as to why family membership might have served as a reason for past or future persecution.

Conclusion

As the above hopefully demonstrates, there are plenty of bases to challenge the Board’s recent decision. In M-R-M-S-, the Board presented an approach to nexus that is at odds with the case law of the majority of circuits. The Board mischaracterized the holdings in a number of circuit court decisions, championed a decision of the Tenth Circuit in which the Board’s standard was conceded and thus not in dispute before that court, and completely ignored the Supreme Court’s analysis of the “on account of” standard without explaining why what the Court termed the traditional standard for nexus was distinguishable in the asylum context.

To reiterate, the proper thing for the Attorney General to do at this point is to certify the decision to himself, and vacate it pending anticipated rulemaking. In the meantime, it is hoped that some of the above points will receive serious consideration from asylum officers, Immigration Judges, ICE attorneys, and federal appellate courts.

Copyright Jeffrey S. Chase 2023. All rights reserved.

Notes:

27 I&N Dec. 40 (BIA 2017).

28 I&N Dec. 757 (BIA 2023).

21 I&N Dec. 486 (BIA 1996).

25 I&N Dec. 208 (BIA 2007).

557 F.3d 124, 129-30 (3rd Cir., 2009).

25 I&N Dec. 526 (BIA 2011).

Id. at 531 (emphasis added).

Matter of L-E-A-, supra at 44.

Matter of M-R-M-S-, supra at 759 (emphasis added).

784 F.3d 944, 950 (4th Cir. 2015).

See, e.g., Alvarez-Lagos v. Barr, 927 F.3d 236, 250 (4th Cir. 2019); Cruz v. Sessions, 853 F.3d 122, 129 (4th Cir. 2017).

Perez Vasquez v. Garland, 4 F.4th 213 , 222 (4th Cir. 2021).

Hernandez-Cartagena v. Barr, 977 F.3d 316, 322 (4th Cir. 2020) (citing Salgado-Sosa v. Sessions, 882 F.3d 451, 459 (4th Cir. 2018)).

M-R-M-S-, supra at 761.

39 F.4th 233 (4th Cir. 2022).

28 I&N Dec. 693 (BIA 2023).

51 F.4th 647, 648 (5th Cir. 2022) (per curiam).

M-R-M-S-, supra at 760.

No. 22-60307 (5th Cir. Dec. 5, 2023).

Id., slip op. at 16-17 (citing Rivas-Martinez v. I.N.S., 997 F.2d 1143, 1145, 1147-48 (5th Cir. 1993) (remanding to BIA for consideration of mixed motives).

No. 23-3059 (6th Cir. Dec. 8, 2023).

Id., slip op. at 22 (quoting Al-Ghorbani v. Holder, 585 F.3d 980, 998 (6th Cir. 2009).

922 F.3d 346 (7th Cir. 2019).

Id. at 355-56.

Id. at 356.

See M-R-M-S-, supra at 761 (stating that the Tenth Circuit does not agree with the Fourth Circuit’s approach in Hernandez-Avalos, and adding its opinion that the Tenth Circuit’s is the proper approach).

935 F.3d 1148 (11th Cir. 2019).

Id. at 1158-59.

Rodriguez Tornes v. Garland, 993 F.3d 743, 751 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Parussimova v. Mukasey, 555 F.3d 734, 741 (9th Cir. 2009).

See M-R-M-S-, supra at 762.

52 F.4th 103, 112-13 (2d Cir. 2022).

53 F.4th 752, 758 (2d Cir. 2022).

993 F.3d 851 (10th Cir. 2021).

M-R-M-S-, supra at 761 (stating “In our view, the Tenth Circuit’s approach is the proper way to analyze whether membership in a family-based particular social group is one central reason for harm.

Id. at 857.

140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).

Id. at 1739.

Id.

DECEMBER 24, 2023

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Jeffrey S. Chase is an immigration lawyer in New York City. Jeffrey is a former Immigration Judge and Senior Legal Advisor at the Board of Immigration Appeals.He is the founder of the Round Table of Former Immigration Judges, which was awarded AILA’s 2019 Advocacy Award.Jeffrey is also a past recipient of AILA’s Pro Bono Award.He sits on the Board of Directors of the Association of Deportation Defense Attorneys, and Central American Legal Assistance.

Reprinted by permission.

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It’s very satisfying to see Jeffrey’s positive use of Matter of S-P-, a “Schmidt era” precedent in which I joined and which remains good law despite the current BIA’s often ignoring or misapplying it. It’s also a great example of the useful guidance flowing from “positive precedents” — those illustrating and promoting proper asylum grants — as opposed to the overwhelmingly negative tenor of today’s unduly restrictive BIA asylum precedents.

As many of us often say, justice for asylum seekers and other migrants shouldn’t be this difficult in Garland’s courts. See also https://immigrationcourtside.com/2023/12/04/☠%EF%B8%8F🤯-bia-trashes-normal-legal-rules-of-causation-jettisons-4th-cir-precedent-to-deny-family-based-psg-case-the-latest-anti-asylum-znger-from-falls-church-famil/.

Even while the BIA tortures asylum law to make it more difficult to qualify, authorities in other “UN Convention nations” are moving in the opposite direction. For example, Switzerland recently joined Finland, Sweden, and Denmark in automatically granting asylum to Afghan women. See, e.g., https://www.tortoisemedia.com/2023/12/19/switzerland-becomes-fourth-country-to-automatically-grant-asylum-to-afghan-women/.

This approach is far more consistent with the Supreme Court’s generous guidance in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca and the BIA’s own initial implementation of that standard in Matter of Mogharrabi, both of which are routinely ignored at EOIR today. (Indeed, if someone with the exact same facts as Mogharrabi applied today, it’s highly likely that the BIA would invent a host of bogus reasons to send him packing!) It’s also a much more practical approach that can actually “streamline” the granting of more “first instance” cases by the Asylum Office, greater consistency, and lessening the need for petitions for review and “Circuit specific” strategies.

While there is no “silver bullet” that will eliminate overnight a backlog built over years of neglect, active mismanagement, and poor performance at EOIR and DOJ, a new, functional, well-respected BIA of asylum expert judges unswervingly committed to due process, fundamental fairness, and best practices is an absolutely necessary first step toward regaining control over our asylum system without sacrificing the legal rights of asylum seekers. The system can’t start eliminating backlog until it ceases doing those things that build unnecessary backlog in the first place.

In the meantime, this example of “law you can use” from “Sir Jeffrey” promises to be the “gift that keeps on giving” during what is sure to be a difficult upcoming year for refugees, asylum seekers, migrants, and their dedicated attorneys and representatives!

🇺🇸 Due Process Forever!

PWS

12-26-23

⚖️🗽📡BELOW THE RADAR SCREEN: Judge Javier Balasquide (MIA) Grants Honduran Family-Based PSG Asylum Case Represented By Attorney Ysabel Hernandez!

“Sir Jeffrey” Chase’s reaction:

Nice to see that with L-E-A- II vacated, family can be stated so matter-of-factly as a PSG even in the 11th Cir.

Here’s the decision:

Ysabel Hdz IJ redacted

**************

Congrats to Ysabel Hernandez!

There are plenty of similar cases out there in the EOIR backlog and waiting at the border for the Administration to start following asylum law!(Others have been unlawfully and immorally returned to persecution without meaningful opportunities to present their claims.)

These types of cases could be identified, represented, and timely granted by a “better EOIR” led by a “better BIA.” These are the decisions that should be binding precedents. Practical, positive legal guidance shows how to “build on” gender-based and family-based asylum to grant more protection, encourage good preparation and presentation on both sides, rein in “never asylum judges,” and to clear dockets of cases of individuals who deserve to be on their way to green cards, citizenship, and full participation in our society.

A fair, consistent, timely application of asylum and refugee laws would establish that many of those wrongly characterized as “law violators” are, in fact, legal immigrants. And, that’s something our country needs!

What if the “powers that be” would “institutionalize” this type of judicial performance rather than the “denial factory/good enough for government work” culture that continues to operate widely at EOIR under Garland? Wouldn’t that be the type of “good government” that Biden and Harris promised, but have yet to deliver, particularly on immigration?

Personal note: Judge Balasquide was the widely respected ICE Chief Counsel in Arlington when I arrived at the Arlington Immigration Court in 2003. He was initially appointed as a Immigration Judge in New York in July 2006 by then AG Alberto Gonzalez. I always enjoyed working with Judge Balasquide during my time in Arlington. (He actually appeared before me in court on a few occasions.)

🇺🇸 Due Process Forever!

PWS

06-0-22

🇺🇸⚖️🗽ATTN NDPA: LAW YOU CAN USE: Hon. Jeffrey S. Chase’s “Practical Scholarship” Outs Garland BIA’s Disingenuous Approach To “Nexus” — Use These Arguments To Litigate Garland’s Dysfunctional “Denial Factory” To A Standstill!

https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2021/12/21/the-proper-test-for-nexus1

The Proper Test for Nexus

On November 4, the Board of Immigration Appeals issued its precedent decision in Matter of M-F-O-.1,2 At first glance, the decision seems to be a correction regarding when the accrual of continuous presence for voluntary departure ends, necessitated by a Supreme Court decision rejecting the Board’s prior take on the question. The headnote summarizing the decision mentions only this issue.

However, reading further into the decision reveals an additional motive. It turns out that the respondent in M-F-O- sought asylum; it was the denial of that protection that brought voluntary departure into play. The respondent stated that he feared being persecuted by a violent gang on account of his membership in a particular social group consisting of “indigenous Guatemalan youths who have abstained from joining the street gangs.”

The BIA uncharacteristically assumed the above group to be a valid one for asylum purposes. In doing so, the Board was aware of proposed regulations being drafted by the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security, which are likely to create a more inclusive standard for particular social group determinations than that currently employed by the Board.

But in M-F-O-, the Board sought to make the point that even where such groups are legally recognized, no asylum will be forthcoming unless a nexus is found between the group membership and the harm. And the Board in upholding the asylum denial in M-F-O- aimed to bolster a standard it has employed in recent years to make it remarkably easy to deny the existence of such a nexus.

Our asylum laws state that a nexus exists when persecution is “on account of” one of the five statutorily-protected grounds.3 Whether or not a nexus is found depends on what is meant by those three words. Let’s therefore take a deeper dive into the meaning of that term.

The Traditional Standard 4

“On account of” is by no means a phrase specific to immigration law; it long predates the Refugee Act of 1980. The Fifteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, ratified in 1870, states in part that “The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” The Nineteenth Amendment, ratified in 1920, similarly prohibits denying or abridging one’s right to vote “on account of sex.”

As to how that term should be interpreted, the Supreme Court recently addressed the question outside of the asylum context in Bostock v. Clayton County,5 a case involving employment discrimination under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The Court explained that the statutory term in question, “because of,” carries the same legal meaning as “on account of.”6

The Court continued that the standard requires a court to apply the “simple” and “traditional” “but-for” test. As the Court explained, “a but-for test directs us to change one thing at a time and see if the outcome changes. If it does, we have found a but-for cause.”7

The Court recognized that the “but-for” standard is a “sweeping” one, acknowledging that “[o]ften, events have multiple but-for causes.”8 The Court further observed that “[w]hen it comes to Title VII, the adoption of the traditional but-for causation standard means a defendant cannot avoid liability just by citing some other factor that contributed to its challenged employment decision.”9

According to the Court:

It doesn’t matter if other factors besides the plaintiff’s sex contributed to the decision. And it doesn’t matter if the employer treated women as a group the same when compared to men as a group. If the employer intentionally relies in part on an individual employee’s sex when deciding to discharge the employee—put differently, if changing the employee’s sex would have yielded a different choice by the employer—a statutory violation has occurred.10

The Court also provided a hypothetical:

Consider an employer with a policy of firing any woman he discovers to be a Yankees fan. Carrying out that rule because an employee is a woman and a fan of the Yankees is a firing “because of sex” if the employer would have tolerated the same allegiance in a male employee.11

So under the Court’s hypothetical, any argument that the “real” or “primary” reason for terminating the employment was being a Yankees fan, and that the gender of the employee was merely “incidental” because women who aren’t Yankees fans aren’t fired, and in fact are treated equally as a group to men, is rejected because removing the gender of the Yankees fan from the equation brings about a different result. Note that under this test, the question is not the general treatment of women, but rather the impact of being a woman on the treatment of the specific employee. Also, the test does not require a test to determine the dominant reason for the unequal treatment; in the hypothetical, there was no concern over whether being a Yankees fan or a woman was the stronger motivation for the termination. This is in fact a clear standard that is easy to both understand and apply in practice.

The Asylum “One Central Reason” Standard

Let’s turn back to the asylum context. In 2005, Congress included language in the REAL ID Act requiring a statutorily-protected ground to be “at least one central reason” for the persecution in order to meet the “on account of” requirement. Did this added language create a different standard for asylum cases than that described in Bostock?

One leading authority points out that an earlier version of the 2005 legislation would have required the protected ground to be “the central motive” behind the persecution. However, in the final version, “the” was changed to “at least one,” meaning that a protected ground need be only one of multiple causes behind the harm.12

Also, note the replacing of “motive” with “reason.” The Cambridge English Dictionary defines “reason” as “the cause of an event or situation or something that provides an excuse or explanation,” providing the example: “the reason for the disaster was engine failure, not human error.” “Reason” would thus seem to cover more territory than “motive,” as an engine has no motive to fail.

The change from “motive” to “reason” lends itself to what scholars of international refugee law have termed the “predicament approach,” in which a causal connection between the persecution and a protected ground satisfies the nexus requirement irregardless of evidence of a specific persecutorial intent.13 The concept is illustrated through the example of a conscientious objector who is imprisoned for evading mandatory military service. While the conscription law applies equally to all, the real cause may be a protected ground where noncompliance with the law was because of a religious or political belief.14

It is for this reason that one leading scholar viewed the choice of word as an indication “of increased conformity with international standards” in line with the fact that the Refugee Act was enacted to bring U.S. law into conformity with international treaty obligations under the 1967 Protocol.15

The BIA’s Initial Take on “One Central Reason”

The BIA initially interpreted “one central reason” as a reason that is not “incidental, tangential, superficial, or subordinate to another reason for harm.”16 In doing so, the BIA explicitly rejected the view that “one central reason” must be “dominant.” As the Board explained, “[t]he problem in classifying one motive as “dominant” or “central” is that it renders all other motives, regardless of their significance to the case, secondary and therefore ultimately irrelevant.”17 (It is worth noting the Board’s use of the word “motive” rather than “reason.”).

However, the Board’s inclusion of the word “subordinate” in its definition was rebuffed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which found it to be the “mirror image of the rejected ‘dominance’ test: the requirement that a protected ground, even if a ‘central’ reason for persecution, not be subordinate to any other reason.”18 In other words, the court found no difference between requiring a reason to be dominant (which the Board correctly found it could not do) and prohibiting a reason from being subordinate (which the Board then did instead). The Board has since dropped the word “subordinate” when describing the standard.

So in summary, the “at least one central reason” standard allows a cause for persecution to be one of many, and does not require the protected ground to be dominant in comparison with the others. It only prevents the reason from being incidental, tangential, or superficial. And again, the word is “reason” and not “motive;” surely, Congress saw a difference between those words or it wouldn’t have changed the latter to the former in the final version.

In its recognition that there may be multiple causes for persecution, in its substitution of “reason” for motive, and in its rejection of a dominance test, the “one central reason” test is indistinguishable from the standard described in Bostock.

Circuit Courts Have Applied the Bostock “But-For” Test in Asylum Cases

The Fourth Circuit has addressed the “one central reason” standard in a number of decisions in which it has consistently applied the “but-for” test.19 In one, a woman from El Salvador sought asylum after members of Mara 18 threatened to kill her for blocking them from recruiting her son. The BIA upheld the Immigration Judge’s finding of no nexus, on the grounds “that gang recruitment was the central motivation for these threats;” while claiming that “the fact that the person blocking the gang members’ recruitment effort was their membership target’s mother was merely incidental to the recruitment aim.”20

Note the Board’s citing of a completely incorrect standard: “the central motivation,” referencing the wording that Congress rejected in place of the language it ultimately adopted. As a practical matter, the Board viewed the recruitment aim as ending its nexus inquiry, whereas I would argue that it should have served as the starting point. Once we know that the gang sought to recruit the son, we gain a perspective that allows us to better understand how the particular social group membership might put the asylum seeker in harm’s way.

Properly applying the “but-for” test described in Bostock to the above fact pattern required removing the family relationship from the equation to see if the threat of harm would remain. Of course, it would not; it was the specific fact that the asylum-seeker was the intended recruit’s mother that put her between the gang and her son, blocking the recruitment. And it was because she stood between the gang and her son that the former sought to kill her. The maternal relationship wasn’t tangential or incidental to the recruitment; it was precisely the reason that the asylum-seeker was an obstacle that needed to be eliminated.

That is why the Fourth Circuit concluded that the family relationship was “at least one central reason” for the threatened harm: because the petitioner’s “relationship to her son is why she, and not another person, was threatened with death if she did not allow him to join Mara 18. The court added “The BIA’s conclusion that these threats were directed at her not because she is his mother but because she exercises control over her son’s activities draws a meaningless distinction under these facts.”21

The Eleventh Circuit also applied the traditional “but-for” test in a 2019 decision in which the Board had found no nexus because a cartel had a financial motive in targeting the Petitioner in order to extort money owed to the cartel by his uncle.22 The Eleventh Circuit found that “it is impossible to disentangle [the Petitioner’s] relationship to his father-in-law from the Gulf Cartel’s pecuniary motives: they are two sides of the same coin.” The court continued that absent the familial relationship with the uncle, the cartel never would have hunted the Petitioner down or persecuted him. The court thus rejected the Board’s view that the family relationship was merely incidental; to the court, it was “abundantly clear to us that the family relationship was one central reason, if not the central reason, for the harm visited upon Mr. Perez-Sanchez.”23

The Ninth Circuit has also held the “but-for” cause to be the correct standard for determining nexus in asylum cases, citing the Black’s Law Dictionary definition of the term as “[t]he cause without which the event could not have occurred.”24

The Description of the Standard By the BIA (and an Acting Attorney General)

The BIA’s application of the “one central reason” standard is best summarized in a recent decision of the Third Circuit: “although the BIA correctly recited the ‘one central reason’ test, it applied something altogether different.”25

In 2011, the BIA recognized the “one central reason” standard as requiring the asylum seeker to “demonstrate that the persecutor would not have harmed the applicant if the protected trait did not exist.”26 What the BIA described is the traditional “but for” test. And in 2017, in its decision in Matter of L-E-A-, the Board described the test as “[i]f the persecutor would have treated the applicant the same if the protected characteristic of the family did not exist, then the applicant has not established a claim on this ground.”27

Interestingly, less than a week before the end of the Trump Administration, a briefly serving Acting Attorney General issued a second decision in Matter of A-B- recognizing that to establish a nexus for asylum purposes, “the protected ground: (1) must be a but-for cause of the wrongdoer’s act; and (2) must play more than a minor role—in other words, it cannot be incidental or tangential to another reason for the act.”28

The Acting Attorney General listed the “but-for” test and the fact that the ground not be incidental or tangential as if they were two separate requirements, even though a ground that serves as a “but-for” cause for persecution cannot be incidental or tangential. Also curious is the Acting A.G.’s statement that the ground could not be incidental or tangential to another reason for the act. Was this meant to be a return to the dominance test that was rejected by the Third Circuit and the BIA? Or might this have simply been the result of sloppy drafting, in which the Board’s language from Matter of J-B-N- & S-M- was modified by removing the word “subordinate” that the Third Circuit had rejected, while neglecting to also remove the “to any other reason” language that followed? The question was rendered moot when the decision was vacated in June by Attorney General Garland.29

The Board Has Applied an Incorrect Standard for Nexus

Descriptions aside, as noted by the Third Circuit, the standard actually applied by the BIA has been something entirely different. In many of the Board’s decisions, asylum has been denied for lack of nexus simply because the adjudicator deemed a non-protected reason to be the persecutor’s primary motive, without regard to the impact of the protected ground on outcome. This approach is not only inconsistent with the test applied in the above-mentioned circuit court cases (and in Bostock), but is inconsistent with the standard described by the Board itself which rejected a test for dominance.

The Second Circuit made this point in 2014, reversing a decision in which the IJ applied a “the central reason” test, as opposed to “at least one central reason.” The court emphasized that this was not harmless error; rather, it “set up an ‘illogical’ rubric for analyzing motivation that presupposed that multiple motives for persecution must be analyzed in competition with one another, rather than in concert.”30 The court further pointed out that this was not an isolated error by the agency, citing three other decisions dating back to 2007 in which the Board had done precisely the same thing.31

And the Fourth Circuit this year identified an oft-repeated error of the Board in determining nexus on account of family “by incorrectly focusing on why the gang targeted Petitioner’s family, rather than on why they targeted Petitioner herself.”32 In another recent decision, the Fourth Circuit stated that “‘once the right question is asked’ — that is, why was Petitioner being targeted — the conclusion is quite clear: ‘whatever [the gang]’s motives for targeting [her] family, [Petitioner herself] was targeted because of [her] membership in that family.'”33

Returning to the Supreme Court’s Yankees fan hypothetical in Bostock, the Board has been doing the equivalent of looking to how women were generally treated as a group (which, in the Court’s hypothetical, was equivalent to men) to conclude that gender was only incidental to being a Yankees fan, rather than deeming gender to be “at least one central reason” for the particular employee being fired due to its impact on outcome, as male Yankees fans were not terminated. Of course, the Supreme Court in Bostock directly refuted this approach. Similarly, in the asylum context, as the Fourth Circuit made clear, it doesn’t matter what view (if any) the gang has of the asylum-seeker’s family. It only matters that the individual asylum seeker was targeted by the gang because of the family membership. If so, there is a nexus to a protected ground.

In Matter of M-F-O-, the Board specifically referenced its 2017 decision in Matter of L-E-A- (i.e. L-E-A- I”), noting that its nexus analysis in that case “remains good law.”34 Let’s take a closer look at that decision. We will first see what standard the Board purported to apply to the facts of the case. Next, we’ll apply the traditional “but-for” test described in Bostock to those facts. And lastly, we’ll examine the standard actually applied by the Board.

Matter of L-E-A-: The Board’s Statement of the Law

In Matter of L-E-A-, a criminal cartel sought to kidnap the respondent in his native Mexico. The respondent’s father owned a store from which the cartel wished to sell drugs. When the father refused the cartel’s request for access, it targeted the respondent as a means of coercing the father. The Immigration Judge denied asylum, finding that the cartel’s motive was to sell drugs, not to harm members of the respondent’s family. The Immigration Judge continued that the cartel’s focus was the store, stating that if the store were to be sold, the cartel would then target the new owner.

On appeal the Board recognized in a footnote the Fourth Circuit’s case law on the matter. Instead of being instructed by it, the Board simply stated that “[w]hile it is not clear how the Fourth Circuit would apply that precedent to the facts here, this case does not arise in the Fourth Circuit.”35 With those words, the Board dismissed the standard traditionally employed in such matters. And with what did the Board replace it?

The Board started down the same road as both Bostock and the Fourth Circuit. It said that nexus is not established “if the persecutor would have treated the applicant the same if the protected characteristic did not exist,” a correct description of Bostock’s “but for” test. In then citing its own prior take on “one central reason,” the Board omitted the word “subordinate,” stating instead that the protected characteristic “cannot be incidental [or] tangential…” It continued by noting that both direct and circumstantial evidence of motive should be considered, and that sometimes “a more nuanced evaluation” will be warranted.36

The Traditional “But For” Standard Applied to the Facts of L-E-A-

As the Supreme Court stated in Bostock, “a but-for test directs us to change one thing at a time and see if the outcome changes. If it does, we have found a but-for cause.”37

The traditional “but for” standard would thus remove the respondent’s familial relationship to his father from the equation. We know that the cartel’s aim is to compel the respondent’s father into allowing them to sell drugs in his store. The cartel would have no reason to kidnap the respondent as a means of coercing his father if not for the familial relationship; the leverage over the father derives entirely from his fear for the safety of his child. The protected characteristic of family is thus not merely incidental or tangential. It is one central reason for the persecution.

As noted above, under this standard, it doesn’t matter that the goal of selling drugs is the persecutor’s dominant motive; the hierarchy of reasons is irrelevant. As we have seen, the Board itself conceded this point in Matter of J-B-N- & S-M-. Nor does it matter that when the gang isn’t focused on selling drugs in the father’s store, it treats the members of the family the same as everyone else. Think of Bostock’s Yankees fan example, in which the fact that women as a group are treated equally to men by the employer until their offending Yankees loyalty is discovered, at which point only women who root for the Yankees are fired. The fact that both the employer’s hatred of the Yankees in the Bostock example and the gang’s desire to sell drugs in the father’s store in L-E-A- are central reasons doesn’t preclude other “but for” causes.

The Board Applied a “The Central Motive” Test in L-E-A-

However, the traditional standard was not what the Board actually applied to the facts of the case. Instead, it first claimed that “nexus would be established based on family membership where a persecutor is seeking to harm the family members because of an animus against the family itself.”38 In that example, the persecution is caused by the hatred of the family itself, without a need for any further reason. But that is an example of the family membership serving as “the central motive” for the harm.

The Board then went on in L-E-A- to address instances lacking such animus towards the family itself. But in doing so, the Board never mentioned the “but for” test described above. Instead, it made general statements from which it is difficult to discern a coherent test. In finally denying the claim on the ground that the cartel’s motive was financial, the Board continued to apply an incorrect “the central motive” standard.

Importantly, the Board in L-E-A- never undertook the required exercise of removing the protected ground to see if it would cause a different result. Instead, it concluded that because the motive was financial, the claim failed. In summary, the Board again recounted one standard, but then applied something entirely different. What the Board in fact applied was a “the central motive” test, in which the dominance of the financial motive eliminated all other reasons from consideration.

Conclusion

In spite of the clarity of the correct standard, the universality of its application, and the criticism from numerous circuit courts over the years for its failure to apply it correctly, the BIA has made no effort to correct its course in its application of the “on account of” standard. The Board remains consistent in its citing of something close to the correct standard, but then applying an entirely incorrect test. Whatever it claims to be doing, the Board’s test is for “the central motive,” in which nexus is denied whenever a dominant purpose may be identified that is not a statutorily protected ground for asylum. Congress specifically rejected this standard in favor of the more generous “at least one central reason” test. Furthermore, the “predicament approach” has never been mentioned, much less applied, by the Board, which has continued to focus on the persecutor’s motive as if Congress had not changed that word to “reason.”

There are many within the Department of Justice who must be aware of this practice. I would hope that Attorney General Garland, a longtime circuit court judge, is among them. In light of the BIA’s refusal to self-correct, it is incumbent on the Department to impose a correction from above. Otherwise, any forthcoming regulations relating to particular social group formulation will fail to have their desired impact on the outcomes of asylum claims.

Copyright Jeffrey S. Chase 2021. All rights reserved.

Notes:

Thanks to Dr. Alicia Triche for providing invaluable insight that was incorporated into the final version of this article.

28 I&N Dec. 408 (BIA 2021).

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).

My use of the term “Traditional” is based on the Supreme Court’s reference in Bostock cited below to the “traditional” “but-for” test in cases with a “because of” or “on account of” requirement.

140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).

Id. at 1739. Although no further explanation regarding the equivalency of the terms was provided in Bostock, in a prior decision, the Court had stated: “The words ‘because of’ mean ‘by reason of: on account of.’ 1 Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 194 (1966); see also 1 Oxford English Dictionary 746 (1933) (defining ‘because of’ to mean ‘By reason of, on account of ‘ (italics in original)); The Random House Dictionary of the English Language 132 (1966) (defining ‘because’ to mean ‘by reason; on account’).” Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2350 (2009).

Id. The Court has applied this same test in other cases, including FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., supra, in which it also referenced the description of the test found in W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts 265 (5th ed. 1984) (“An act or omission is not regarded as a cause of an event if the particular event would have occurred without it”).

Id.

Id.

Id. at 1741.

Id. at 1742.

Deborah E. Anker, Law of Asylum in the United States (2021-2022 Ed.) (Thomson Reuters) at 409.

See James C. Hathaway and Michelle Foster, The Law of Refugee Status (2nd Ed.) (Cambridge) at 376.

Id. at 276-77.

Anker, supra at 390.

Matter of J-B-N- & S-M-, 24 I&N Dec. 208, 214 (BIA 2007).

Id. at 212, n.6.

Ndayshimiye v. Attorney General of U.S., 557 F.3d 124, 129-30 (3rd Cir., 2009).

See, e.g., Perez Vasquez v. Garland, 4 F.4th 213, 222 (4th Cir. 2021); Portillo Flores v. Garland, 3 F.4th 615, 630-31 (4th Cir. 2021) (en banc); Arita-Deras v. Wilkinson, 990 F.3d 350, 361 (4th Cir. 2021); Hernandez-Cartagena v. Barr, 977 F.3d 316, 322 (4th Cir. 2020); Zavaleta-Policiano v. Sessions, 873 F.3d 241, 249-50 (4th Cir. 2017); Hernandez-Avalos v. Lynch, 784 F.3d 944 (4th Cir. 2015).

Hernandez-Avalos v. Lynch, supra at 949 (emphasis added).

Id. at 950.

Perez-Sanchez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 935 F.3d 1148 (11th Cir. 2019).

Id. at 1158-59.

Rodriguez Tornes v. Garland, 993 F.3d 743, 751 (9th Cir. 2021).

Ghanem v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., No. 19-1475 (3rd Cir. Sept. 22, 2021).

Matter of N-M-, 25 I&N Dec. 526, 531 (BIA 2011) (citing Parussimova v. Mukasey, 555 F.3d 734, 741 (9th Cir. 2009)).

Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I&N Dec. 40, 43-44 (BIA 2017) (“L-E-A- I”).

Matter of A-B-, 28 I&N Dec. 199, 208 (A.G. 2021) (“A-B- II”).

See Matter of A-B-, 28 I&N Dec. 307 (A.G. 2021) (vacating both prior A.G. decisions in Matter of A-B-).

Acharya v. Holder, 761 F.3d 289, 298 (2d Cir. 2014).

The three earlier decisions cited in Acharya in which the BIA had committed the same error in applying a “the central reason” standard were Castro v. Holder, 597 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010); Aliyev v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2008); and Uwais v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 478 F.3d 513 (2d Cir. 2007).

Perez Vasquez v. Garland, supra at 222.

Hernandez-Cartagena v. Barr, supra at 322 (citing Salgado-Sosa v. Sessions, 882 F.3d 451, 459 (4th Cir. 2018).

Matter of M-F-O-, supra at 412, n.6.

Matter of L-E-A-, supra at 46, n.3.

Id. at 43-44.

Bostock v. Clayton Country, supra at 1739.

Id. at 44.

DECEMBER 21, 2021

Reprinted by permission.

*************

I’d describe the BIA’s approach to nexus this way:

Find any possible “non-protected” motivation (no matter how attenuated);
Characterize any “protected ground” as “tangential,” “marginal,” or “too attenuated” (even if, as in L-E-A-, it’s the direct or proximate cause of the harm or fear under conventional causation analysis — as Jeffrey points out, in L-E-A– not only was “family relationship” “at least one central reason” driving the gang’s interest, it was the only apparent reason for the gang’s interest in the respondent);
Deny asylum;
Hope that the refugee doesn’t seek judicial review or draws a circuit panel whose knowledge of asylum and commitment to humanity are as shallow as their own.

Let’s apply “BIA-think” to the infamous Krystal Nacht in Nazi Germany. It was “mere vandalism and crimes against against property,” albeit on a widespread basis. Sure, a few synagogues got burned to the ground. But, that was just an “unfortunate consequence” of their being in neighborhoods that were being randomly vandalized by hooligans.

Moreover, “arson” is a crime, not a “protected ground.” There were laws on the books in Germany punishing vandalism, so no “unwillingness or inability” to protect.

Of course it was hard tracing down the “alleged perps” because of the widespread nature of the crimes. The alleged perps were “non-government actors” not carrying out official policies. And police or other officials involved were merely “rogue officers” acting in violation of German law. Most significantly, the “alleged victims” never filed police reports. So how could the German Government be expected to act? Nothing to see here, really!

Moreover, if we grant one case, all the Jews in Nazi Germany might qualify for asylum. That would “open the floodgates.” Certainly not what Congress intended!

“Widespread vandalism” but no persecution o/a/o any “protected ground” here!
Krystal Nacht
SOURCE: Holocaust Museum

Let’s face it, if the vessel St. Louis arrived at our shores today the Biden Administration wouldn’t even need to shove it back out to sea! They would use Title 42 to send the refugees back to death without any process at all, just as “Gauleiter Miller” told them to do!

The St.Louis — “No room at the inn! Go back and die in place, you ‘illegals.’”
The St Louis (1939)
Faces of the doomed
SOURCE: History.com

Jeffrey hits the nail on the head when he suggests that the BIA’s renewed vigor in “pushing” bogus nexus denials is prompted by the slow erosion of their Sessions/Barr inspired effort to define PSG out of existence as well as the Circuits’ increasingly critical treatment of the BIA’s often-specious adverse credibility findings (frequently improperly substituting their view for the IJ’s when necessary to sustain a DHS appeal) and their highly sanitized, “fantasyland” view of country conditions in the Northern Triangle and other major “refugee sending” countries. The latter probably reflects the many superior, authoritative tools for proving country conditions now available to advocates which highlight the “double speak, dumbing down, and overt polarization” of State Department Country Reports.

Manipulation and encouragement of wrongful nexus denials by IJs might be the “last line of defense” for the BIA against giving many more asylum seekers the protection they need and deserve under a fair and proper interpretation and application of asylum law!

Perhaps, we shouldn’t be surprised by Garland’s disinterest in making the progressive reforms necessary to restore some semblance of justice, order, and intellectual integrity to his disgracefully dysfunctional courts. While the GOP has been fixated on weaponizing Immigration Courts against migrants over the past two decades, Dems have shown little or no interest in fixing these glaring problems.

Poor policies and inattention to progressive judicial appointments @ EOIR during the Obama Administration started the exponential growth in backlog!

Now, in the words of one of my esteemed colleagues: “At this point, it just seems like a giant snowball careening down the mountain.”

Litigating this mess to a standstill appears to be the only option Garland is leaving for those who believe that equal justice in America is for “all persons!”

🇺🇸Due Process Forever!

PWS

12-21-21

‘SIR JEFFREY” CHASE: Garland’s “First Steps” To Eradicate Misogyny & Anti-Asylum Bias @ EOIR Are Totally Insufficient Without Progressive Personnel Changes — Regulations Will Only Be Effective If Drafted By Progressive Human Rights Experts Of Which There Currently Are NONE @ DOJ Save For Some Immigration Judges In The Field Whose Expertise, Intellectual Integrity, & Moral Courage Has Been Ignored By Team Garland! — There Will Be No Gender, Racial, Or Immigrant Justice @ Justice As Long As Garland Mindlessly Lets “Miller’s Club Denial” Operate @ BIA! — Progressives Must Turn Up The Heat On Garland To Reform & Remake EOIR With Qualified Expert Judges & Dynamic, Independent, Progressive Leaders!

https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2021/6/21/first-steps

The latest from the Hon. “Sir Jeffrey:”

JEFFREY S. CHASE | OPINIONS/ANALYSIS ON IMMIGRATION LAW

Blog Archive Press and Interviews Calendar Contact

First Steps

On June 16, Attorney General Merrick Garland finally, mercifully vacated three decisions that formed a key part of the Trump administration’s unrelenting attack on the law of asylum.1 Matter of A-B-, issued by Jeff Sessions in June 2018, took aim in particular at victims of domestic violence.2 Matter of L-E-A-, issued the following year by William Barr, sought to undermine protection for those targeted by gangs due to their familial ties.3 And on January 14, 2021, six days from the end of the Trump Administration, acting A.G. Jeffrey Rosen issued a second decision in A-B-, gratuitously criticizing the method for determining nexus in asylum claims employed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, while conveniently evading that court’s review of the original decision in the case through remand.4

Garland’s action restores the law to where it stood prior to June 11, 2018, but only for the time being. Proposed rules on the subject (which Garland referenced) are due by October 30, when they will first be subjected to a period of public comment. If final rules are eventually published, it will occur well into next year.

As we sigh in collective relief and celebrate the first steps towards correcting our asylum laws, let’s also take note of the imperfect place in which the case law stands at present.

As to domestic violence claims, the BIA’s 2014 decision in Matter of A-R-C-G- (which Matter of A-B- had vacated) has been restored as binding precedent.5 That decision was issued at a time when (as now) regulations addressing particular social groups were being contemplated by DHS and EOIR.6 While A-R-C-G- was an extremely welcome development, the Board used it to recognize a rather narrowly-defined group: “married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship.” In a footnote to the decision, the Board declined to address the argument of several amici (including UNHCR) that a particular social group may be defined by gender alone. Although A-R-C-G- led to many grants of asylum, some immigration judges relied on the limited scope of the group’s definition to deny claims involving slightly broader variations, in particular, where the victim was not legally married, but nevertheless in a domestic relationship that she was unable to leave. While the BIA reversed some of those denials in unpublished decisions, it declined to speak to the issue through binding precedent.

As to Matter of L-E-A-, Garland’s recent action returns us to the BIA’s original opinion in that case.7 While the decision acknowledged that families constitute particular social groups (a point that was not in dispute, having been universally recognized for some 35 years and stipulated to by DHS), the BIA still denied asylum by invoking a legally incorrect standard for establishing nexus that it has continued to apply in all family-based asylum claims.

For these reasons, the content of the forthcoming regulations will be extremely important in determining the future of asylum in this country. While a return to the test for social group cognizability expressed in the BIA’s 1985 precedent in Matter of Acosta tops most regulation wish lists, I will focus the discussion here on a couple of more specific items necessary to correct the shortcomings of Matter of A-R-C-G- and Matter of L-E-A-.

First, the regulations need to explicitly recognize that a particular social group may be defined by gender alone. In its 2002 Gender Guidelines, UNHCR identified women “as a clear example of a social subset defined by innate and immutable characteristics, and who are frequently treated differently than men,” and whose “characteristics also identify them as a group in society, subjecting them to different treatment and standards in some countries.”8 However, over the nineteen years since those guidelines were issued, the BIA has consistently avoided considering the issue.

The peril of defining gender-based groups in the more narrow manner employed by the BIA has been addressed by two distinguished commentators, who explain that such practice results in “constant re-litigating of such claims,” sometimes creating “an obstacle course in which the postulated group undergoes constant redefinition.”9 And of course, that is exactly what has happened here, as A-R-C-G- gave way to A-B-, which led to differing interpretations among different courts until Garland’s recent reset. The above-mentioned commentators further decried the “nitpicking around the margins of the definition” resulting from the narrow approach when the true reason for the risk of persecution to the applicant “is simply her membership in the social group of ‘women.’”10 Regulations recognizing gender alone as a particular social group would thus provide clarity to judges and asylum officers, eliminate the wastefulness of drawn out litigation involving “nitpicking around the margins,” and bring our laws into line with international standards.

But as L-E-A- demonstrates, recognition of a group alone does not guarantee asylum protection. In order for a group’s recognition to be meaningful, the regs must also address an ongoing problem with the BIA’s method for determining nexus, or whether persecution is “on account of” the group membership.

The BIA is accorded deference by Article III courts when it reasonably interprets immigration laws, provided that the meaning of the language in question is ambiguous. However, the “on account of” standard included by Congress in defining the term “refugee” is quite clear; its meaning is long established, and in fact, is not particular to immigration law.

The Supreme Court referenced this standard last year in a non-immigration case, Bostock v. Clayton County. The Court explained that the test

incorporates the “‘simple’” and “traditional” standard of but-for causation…. That form of causation is established whenever a particular outcome would not have happened “but for” the purported cause….In other words, a but-for test directs us to change one thing at a time and see if the outcome changes. If it does, we have found a but-for cause.11

In a 2015 decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit applied this exact test in the asylum context to conclude that persecution was on account of family, determining that the petitioner’s “relationship to her son is why she, and not another person, was threatened with death if she did not allow him to join Mara 18.”12 But for some reason, the BIA has felt entitled to reject this established standard outside of the Fourth Circuit in favor of its own excessively restrictive one.

Had the proper test for nexus been employed in L-E-A-, asylum would have been granted. Under the facts of that case, once the familial relationship is removed from the equation, the asylum-seeker’s risk ceases to exist. However, the BIA instead imposed an incorrect test for nexus requiring evidence of an “animus against the family or the respondent based on their biological ties, historical status, or other features unique to that family unit.”13

As a former circuit court judge, Garland is particularly qualified to recognize the error in the Board’s approach, as well as the need to correct its course. The problem is compounded by the particular composition of the BIA at present. For example, of the ten immigration judges who were promoted to the BIA during the Trump administration, nine denied asylum more than 90 percent of the time (with the tenth denying 85 percent of such claims). Three had an asylum denial rate in excess of 98 percent.14

This matters, as those high denial rates were achieved in part by using faulty nexus determinations to deny asylum in domestic violence claims, even before the issuance of Matter of A-B-. This was often accomplished by mischaracterizing the abuse as merely personal in nature, referencing only the persecutor’s generally violent nature or inebriated state. The analysis in those decisions did not further examine whether gender might also have been one central reason that the asylum seeker, and not someone else, was targeted.

One BIA Member appointed under Trump recently found no nexus in a domestic violence claim by concluding that the persecutor had not targeted the asylum seeker because of her membership in the group consisting of “women,” but rather because she was his woman. There is no indication in the decision that the Board Member considered why the persecutor might view another human being as belonging to him and lacking the same rights he seems to enjoy. Might it have been because of her gender?

Without a correction through published regulations, there is little reason to expect different treatment of these claims moving forward. Let’s hope that the Attorney General views his recent action as only the first steps on a longer path to a correct application of the law.

Copyright 2021, Jeffrey S. Chase. All rights reserved.

Notes:

Matter of A-B-, 28 I&N Dec. 307 (A.G. 2021) (“A-B- III”); Matter of L-E-A-, 28 I&N Dec. 304 (A.G. 2021) (“L-E-A- III”).

27 I&N Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018) (“A-B- I”).

27 I&N Dec. 581 (A.G. 2019) (“L-E-A- II”).

28 I&N Dec. 199 (A.G. 2021) (“A-B- II”).

26 I&N Dec. 388 (BIA 2014).

The regulations under consideration at that time were never issued.

27 I&N Dec. 40 (BIA 2017) (“L-E-A- I”).

UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection: Gender-Related Persecution within the context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (May 2002) at para. 30.

James C. Hathaway and Michelle Foster, The Law of Refugee Status, Second Edition (Cambridge University Press, 2014) at 442.

Hathaway and Foster, supra.

Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S.Ct. 1731, 1739 (2020).

Hernandez-Avalos v. Lynch, 784 F.3d 944, 950 (4th Cir. 2015).

L-E-A- I, supra at 47.

See TRAC (Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse) Immigration Judge Reports https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/judgereports/.Republished with permission.

*************************

Without progressive intervention, this is still headed for failure @ EOIR! A few things to keep in mind.

- Former Attorney General, the late Janet Reno, ordered the same regulations on gender-based asylum to be promulgated more than two decades ago — never happened!
- The proposed regulations that did finally emerge along the way (long after Reno’s departure) were horrible — basically an ignorant mishmash of various OIL litigation positions that would have actually made it easier for IJs to arbitrarily deny asylum (as if they needed any invitation) and easier for OIL to defend such bogus denials.
- There is nobody currently at “Main Justice” or EOIR HQ qualified to draft these regulations! Without long overdue progressive personnel changes the project is almost “guaranteed to fail” – again!
- Any regulations entrusted to the current “Miller Lite Denial Club” @ the BIA ☠️ will almost certainly be twisted out of proportion to deny asylum and punish women refugees, as well as deny due process and mock fundamental fairness. It’s going to take more than regulations to change the “culture of denial” and the “institutionalized anti-due-process corner cutting” @ the BIA and in many Immigration Courts.
- Garland currently is mindlessly operating the “worst of all courts” — a so-called “specialized (not) court” where the expertise, independence, and decisional courage is almost all “on the outside” and sum total of the subject matter expertise and relevant experience of those advocating before his bogus “courts” far exceeds that of the “courts” themselves and of Garland’s own senior team! That’s why the deadly, embarrassing, sophomoric mistakes keep flowing into the Courts of Appeals on a regular basis.
- No regulation can bring decisional integrity and expertise to a body that lacks both!
- Any progressive who thinks Garland is going to solve the problem @ EOIR without “outside intervention” should keep this nifty “five month snapshot of EOIR under Biden” in mind:
  - Progressive judges appointed to BIA: 0
  - Progressive judges appointed to Immigration Court: 0
  - Progressives installed in leadership positions @ EOIR permanently or temporarily: 0
  - Billy Barr Selected Immigration Judges Appointed: 17
  - “Miller Lite” holdover individuals still holding key positions @ EOIR: many (only two removed to date)
  - Number of BIA precedents decided in favor of respondent: 2
  - Number of BIA precedents decided in favor of DHS: 9

That’s right, folks: Billy Barr and Stephen Miller have had more influence and gotten more deference from Garland at EOIR than have the progressive experts and advocates who fought tirelessly to preserve due process and to get the Biden Administration into office. How does that a make sense?

“Miller Lite” – Garland’s Vision of “Justice @ Justice” for Communities of Color — Finally vacating two grotesquely wrong anti-female, anti-asylum precedents hasn’t ended the “Miller Lite Unhappy Hour” for migrants and their advocates at Garland’s foundering DOJ!

Progressives, advocates, and NGOs must keep raising hell until we finally get the “no-brainer,” long overdue, obvious, personnel, legal, structural, institutional, and cultural changes at EOIR that America needs! Waiting for Judge Garland to get around to it is like “Waiting for Godot!” Perhaps worse — I don’t recollect that anyone died waiting for Godot!

🇺🇸Due Process Forever! The BIA Denial Club, Never!🏴‍☠️

PWS

06-22-21

NDPA STALWART JASON “THE ASYLUMIST” DZUBOW 🌟 QUOTED IN AP ARTICLE ABOUT REPEAL OF A-B- & L-E-A-!

http://enewspaper.latimes.com/infinity/article_share.aspx?guid=a9dc6320-82bc-4db8-bb6b-cfba11a536cb

AP reports:

The U.S. government on Wednesday ended two Trump administration policies that made it harder for immigrants fleeing violence to qualify for asylum, especially Central Americans.

Atty. Gen. Merrick Garland issued a new policy saying immigration judges should cease following the Trump-era rules that made it tough for immigrants who faced domestic or gang violence to win asylum in the United States. The move could make it easier for them to win their cases for humanitarian protection and was widely celebrated by immigrant advocates.

“The significance of this cannot be overstated,” said Kate Melloy Goettel, legal director of litigation at the American Immigration Council. “This was one of the worst anti-asylum decisions under the Trump era, and this is a really important first step in undoing that.”

Garland said he was making the changes after President Biden ordered his office and the Department of Homeland Security to draft rules addressing complex issues in immigration law about groups of people who should qualify for asylum.

Gene Hamilton, a key architect of many of then-President Trump’s immigration policies who served in the Justice Department, said in a statement that he believed the change would lead to more immigrants filing asylum claims based on crime and that it should not be a reason for the humanitarian protection.

. . . .

In the current fiscal year, people from countries such as Russia and Cameroon have seen higher asylum grant rates in the immigration courts than those from El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, the data show.

One of the Trump administration policies was aimed at migrants who were fleeing violence from nonstate actors, such as gangs, while the other affected those who felt they were being targeted in their countries because of their family ties, said Jason Dzubow, an immigration attorney in Washington who focuses on asylum.

Dzubow said he recently represented a Salvadoran family in which the husband was killed and gang members started coming after his children. While Dzubow argued they were in danger because of their family ties, he said the immigration judge rejected the case, citing the Trump-era decision among the reasons.

Dzubow welcomed the change but said he doesn’t expect to suddenly see large numbers of Central Americans winning their asylum cases, which remain difficult under U.S. law.

“I don’t expect it is going to open the floodgates, and all of a sudden everyone from Central America can win their cases. Those cases are very burdensome and difficult,” he said. “We need to make a decision: Do we want to protect these people?”

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Read the full article at the link.

You know for sure you’re doing the right thing when anti-asylum shill and Stephen Miller crony Gene Hamilton criticizes it!

I tend to agree with my friend Jason that under present conditions, asylum cases for women refugees from Central America are likely to continue to be a “tough slog” at EOIR. The intentionally-created anti-asylum, misogynist, anti-Latino, anti-scholarship, anti-quality, anti-due-process culture at EOIR that emerged under Sessions and Barr isn’t going to disappear overnight, particularly the way Judge Garland is approaching it. He needs to “get out the broom,🧹 sweep out the current BIA and the bad, anti-asylum judges, get rid of ineffective administration, and bring in human rights and due process professionals to get this system operating again!

Jason, for one, would be an outstanding judicial choice for building a functioning, fair, efficient Immigration Court; one that would fulfill the long-abandoned vision of “through teamwork and innovation, being the world’s best tribunals guaranteeing fairness and due process for all.” Under the Trump regime, EOIR was the antithesis of that noble vision!

Cases such as that described by Jason (incorrectly decided by the Immigration Judge) utilizing A-R-C-G- and “family friendly” precedents from the Fourth Circuit were usually well-represented and well-prepared by attorneys like Jason, Clinics, and NGOs like CLINIC, CAIR Coalition, Human Rights First, and Law School Clinics. After review by ICE Counsel, many were candidates for my “short docket” in Arlington where asylum could easily be granted based on the documentation and short confirming testimony.

To their credit, even before the BIA finally issued A-R-C-G-, the Arlington Chief Counsel’s Office was not opposing well-documented asylum grants based on domestic violence under what was known as the “Martin Brief” after former DHS/INS Senior Official, renowned immigration scholar, and internationally recognized asylum expert, now emeritus Professor David A. Martin of UVA Law. I remember telling David after one such case that his brief was still “saving lives” even after his departure from DHS and return to academia.

David Martin — Professor (Emeritus) David A. Martin
UVA Law
PHOTO: UVA Law

Rather than building on that real potential for efficiency, cooperation, quality, and due process, under Sessions those things that were working at EOIR and represented hope and potential for future progress were maliciously and idiotically dismantled. From the outside, throughout the country, I saw DV cases that once would have been “easy short docket grants” in Arlington require lengthy hearings and often be incorrectly decided in Immigration Court and the BIA. Sometimes the Circuits corrected the errors, sometimes not.

At best, what had been a growing census around recognizing asylum claims based on DV became a “crap shoot” with the result almost totally dependent on what judges were assigned, what Circuit the hearing was held in, and even the composition of the Circuit panel! And, of course, unrepresented claimants were DOA regardless of the merits of their cases. What a way to run a system where torture or death could be the result of a wrong decision!

But, it doesn’t have to be that away! Experts like Jason and others could get this system functioning fairly and efficiently in less time than it took Sessions and Barr to destroy it.

However, it can’t be done with the personnel now at DOJ and EOIR Headquarters. If Judge Garland wants this to function like a real court system (not always clear to me that he does), he needs to recruit and bring in the outside progressive experts absolutely necessary to make it happen. At long last, it’s time for “Amateur Night at the Bijou” to end its long, disgraceful, debilitating “run” @ EOIR!

Time for this long-running show at DOJ/EOIR to end! PHOTO: Thomas Hawk
Creative Commons
Amateur Night

🇺🇸Due Process Forever!

PWS

06-18-21

👍🏼UNHCR welcomes US decision to restore protections from gang and domestic violence

UNHCR welcomes US decision to restore protections from gang and domestic violence

UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency, welcomes the U.S. government’s decision announced 16 June to reverse legal rulings introduced several years ago that effectively made people forced to flee life-threatening domestic and gang violence in their home countries ineligible from being able to seek safety in the United States.

“These rulings have put the lives of vulnerable people at risk,” said Matthew Reynolds, UNHCR Representative to the United States and the Caribbean, after the U.S. Justice Department announced that the legal rulings known as Matter of A-B- and Matter of L-E-A- had been vacated in their entirety.

“Today’s decisions will give survivors fleeing these types of violence a better chance of finding safety in the United States and being treated with the basic compassion and dignity that every single person deserves. UNHCR welcomes this important humanitarian step,” Reynolds said.

UNHCR, he added, also welcomes the U.S. administration’s commitment to bringing its asylum system into line with international standards and specifically to writing new rules on determining membership of a “particular social group,” one of five grounds spelled out in the 1951 Refugee Convention defining who is entitled to international protection as a refugee.

“In keeping with international standards, a simple and broad definition of ‘particular social group’ is an essential part of a fair and efficient asylum system,” Reynolds said, adding that UNHCR stands ready and willing to support the asylum review and rulemaking process in any way requested by the U.S. government.

ENDS

This Press Release is available here.

UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency: 70 years protecting people forced to flee.

—

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The unethical and illegal “bogus precedents” issued by Sessions and Barr have cost lives! Much of the damage done to date is irreparable. So is the continuing damage resulting from the Biden Administration’s failure to reopen ports of entry to legal asylum seekers.

🆘A functioning asylum system at ports of entry, establishing a viable refugee program in or in the region of the Northern Triangle, and a wholly reformed, due process oriented EOIR with real judges who understand how to fairly and efficiently evaluate and grant asylum under the very generous standard enunciated by the BIA in Matter of Mogharrabi but never in fact uniformly applied in practice will reduce the number of individuals crossing the border between ports of entry to seek refuge. We also need the help of NGOs in providing representation to those arriving and resettlement assistance for those “screened in” for hearings.

Right now, we have no legal asylum system at our border despite very clear statutory language commanding it. That’s a BIG problem that must be addressed immediately! Clearly, the Biden Administration must cooperate with and seek help from human rights experts now outside Government including the UNHCR.

As I’ve said before many times, expert human rights leadership needs to be brought into their Biden Administration to “kick some tail,” eradicate incompetence and bias, and fix EOIR and the asylum system.

The NDPA needs to keep the pressure building for more immediate, common sense reforms to our asylum system and a legitimate EOIR of experts who function independently from DHS enforcement and politicos.

🇺🇸⚖️Due Process Forever!

PWS

06-17-21

🆘COME ON, MAN! — BIDEN ADMINISTRATION MUST REFORM THE IMMIGRATION COURTS TO FIX THE ASYLUM SYSTEM! — New BIA, Better Judges, Practical Precedents, Slashed Backlogs Needed, Not More “Built To Fail” Gimmicks! — Stop Screwing Around, Bring In The Human Rights/Due Process Experts, & Empower Them To Fix The EOIR Mess! — After Garland’s Important First Step, Biden Administration Threatens To “Take Points Off The Board” With Wacko Proposal That Due Process/Human Rights Experts Hate! — Stop The Nonsense & Fix EOIR Before More Innocents Die!

From Human Rights First:

PUSHING FOR A MORE JUST ASYLUM SYSTEM

Friday marked three years since former Attorney General Jeff Sessions declared that people fleeing gender-based violence, gang brutality, and other human rights violations are undeserving of protection — in the reprehensible decision known as Matter of A-B-.

Human Rights First and over 70 organizations of the Welcome With Dignity campaign urged the Biden administration to end Trump-era cruelty and restore fairness to the asylum process.

Today, news broke that the Department of Justice had vacated Matter of A-B-, a welcome move that will help protect refugees who are persecuted by violent gangs, suffer domestic abuse, or are endangered because of their family ties.

Amid news that the Biden administration is considering issuing an interim final rule in asylum processing that may cut back vital due process protections, Human Rights First led over 40 organizations in a letter calling on the administration to adjust course and provide the requisite notice and comment period for the rule.

This week, Human Rights First also applauded the Biden administration’s plans to expand the categories of people who can petition to bring children to safety in the U.S. through the Central American Minors Program (CAM) to include asylum seekers and others.

*****************

Unlike the Administration folks pushing this misguided policy, I’ve actually worked in and on our asylum system for nearly five decades. I’ve seen it from the inside and the outside. I’ve been to the border. I’ve adjudicated lots of asylum cases at both the trial and appellate levels. I’ve seen them at the border, the interior, and places in between. I’ve worked through every past “asylum emergency” and experienced, and sometimes had to defend or oppose, the failed policies of Administrations of both parties over the past four decades.

Reviewing asylum claims on records created by non-judicial officials doesn’t work! Because of the importance of credibility, a de novo hearing is required! The last misguided attempt to do what the Biden Administration apparently intends failed with respect to “Asylum Only” cases at the BIA more than two decades ago and resulted in transfer of the function to the Immigration Courts;
I have the greatest respect for Asylum Officers. But, perhaps because so many individuals were unrepresented at the Asylum Office and because of the defects in developing the record, the majority of Asylum Office referrals I experienced in 13 years on the Arlington Immigration Court resulted in grants of asylum after full hearings! Sometimes, after full hearing and/or full documentation, the grants were so obvious that they were agreed upon or uncontested by ICE Counsel;
Yes, many cases coming from the border could be granted by the Asylum Office without referral to Immigration Court! But, referral of non-granted cases to a radically reformed and better EOIR for a full de novo hearing is absolutely necessary for due process and fundamental fairness. Anything less is “built to fail” and will endanger lives to boot!
We need a BIA of real asylum experts to provide and enforce informed, legally correct, and practical asylum precedents for both Asylum Officers and Immigration Judges. Only experts who have experienced and resisted the current illegal and impractical “denial-based” EOIR system — an intentional perversion of the Supreme Court’s generous decision in Cardoza-Fonseca and a complete mockery of the BIA’s implementing precedent in Matter of Mogharrabi — should be on the reformed BIA. Time to break up the “denial club” in Falls Church, eradicate disgraceful “Asylum Free Zones” in poorly-functioning, anti-asylum Immigration “Courts” throughout the country, and re-establish the rule of law, due process, fundamental fairness, and human dignity at EOIR! (Fair application of asylum laws to protect rather than reject would also reduce the many cases unnecessarily clogging the Court of Appeals that could and should easily have been granted at a fair, functional, expert EOIR!)
Preserving a right to meaningful judicial review of denials by the independent Article III Judiciary is also absolutely essential to due process.

The Administration needs to bring in experts with asylum expertise and actual Immigration Court experience — folks like Karen Musalo of CGRS, Judge Ilyce Shugall, Michelle Mendez of CLINIC, Temple Law Associate Dean Jaya Ramji-Nogales, and retired Judge Paul Grussendorf (who additionally served as an Asylum Officer and has written a book about the shortcomings of both systems) — to solve the problem. That must include getting rid of the deadwood, the folks who don’t understand the problem, and those who see asylum policy wrongly as a “deterrent,” rather than an essential part of our legal immigration system!

Getting rid of the atrocious “precedents” in Matter of A-B- and Matter of L-E-A- is just a start! The asylum system needs help from progressive experts. The NDPA must keep up the pressure on the Administration to stop fumbling and dawdling and bring in the now-missing progressive expertise and dynamic leadership to solve the problems that threaten our democracy!

Yes, not everybody qualifies for asylum or another form of protection. But, you can “bet the farm” that in an honest, expert, properly functioning, due-process-oriented EOIR many more would qualify than under the current broken, biased, and disgraceful charade of justice still going on @ Justice! And, even those who don’t ultimately qualify deserve to be treated fairly, respectfully, and as human beings — “persons” under the Due Process Clause, because that’s exactly what they are!

🇺🇸Due Process Forever!

PWS

06-17-21

BREAKING: YES!!!!! — JUDGE GARLAND FINALLY TAKES CHARGE! — VACATES MATTER OF A-B- & MATTER OF L-E-A- — Sessions’s, Barr’s Intellectual Dishonesty Exposed!

Attorney General Decisions

The Attorney General has issued a decision in Matter of A-B-, 28 I&N Dec. 307 (A.G. 2021).

(1) Matter of A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018) (“A-B- I”), and Matter of A-B-, 28 I&N Dec. 199 (A.G. 2021) (“A-B- II”), are vacated in their entirety.

(2) Immigration judges and the Board should no longer follow A-B- I or A-B- II when adjudicating pending or future cases. Instead, pending forthcoming rulemaking, immigration judges and the Board should follow pre-A-B- I precedent, including Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 388 (BIA 2014).

The Attorney General has issued a decision in Matter of L-E-A-, 28 I&N Dec. 304 (A.G. 2021).

(1) Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I&N Dec. 581 (A.G. 2019) (“L-E-A- II”), is vacated in its entirety so as to return the immigration system to the preexisting state of affairs pending completion of the ongoing rulemaking process and the issuance of a final rule addressing the definition of “particular social group.”

(2) Immigration judges and the Board should no longer follow L-E-A- II when adjudicating pending and future cases.

___________________________________________

Executive Office for Immigration Review

Office of Policy

Communications and Legislative Affairs Division

PAO.EOIR@usdoj.gov

703-305-0289

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PWS

06-16-21

😎WIN ONE, LOSE ONE☹️: 9TH CIR. ANNIHILATES MATTER OF ARMENDAREZ-MENDEZ (SUA SPONTE REOPENING), WHILE 11TH CIR. WOODENLY ENDORSES 👎🏻 MATTER OF L-E-A- (NEXUS)!☠️⚰️

https://www.lexisnexis.com/LegalNewsRoom/immigration/b/insidenews/posts/ca9-on-departure-bar-sua-sponte-reopening-balerio-rubalcaba-v-garland#

CA9 on Departure Bar, Sua Sponte Reopening: Balerio Rubalcaba v. Garland

Balerio Rubalcaba v. Garland

“This case presents the question whether the departure bar limits an IJ’s ability to reopen immigration proceedings sua sponte. We have jurisdiction to review questions of law under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), and we conclude that the departure bar does not apply in the context of sua sponte reopening. That is, an IJ’s discretion to reopen a case on his or her own motion is not limited by the fact that a noncitizen has previously been removed or has departed from the United States. Therefore, we grant the petition for review.”

[Hats off to Elsa Martinez!]

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https://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201915091.pdf

KELLY SANCHEZ-CASTRO,

versus

U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,

________________________

Petition for Review of a Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals _______________________

(June 1, 2021)

Petitioner,

Respondent.

Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, LUCK and ED CARNES, Circuit Judges.

WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge:

Kelly Sanchez-Castro, a native of El Salvador, petitions for our review after

she unsuccessfully sought relief from removal because a gang targeted her family based on the assumption that her father’s work in the United States made it

USCA11 Case: 19-15091 Date Filed: 06/01/2021 Page: 2 of 15

wealthy. The Board of Immigration Appeals denied her applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, and substantial evidence supports its decision. Sanchez-Castro is ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal because the gang that targeted her family did so only as a means to the end of obtaining funds, not because of any animus against her family. And she is ineligible for protection under the Convention Against Torture because she has not established that any harm she will suffer if returned to her home country will come with at least the acquiescence of a government official. We deny Sanchez-Castro’s petition for review.

. . . .

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Woman Tortured — “Tough noogies, Baby! Chief Judge Pryor and his all-male, all White ivory tower panel don’t see any nexus here! So, suffer and die, Baby, suffer and die!” “She struggled madly in the torturing Ray”
Amazing StoriesArtist Unknown, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons

To reach its incorrect and life-threatening endorsement of the BIA’s misconstruction of the nexus requirements (throwing out the normal rules of causation to achieve an anti-asylum-seeker result) the 11th Circuit panel eschewed a much better and more intellectually honest approach by the 4th Circuit in Hernandez-Avalos v. Lynch, 784 F.3d 944, 950 (4th Cir. 2015).

Notwithstanding Chief Judge Pryor’s cavalier attitude about sending Ms. Castro-Sanchez back to possible death or dismemberment at the hands of gangs who operate with relative impunity in El Salvador, these are not “academic exercises.” They are serious life or death matters involving bad law produced by a (non) “court” (the BIA) controlled by a law enforcement official (the Attorney General) that is not comprised of judges who are recognized experts in asylum and immigration laws and has over recent history construed the law against immigrants at almost every opportunity!

These two cases show the difference between this panel of the 9th Circuit that takes judicial review and what’s at stake seriously and the “indifferent to humanity” rubber-stamp approach applied by the 11th Circuit panel. We need better judges, progressives with expertise in due process, human rights, immigration, and racial justice at every level of our Federal Judiciary — from the Immigration Courts to the Supremes! Circuits like the 5th and the 11th with long and disgraceful records of relative indifference to the rights and lives of migrants, mostly those of color, are long, long overdue for infusion of better qualified progressive “practical scholars” and advocates.

That makes the progressive outrage over Garland’s totally inappropriate “giveaway” of Immigration Judge positions he controls to Barr-selected, non progressive, candidates who applied under a flawed recruitment process designed to discourage diversity and exclude the best qualified expert candidates from the private sector, along with his failure to address skewed anti-asylum-seeker precedents like L-E-A- and A-B– all the more understandable! It also makes changes that will put more expert, progressive, due-process oriented judges who have experience representing individuals in court all the more urgent!

Cases like this wouldn’t get into the “Article III Life or Death Lottery” if Garland had dealt promptly and properly with L-E-A-, A-B-, and other Trump-era, anti-asylum, anti-migrant, anti-due-process, misogynist precedents!

Judge Merrick Garland — Attorney General Merrick B. Garland — His failure to institute long-overdue and obvious progressive due process reforms @ EOIR is costing Kelly Castro-Sanchez and other vulnerable refugee women their lives while enraging their advocates! It’s not an “academic exercise,” as Garland seems to think. There are real life consequences and irreparable harm from his failure to take due process, human rights, and racial justice seriously @ EOIR!
Official White House Photo
Public Realm

🇺🇸⚖️🗽🧑🏽‍⚖️Due Process Forever! Tell the Biden Administration that we need progressives, not more “regressives,” on the Federal Bench, starting with the Immigration Courts! End abusive judging by a non-diverse Federal Judiciary!

PWS

06-04-21

⚖️🧑🏽‍⚖️JUDICIAL REVIEW — C.A. 2 — Brace Of Bad BIA Bobbles On Basics Brings “Culture Of Denial” Into Focus — Justice Will Continue To Be Illusive @ EOIR 👎🏽 Until Garland Steps Up & Replaces His Fatally Flawed BIA With Real Judges Who Are Progressive Practical Scholars In Immigration, Due Process, Human Rights, With A Firm Commitment To Bringing Racial & Gender Equity To Now-Disgraced Immigration Courts!🤮

Dan Kowalski forwards these two 2d Circuit reversals on basic “bread and butter” issues: 1) mental competency (BIA unable or unwilling to follow own precedent); 2) credibility; 3) corroboration; 4) consideration of testimony and evidence:

https://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/85d225f1-0b15-44a9-8890-80f9027d12b5/3/doc/18-1083_so.pdf#xml=https://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/85d225f1-0b15-44a9-8890-80f9027d12b5/3/hilite/

https://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/57161a21-b70c-4b36-9a38-ff6a88d12453/14/doc/19-1370_so.pdf#xml=https://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/57161a21-b70c-4b36-9a38-ff6a88d12453/14/hilite/

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These aren’t “cases of first impression,” “Circuit splits,” complex questions involving state law, unusual Constitutional issues, or difficult applications of treaties or international law. No, these are the “basics” of fair, competent adjudication in Immigration Court. Things most law students would get correct that IJs and BIA Appellate Judges are getting wrong on a daily basis in their “race to deny.”

Don’t kid yourself! For every one of these “caught and outed” by Circuit Courts, dozens are wrongly railroaded out of America because they are unrepresented, can’t afford to pursue judicial review in the Article IIIs, or are duressed and demoralized by unconstitutional detention and other coercive methods applied by the “unethical partnership” between EOIR and ICE enforcement.

Others have the misfortune to be in the 5th Circuit, the 11th Circuit, or draw Circuit panels who are happy to “keep,the line moving” by indolently “rubber stamping” EOIR’s “Dred Scottification” of “the other.” After all, dead or deported (or both) migrants can’t complain and don’t exercise any societal power! “Dead/deported men or women don’t talk.”☠️⚰️ But, members of the NDPA will preserve and tell their stories of unnecessary human suffering and degradation for them! We will insure that Garland, Monaco, Gupta, and others in the Biden Administration who ignored their desperate moans and tortured screams in their time of direst need are held accountable!🤮

Unfortunately, these decisions are unpublished. They should be published! It’s critically important that the daily gross miscarriages of justice @ EOIR be publicly documented, citable as precedent, and serve as a permanent record of perhaps the most unconstitutional and corrupt episode in modern American legal history.

It’s also essential to keep the pressure on Garland and his so far feckless lieutenants to fix the problem:

Remove the Trump/Miller holdovers @ EOIR;
Prune out the “go along to get along” deadwood;
Rescind the improper hiring of 17 “Billy the Bigot” judicial selections (including the one absurdist selection by “AG for a Day Monty Python” — talk about a “poke in the eyes with a sharp stick” to progressives);
Bring in top notch progressive practical scholars as leaders and REAL judges at both the appellate and trial levels of EOIR – NOW;
Make the “no brainer” changes to eradicate Trump-era unethical, xenophobic “precedents” and inane “rules” and establish due process and fundamental fairness, including, of course, racial and gender equity in decision making.

So far, Garland has pretended that the “Culture of Denial” flourishing under his nose at HIS EOIR doesn’t exist! It does exist — big time — and it continues to get worse, threaten more lives, and squander more resources every day!

Due process (not to mention simple human decency) requires bold, immediate ACTION. Garland’s continued dawdling and inaction raises the issue of what is the purpose of an Attorney General who allows his “delegees” (basically Stephen Miller’s “judges”) to violate due process every day! There is no more important issue facing the DOJ today. Garland’s silence and inaction raise serious questions about his suitability to serve as the American public’s top lawyer!

🗽⚖️🧑🏽‍⚖️Due Process Forever!

PWS

05-24-21

SEN. DIANNE FEINSTEIN (D-CA) JOINS CALL FOR GARLAND TO QUICKLY REVERSE TRUMP-ERA RACIST, MISOGYNIST, INCORRECT PRECEDENTS AIMED AT PUNISHING WOMEN REFUGEES FROM THE NORTHERN TRIANGLE!

Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA)
Official Portrait

https://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-releases?id=D36F6BAC-ADE5-4173-BE85-8CE83CD6FE09

Home News Room Press Releases

Feinstein to Garland: Reverse Trump-Era Asylum Eligibility Rules

May 14 2021

Washington—Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) called on Attorney General Merrick Garland to review decisions made by the Trump administration restricting asylum eligibility for victims of domestic and gang violence.

The Refugee Act of 1980 extended asylum protections to foreign nationals who fear to return to their home countries due to past persecution or fear of persecution “on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” The Trump administration rejected established precedent by restricting asylum eligibility for victims of gang and domestic violence.

“As a result of these decisions, the United States denies humanitarian relief to asylum-seekers fleeing countries in which 95 percent of sexual violence cases are never investigated and in which gang-related killings and extortion are common practice. This is out of step with our nation’s reputation as a safe haven for those fleeing persecution,” wrote Senator Feinstein.

“I ask that you … consider vacating … those decisions and bring our asylum system back into alignment with the law and the values informing it,” Feinstein added.

Full text of the letter is available here and below:

May 13, 2021

The Honorable Merrick B. Garland

Attorney General

U.S. Department of Justice

950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW

Washington, DC 20530

Dear Attorney General Garland:

I write regarding two decisions issued by Attorneys General Session and Barr during the Trump administration in Matter of A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018), and Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I&N Dec. 581 (A.G. 2019), as well as other opinions based on these decisions. Enclosed are copies of letters I sent the Attorneys General on these decisions, which in my opinion, ignored precedent by eliminating asylum eligibility for many victims of domestic and gang violence. I am sure you share my belief that all who Congress made eligible for asylum should receive the law’s protections.

As a result of these decisions, the United States denies humanitarian relief to asylum-seekers fleeing countries in which 95 percent of sexual violence cases are never investigated and in which gang-related killings and extortion are common practice. This is out of step with our nation’s reputation as a safe haven for those fleeing persecution.

The Refugee Act of 1980 extends asylum to foreign nationals who are unwilling or unable to return their country of origin due to past persecution or fear of persecution “on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42)(A), 1158(b)(1)(A). The Trump Administration rejected established precedent when it concluded that victims of domestic or gang violence ignored by their home countries could not claim the protections of asylum.

Accordingly, I ask that you, as part of your review of “precedential decisions … governing the adjudication of asylum claims” directed by President Biden in Executive Order No. 14,010, consider vacating Matter of A-B-, Matter of L-E-A-, and subsequent opinions based on those decisions and bring our asylum system back into alignment with the law and the values informing it. This approach has been used before to provide timely relief in anticipation of formal rulemaking.

Thank you for your prompt attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

Dianne Feinstein

United States Senator

###

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It’s a very modest, straightforward, well-justified, and long overdue “ask” by Senator Feinstein and others.

It’s simply shocking that Garland continues to dither and “swallow the whistle” on “Basic Day 1 Immigration/Human Rights Stuff” while abused refugee women and their children continue to suffer and die on his watch. Meanwhile, their long suffering pro bono and “low bono” attorneys tear their hair out at Garland’s lack of attention to the horrible human rights, due process disaster in his Immigration “Courts.”

🇺🇸🗽⚖️Due Process Forever!

PWS

05-19-21

😎👍⚖️🗽👩🏻‍⚖️👨‍⚖️🇺🇸YES! — WOW! IN A HUGE VICTORY FOR DUE PROCESS & FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS, PANEL LED BY JUDGE STEPHANIE THACKER WITH 2 TRUMP APPOINTEES UNANIMOUSLY BLOWS AWAY BIA ON NEXUS TO A NUCLEAR FAMILY PSG FROM EL SALVADOR! — Arlington Superstar 🌟 Litigator Aaron Caruso With Big Win For Cause Of Justice! — Hernandez-Cartagena v, Barr! — “Kardashian Rule” & Other BIA/Billy The Bigot Nonsense Smashed!

https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/191823.P.pdf

HERNANDEZ-CARTAGENA v. BARR, 4th Cir., 10-15-20, published

PANEL: THACKER, RICHARDSON, and QUATTLEBUAM, Circuit Judges

OPINION BY: JUDGE STEPHANIE THACKER

KEY QUOTE:

Contrary to the BIA’s conclusion in this case, the record does not support the conclusion that Petitioner’s own conflict with the gang precipitated any of the events in question. Indeed, substantial evidence in the record compels the conclusion that at least one central reason Petitioner was targeted was her membership in the Hernandez-Cartagena family. The unrebutted evidence in the record demonstrates that the threats and violence against Petitioner, her child, and her siblings were designed to get her parents to pay up. Pursuant to Hernandez-Avalos, it is therefore unreasonable to conclude that the fact that Petitioner is her parents’ child — a member of their family, concern for whom might motivate additional payments to the gang — is not at least one central reason for her persecution.
11

IV.
For the reasons set forth herein, the petition for review is granted, the decision of
the BIA is reversed, and we remand to the BIA for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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Why this is important: It delivers a totally deserved “double whammy” to two of the worst and most biased precedents issued during the Trump White Nationalist “kangaroo court era” at the BIA.

First, in Matter of L-E-A, 27 I&N Dec. 40 (BIA 2017), (“L-E-A- 1”) the BIA recognized the “nuclear family” as a “particular social group.” Yet, to produce the necessary asylum denial sought by their “Trump handlers” at DOJ, the BIA erroneously found that the threatened harm had no “nexus” to the PSG.

To reach this improper and illogical result, the BIA disingenuously trashed the “normal” rules of causation. Those say that nexus is established if the harm would not have occurred “but for” membership in the protected group. Of course, there could be multiple “but fors” in a particular case, recognizing the “at least one central reason” statutory language for nexus.

That respondent was targeted for harm by gangs because his family owned a drug store that the gangs wanted to access to distribute illegal drugs. Had the respondent not been a member of his particular family, there is no reason to believe he would have have been targeted for any harm, or indeed have been of any interest to the gangs at all.

In other words, “but for” his membership in that particular family PSG, the threats would not have occurred. Essentially, a “no brainer” asylum grant that could have been quickly granted by a competent adjudicator. Any DHS appeal should have been a strong candidate for summary dismissal.

Instead of doing the obvious, the BIA invented new rules of causation. Contrary to the record, they found that family membership was essentially irrelevant to the threatened persecution. No, according to the BIA, the threats against the respondent were motivated solely the gang’s desire to sell illegal drugs through the family store, not a protected ground.

By searching for “any other motivation” and then basically substituting it to the exclusion of the clear family PSG motivation, the BIA bizarrely and erroneously concluded that the PSG was not “one central reason” for the persecution. This allowed the BIA to deny asylum to a respondent who fit squarely within the “refugee” definition.

Although the decision might have been cloaked in garbled legalese and irrational, result-oriented analysis, the overall message to Immigration Judges and BIA Appellate Judges was clear: faced with facts that demanded an asylum grant to a Central American refugee, the adjudicator should manufacture “any reason other than a protected ground” to deny protection. The BIA will have your back.

Let’s play out the BIA’s intentionally perverted analysis on a larger scale. The leaders of the Nazi movement stood to profit mightily from the eradication of the German Jewish community. Stolen artwork, confiscated wealth and property, and even the proceeds of the gold and silver obtained from collecting and melting down the dental fillings of gassed Jews found their way into Nazi bank accounts, many abroad. Thus, the BIA could view the Holocaust not as religious, nationality, or racial persecution, but rather part of an overall criminal scheme to enrich Nazi leaders by stealing from prosperous or vulnerable individuals. No persecution there!

Happily, in Hernandez-Cartagena, Judge Thacker and her colleagues blew through the type of bogus analysis set forth in L-E-A- 1. Although not specifically citing the BIA’s defective precedent, the court applied “normal rules of causation” rather than the BIA’s “any reason to deny” approach.

The petitioner was a “conduit” In the gang’s scheme to extort money from her parents. The court recognized that “it is therefore unreasonable to conclude that the fact that Petitioner is her parents’ child — a member of their family, concern for whom might motivate additional payments to the gang — is not at least one central reason for her persecution.”

Good bye and good riddance L-E-A- 1. Hello, rational analysis and well-merited protection, although sadly only within Fourth Circuit, for now.

But, that’s not the end of the tale of woe from America’s most blatantly biased, unprofessional, deadly, and totally unconstitutional “21st Century Star Chambers.” Not satisfied with the BIA’s illegal denial of protection in L-E-A- 1, two years later, Attorney General “Billy the Bigot” Barr “certified” that case to himself. That became Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I&N Dec. 581 (A.G. 2019) (“L-E-A- 2”).

Star Chamber Justice — “Justice”
Star Chamber
Style

His purpose? To reverse the only correct part of L-E-A- 1: the BIA’s recognition of the “nuclear family” as a “PSG.” As we all know, the nuclear family is one of the oldest, most well-established, well-defined, and universally recognized social units in human history. Not surprisingly, then, it has been recognized as a “PSG” under the Refugee Act of 1980 in numerous judicial and BIA decisions as well as by a myriad of human rights and international law scholars.

Billy Barr Consigliere Artist: Par Begley Salt Lake Tribune Reproduced under license, Large — Bill Barr Consigliere
Artist: Pat Bagley
Salt Lake Tribune
Reproduced under license

No matter to Billy! In an exercise in disingenuous legal gobbledygook and counter-rationality, he tried to explain why it was wrong to recognize the obvious: that the nuclear family” is a “cognizable PSG” for asylum adjudication purposes.

Instead, Billy substituted what I call the “Kardashian rule.” Only those families who have some sort of widespread recognition in society as a whole should be considered to possess the “social distinction” (the characteristic formerly known as “social visibility”) to qualify as a “cognizable PSG.”

Kardashians — Billy Barr’s Vision Of A “Cognizable Particular
Social Group” By hotrock pictures – Vimeo: Kardashian Kollection at Sears (view archived source), CC BY 3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=82871460
Creative Commons License

Again, without specifically citing L-E-A- 2, (perhaps the OIL was too embarrassed to argue it) Judge Thacker and her colleagues “blew away” its bigoted and irrational nonsense:

We have repeatedly held “a nuclear family provides a prototypical example of a particular social group” cognizable in our asylum framework. Cedillos-Cedillos v. Barr, 962 F.3d 817, 824 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Indeed, the Fourth Circuit has been a leader in recognizing the nuclear family as a PSG, going all the way back to a case where they reinstated some of my rulings as an Immigration Judge that had been wrongfully reversed by the BIA: Crespin-Valadares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117, 128 (4th Cir. 2011). But, hey, who remembers stuff like that from nearly a decade ago where I was once again proved right and the BIA was wrong?

Yeah, I’ll have to admit that after eight years of regularly getting “stuffed” by my BIA colleagues at en banc, there were few things in my professional life more satisfying than having a Court of Appeals “stuff” the BIA on a case where I had dissented as a BIA Judge or been reversed as an Immigration Judge!

So Billy the Bigot’s attempt to impose the absurdist “Kardashian rule” (sorry Kim, Kourtney, and Khloe) in L-E-A- 2 bites the dust, at least in the Fourth Circuit. I hope it will serve as a “blueprint” to eradicate the “twin travesties” of L-E-A- 1 & 2 across the nation!

Exhilarating as this case is, it’s just one step in the right direction. The unconstitutional White Nativist bias and abuse being heaped upon refugees and other migrants by a “Star Chamber” beholden to the likes of “Billy the Bigot” Barr and his predecessor Jeff “Gonzo Apocalypto” Sessions won’t end until EOIR is abolished and replaced with a real court system that complies with 5th Amendment Due Process. If the Article III Courts don’t have the guts to get the job done, then its up to future better Congress to make it happen!

Lots of “gold stars” to hand out here!

🌟First and foremost, Aaron Caruso, Esquire, of Abod & Caruso, Wheaton, MD. He appeared before me in Arlington. He’s the “total pro,” a “judge’s lawyer:” scholarly, unfailingly courteous, prompt, well-prepared, practical, wrote outstanding “to the issue” briefs that didn’t waste my time, took tough cases, and never gave up on his clients. In a “better world,” he’s definitely someone I could see on the Federal Bench at some level. A member of the NDPA, for sure!

Judge Stephanie D. Thacker — Honorable Stephanie D. Thacker
U.S. Circuit Judge
Fourth Circuit
Photo From Ballotpedia

🌟Judge Stephanie Thacker of the Fourth Circuit. I haven’t studied all of her judicial opinions. But, based on this opinion and her outstanding and totally correct dissent in Portillo-Flores v. Barr where she cogently castigated her fellow panel members for “going along to get along” with the BIA’s “at worst nonsensical and cursory at best” asylum denial, she appears one of a painfully small number of Article III Judges who both understand the mockery of justice going on in our Immigration “Courts” and have the guts to take a strong stand against it. https://immigrationcourtside.com/2020/09/04/%E2%80%8D%EF%B8%8F%EF%B8%8F%EF%B8%8Finjustice-watch-4th-cir-judge-stephanie-thacker-cogently-castigates-colleagues-for-misapplying/

Interestingly, this is the same panel as in Portillo-Flores. And, the BIA’s sloppy and incompetent analysis, including ignoring the evidence of record, presents largely the same issues. Only, this time Judge Thacker’s colleagues paid attention to what she was saying!

That says something about both her persuasiveness and her colleagues’ willingness to listen and take a better approach to judicial review. That’s also what’s known in the business as “making progress every day, one case, one life at a time.”

Unfortunately, Trump and the GOP right wing pols have turned Federal judicial selection into a race to control justice until at least 2060. That has forced the Dems to finally wake up and do likewise the next time they get the chance. The upshot: At 55, although still in the “prime years” of her career from a professional standpoint, Judge Thacker has probably “aged out” of the sweepstakes to be the “heart and soul” of the Supremes for the next four decades.

The good news: She should be around to continue saving lives, speaking truth to power, and serving as a great role model for younger, aspiring jurists and public officials of all races and genders for many years to come.

Compare Judge Thacker’s clear, concise, cogent analysis in this case with the wandering legal gobbledygook and pure nonsense put forth by the BIA and Barr in L-E-A- 1 & 2.

🌟Judge Julius N. Richardson and Judge A. Marvin Quattlebaum, Jr., of the Fourth Circuit also deserve stars. I really lambasted these two Trump appointees for their tone-deaf performance in Portillo-Flores. But, here they surprised me by joining fully in Judge Thacker’s analysis. Shows a capacity for teamwork, listening, adjusting views, and taking judicial review seriously, all really good things!

Additionally, it’s really important and significant when Trump appointees “do the right thing” and uphold due process, fundamental fairness, and recognize asylum seekers as “persons” entitled to equal justice under our Constitution. Given the large number of fairly young Trump appointees on the Federal Bench, it’s critical that as many of them as possible join their colleagues in resisting the White Nationalist assault on the rights and human dignity of people of color, particularly migrants and asylum seekers, being orchestrated by Trump, Miller, Barr, Wolf, and the rest of the regime’s gang of bigots.

Don’t know if this will be repeated in the future, but the votes of Judge Richardson and Judge Quattlebaum in this case are an encouraging sign for the American justice system. Will it be a trend or an aberration? Can’t tell, but stay tuned.

🌟Finally, and perhaps most importantly, hats off for Sandra Marleny Hernandez-Cartagena. In the face of a bogus “court” system controlled and operated by White Nationalist racist bigots for the purpose of wiping out asylum laws, demoralizing applicants through dishonest procedures and rules meant to discourage them from seeking protection, and to “send a message” that they aren’t wanted in our country, she persisted for herself, her family, and others similarly situated. Her victory in this case is a victory for American justice and for every one of us who believe in due process, fundamental fairness, and equal justice for all.

Thanks, Sandra, for inspiring us with your courage and unrelenting persistence in the face of evil and institutionalized, illegal, bias!

Due Process Forever!

PWS

10-16-20

LAWRENCE UNIVERSITY, GOVERNMENT 365: INTERNATIONAL LAW — A Virtual Conversation Between Professor Jason Brozek and Me!

https://youtu.be/CmC5fLys8oM

Whatever happened to the “promise of Kasinga? How have Sessions & Barr attacked the international refugee definition? Does international law have any meaning for the U.S. today? All this and more in 15 minutes!

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See the “premier offering” from the “Courtside Video” broadcasting from our redesigned studio!

Thanks so much, Jason, for inviting me to do this! I hope your students find it useful! And, remember, I’m always available to answer questions at “Courtside.”

Due Process Forever!

PWS😎

05-06-20

TWO MORE FROM HON. JEFFREY CHASE EXPOSING TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY & HOW THE COMPLICIT FEDERAL COURTS FURTHER THESE ABUSES! — “How innocent women and children resigning themselves to being severely beaten, raped, and killed in their home countries constitutes all problems being solved is beyond comprehension.”

https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2019/9/16/the-cost-of-outsourcing-refugees

The Cost of Outsourcing Refugees

It seems perversely appropriate that it was on 9/11 that the Supreme Court removed the legal barrier to the Trump Administration’s most recent deadly attack on the right to asylum in this country. I continue to believe that eventually, justice will prevail through the courts or, more likely, through a change in administration. But in the meantime, what we are witnessing is an all-out assault by the Trump Administration on the law of asylum. The tactics include gaming the system through regulations and binding decisions making it more difficult for asylum seekers to prevail on their claims. But far uglier is the tactic of degrading those fleeing persecution and seeking safety here. Such refugees, many of whom are women and children, are repeatedly and falsely portrayed by this administration and its enablers as criminals and terrorists. Upon arrival, mothers are separated from their spouses and children from their parents; all are detained under dehumanizing, soul-crushing conditions certain to inflict permanent psychological damage on its victims. In response to those protesting such policies, Trump tweeted on July 3: “If illegal immigrants are unhappy with the conditions in the quickly built or refitted detention centers, just tell them not to come. All problems solved!”

How innocent women and children resigning themselves to being severely beaten, raped, and killed in their home countries constitutes all problems being solved is beyond comprehension.

Those in Trump’s administration who have given more thought to the matter don’t seek to solve the problem, but rather to make it someone else’s problem to solve. By disqualifying from asylum refugees who passed through any other country on their way to our southern border or who entered the country without inspection; by forcing thousands to remain exposed to abuse in Mexico while their asylum claims are adjudicated, and by falsely designating countries with serious gang and domestic violence problems as “safe third countries” to which asylum seekers can be sent, this administration is simply outsourcing refugee processing to countries that are not fit for the job in any measurable way. Based on my thirty-plus years of experience in this field, I submit that contrary to Trump’s claim, such policies create very large, long-term problems.

I began my career in immigration law in the late 1980s representing asylum seekers from Afghanistan, many of whom were detained by our government upon their arrival. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Afghans constituted the largest group of refugees in the world. At one point, there were more than 6 million refugees from Afghanistan alone, most of whom were living in camps in Pakistan. Afghan children there received education focused on fundamentalist religious indoctrination that was vehemently anti-western. The Taliban (which literally means “students”) emerged from these schools. The Taliban, of course, brought a reign of terror to Afghanistan, and further provided a haven for Al-Qaeda to launch the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The outsourcing of Afghan refugees to Pakistan was the exact opposite of “all problems solved,” with the Taliban continuing to thwart peace in Afghanistan up to the present.

Contrast this experience with the following: shortly before I left the government, I went to dinner with a lawyer who had mentioned my name to a colleague of his earlier that day. The colleague had been an Afghan refugee in Pakistan who managed to reach this country as a teen in the early 1990s, and was placed into deportation proceedings by the U.S. government. By chance, I had been his lawyer, and had succeeded in obtaining a grant of asylum for him. Although I hadn’t heard from him in some 25 years, I learned from his friend that evening that I had apparently influenced my young client when I emphasized to him all those years ago the importance of pursuing higher education in this country, as he credited me with his becoming a lawyer. Between the experiences of my former client and that which led to the formation to the Taliban, there is no question as to which achieved the better outcome, and it wasn’t the one in which refugees remained abroad.

In 1938, at a conference held in Evian, France, 31 countries, including the U.S. and Canada, stated their refusal to accept Jewish refugees trapped in Nazi Germany. The conference sent the message to the Nazis on the eve of the Holocaust that no country of concern cared at all about the fate of Germany’s Jewish population. The Trump administration is sending the same message today to MS-13 and other brutal crime syndicates in Central America. Our government is closing the escape route to thousands of youths (some as young as 7 years old) being targeted for recruitment, extortion, and rape by groups such as MS-13, while simultaneously stoking anti-American hatred among those same youths through its shockingly cruel treatment of arriving refugees. This is a dangerous combination, and this time, it is occurring much closer to home than Pakistan. Based on historic examples, it seems virtually assured that no one will look back on Trump’s refugee policies as having solved any problems; to the contrary, we will likely be paying the price for his cruel and short-sighted actions for decades to come.

Copyright 2019 Jeffrey S. Chase. All rights reserved.

********************************************************************

https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2019/9/14/former-ijs-file-amicus-brief-in-padilla-v-ice

Former IJs File Amicus Brief in Padilla v. ICE

The late Maury Roberts, a legendary immigration lawyer and former BIA Chair, wrote in 1991: “It has always seemed significant to me that, among all the members of the animal kingdom, man is the only one who captures and imprisons his fellows. In all the rest of creation, freedom is the natural order.”1 Roberts expressed his strong belief in the importance of liberty, which caused him consternation at “governmental attempts to imprison persons who are not criminals or dangerous to society, on the grounds that their detention serves some other societal purpose,” including noncitizens “innocent of any wrongdoing other than being in the United States without documents.”2

The wrongness of indefinitely detaining non-criminals greatly increases when those being detained are asylum-seekers fleeing serious harm in their home countries, often after undertaking dangerous journeys to lawfully seek protection in this country. The detention of those seeking asylum is at odds with our obligations under the 1951 Refugee Convention, which at Article 31 forbids states from penalizing refugees from neighboring states on account of their illegal entry or presence, or from restricting the movements of refugees except where necessary; and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which guarantees at Article 9, para. 4 the right of detainees to have a court “without delay” determine the lawfulness of the detention order release if it is not.

In 1996, in response to an increase in asylum seekers at ports of entry, Congress enacted a policy known as expedited removal, which allows border patrol officers to enter deportation orders against those noncitizens arriving at airports or the border whom are not deemed admissible. A noncitizen expressing a fear of returning to their country is detained and referred for a credible fear interview. Only those whom a DHS asylum officer determines to have a “significant possibility” of being granted asylum pass such interview and are allowed a hearing before an immigration judge to pursue their asylum claim.

In 2005, the Board of Immigration Appeals issued a precedent decision stating that detained asylum seekers who have passed such credible fear interview are entitled to a bond hearing. It should be noted that the author of this decision, Ed Grant, is a former Republican congressional staffer and supporter of a draconian immigration enforcement bill enacted in 1996, who has been one of the more conservative members of the BIA. He was joined on the panel issuing such decision by fellow conservative Roger Pauley. The panel decision was further approved by the majority of the full BIA two years after it had been purged of its liberal members by then-Attorney General John Ashcroft. In other words, the right to bond hearings was the legal conclusion of a tribunal of conservatives who, although they did not hold pro-immigrant beliefs, found that the law dictated the result it reached.

14 years later, the present administration issued a precedent decision in the name of Attorney General Barr vacating the BIA’s decision as “wrongly decided,” and revoking the right to such bond hearings. The decision was immediately challenged in the courts by the ACLU, the Seattle-based Northwest Immigrant Rights Project, and the American Immigration Council. Finding Barr’s prohibition on bond hearings unconstitutional, U.S. District Judge Marsha Pechman issued a preliminary injunction blocking the decision from taking effect, and requiring bond hearings for class members within 7 days of their detention. The injunction additionally places the burden on the government to demonstrate why the asylum-seeker should not be released on bond, parole, or other condition; requires the government to provide a recording or verbatim transcript of the bond hearing on appeal; and further requires the government to produce a written decision with particularized determinations of individualized findings at the end of the bond hearing.

The Administration has appealed from that decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. On September 4, an amicus brief on behalf of 29 former immigration judges (including myself) and appellate judges of the BIA was filed in support of the plaintiffs. Our brief notes the necessity of bond hearings to due process in a heavily overburdened court system dealing with highly complex legal issues. Our group advised that detained asylum seekers are less likely to retain counsel. Based on our collective experience on the bench, this is important, as it is counsel who guides an asylum seeker through the complexities of the immigration court system. Furthermore, the arguments of unrepresented applicants are likely to be less concise and organized both before the immigration judge and on appeal than if such arguments had been prepared by counsel. Where an applicant is unrepresented, their ongoing detention hampers their ability to gather evidence in support of their claim, while those lucky enough to retain counsel are hampered in their ability to communicate and cooperate with their attorney.

These problems are compounded by two other recent Attorney General decisions, Matter of A-B- and Matter of L-E-A-, which impact a large number of asylum claimants covered by the lawsuit who are fleeing domestic or gang violence. Subsequent to those decisions, stating the facts giving rise to the applicant’s fear can be less important than how those facts are then framed by counsel. Immigration Judges who are still navigating these decisions often request legal memoranda explaining the continued viability of such claims. And such arguments often require both a legal knowledge of the nuances of applicable case law and support from experts in detailed reports beyond the capability of most detained, unrepresented, newly-arrived asylum seekers to obtain.

Our brief also argues that the injunction’s placement of the burden of proof on DHS “prevents noncitizens from being detained simply because they cannot articulate why they should be released, and takes into account the government’s institutional advantages.” This is extremely important when one realizes that, under international law, an individual becomes a refugee upon fulfilling the criteria contained in the definition of that term (i.e. upon leaving their country and being unable or unwilling to return on account of a protected ground). Therefore, one does not become a refugee due to being recognized as one by a grant of asylum. Rather, a grant of asylum provides legal recognition of the existing fact that one is a refugee. 3 Class members have, after a lengthy screening interview, been found by a trained DHS official to have a significant possibility of already being a refugee. To deny bond to a member of such a class because, unlike the ICE attorney opposing their release, they are unaware of the cases to cite or arguments to state greatly increases the chance that genuine refugees deserving of this country’s protection will be deported to face persecution

The former Immigration Judges and BIA Members signing onto the amicus brief are: Steven Abrams, Sarah Burr, Teofilo Chapa, Jeffrey S, Chase, George Chew, Cecelia Espenoza, Noel Ferris, James Fujimoto, Jennie Giambiastini, John Gossart, Paul Grussendorf, Miriam Hayward, Rebecca Jamil, Carol King, Elizabeth Lamb, Margaret McManus, Charles Pazar, George Proctor, Laura Ramirez, John Richardson, Lory D. Rosenberg, Susan Roy, Paul W. Schmidt, Ilyce Shugall, Denise Slavin, Andrea Hawkins Sloan, Gustavo Villageliu, Polly Webber, and Robert D. Weisel.

We are greatly indebted to and thankful for the outstanding efforts of partners Alan Schoenfeld and Lori A. Martin of the New York office of Wilmer Hale, and senior associates Rebecca Arriaga Herche and Jamil Aslam with the firm’s Washington and Los Angeles offices in the drafting of the brief.

Notes:

Maurice Roberts, “Some Thoughts on the Wanton Detention of Aliens,”Festschrift: In Celebration of the Works of Maurice Roberts, 5 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 225 (1991).

Id. at 226.

UNHCR,Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status Under the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees at Para. 28.

Copyright 2019 Jeffrey S. Chase. All rights reserved.

****************************************************************

Thanks, Jeffrey, my friend, for courageously highlighting these issues. What a contrast with the cowardly performance of the Trump Administration, Congress, and the ARTICLE IIIs!

I’m proud to be identified with you and the rest of the members of our Roundtable of Former Judges who haven’t forgotten what Due Process, fundamental fairness, refugee rights, and human rights are all about.

Also appreciate the quotation from the late great Maurice A. “Maury” Roberts, former BIA chair and Editor of Interpreter Releases who was one of my mentors. I‘m sure that Maury is rolling over in his grave with the gutless trashing of the BIA and Due Process by Billy Barr and his sycophants.

PWS

09-24-19

HON. JEFFREY CHASE: Barr Intended To Attack The “Quintessential Particular Social Group In Society” — The Family — As Part Of His Restrictionist Deconstruction of Asylum Protections For Vulnerable Refugees — But, Can He Really Rewrite Reality? — Chase On Matter of L-E-A-!

https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2019/8/11/l-e-a-how-much-did-the-ag-change

Aug 11 L-E-A-: How Much Did the AG Change?

In June 2018, the Attorney General issued his precedent decision in Matter of A-B-. The AG intended his decision to lead to the denial of asylum claims based on domestic violence and gang violence by asylum officers, immigration judges, the BIA, and the circuit courts. The decision also aimed to compel asylum officers to find those arriving at the southern border to lack the credible fear necessary for entry into the court system, allowing for their immediate deportation.

However, the decision failed to achieve these goals. A U.S. District Court decision, Grace v. Whitaker, prohibited USCIS from applying A-B- in credible fear determinations. And Immigration Judges have continued to grant significant numbers of domestic violence claims, concluding that A-B- did not prevent them from doing so, but only required their decisions to contain an in-depth analysis of their reasoning. The case of A-B- herself presently remains pending before the BIA.

More recently, the Attorney General took the same approach to the question of whether family may constitute a particular social group. While once again, the administration’s goal is to prevent such claims from passing credible fear interviews and from being granted asylum, the effort also seems likely to fail.

* * *

“There can, in fact, be no plainer example of a social group based on common, identifiable and immutable characteristics than that of the nuclear family. Indeed, quoting the Ninth Circuit, we recently stated that ‘a prototypical example of a “particular social group” would consist of the immediate members of a certain family, the family being a focus of fundamental affiliational concerns and common interests for most people.'”

The above language is from a 1994 decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, Gebremichael v. INS, 10 F.3d 28 (1st Cir. 1994). It pretty much reflects the view of every circuit court over the past 25 years. Since Gebremichael, the BIA has added additional requirements of particularity and social distinction to the particular social group (“PSG”) requirements in a series of six precedent decisions issued between 2006 and 2014. But as a recent practice advisory of CLINIC points out, the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have all recognized that family can constitute a PSG, and all have reiterated that opinion in decisions issued in 2014 or later, meaning that those courts have not found the BIA’s subsequent requirements to alter their longstanding view on the matter.

For this reason, when L-E-A- was first decided by the BIA in 2017, the parties were not in disagreement on this point – the issue had acquired a “the sky is blue” certainty. The issue before the BIA was rather about nexus – i.e. what was required to show that one’s feared persecution was in fact “on account of” such family membership. The Board settled on a highly restrictive standard for establishing nexus, illustrated by the single example of the Romanov family in 1918 Russia.

Possibly fearing an influx of asylum-seeking Romanovs, Matthew Whitaker, during his very brief tenure as Acting Attorney General, felt the need to certify the decision to himself. And on July 29, his successor, WIlliam Barr, issued a decision very reminiscent of A-B-.

As in A-B-, Barr justified vacating the Board’s decision because it relied on the parties’ stipulation to the issue in question. In Barr’s view, this caused the resulting decision to lack the rigorous analysis deserving of a precedent decision. While it remains unclear why rigorous legal analysis is required where everyone agrees to the correctness of the assertion (do we require rigorous mathematical analysis to the proposition that 2+2 = 4?), it should be noted that unlike Matter of A-R-C-G-, which was the single precedent decision holding that victims of domestic violence could be eligible for asylum, there is 25 years worth of circuit court case law on this point, plus the BIA’s own statement in Matter of Acosta that kinship could be a basis for a PSG, which dates to 1985, a point that the BIA reaffirmed over the next three decades, in Matter of C-A- (2006), and then, by reference to that case, in Matter of M-E-V-G- (2014). Barr’s excuse is that, in his view, multiple circuits “have relied upon outdated dicta from the Board’s early cases.”

As in A-B-, the AG’s decision affects no change in the applicable legal standard. The holding is quite narrow, simply overruling the part of the BIA’s decision discussing the cognizability of family as a PSG. The decision doesn’t preclude such findings, but rather requires adjudicators to spend more time on each case, providing a detailed, step-by-step analysis before granting relief. This is a critical point, as at least one IJ has said that L-E-A- has closed the door on family-based PSGs. IJs had a similar reaction in the immediate aftermath of A-B-, stating that they can no longer grant domestic violence claims, only to realize otherwise over time. Barr specifically states that his decision “does not bar all family-based social groups from qualifying for asylum,” adding “[t]o the contrary, in some societies, an applicant may present specific kinship groups or clans that, based on the evidence in the applicant’s case, are particular and socially distinct.” He also cautions adjudicators to “be skeptical of social groups that appear to be “defined principally, if not exclusively, for the purposes of [litigation] . . . without regard to the question of whether anyone in [a given country] perceives [those] group[s] to exist in any form whatsoever.” These are restatements of long-existing law. Of course, the concept of family was not artificially created for litigation purposes.

In L-E-A-, Barr specifically referenced the canon of ejusdem generis, which the BIA applied in Matter of Acosta to conclude that a particular social group should not be interpreted more broadly than the other four terms (race, religion, nationality, and political opinion) that surround it in the statute.1 As the canon was applied to counter the argument that the legislative intent of the PSG ground was to serve as a broad, catch-all “safety net” for those deserving of protection but unable to fit within the other four protected categories, the AG is happy to rely on the premise in his decision as well.

However, ejusdem generis is a two-edged sword. In the same way as it prevents the PSG category from being interpreted more broadly than its fellow protected grounds, it similarly prevents those other categories from being interpreted more broadly than PSG.

And therein lies the flaw in Barr’s argument that “as almost every [noncitizen] is a member of a family of some kind, categorically recognizing families as particular social groups would render virtually every [noncitizen] a member of a particular social group. There is no evidence that Congress intended the term “particular social group” to cast so wide a net.”

Every noncitizen is also a member of a race and a nationality. And most believe in a religion of some type. But no court has suggested that those categories are therefore too wide to form a protected ground for asylum purposes. Barr fails to explain that belonging to a protected ground does not make one a refugee; everyone in the world belongs to one or more such categories; many of us belong to all five. Asylum requires persecution (either suffered in the past, or a sufficient likelihood of suffering in the future), as well as a showing that such persecution was motivated more than tangentially in the persecutor’s view by the victim’s possessing one or more of the protected bases. When one also considers how extreme the harm must be to be constitute persecution; that such harm must either be by the government, or by a person or group that the government is unable or unwilling to control, and that the asylum seeker must not be able to avoid such harm through reasonable relocation to a safer place within their own country, it is not an easy standard to satisfy.

Barr then further errs in claiming that the test for social distinction is not whether the nuclear family carries societal importance (which in fact is the test), but rather, whether the applicant’s “specific nuclear family would be ‘recognizable by society at large.’” In that sentence, Barr supported his erroneous claim by misquoting Jeff Sessions in Matter of A-B-, by omitting the word “classes.” The actual quote, “social groups must be classes recognizable by society at large,” actually supports the argument that nuclear families would enjoy social distinction. By manipulating the language of case law, Barr attempts to equate “social distinction” with fame. Under his proposed interpretation, an asylum seeker must be a Kardashian to satisfy the PSG standard, and a Romanov to then prove nexus. (While such interpretation is clearly incorrect, I am nevertheless coining the term “Czardashian” here).

The true test for social distinction is whether the proposed group is consistent with how society divides itself. And families are the most basic way that society divides itself into groups. We are often identified in society as someone’s child, spouse, parent, or sibling. When we meet someone with a familiar last name, the first thing we ask is “are you related to so and so?” The reason we care to ask such question is precisely because families are socially distinct. By comparison, no one has ever asked me if I’m a member of the group of “tall, gray-haired, left-handed immigration lawyers with glasses,” because that is the type of artificially concocted group that in no way reflects how society divides itself.

Barr’s statement that “unless an immediate family carries greater societal import, it is unlikely that a proposed family-based group will be ‘distinct’ in the way required by the INA for purposes of asylum” is nonbinding dicta, expressing the likelihood of success in claims not before him.2 Nevertheless, his statement also overlooks an important aspect of PSG analysis: the impact of persecution on public perception. Social distinction is measured not in the eyes of the persecutors, but of society. But as UNHCR points out in its 2002 Particular Social Group Guidelines, at para. 14, even though left-handed people are not a particular social group, “if they were persecuted because they were left-handed, they would no doubt quickly become recognizable in their society as a particular social group.” So even if we were to accept Barr’s flawed premise that a regular, non-celebrity family lacks his misconstrued version of social distinction, as word spread of the targeting of its members, that family would gain social recognition pretty quickly.

And as CLINIC’s practice advisory astutely notes, societies accord social distinction to even non-famous families in its laws determining how property is inherited, or to whom guardianship of surviving children is determined.

Notes:

For a highly detailed analysis of the Chevron deference test as applied to Matter of A-B-, including the use of ejusdem generis as a canon of construction in step one of Chevron, see Kelley-Widmer, Jaclyn and Rich, Hillary, A Step Too Far: Matter of A-B-, ‘Particular Social Group,’ and Chevron (July 15, 2019). Cornell Legal Studies Research Paper No. 19-30. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3410556 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3410556

See CLINIC’s Practice Advisory at 3. Much thanks to CLINIC attorneys Victoria Neilson, Bradley Jenkins, and Rebecca Scholtz for so quickly authoring this excellent guide.

Copyright 2019 Jeffrey S. Chase. All rights reserved.

********************************************

There can be no doubt of Bill Barr’s anti-asylum bias, his poor lawyering skills, his lack of ethics, and his willingness to serve as a weapon of White Nationalist racist nonsense. If you serve the cause like a toady, whether or not you “truly believe” becomes irrelevant.

But, as Jeffrey points out, no matter how much the Barrs of the world would like to rewrite the law without going through the legislative or regulatory process, there is a long history of Article III Courts and the Immigration Courts themselves recognizing family-based asylum cases.

There is also an irreducible truth staring Barr and his fellow restrictionists in the face: folks have been identifying themselves based on kinship ties from the beginning of history and other folks have been protecting, rejecting, joining, or excluding themselves from those family-based kinship groups since humans first walked the earth. Sometimes these processes have been peaceful, other times violent, sometimes cooperative, and sometimes coercive.

But, the reality is that family-based persecution happens every day of the week, through out our world. In many many instances it’s “at least one central reason” for the persecution.

Ironically, folks like Trump and Barr are doing their best to divide our country into as many hostile and sometimes violent, ethnic, racial and social groups as it can. But, in the end, whether within my lifetime or not, the truth will “eat up” the lies and false ideologies that drive Barr and the rest of the Trumpists. Sadly, however, by the time they are rightfully dislodged from power, too many will have died or been irrevocably harmed by their false doctrines and conscious disregard for human life, human decency, and well-established truths of human history.

PWS

08-17-19

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