“My Trials: Inside America’s Deportation Factories” — Round Table Star 🌟 Hon. Paul Grussendorf Releases Revised Edition Of His Acclaimed Book 🏆 — Help Him Self-Publish Here!

Hon. Paul Grussendorf
Hon. Paul Grussendorf
U.S. Immigration Judge (Ret.)
Member, Round Table of Former IJs
Author
Source: Amazon.com

 

Paul Grussendorf is organizing this fundraiser.


Creative Arts, Music & Film

  • I am a lawyer specializing in asylum and refugee law. I have taught refugee law at George Washington University, University of San Francisco and Howard University. I have worked with the U.S. government and the UN Refugee Agency in refugee resettlement all over the world, most recently in Rwanda until COVID shut down our interviews. 
  • In 2011 I self-published my legal memoir, My Trials: Inside America’s Deportation Factories, focusing upon the deportation system and my time as an immigration judge. It is time to update the book, given all the changes and destructive policies that have occured in recent years to our asylum system.  The book received great reviews: “My Trials is both a scathing indictment of a broken immigration system that sends vulnerable immigrants back to perilous situations from which they fled, and a heartfelt call for a return to the values upon which our nation was founded.” American Immigration Lawyers Association. It was endorsed by renowned criminal defense attorney Gerry Spence.
  • The budget will include $2000 for editing and formatting, and $3000 for a limited publicity campaign.  I am currently working with an editor to make the book available on Amazon by first week of October, so funds are essential now. It will be available on all other platforms mid-October.
  • This book has been a labor of love and education, and I have not profited from it. I will be tremendously grateful for assistance to make this updated book available at this critical junction in our nation’s history.

Click here it contribute to Paul’s “Go Fund Me” Campaign:

https://www.gofundme.com/f/help-paul-selfpublish-his-immigration-book?utm_source=customer&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=p_cf+share-flow-1

********************

Judge, educator, public servant, humanitarian, author, role model, tireless advocate for due process, fundamental fairness, and equal justice for all: Thanks, Paul, for all you have done and continue to do. It’s a total honor to serve with you on the Round Table!🛡⚔️👍🏼

PWS

09-27-20

ROUND TABLE 🛡 JOUSTS AGAIN WITH DARK KNIGHTS ☠️  OF THE REGIME ON COURT STRUCTURE REGS!

Hon. Ilyce Shugall
Hon. Ilyce Shugall
U.S. Immigraton Judge (Retired)
Director, Immigrant Legal Defense Program, Justice & Diversity Center of the Bar Assn. of San Francisco.
Jeffrey S. Chase
Hon. Jeffrey S. Chase
Jeffrey S. Chase Blog
Coordinator & Chief Spokesperson, Round Table of Former Immigration Judges
Judge Joan Churchill
Honorable Joan Churchill
Retired U.S. Immigration Judge
Member Round Table of Retired Judges
Cecelia M. Espenoza
Hon. Cecelia M.Espenoza
Former Appellate Immigration Judge, BIA
Source:
Denverdemocrats.org
Rebecca Jamil
Hon. Rebecca Jamil
U.S. Immigration Judge (Ret.)
Source: Twitter

The Round Table of Former Immigration Judges is composed of 47 former Immigration Judges and Appellate Immigration Judges of the Board of Immigration Appeals. We were appointed by and served under both Republican and Democratic administrations. We have centuries of com- bined experience adjudicating asylum applications and appeals. Our members include nation- ally-respected experts on asylum law; many regularly lecture at law schools and conferences and author articles on the topic.

Our members issued decisions encompassing wide-ranging interpretations of our asylum laws during our service on the bench. Whether or not we ultimately reached the correct result, those decisions were always exercised according to our “own understanding and conscience,”1 and not in acquiescence to the political agenda of the party or administration under which we served.

We as judges understood that whether or not we agreed with the intent of Congress, we were still bound to follow it. The same is true of the Attorney General, Secretary of Homeland Security, and for that matter, the President.

INTRODUCTION

Initially we note that the current practice of reducing the time for notice and comment, severely undermines the ability for the public to digest and comment on rules. The reduction of time to

1 See Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 266-67 (1954). 1

 

30 days violates the intent of Congress to give full deliberation to regulatory changes. As experi- enced adjudicators, we are in a unique position to contextualize these changes, but even with our experience, the breadth of these proposed regulations should allow for additional time to review and comment.

Next, we note that the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), contains changes that continue to diminish the role and function of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) as an independent adjudicatory body free from political pressure. For example, the granting of certification author- ity to judges who are supposed to be subject to the appellate review of the BIA, does not further the objectives of finality or due process. Further, these rules are slanted in ways that diminish actions and take away tools used by Immigration Judges and Board to manage dockets and en- sure consideration of changed circumstances that might arise for either party. Under the NPRM, the Department of Homeland Security is invited to utilize unlimited power to reopen cases for negative information, and all opportunity for respondents to obtain reopening for new infor- mation have been removed.

In our review we do not object to the clarifications and changes regarding: 1) finality; 2) the ex- pansion of the authority to grant voluntary departure to the BIA; and 3) having cases that only need security checks being placed on hold by the BIA.

However, we do object to: 1) the proposed shortened briefing schedule; 2) simultaneous briefing in non-detained cases; 3) the prohibition from receiving new evidence on appeal, remanding a case for the immigration judge to consider new evidence in the course of adjudicating an appeal, or considering a motion to remand based on new evidence; 4) the elimination of the ability of immigration judges to consider issues beyond the express scope of the remand; 5) giving Immi- gration Judges Certification Authority over BIA decisions; 5) the proposed elimination of admi- nistrative closures; 6) the proposed elimination of the delegation of sua sponte reopening author- ity; 7) removal of BIA certification authority; 8) the imposition of new deadlines and timeframes for adjudication of appeals with those failing to be adjudicated in the specified time being re- ferred to the EOIR Director for adjudication; and 9) the elimination of Immigration Judge review of transcripts.

In short, there is little in the NPRM, that furthers the interests of ensuring a fair and neutral adju- dication. We are concerned with the overall diminishment of the BIA as an appellate body.

Read the full 17-page comment with the names of all the signers here:

BIA restructure regulation comments_FINAL

**********************************

Knightess
Knightess of the Round Table

Many thanks to Ilyce, Jeffrey, Joan, Cecelia, and Rebecca for spearheading this effort!

B/T/W, “diminishment’ is a polite term for “dumbing down!” In this case, “further dumbing down.”

Due Process Forever!

 

PWS

09-26-20

 

🏴‍☠️☠️⚰️🤮⚔️🛡TWO RECENT LAW360 ARTICLES HIGHLIGHT ROUNDTABLE’S SUPPORT FOR AILA’S LITIGATION AGAINST DANGEROUS CONDITIONS IN NEWARK IMMIGRATION COURT! —”It’s somewhat of a shocking argument to hear the DOJ say there’s nothing the attorneys can do to protect themselves if the [Board of Immigration Appeals] decides not to take action,” Judge Vasquez said. “It’s disheartening.”  — But, sadly, not very surprising to those in the “Immigration Community” forced to deal with EOIR’s now chronic disregard and disrespect for human life, on several levels, on a daily basis!

EYORE
“Eyore In Distress”
Once A Symbol of Fairness, Due Process, & Best Practices, Now Gone “Belly Up”
Star Chamber Justice
“Justice”
Star Chamber
Style
Hon. Susan G. Roy
Hon. Susan G. Roy
Law Office of Susan G. Roy, LLC
Princeton Junction, NJ
Member, Round Table of Former Immigration Judges
Knightess
Knightess of the Round Table
Jeffrey S. Chase
Hon. Jeffrey S. Chase
Jeffrey S. Chase Blog
Coordinator & Chief Spokesperson, Round Table of Former Immigration Judges
Laura Lynch
Laura Lynch
Senior Policy Counsel
AILA

https://www.law360.com/immigration/articles/1306711/ex-immigration-judges-say-nj-court-risking-public-health-

Ex-Immigration Judges Say NJ Court Risking Public Health

By Sarah Martinson

Law360 is providing free access to its coronavirus coverage to make sure all members of the legal community have accurate information in this time of uncertainty and change. Use the form below to sign up for any of our daily newsletters. Signing up for any of our section newsletters will opt you in to the daily Coronavirus briefing.

Sign up for our Immigration newsletter

Email (NOTE: Free email domains not supported)

Sign up now

Select more newsletters to receive for free [+]

Law360 (September 2, 2020, 7:00 PM EDT) — More than 30 former immigration judges voiced support for New Jersey lawyers’ lawsuit seeking to stop in-person hearings at Newark Immigration Court during the COVID-19 pandemic, saying the court needs to prioritize people’s health over case completion numbers.

In a letter Tuesday supporting the New Jersey chapter of the American Immigration Lawyers Association‘s suit against the Trump administration, the Round Table of Former Immigration Judges said the fact that the New Jersey immigration court is requiring judges, court staff and interpreters to appear in person at all hearings and not requiring them to wear masks is “troubling,” especially in light of four coronavirus-related deaths of people who visited and worked at the courthouse building.

The U.S. Department of Justice‘s Executive Office for Immigration Review, which operates the Newark Immigration Court, is putting case completion numbers ahead of people’s health and safety, to “the detriment of all those who appear at the court,” the former immigration judges said.

“EOIR’s push to move forward and complete as many cases as possible demonstrates that it has abdicated its responsibility to ensure that all parties are guaranteed a semblance of due process,” they said, adding that the agency’s “complete disregard of the health and safety of not only litigants, but its own employees, is further testament of the agency’s misguided priorities.”

In April 2018, the EOIR announced starting in October of that year immigration judges would be required to complete 700 cases annually and remand less than 15% of cases to have satisfactorily met their job expectations.

The policy change came after the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse at Syracuse University released a February 2018 report finding that there was a backlog of more than 680,000 cases in immigration courts nationwide. Later that year, TRAC reported that the immigration court backlog surpassed 1 million cases.

The agency’s policy shift raised concerns among immigration advocates that immigration judges wouldn’t be able to decide cases fairly and prompted six immigration advocacy groups to sue the EOIR in federal court. The groups alleged that the Trump administration was weaponizing immigration courts by denying immigrants a fair chance at obtaining asylum.

The former immigration judges and Board of Immigration Appeals judges said in their letter that the Newark Immigration Court has “no legitimate reason” for not using videoconferencing technology that is being used by other New Jersey courts in place of in-person hearings.

“We are well aware of the fact that EOIR has the technology to handle its cases via televideo,” they said.

In March, the American Immigration Lawyers Association along with two other advocacy organizations filed a similar complaint in D.C. federal court seeking the immediate suspension of in-person detention hearings or the release of all detained migrants who have no means to remotely access legal representation or the immigration court.

A D.C. federal judge ruled in that case that the organizations didn’t show the court had the authority to stop proceedings, allowing in-person hearings to continue.

AILA-NJ’s attorney Michael Noveck of Gibbons PC told Law360 in a statement Wednesday that “there is no excuse for EOIR’s failure to conduct proceedings by remote videoconferencing, where the technology to do so is fully available to EOIR.”

“EOIR’s failure to use this readily accessible technology risks the health and lives of attorneys (among others) who are compelled to appear in person at the Newark Immigration Court, and, as we have argued in our complaint and motion for preliminary injunction, it is therefore unlawful and cannot be justified by a rush to deport people,” Noveck said.

Counsel for the federal government declined to comment Wednesday.

AILA-NJ is represented by Lawrence S. Lustberg and Michael R. Noveck of Gibbons PC.

The federal government is represented by Ben Kuruvilla of the Office of the U.S. Attorney for the District of New Jersey.

The case is American Immigration Lawyers Association et al. v. Executive Office for Immigration Review et al., case number 2:20-cv-09748, in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey.

–Additional reporting by Alyssa Aquino and Suzanne Monyak. Editing by Stephen Berg.

****************

https://www.law360.com/articles/1307316/nj-immigration-attys-can-t-stop-in-person-hearings-for-now

NJ Immigration Attys Can’t Stop In-Person Hearings For Now

By Jeannie O’Sullivan

Law360 is providing free access to its coronavirus coverage to make sure all members of the legal community have accurate information in this time of uncertainty and change. Use the form below to sign up for any of our daily newsletters. Signing up for any of our section newsletters will opt you in to the daily Coronavirus briefing.

Sign up for our Immigration newsletter

Email (NOTE: Free email domains not supported)

Sign up now

Select more newsletters to receive for free [+]

Law360 (September 3, 2020, 8:53 PM EDT) — A New Jersey federal judge on Thursday expressed sympathy for attorneys’ concerns about mandated in-person hearings in Newark Immigration Court during the COVID-19 pandemic, but said he needed more information from the government before ruling on their request to halt the in-person requirement.

During a telephone hearing, U.S. District Judge John Michael Vasquez declined to grant a temporary restraining order for the Garden State chapter of the American Immigration Lawyers Association, citing a dearth of information about the Justice Department’s Executive Office of Immigration Review’s July decision to resume in-person proceedings.

The AILA’s emergency request came as part of its lawsuit seeking to reverse the EOIR’s mandate after an attorney and law clerk who attended March hearings later died of the coronavirus. Judge Vasquez said he needed to know more about the EOIR’s plan for social distancing and screening before it ordered the in-person hearings.

“I’m looking for the decision-making process before these instructions were put in place,” Judge Vasquez told the parties. “I want to understand what the EOIR considered, and what the Newark immigration judges considered, before they made these decisions. I’m looking for what they actually took into account.”

The judge instructed the government to furnish the information within two weeks, and said the immigration attorneys would have a week after that to reply.

“In-person can be workable, but there’s a lot more information that I need,” Judge Vasquez said at one point.

Also during the hearing, Judge Vasquez suggested that he was going to reject the government’s argument that the district court can’t hear the matter due to jurisdiction-limiting provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

“It’s somewhat of a shocking argument to hear the DOJ say there’s nothing the attorneys can do to protect themselves if the [Board of Immigration Appeals] decides not to take action,” Judge Vasquez said. “It’s disheartening.”

The AILA’s July 31 complaint targets the EOIR’s July 8 decision to resume in-person hearings for nondetained immigrants on July 13. The group said forcing immigration attorneys to show up to court is needlessly risky with the availability of videoconferencing technology, and claimed that when the EOIR restarted hearings in the Newark court, it did so without “basic information” on how to safely social distance in the building.

The AILA claimed attorneys have been “arbitrarily” denied requests to postpone scheduled hearings, and that an immigration judge has even threatened disciplinary action against two lawyers if they failed to appear for an in-person hearing. On Thursday, AILA attorney Michael R. Noveck of Gibbons PC said attorneys were “risking their lives” by showing up to court, or facing potential discipline if they didn’t.

The government has countered that halting the in-person proceedings would bring the Newark Immigration Court’s caseload, which currently tops 67,500, to a standstill. The EOIR has pointed to the availability in court of video-teleconferencing technology, or VTC, which allows attorneys to join proceedings from an empty courtroom.

The AILA has pushed to use Zoom or Skype in order to avoid having to go to a courtroom at all, but the government has said that those applications lack VTC’s transcription capabilities and security features.

The AILA is represented by Lawrence S. Lustberg and Michael R. Noveck of Gibbons PC.

The government is represented by Ben Kuruvilla of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of New Jersey.

The case is American Immigration Lawyers Association et al. v. Executive Office for Immigration Review, case number 2:20-cv-09748, in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey.

–Additional reporting by Jennifer Doherty and Alyssa Aquino. Editing by Breda Lund.

For a reprint of this article, please contact reprints@law360.com.

**************

Should representing individuals in the “No Due Process Star Chambers” really be health and life endangering as well as frustrating?⚰️🤮

I agree with Judge Vasquez’s statement quoted in my headline, except for one thing: “shocking” as this behavior by DOJ might be to the Judge, it’s hardly unusual. Unhappily, it’s “business as usual” for hard working, often pro bono or “low bono” attorneys, trying to represent clients in today’s “Beyond FUBAR” Immigration “Courts” (that aren’t “courts” at all). Isn’t it time for Article III Judges throughout the nation to stop “expressing shock, puzzlement, annoyance, and disbelief” and take some effective action to force EOIR into at least minimal compliance with the Due Process Clause of our Constitution?

When, exactly, during the “Gonzo/Billy the Bigot Era” has the BIA EVER intervened in a high profile case on the side of individual rights and Due Process rather than promoting the Stephen Miller White Nationalist, racist, anti-immigrant, anti-due-process agenda?

To be honest, an Article III Judge would only be “surprised” by dishonesty and intransigence from the DOJ, EOIR, and the BIA if he or she hadn’t been paying attention to the daily charade of justice unfolding in “America’s Star Chambers” under the dishonest, unethical, biased, and racism-promoting stewardship of Billy the Bigot! Whatever happened to the role of DOJ lawyers as “officers of the court” and the “duty of candor to tribunals?” Seems to have done a “disappearing act” in the Article IIIs!

I imagine that if Article III Judges were subjected to the same conditions and humiliations as attorneys trying to represent individuals in Immigration Court, serious systemic change would have happened long ago. That’s why we need some “new faces and enlightened minds” from the private sector immigration bar on the Article III bench! 

Due Process Forever!

PWS

09-05-20

‍‍‍🏴‍☠️☠️⚰️🤮KAKISTOCRACY WATCH: BIA Continues To Get Pummeled For Absurdist Anti-Asylum “Jurisprudence” – Are The Article IIIs Finally Catching On? – If So, Why Does The BIA Still Exist? – Jeffrey S. Chase Analyzes Latest BIA Debacle From the 9th Cir. — Akosung v. Barr

Jeffrey S. Chase
Hon. Jeffrey S. Chase
Jeffrey S. Chase Blog
Coordinator & Chief Spokesperson, Round Table of Former Immigration Judges

https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2020/8/16/9th-cir-to-bia-hiding-in-fear-is-not-reasonable-relocation

JEFFREY S. CHASE | OPINIONS/ANALYSIS ON IMMIGRATION LAW
9th Cir. to BIA: Hiding in Fear is Not Reasonable Relocation
In, Akosung v. Barr a young woman from Cameroon had been sentenced against her will to marry the village chieftain, or Fon, in order to settle a family debt. Not wishing to suffer this fate, she first hid locally. After her family’s assets and funds were seized, their crops were destroyed, and they were barred from attending social activities as punishment, she fled town.
Akosung remained a fugitive in Cameroon for over a year. A relative who harbored her in another city for most of that time asked her to leave out of fear of repercussions. After relocating again, she barely evaded capture. The police declined to get involved. Akosung eventually managed to cross into Nigeria, and from there, made her way to the U.S.
After an Immigration Judge denied asylum, the BIA dismissed Akosung’s appeal on two grounds. First, the Board determined that she had not shown harm on account of her membership in a particular social group consisting of “women resistant to forced marriage proposals.” More surprisingly, the Board concluded that, in spite of the above tale of near capture and narrow escape, Akosung could somehow safely relocate to another part of Cameroon.
Asylum will be denied to one who could reasonably relocate within their country. Where a dispute is so localized that it can be ended with a move to the next street, neighborhood, or town, the law sees no reason for international intervention.
However, federal regulations that are binding on immigration judges, asylum officers, and the BIA, recognize the complexity of determining whether such relocation, if possible, would be considered reasonable. Per the regulation:
(3) Reasonableness of internal relocation. For purposes of determinations under paragraphs (b)(1)(i), (b)(1)(ii), and (b)(2) of this section, adjudicators should consider, but are not limited to considering, whether the applicant would face other serious harm in the place of suggested relocation; any ongoing civil strife within the country; administrative, economic, or judicial infrastructure; geographical limitations; and social and cultural constraints, such as age, gender, health, and social and familial ties. Those factors may, or may not, be relevant, depending on all the circumstances of the case, and are not necessarily determinative of whether it would be reasonable for the applicant to relocate.
That’s quite a lot to consider. And in saying that the listed factors may or may not be relevant or determinative, the judge or asylum officer is being told to dive in deep in analyzing what factors exist, and how much they should matter.
Furthermore, the regulations state that where the persecutor is the government, or where the applicant has already suffered persecution, there is a legal presumption that such internal relocation is not reasonable. It’s not clear from the decision whether the issue was considered, but as the facts state that the applicant’s town was ruled by a council, that it was said council that ordered her marriage to the Fon, and that the police ceded jurisdiction over the matter to the council, a strong argument seems to exist that the persecutor in this case is the government.
Not surprisingly, such a detailed, in depth, thoughtful analysis that cedes so much authority to the immigration judge runs contrary to EOIR Director James McHenry’s goal of assembly line, rubber stamp adjudication. Of course, his agency’s recently proposed regulations aimed at destroying asylum directly attack this rule, and seek to replace it with a much simpler one in which the judges would draw a negative inference from the fact that the asylum seeker had managed to reach the U.S. It’s not clear why reaching the U.S. to seek asylum would demonstrate the reasonableness of remaining in the country in which one is being targeted. Perhaps McHenry seeks to imbue an entirely new meaning to the lyric from Frank Sinatra’s ode to my hometown: “If I can make it there, I’ll make it anywhere?”
In Akosung, the Board treated the regulation as if McHenry’s changes were already in effect. It simply saw that it could easily rubber-stamp the IJ’s denial by checking the “internal relocation” box, and certainly did not bother to undertake the analysis that the actual binding regulation requires.
Fortunately, the Ninth Circuit called foul. Noting that the regulation requires a conclusion that, after considering all of the listed factors, it would be reasonable to expect the applicant to relocate, the court noted that “it hardly seems ‘reasonable to expect’ one facing persecution or torture to become a fugitive and live in hiding.”
The court added some additional statements of the obvious: first, that “‘relocate’ most naturally refers to resettlement or a change of residence, not the unstable situation of one who must always be ready to flee.” And also: “living in hiding does little to establish that a person is able to “avoid future persecution.” To the contrary, it establishes the opposite; hence, the hiding.
The Ninth Circuit also found error in the Board’s social distinction determination. The Board upheld the immigration judge’s questioning of “how anyone in society” would be able to recognize someone “as an individual who has declined a marriage proposal from a fon.”
The court first noted that the statement seemed to erroneously apply the “optical visibility” approach to social distinction (i.e. that the group member should be recognizable on sight to members of society), an approach the Board disavowed in Matter of M-E-V-G-. But the court added that even if the Board here meant that society in Cameroon would not recognize the group as distinct, Akosung’s experience, and that of another woman who she described as being successfully hunted down after also attempting to evade marriage to the Fon, demonstrate otherwise.
The court then quoted Matter of M-E-V-G- as requiring the group to be viewed as distinct “within the society in question,” adding that “the Board should have taken that into account.”
The court did not discuss further how “the society in question” should be defined. And the court’s citation was to page 237 of M-E-V-G-. But as I have noted when lecturing on the topic, the Board on page 243 of the same decision clarified that “persecution limited to a remote region of a country may invite an inquiry into a more limited subset of the country’s society, such as in Matter of Kasinga…where we considered a particular social group within a tribe.”
Later, on page 246 of M-E-V-G-, the Board stated that in Matter of Kasinga, “people in the Tchamba-Kunsuntu tribe” would view members of the particular social group in that case to be “a discrete and distinct group that was set apart in a meaningful and significant way from the rest of society.” The Board then stated its conclusion that the social group in Kasinga “was perceived as socially distinct within the society in question.”
Attorneys should cite to Akosung (along with M-E-V-G-) in arguing that the “society in question” to be considered for social distinction purposes is the society their clients inhabit.
Copyright 2020, Jeffrey S. Chase. All rights reserved. Reprinted With Permission.

**********************

Wow! Talk about absurdly unfair and totally biased!

For a “real judge” who is committed to due process and understands asylum law, this should have been a 30-minute hearing resulting in a grant of asylum! Instead two levels of EOIR “judges” got this grotesquely wrong in an attempt to deny asylum and return a refugee to harm or death when she clearly is entitled to protection. Because, that’s what their political “handlers” at DOJ and its wholly owned subsidiary EOIR want from their weaponized parody of a “court system.”

These aren’t “legal errors” or “legitimate differences of opinion.” No, they are evidence of “malicious incompetence” – deep intellectual dishonesty and corruption on the part of a fraudulent “tribunals” that under this regime have ceased to serve any legitimate function.

And, that also doesn’t say much good about Article III Courts who see these clear errors time and again, recognize them, yet fail to take the strong, systemic corrective action necessary to stop the BIA’s gross abuses of our legal system and humanity and to hold Billy the Bigot and his subordinate toadies accountable for their misfeasance! That’s a denial of due process by the Article IIIs; it means that only those with the wherewithal to get good representation and pursue appeals beyond EOIR can get anything resembling “justice.” I call that dereliction of duty by the Article IIIs!

Think about this! If folks don’t immediately leave after suffering persecution, then corrupt EOIR adjudicators will sometimes find them not to be in “real danger” or use it as specious “evidence” that the claim isn’t “credible.” But, if they do leave, then that nonsensically shows they could somehow “relocate.”

So in typical EOIR Kangaroo Court fashion, the refugee loses no matter what the facts! I guess that reinforces the “don’t come because we won’t protect you no matter” message that the “New EOIR” is there to deliver! The real issue, however, is why EOIR is still in existence and threatening both our legal system and those seeking justice in America?

Systemic racial injustice in America is no mystery! It’s fueled by Article III Courts that fail to intervene to stop the Trump regime’s racist assault on migrants of all types! Trump, Stephen Miller, “Wolfman” (actually illegally serving at DHS) make no secret of their racist agenda. But, life-tenured Article III Justices and Judges literally keep letting them get away with murder!

Due Process Forever! EOIR’s corrupt “Kangaroo Courts,” never!

PWS

08-17-20

🛡⚔️⚖️ADVENTURES OF THE ROUND TABLE: Latest Amicus Brief To Supremes Weighs In On “Stop Time Rule” — Niz-Chávez v. Barr — Many Thanks to The Pro Bono Stars  @ Gibson Dunn!

Jeffrey S. Chase
Hon. Jeffrey S. Chase
Jeffrey S. Chase Blog
Coordinator & Chief Spokesperson, Round Table of Former Immigration Judges
Knightess
Knightess of the Round Table

Niz-Chavez Amicus Brief TO FILE

No. 19-863 IN THE

    _______________

AGUSTO NIZ-CHAVEZ,

v.

WILLIAM P. BARR, ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondent.

                   _______________

On Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court of Appeals For the Sixth Circuit _______________

BRIEF OF THIRTY-THREE FORMER IMMIGRATION JUDGES AND MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS

AS AMICI CURIAE

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER _______________

RICHARD W. MARK

Counsel of Record

AMER S. AHMED

TIMOTHY SUN

DORAN J. SATANOVE

GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP 200 Park Avenue

New York, NY 10166 (212) 351-4000 rmark@gibsondunn.com

Counsel for Amici Curiae 

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 

1

1

Amici curiae are thirty-three former immigration judges and members of the Board of Immigration Ap- peals (“BIA” or “Board”).2

Amici curiae have dedicated their careers to the immigration court system and to upholding the immi gration laws of the United States. Each is intimately familiar with the functioning of immigration courts and is invested in improving the fairness and effi- ciency of the United States immigration scheme. Amici curiae’s extensive experience adjudicating im- migration cases provides a unique perspective on the procedures and practicalities of immigration proceed- ings.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The straightforward question this case presents is one of enormous practical significance: Must the ini- tial written notice served on noncitizens to commence their removal proceedings provide—in one docu- ment—the “time and place at which the proceedings will be held” (along with charges and other specified information) in order to satisfy the requirements of 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a), or does the statute allow the govern- ment to cobble together the required elements of a “notice to appear” from multiple documents, issued at different times, some containing misinformation, and

1 All parties have consented to the filing of this brief. Amici state that this brief was not authored in whole or in part by coun- sel for any party, and that no person or entity other than amici or their counsel made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief.

2 The appendix provides a complete list of signatories.

 

2

none of which alone contains all of the statutorily re- quired information?

Reversing the Sixth Circuit and holding that § 1229(a)’s requirements must be included in a single document will greatly reduce the procedural and bu- reaucratic errors attendant in a two-step process that detrimentally impact thousands of noncitizens law- fully seeking to remain in this country.

I. For noncitizens applying for cancellation of re- moval, service of a valid “notice to appear” under § 1229(a) triggers the so-called “stop-time” rule, which terminates the period of continuous presence required for cancellation eligibility. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229b(d)(1), 1229b(a)(2), 1229b(b)(1)(A). Separately but relatedly, for noncitizens ordered removed in ab- sentia, whether that “severe” penalty, Pereira v. Ses- sions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2111 (2018), is proper depends on whether the notice served on the noncitizen satis- fied the requirements of §1229(a). 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(A). This Court’s decision will thus touch not only those like Petitioner who are seeking cancel- lation of removal, but also those who may not even have been provided sufficient notice to appear for their removal hearings—and potentially severely punished as a result.

II. The Sixth Circuit’s ruling approves a two-step notice process that involves: (i) the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) serving on a noncitizen a putative notice to appear lacking time-and-place in- formation (or, perhaps worse, that includes fake time- and-place information), and (ii) only after that notice to appear is filed and docketed with the immigration court, the immigration court separately sending a “no- tice of hearing” supplying the time-and-place infor- mation to the noncitizen.

3

Under this two-step process an initial notice lack- ing § 1229(a)’s time-and-place information languishes in a proverbial “No Man’s Land” until the notice is filed with an immigration court and entered into the court’s computer systems—a process that can take years. This delay increases the risk of procedural er- rors and lost filings, such as crucial Change of Address forms, which can result in noncitizens never receiving time-and-place information at all—potentially result- ing in wholly unjustified in absentia removal orders.

Sorting through those issues adds to immigration judges’ fact-finding burdens by requiring them to di- vert attention from the merits of a case to investigate collateral issues like whether time-and-place infor- mation was provided in a second document; whether that document was properly served; and whether a fil- ing like a Change of Address form was submitted but ultimately lost in “No Man’s Land.” When coupled with the pressure to complete cases—even if it means churning out in absentia removal orders without fully considering whether the noncitizen received adequate time-and-place notice—the result may be an increase in unwarranted removal orders.

These problems would be ameliorated if the gov- ernment simply provided the actual time-and-place information in a single document as required by § 1229(a).

III. Requiring DHS to work with the Executive Office of Immigration Review (“EOIR”) to obtain time- and-place information before serving a notice to ap- pear—and including such information in that docu- ment, as § 1229(a) and Pereira require—is practical and within the government’s capabilities.

4

A single-step notice process, consistent with this Court’s ruling in Pereira, furthers the due process ax- iom that a party charged to defend against a legal pro- ceeding must receive notice of the time and place of the proceeding and an opportunity to be heard.

*****************

Read the complete brief, with better formatting, at the link!

Of course we couldn’t have done this without the amazing talent and assistance of Amer S. Ahmed and the rest of the “Pro Bono All-Star Team” 🎖🏆 @ Gibson Dunn! Just another example of the essential contribution of pro bono lawyers to literally saving our legal system that has been featured on “Courtside” this week!

Due Process Forever!

PWS

08-14-20

🎾 COURTSIDE TAKES THE (TENNIS) COURT WITH JEFFREY S. CHASE 🏆 — Penetrating Analysis By “Resident Pro” Jeff Chase of The Serves, Returns, Volleys, In & Out of Bounds In The “Blanco v. AG” Match, Recently Played On The Court of Appeals (3d Cir.) – It’s Not Wimbledon, But Chase’s Tips Guaranteed to Improve Your Game, or Your Money Back💸!

Jeffrey S. Chase
Hon. Jeffrey S. Chase
Jeffrey S. Chase Blog
Coordinator & Chief Spokesperson, Round Table of Former Immigration Judges

 

https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2020/8/13/follow-the-bouncing-ball-persecution-and-the-shifting-burden-of-proof

Follow the Bouncing Ball: Persecution and the Shifting Burden of Proof

On July 24, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the BIA as to what constitutes past persecution.  In Blanco v. Att’y Gen., the asylum-seeker had been abducted by police in his native Honduras because he had participated in marches in support of the LIBRE party.  Police officers there detained him for 12 hrs in an abandoned house, where he was subjected to multiple beatings lasting 40 to 60 minutes each.  The police also  threatened to kill him and his family if he continued to participate in LIBRE party marches, and further insulted him with racial slurs.  Learning that other LIBRE supporters had been killed by the police, the petitioner moved from city to city within Honduras over the next 14 months.  However, he received three letters and one phone call during that time threatening that he and his family would be killed if he did not leave the country.

The immigration judge believed the petitioner, but nevertheless denied asylum, finding the harm to have not been severe enough to constitute past persecution.  The B.I.A. agreed, saying that the treatment was “more akin to harassment” than persecution.  The B.I.A. also found that the petitioner had not even established a well-founded fear of future persecution, concluding that there wasn’t a ten percent chance that a mere supporter who had last participated in a demonstration almost 2 years earlier would be persecuted.

The 3d Circuit reversed.  It first quoted the oft-cited phrase that “persecution does not encompass all forms of unfair, unjust, or even unlawful treatment.”  But the court continued that it has found persecution to include “threats to life, confinement, torture, and economic restrictions so severe that they constitute a real threat to life or freedom.”  Of course, the facts described above include multiple threats to life, as well as confinement and torture.  So then how did the Board find what was obviously persecution several times over to be “more akin to harassment?”

As the Third Circuit explained, the BIA and the immigration judge committed three errors.  The first was in finding that the past harm was not severe enough.  But the court noted that persecution does not require severe injury; in fact, it requires no physical injury at all, as evidenced by the fact that a death threat alone may constitute past persecution.  Thus, the court corrected the Board in holding that “physical harm is not dispositive in establishing past persecution.”

The court next corrected the Board’s discrediting of the threats on the ground that it was not “imminent,” citing  the fact that the threat was not carried out in the 14 months until the petitioner’s departure.  The court observed that in order to constitute persecution, a threat must be concrete and menacing, but explained that neither term relates to its immediacy.  Rather, concrete and menacing go to the likelihood of the threatened harm, and excludes threats that are merely “abstract or ideal.”  The court rejected the idea that an asylum-seeker must wait “to see if his would-be executioners would go through with their threats” before qualifying for protection, which “would upend the fundamental humanitarian concerns of asylum law.”

The last error pointed to by the court was the Board’s failure to weigh the various harms cumulatively.  The court distinguished between the Board’s claim to have considered the harm cumulatively, and its actual analysis, which considered the individual instances of harm in isolation.

The court observed that, having shown past persecution, there was a presumption that the petitioner possessed a well-founded fear of persecution, which is what one must prove to merit asylum.  But as both the IJ and the Board erred in their conclusion regarding past persecution, no determination regarding whether ICE had rebutted the regulatory presumption was ever reached.

*     *    *

Although Blanco did not reach the question of what happens following a showing of past persecution, I would like to continue the conversation in order to discuss this point.  I don’t believe that the shifting burden of proof that arises upon a showing of past persecution is properly taught by EOIR in its training.  For that reason, years ago, when I was still with EOIR, I conducted a training in which I tried to clarify the concept by using a tennis analogy.  I will attempt to recreate the lesson here.

Imagine the asylum applicant as serving in a tennis match.  In tennis, only the serve must go into one specific box on the court, as opposed to anywhere on the opponent’s side of the net.  Here, I have marked that service box “past persecution,” as it is only by “serving” into that specific box that the asylum-seeker can create a presumption of well-founded fear, and thus shift the burden of proof to the government.

 

In the above illustration, the respondent has served into the “past persecution” box by establishing facts that constitute past persecution.  This doesn’t require a showing of severe or extreme persecution; any harm rising to the level of what has been found to constitute persecution will suffice.  Examples includes multiple instances of lesser harm that cumulatively rise to the level of persecution (see, e.g. Matter of O-Z- & I-Z-, 22 I&N Dec. 23 (BIA 1998); a concrete and menacing threat (not accompanied by actual physical harm); or persecution in the guise of criminal prosecution or conscription.

Once the respondent establishes past persecution, the ball is then in the DHS’s “court.”  The only way DHS can “return the serve” to the respondent’s side of the net (i.e. shift the burden of proof back to the asylum applicant) is to demonstrate either (1) changed circumstances such that the respondent no longer has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of a protected ground; or (2) that the respondent could reasonably safely relocate to another part of the home country.  If DHS can’t prove either of the above, the respondent has “won the point” of establishing persecution.

Only if DHS succeeds in establishing one of those two points is the ball returned to the respondent.  But just as in tennis, after the serve is returned, the respondent is no longer limited to hitting into the service box only.  The respondent now has a wider court in which to win the point:

Just as there are three boxes on each side of a tennis court (i.e. the two service boxes and the backcourt), the respondent now has three options for meeting the burden of proof.

The two service boxes (closest to the net)  represent the two ways in which one who has suffered past persecution can still merit a grant of “humanitarian asylum” even where there is no longer a basis to fear future persecution.

The first of these is where a humanitarian grant is merited based on the severity of the past persecution.  This is the only time that the severity of the past persecution matters.  (I believe that errors such as those committed in Blanco arise because the immigration judge remembers learning something about the severity of the past persecution, but isn’t quite clear on the context in which it arises.)

This rule is a codification of the BIA’s holding in a 1989 precedent decision, Matter of Chen.  In a concurring opinion in that decision, former Board Member Michael Heilman pointed out that our asylum laws are designed to conform to our international law obligations.  He continued that the source of those obligations, the 1951 Convention, came into effect years after the majority of those refugees it was meant to protect, i.e. those who had suffered past persecution during WW II, were clearly no longer at risk from the same persecutors following the defeat of the Axis powers

From this history, Heilman concluded that “the historical underpinnings of the Convention, from which the Refugee Act of 1980 receives its genesis, would have to be totally ignored if one were inclined to adopt the position that present likelihood of persecution is also required where past persecution has been established.”

The majority of the Board adopted this position only where it deemed the past persecution sufficiently severe, and it was that view that the regulations codified in 1990.

Years later, a second basis for humanitarian asylum was added to the regulations for those who suffered past persecution but had their presumption of well-founded fear rebutted by the government.  This second category (represented by the second service box in the third illustration) applies to those who might reasonably suffer “other serious harm” in their country of origin.  This rule (which became effective in January 2001) looks to whether the asylum applicant might suffer harm as severe as persecution, but unrelated to any specific ground or motive.  Thus, an asylum-seeker who suffered past persecution but whose original basis for asylum has dissipated due to changed conditions may merit a humanitarian grant where their return might give rise to mental anguish, put their health at risk due to the unavailability of necessary medical treatment or medication, or subject them to abject poverty or severe criminal extortion, to provide a few examples.

Lastly, an asylum applicant who no longer has a well-founded fear due to changed conditions in their country of origin may still “win the point” by establishing a different well-founded fear of persecution under the new conditions.

Copyright 2020 Jeffrey S. Chase.  All rights reserved. Reprinted With Permission.

 

**************************

You’ll have to go to the original at the above link to see all of Jeffrey’s great “tennis court illustrations!”

Reminded me of my own, less than illustrious, career on the tennis court. Here’s the anecdote I shared with Jeffrey:

I loved it, Jeffrey, even though in my life many of my shots and serves “went over the fence.” Indeed, I once ended an inter-fraternity tennis match with a forfeit after hitting all of my opponent’s tennis balls into the Fox River which at that time bordered the LU Tennis Courts in Appleton. It was kind of like a “mercy killing” since I was being totally creamed anyway, and it was a hot day. I found Immigration Court a much more comfortable fit for my skill set.

I also appreciate Jeff’s citation of Matter of O-Z- & I-Z-, 23 I&N Dec. 22 (BIA 1998). I was on that panel, along with my colleagues Judge Lory Rosenberg and Judge Jerry Hurwitz, who wrote the opinion. The record will show that it was one of the few published BIA precedents where the three of us, members of the “Notorious Panel IV,” agreed. Perhaps that’s why it got published. Our colleagues probably figured that any time the three of us were in harmony, it must be an auspicious occasion worth preserving for the future!

In any event, of all of the more than 100 published decisions in which I participated during my tenure on the BIA, O-Z- & I-Z- on the issue of “cumulative harm” proved to be one of the most useful during my tenure at the Arlington Immigration Court. Attorneys on both sides, knowing my tendencies, liked to frame their arguments in many cases in terms of “it is” or “it isn’t” O-Z- & I-Z-.

I think that “cumulative harm” is one of the most important, and these days most overlooked or wrongly ignored, concepts in modern asylum law. It was really one of the keys to favorable resolution of many asylum cases based on “past persecution.” But, that goes back to a time when the law was applied to protect worthy asylum seekers, rather than to reject them, often on specious grounds as happens on today’s “deportation railroad.”

PWS

08-14-20

 

 

JEFFREY S. CHASE: 9TH Circuit “Schools” BIA In Asylum Law – But, Will It Really Make Any Difference To “Death Board” In A Regime That Gives The Article IIIs, Congress, & The Law The Big Middle Finger Every Day With No Meaningful Consequences?  — Programmed To Deny Asylum At Any Cost, EOIR Under Billy The Bigot Is Largely Undeterred By Judicial Lectures Without Teeth!

Jeffrey S. Chase
Hon. Jeffrey S. Chase
Jeffrey S. Chase Blog
Coordinator & Chief Spokesperson, Round Table of Former Immigration Judges

https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2020/8/10/9th-cir-sets-bia-straight-on-circularity

 

9th Cir. Sets BIA Straight on ‘Circularity’

On August 7, the U.S Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit dealt a blow to the Trump Administration’s attacks on domestic violence-based asylum claims.  In Diaz-Reynoso v. Barr, the petitioner applied for withholding of removal to Guatemala because she had been persecuted by her domestic partner on account of her membership in the particular social group consisting of “indiginous women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship.”1  An immigration judge found her credible, but denied her applications for relief.

While her appeal was pending before the BIA, then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions issued his decision in Matter of A-B-.  The BIA subsequently relied on that decision to reject the Petitioner’s particular social group.

Regarding this sequence of events, it’s important to realize that in 2014, the BIA issued a precedent decision holding that a particular social group consisting of “married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship” could serve as a basis for asylum.  As a result, domestic violence-based asylum claims relied on this BIA-approved formulation as a model over the next four years.

When Sessions vacated the Board’s decision, many asylum claims relying on the prior precedent were already in the pipeline.  The BIA could have applied Matter of A-B- only prospectively to cases filed after Sessions’ decision.2  Or if it decided to apply the decision retroactively, it could have remanded the cases that had relied on the law at the time of filing to now allow them to modify their record in response to the superseding decision.

However, the Board did neither of these things.  Instead, it denied the pending cases with no individualized analysis, simply dismissing the claim as being too similar to the case that the Attorney General had just disagreed with.

In Diaz-Reynoso, the Ninth Circuit refuted the above approach by affirming the following points that have been raised repeatedly since the issuance of the AG’s decision, but that the BIA has continued to ignore.

First, the court held that Matter of A-B- does not categorically bar the granting of domestic violence-based asylum claims.  In the words of the court: “Far from endorsing a categorical bar, the Attorney General emphasized that the BIA must conduct the ‘rigorous analysis’ set forth in the BIA’s precedents.’”

Second, the court affirmed the commonly-held view that much of the AG’s decision in Matter of A-B- is nonbinding dicta.  In the words of the Ninth Circuit, the AG offered “some general impressions about asylum and withholding claims based on domestic violence and other private criminal activity.”  But the court noted that “despite the general and descriptive observations set forth in the opinion, the Attorney General’s prescriptive instruction is clear: the BIA must conduct the proper particular social group analysis on a case-by-case basis.”

Third, the court held that the particular social group that Sessions rejected in Matter of A-B- was not impermissibly circular.

As the concept of circularity can be confusing, I will offer some explanation.  In order to merit asylum, persecution must be on account of a statutory ground: race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.  Hypothetically, someone with a fear clearly unrelated to one of the necessary grounds could put forth an argument as follows: “I fear persecution.” “Why?” “Because I’m a member of a particular social group.” “What group?” “People who fear persecution.” “But why do they fear persecution?” “Because of their social group.”  “What group?” “People who fear persecution.”  And this could  go on and on, continuing in the same circle.

In a 2006 precedent decision, Matter of C-A-, the BIA cited to UNHCR guidelines on particular social groups as prohibiting this exact scenario, in which a group is defined exclusively by the harm.  The Board repeated the same rule a year later in another precedent, Matter of A-M-E- & J-G-U-, again using the word “exclusively” (although this time without the emphasis).3  However, the BIA in 2014 added language that a particular social group must exist independently of the persecution, without explaining whether this term differed in meaning from the “exclusively defined” prohibition, and if so, to what degree.

In Matter of A-B-, the AG first jumped to the conclusion that the reason an asylum-seeker is  “unable to leave the relationship” is due to persecution.4  And following that assumption, he rejected the particular social group as being impermissibly circular.

As stated above, the particular social group in Diaz-Reynoso was “indiginous women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship.”  The group was thus defined by the group members’ (1) indiginous status; (2) Guatemalan nationality; (3) gender; and (4) inability to leave their relationship.  So the group was clearly not exclusively defined by the persecution.

And yet, as the Ninth Circuit noted, “with almost no analysis, the BIA rejected Diaz-Reynoso’s proposed particular social group because it ‘suffer[ed] from the same circularity problem articulated by the Attorney General in Matter of A-B-.’”

The Ninth Circuit continued: “In the Government’s and dissent’s view, in order to exist independently from the petitioner’s feared harm, a proposed group may not refer to that harm at all. We disagree. The idea that the inclusion of persecution is a sort of poison pill that dooms any group does not withstand scrutiny.”

The court further clarified that a group exists independent of persecution when it “shares an immutable characteristic other than the persecution it suffers.”  As noted above, the particular social group here included three such immutable characteristics: indiginous status, nationality, and gender.  These serve as what the court termed “narrowing characteristics” independent of any harm.

The court further questioned the logic behind the agency’s restrictive view of circularity: “The purpose of asylum and withholding is to provide relief to people who have been persecuted in foreign lands because of their race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion…The Government and dissent do not explain why a person seeking relief on the basis of membership in a particular social group should be required to omit any mention of threatened persecution.”

One additional point worth mentioning is that the Ninth Circuit looked to UNHCR materials for guidance, noting that the BIA has found UNHCR’s views to be “a useful interpretive aid.”

The Ninth Circuit’s decision should certainly be applauded by asylum advocates.  The court joined the First and Sixth Circuits in rejecting the reliance on Matter of A-B- as a basis for swiftly dismissing domestic violence claims.

But this litigation could have been avoided through the BIA properly doing its job.  The petitioner in this case endured four years of abuse at the hands of her tormentor.  She was forced by him to work without pay in the coffee fields as well as to have sex with him.  She was further subjected to weekly beatings, suffering bruises that sometimes lasted for 10 days.

The petitioner actually escaped to the U.S., where she was detained for a month and then deported back to Guatemala.  There, she was forced to return to her abuser when he threatened to otherwise kill her and her daughter and harm her mother.  Upon return, she was subjected to even worse abuse for another year.

And yet an appellate immigration judge with the BIA saw in this case an opportunity for a quick denial with no analysis, on the grounds that the particular social group that had been valid for four years now contained a few more words than the AG approved of.  This sadly demonstrates the present philosophy of the BIA, where the goal of achieving quick dismissals has usurped the need for reasoned analysis and due process.

The petitioner was represented by students and supervising counsel with the Hastings Appellate Project, an advocacy clinic of the University of California – Hastings College of Law.  Amicus briefs were filed by the Center for Gender and Refugee Studies, the Round Table of Former Immigration Judges, Harvard Law School’s Immigration and Refugee Clinical Programs, and UNHCR.  Special mention is due to Blaine Bookey at CGRS, who so ably argued the case remotely.

The Round Table expresses its gratitude to attorneys Richard W. Mark, Amer S. Ahmed. Grace E. Hart, and Cassarah M. Chu of the law firm of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP for their invaluable assistance.

Notes:

  1. The Petitioner was ineligible to apply for asylum because she was subject to reinstatement of a prior order of removal.
  2. I believe a strong argument can be made that Matter of A-B- more closely  resembled a policy announcement (which should be applied prospectively only) than a judicial interpretation of the law that would apply retroactively.
  3. There is actually an exception to this rule, that we need not go into here.
  4. In De Pena Paniagua v. Barr, the First Circuit in April explained that there may be other reasons one could be unable to leave their domestic relationship that are unrelated to persecution.

Copyright 2020 Jeffrey S. Chase.  All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission.

 

****************************************

While the Supremes and other Federal Courts continue to live in their “alternate universe,” most of the rest of us have noticed that the Trump regime is completely unapologetic and undeterred by their frequent defeats in Federal Court. There are no consequences, and therefore no deterrents, for their lies, misrepresentations, unprofessionalism, racist bias, and contempt for the American justice system. Nobody loses a law license, nobody goes to jail, nobody is required to operate under meaningful court supervision. Appalling misconduct and contemptuous behavior is normalized. “Just commit the same abuse again with a slightly different rationale” has become the watchword. The Supremes have shown they will accept any fraudulent rationale from Trump and his toadies as long as it gives them “some cover” for systemic abuses of people of color.

I’d say that Billy Bigot actually treats the Article IIIs almost like he treats the Immigration Courts – as his toady subordinates. And, he pretty much gets away with it! Contempt for Congress and the Courts is the heart of the “Unitary Executive” pushed by Billy and his neo-fascist cronies. And, until the Article IIIs find the collective backbone to “just say no,” the “Unitary Executive” is going to continue to run roughshod over them while our democracy.

Due Process Forever! Complicit Courts Never!

PWS

08-11-20

 

 

🛡⚔️🗽👍🏼🇺🇸ROUND TABLE SLAMS LATEST BOGUS “KILL ASYLUM” PROPOSED REGS IN COMMENTS TO REGIME!

Knightess
Knightess of the Round Table
Jeffrey S. Chase
Hon. Jeffrey S. Chase
Jeffrey S. Chase Blog
Coordinator & Chief Spokesperson, Round Table of Former Immigration Judges

Comments – Security Bar (COVID) Asylum Reg (PDF)

The Round Table of Former Immigration Judges is composed of 46 former Immigration Judges and Appellate Immigration Judges of the Board of Immigration Appeals. We were appointed and served under both Republican and Democratic administrations. We have centuries of combined experience adjudicating asylum applications and appeals. Our members include nationally- respected experts on asylum law; many regularly lecture at law schools and conferences and author articles on the topic.

We view the proposed rule as an improper attempt to legislate through rule making. The proposed rule is inconsistent with Congressional intent and with our nation’s obligations under international law. The rule is also overly broad, and as worded, could be applied to virtually anyone. It requires determinations to be made based on pure speculation by officials lacking any required expertise in the subject. And the rule fails to consider much lesser, more humane approaches to address the issue.

. . . .

************************

Read our complete comment at the above link.

Gimmicks, cruelty, illegally, gimmicks, cruelty, illegality. Over and over the regime targets asylum seekers with “crimes against humanity.”

Although all DHS statistics should be regarded as suspect, the recent assertions that the regime”s killer tactics are protecting America against COVID appear particularly bogus — especially given the Trump regime’s gross failure to protect Americans from the pandemic and the frequent myths and false claims blabbered by Trump in a pathetic attempt to downplay the disaster caused by his stupidity and malicious incompetence.

The net result of all these “Miller-hatched” cruel gimmicks to eliminate legal immigration (without legislative authority) appears to be steadily increasing levels of extralegal immigration. And that’s just the folks who get caught. Who knows how many get through and simply get lost in the interior?  So, instead of a rational legal immigration and refugee system that encourages screening, testing where necessary, taxpaying, and data collection, thanks to the stupidity and cruelty of Trump and Miller, the fecklessness of Congress, and the complicity of the Supremes, we have created a larger than ever extralegal immigration system. 

Diminishing ourselves as a nation,🤮 won’t stop human migration🗽!

PWS

08|10-20

🛡⚔️⚖️🗽😎GOOD NEWS, AS ROUND TABLE BESTS BIA AGAIN: 9th Cir. Zaps BIA’s Denial Of Guatemalan Woman’s Asylum & CAT Cases Involving Matter of A-B-! — Diaz-Reynoso v. Barr

Sontos, 9th 18-72833_Documents

Diaz-Reynoso v. Barr, 9th Cir., 08-07-20, published

 

SYNOPSIS BY COURT STAFF:

 

Immigration

Granting Sontos Diaz-Reynoso’s petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision affirming the denial of her application for withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture, and remanding, the panel held that the Board misapplied Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018), as well as Board and circuit precedent, in concluding that Diaz-Reynoso’s proposed social group comprised of “indigenous women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship” was not cognizable, and that she failed to establish that the government of Guatemala would acquiesce in any possible torture.

The panel rejected Diaz-Reynoso’s contention that Matter of A-B- was arbitrary and capricious and therefore not entitled to Chevron deference. The panel concluded that, despite the general and descriptive observations set forth in the opinion, Matter of A-B- did not announce a new categorical exception to withholding of removal for victims of domestic violence or other private criminal activity, but rather it reaffirmed the Board’s existing framework for analyzing the cognizability of particular social groups, requiring that such determinations be individualized and conducted on a case-by-case basis.

The panel observed that the Board rejected Diaz- Reynoso’s proposed social group, with almost no analysis,

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

 

Case: 18-72833, 08/07/2020, ID: 11780830, DktEntry: 100-1, Page 3 of 76

DIAZ-REYNOSO V. BARR 3

because it “suffered from the same circularity problem articulated by the Attorney General in Matter of A-B-.” The panel explained that in doing so, the Board appeared to misapprehend the scope of Matter of A-B- as forbidding any mention of feared harm within the delineation of a proposed social group. The panel concluded that this was error, explaining that Matter of A-B- did not announce a new rule concerning circularity, but instead merely reiterated the well- established principle that a particular social group must exist independently of the harm asserted. The panel recognized that a proposed social group may be deemed impermissibly circular if, after conducting the proper case-by-case analysis, the Board determines that the group is defined exclusively by the fact that its members have been subjected to harm. The panel explained, however, that a proposed social group is not impermissibly circular merely because the proposed group mentions harm.

The panel concluded that the Board also erred in assuming that domestic violence was the only reason Diaz- Reynoso was unable to leave her relationship, and in failing to conduct the rigorous case-by-case analysis required by Matter of A-B-. The panel therefore remanded Diaz- Reynoso’s withholding of removal claim for the Board to undertake the required analysis applying the correct framework.

Because the Board failed to discuss evidence that Diaz- Reynoso reported her husband’s abuse to authority figures in her village community, and the government conceded remand was warranted, the panel also remanded Diaz-Reynoso’s CAT claim for further consideration.

4 DIAZ-REYNOSO V. BARR

Concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, Judge Bress agreed with remand of the CAT claim in light of the government’s concession, but disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that the Board misread Matter of A-B- in rejecting Diaz-Reynoso’s proposed social group. In Judge Bress’s view, Matter of A-B- held that a proposed group that incorporates harm within its definition is not a group that exists independently of the harm asserted in an application for asylum or statutory withholding of removal. Judge Bress wrote that substantial evidence supported the Board’s assessment that Diaz-Reynoso’s social group was defined exclusively by the harm suffered, and that the Board correctly applied Matter of A-B-, and the circularity rule, in rejecting Diaz-Reynoso’s proposed social group.

COUNSEL:

Gary A. Watt, Stephen Tollafield, and Tiffany J. Gates, Supervising Counsel; Shandyn H. Pierce and Hilda Kajbaf, Certified Law Students; Hastings Appellate Project, San Francisco, California; for Petitioner.

Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney General; John S. Hogan and Linda S. Wernery, Assistant Directors; Susan Bennett Green, Senior Litigation Counsel; Ashley Martin, Trial Attorney; Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; for Respondent.

Blaine Bookey, Karen Musalo, Neela Chakravartula, and Anne Peterson, Center for Gender & Refugee Studies, U.S. Hastings College of Law, San Francisco, California, for Amicus Curiae Center for Gender & Refugee Studies.

Richard W. Mark, Amer S. Ahmed, Grace E. Hart, and Cassarah M. Chu, Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP, New York New York, for Amici Curiae Thirty-Nine Former Immigration Judges and Members of the Board of Immigration Appeals.

Sabrineh Ardalan, Nancy Kelly, John Willshire Carrera, Deborah Anker, and Zachary A. Albun, Attorneys; Rosa Baum, Caya Simonsen, and Ana Sewell, Supervised Law Students; Harvard Immigration and Refugee Clinical Program, Cambridge, Massachusetts; for Amicus Curiae Harvard Immigration and Refugee Clinical Program.

Ana C. Reyes and Alexander J. Kasner, Williams & Connolly LLP, Washington, D.C.; Alice Farmer, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Washington, D.C.; for Amicus Curiae United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

PANEL: Ronald M. Gould, Morgan Christen, and Daniel A. Bress, Circuit Judges.

OPINION BY: Judge Cristen

CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINION: Judge Bress

************************************

Just another example of how under this regime, EOIR’s perverted efforts to deny and deport, especially targeting female asylum seekers from the Northern Triangle for mistreatment and potential deportation to death, waste time and effort that could, in a wiser more just Administration, be used to reduce dockets and waiting times by ensuring that well-documented, deserving cases like this one are rapidly granted. EOIR’s biased performance also reeks of both anti-Latino racism and misogyny. Here we are, two decades into the 21st Century with our immigration “justice” system still being driven by invidious factors.

The Supremes’ majority may feign ignorance and or indifference to Trump’s and Miller’s overtly racist immigration agenda. But, those of us working in the field of immigration had it figured out long ago. It’s not rocket science! The Trumpsters make little or no real attempt to hide their scofflaw intent and invidious motives. It has, disgustingly, taken a concerted and disingenuous effort by the Supremes’ majority to sweep these unconstitutional attacks on humanity under the carpet.

That’s why we need “regime change” in both the Executive and the Senate which will lead to the appointment of better judges for a better America. Justices and judges who will ditch the institutionalized racism and misogyny and who will make equal justice for all under our Constitution a reality rather than the cruel hoax and “throwaway line” that it is today under GOP mis-governance.

Many thanks to our good friends and pro bono counsel at Gibson Dunn for the help in drafting our Amicus Brief!

Knightess
Knightess of the Round Table

 

Due Process Forever!

 

PWS

 

08-07-20

 

 

 

 

🛡⚔️⚖️🗽 ROUND TABLE ASSISTS FIGHT AGAINST “AMERICA’S STAR CHAMBERS” — Here’s Our Amicus Brief In Las Americas v. Trump! — With Thanks To Our Pro Bono Friends STOLL STOLL BERNE LOKTING & SHLACHTER P.C. in Portland, OR!

Jeffrey S. Chase
Hon. Jeffrey S. Chase
Jeffrey S. Chase Blog
Coordinator & Chief Spokesperson, Round Table of Former Immigration Judges

Excerpt:

The immigration court system lacks independence. An agency within the Department of Justice, the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) houses the immigration court system, which consists of trial-level immigration courts and a single appellate tribunal known as the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). Immigration judges, including appellate immigration judges, are viewed by EOIR “management” not as judges, but as Department of Justice attorneys who serve at the pleasure and direction of the Nation’s prosecutor-in-chief, the Attorney General.

As former immigration judges, we offer the Court our experience and urge that corrective action is necessary to ensure that immigration judges are permitted to function as impartial adjudicators, as required under the Immigration and Nationality Act. The INA and its implementing regulations set forth procedures for the “timely, impartial, and consistent” resolution of immigration proceedings. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1103, 1230; 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1) (charging the Board with appellate review authority to “resolve the questions before it in a manner that is timely, impartial, and consistent with the [INA] and regulations”) (emphasis added); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(b) (similarly requiring “immigration judges . . . to resolve the questions before them in a timely and impartial manner”) (emphasis added).

Although housed inside an enforcement agency and led by the Nation’s chief prosecutor, immigration judges must act neutrally to protect and adjudicate the important rights at stake in immigration cases and check executive overreach in the enforcement of federal immigration law. Applying a detached and learned interpretation of those laws, judges must correct overzealous bureaucrats and policy makers when they overstep the bounds of reasonable interpretation and the requirements of due process.

Here’s the full brief:

Las Americas Amicus (full case)

************************

As I often say, it’s an honor to be a part of this group with so many of my wonderful colleagues. It’s also an honor to be able to assist so many wonderful “divisions and brigades” of the New Due Process Army, like the SPLC and Immigration Law Lab.

Here’s another thought I often express: What if all of this talent, creativity, teamwork, expertise, and energy were devoted to fixing our broken Immigration Court System rather than constantly fighting to end gross abuses that should not be happening? There is a “systemic cost” to “maliciously incompetent” administration and the White Nationalist agenda promoted by the Trump kakistocracy!

Knightess
Knightess of the Round Table

Due Process Forever!

PWS

08-04-20

🏴‍☠️🔨DO IT YOURSELF CORNER: Billy The Bigot Barr Tells You How To Design & Build Your Own “Aggravated Felony” — No Knowledge Or Tools Required — All You Need Is Some Unsustainable Charges, Evil 🦹🏿‍♂️ Imagination, & The Willingness To Ignore The Law To Start Your Very Own Deportation Factory!  — Family Fun For Everyone! — Matter of Reyes

Matter of REYES, 28 I&N Dec. 52 (A.G. 2020)

 

The Attorney General has issued a decision in Matter of REYES, 28 I&N Dec. 52 (A.G. 2020).

HEADNOTE:

(1) If all of the means of committing a crime, based on the elements of the statute of conviction, amount to one or more of the offenses listed in section 101(a)(43) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(43), then an alien who has been convicted of that crime has necessarily been convicted of an aggravated felony for purposes of the INA.

(2) The respondent’s conviction for grand larceny in the second degree under New York Penal Law § 155.40(1) qualifies as a conviction for an aggravated felony for purposes of the INA. DHS charged that the respondent had been convicted of either aggravated-felony theft or aggravated-felony fraud, as defined in section 101(a)(43)(G) and (M)(i) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) and (M)(i). Larceny by acquiring lost property constitutes aggravated-felony theft, and the parties do not dispute that the other means of violating the New York statute correspond to either aggravated-felony theft or aggravated-felony fraud.

******************************

The DHS has the burden of proving removability. The DHS charges two distinct aggravated felonies. At trial and on appeal to the BIA, DHS can sustain neither charge. Therefore, according to Billy, to make the respondent removable, Immigration Judges should look for the generic elements of the respondent’s crime in any of the separate sections defining “aggravated felony” and combine them as necessary to create a new aggravated felony. 

In other words, even if the respondent has not committed any listed “aggravated felony” under the so-called “categorical approach,” the judge must rewrite the statute as necessary to create new aggravated felonies that overcome the shortcomings and limitations of the actual statutory language used by Congress. The judge need not find that the respondent was convicted of any particular aggravated felony listed in the statute. It is enough that he or she committed the elements of some generic crime that would be some aggravated felony if we rewrote the definition as we think it should have been written to maximize deportations.

As my friends and colleagues Judge Jeffrey S. Chase (Jeffrey S. Chase Blog) and Dan Kowalski (LexisNexis Immigration Community) pointed out to me, this is not the first time that a GOP AG has decided to “diss” the Federal Courts by attempting to rewrite the “categorical approach” out of existence. AG Mukasey tried something similar with crimes involving moral turpitude during the Bush II Administration in Matter of Silva-Trevino, 24 I&N Dec. 24 I&N Dec. 608 (A.G. 2006). The Federal Courts didn’t agree, and Attorney General Eric Holder eventually vacated Mukasey’s lousy decision. http://www.immigrantdefenseproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/AG-Order-Vacating-Silva-Trevino-2015.pdf

All of us who believe in due process and equal justice should look forward to a day when a future Attorney General and/or Congress will vacate all of the misguided, biased, anti-immigrant “precedents” by Billy the Bigot, Gonzo Apocalypto, and Whitaker and thereby restore some semblance of fairness, normalcy, and predictability to the law. In the meantime, we’ll see whether Billy’s attempt to undo the “categorical approach” fares any better than Mukasey’s with the Federal Courts.

Litigate litigate, litigate! It’s important that the Federal Courts feel and see the pain caused by the DOJ’s biased rewriting of established principles of immigration law to create unnecessary controversies where there previously were none. Immigration law has never been short of legitimate controversies for litigation. But this regime’s unprecedented attempt to rewrite immigration law by fiat has upset those areas that previously were settled, thereby creating new waves of avoidable litigation and controversy where previously there was some agreement and efficiency. No wonder the Immigration Court backlog has mushroomed out of control. Sadly, the regime’s maliciously incompetent approach to the Immigration Courts resembles its maliciously incompetent approach to the COVID-19 pandemic. Basically a total disaster!

I also credit Jeffrey with the “Do It Yourself” observation. Or, as Dan pointed out, Billy’s approach could be called “Tinker Toy Analysis” or  “Legoland Analysis.”

Due Process Forever!

PWS

07-31-20

🏴‍☠️☠️⚰️👎🤮KAKISTOCRACY KORNER:  Chase, Schmidt Rip Billy The Bigot’s Appointment Of Hate Grouper To Arlington “Bench” – Failed System Drops All Pretenses Of Fairness & Due Process As Feckless Congress & Complicit Article IIIs Flunk Constitutional Duties! –

 

https://www.law360.com/immigration/articles/1293543/ex-fair-research-director-among-46-new-immigration-judges

Hannah Albarazi
Hannah Albarazi
Federal Courts
Reporter
Law360
Jeffrey S. Chase
Hon. Jeffrey S. Chase
Jeffrey S. Chase Blog
Coordinator & Chief Spokesperson, Round Table of Retired Immigration Judges
Me
Me

Ex-FAIR Research Director Among 46 New Immigration Judges

By Hannah Albarazi

. . . .

“It would be impossible for one to receive a fair hearing before Matthew O’Brien,” Jeffrey Chase, a New York City immigration lawyer and former immigration judge, told Law360. Chase said O’Brien has expressed a view of asylum law that is at odds with the controlling circuit case law that he would be tasked with applying from the bench.

Chase said O’Brien has “basically spouted propaganda for an organization openly hostile to immigration.”

His appointment, Chase said, shows that the Trump administration doesn’t want a fair and independent immigration court and is proof that the Executive Office for Immigration Review needs to be taken out of the control of the Department of Justice, an enforcement agency.

The administration “has repeatedly emphasized to classes of new immigration judges that they are above all employees of the attorney general, who does not believe most asylum seekers are deserving of protection,” Chase said.

These appointments could negatively impact the immigration courts for decades, Chase said.

Paul Wickham Schmidt, a retired U.S. immigration judge who chaired the Board of Immigration Appeals in the Clinton administration, also slammed the recent wave of appointments.

“The idea that these are the 46 best qualified individuals in America to discharge these awesome responsibilities in a fair, impartial and expert manner, in furtherance of due process of law and with recognition of the human rights and human dignity of the individuals whose lives are at stake, is beyond preposterous. It’s a fraud on American justice,” Schmidt told Law360.

Schmidt didn’t mince his words about O’Brien’s appointment either.

“As someone who has helped FAIR spread its racially biased, anti-immigrant, and anti-asylum propaganda and false narratives, O’Brien is not qualified to be a fair and impartial quasi-judicial decision maker as required by the due process clause of our Constitution,” Schmidt said.

.  .  . .

**********************************

Those with Law360 access can read Hannah’s complete article at the link.

The U.S. Justice system, once the envy of free nations throughout the world, is disintegrating before our eyes. If there is no justice for those whose lives are at stake, there will be no justice for any of us in the Trump/Barr Third World kakistocracy.

Due Process Forever! Corrupt & Feckless Institutions Parodying Justice, Never!

 

PWS

 

07-21-20

🛡⚔️⚖️ROUND TABLE RIPS REGIME’S FRAUDULENT PROPOSED REGS ELIMINATING ASYLUM IN 36-PAGE COMMENTARY — “The proposed rules are impermissibly arbitrary and capricious. They attempt to overcome, as opposed to interpret, the clear meaning of our asylum statutes.”

Knightess
Knightess of the Round Table

Asylum Ban Reg Comments_July 2020_FINAL

INTRODUCTION

In their introduction, the proposed regulations misstate the Congressional intent behind our asylum laws.2 Since 1980, our nation’s asylum laws are neither an expression of foreign policy nor an assertion of the right to protect resources or citizens. It is for this reason that the notice of proposed rulemaking must cite a case from 1972 that did not address asylum at all in order to find support for its claim.

The intent of Congress in enacting the 1980 Refugee Act was to bring our country’s asylum laws into accordance with our international treaty obligations, specifically by eliminating the above- stated biases from such determinations. For the past 40 years, our laws require us to grant asylum to all who qualify regardless of foreign policy or other concerns. Furthermore, the international treaties were intentionally left broad enough in their language to allow adjudicators flexibility to provide protection in response to whatever types of harm creative persecutors might de- vise. In choosing to adopt the precise language of those treaties, Congress adopted the same flexibility. See e.g. Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64 (1804), pursuant to which national statutes should be interpreted in such a way as to not conflict with international laws.

The proposed rules are impermissibly arbitrary and capricious. They attempt to overcome, as opposed to interpret, the clear meaning of our asylum statutes. Rather than interpret the views of Congress, the proposed rules seek to replace them in furtherance of the strongly anti-immigrant views of the administration they serve.3 And that they seek to do so in an election year, for political gain, is clear.

In attempting to stifle clear Congressional intent in service of its own political motives, the ad- ministration has proposed rules that are ultra vires to the statute.

*****************

Read our full comment at the above link.

Special thanks to the following Round Table Team that took the lead in drafting this comment (listed alphabetically):

Judge Jeffrey Chase

Judge Bruce Einhorn

Judge Rebecca Jamil

Judge Carol King

Judge Lory Diana Rosenberg

Judge Ilyce Shugall

Due Process Forever! Crimes Against Humanity, Never!

PWS

07-14-20

HON. JEFFREY S. CHASE @ LAW360 — Analysis of Thuraissigiam v. Barr — Supremes Put Trump’s Known Human Rights Abusers on “Honor System” In Summarily Disposing of Asylum Seekers’ Lives — Because Due Process Doesn’t Mean Anything When Justices Live in The Ivory Tower & Can’t See “The Other” As Humans Whose Existence Has Meaning & Value!

Jeffrey S. Chase
Hon. Jeffrey S. Chase
Jeffrey S. Chase Blog
Coordinator & Chief Spokesperson, Round Table of Retired Immigration Judges

Read it from the Jeffrey S. Chase Blog here:

https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2020/6/29/justices-asylum-ruling-further-limits-migrant-protections

*******************

Easy to see why ending racism and applying the crystal clear Constitutional requirement of due process and equal justice for all persons in the U.S. has been so hard to achieve! Achieving would start with Justices who actually believe in the Constitution!

What if Justices believed “that all Men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness?”  While some might find these rights to be “self-evident,” not so much the majority of current Supremes’ Justices who apparently believe asylum seekers to be something less than human.

The Dred Scott decision is no longer good law. When will we get Justices who unanimously stop applying it to immigrants and asylum seekers in our country?

It isn’t rocket science. You either believe in equal justice under law, as required by our Constitution, or you don’t. Just how did so many “nonbelievers” in the Constitution make it to our highest Constitutional Court?

PWS

07-01-20

 

🏴‍☠️☠️👎🏻🤮CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: HOW AMERICA IS DISGRACED BY A CORRUPT, RACIST, WHITE NATIONALIST REGIME THAT HAS LAUNCHED A COWARDLY & ILLEGAL ATTACK DESIGNED TO KILL ASYLUM SEEKERS — Hon. Jeffrey S. Chase, “Taking a Sledgehammer to Asylum”

Jeffrey S. Chase
Hon. Jeffrey S. Chase
Jeffrey S. Chase Blog
Coordinator & Chief Spokesperson, Round Table of Retired Immigration Judges

https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2020/6/23/taking-a-sledgehammer-to-asylum

Taking a Sledgehammer to Asylum

The Trump Administration has repeatedly acted to damage our country’s asylum laws.  Its latest move, expressed in 161 pages of proposed regulations, does so with a sledgehammer.  The proposal claims that “as an expression of a nation’s foreign policy, the laws and policies surrounding asylum are an assertion of a government’s right and duty to protect its own resources and citizens, while aiding those in true need of protection from harm.”  Note how “aiding those in true need of protection from harm” comes last.  The proposal supports the preceding statement with a case that not only had nothing to do with asylum, but predated by eight years the enactment of the 1980 Refugee Act, which continues to serve as our country’s law of asylum.

It was necessary to reach back so far because the Refugee Act actually stands for the opposite proposition, placing the protection of those in need above foreign policy considerations.  The Refugee Act replaced our Cold War-influenced refugee preferences with an obligation to provide protection to those from any country fearing persecution on account of their race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.

The Department of Justice tried to limit the impact of this monumental change at its outset by interpreting the new legal standard as restrictively as possible.  In 1987, the Supreme Court rejected the Department’s interpretation of the term “well-founded fear,” finding that the meaning the Department applied to the term was not the one intended by Congress.  The Court found it clear that the primary purpose of Congress was to bring U.S. law into conformity with the 1967 Protocol on the Status of Refugees.  It therefore looked for guidance to UNHCR and legal scholars, and concluded that the standard passed by Congress allowed for as little as a ten percent chance of persecution in order to merit asylum.

More than three decades later, District Court Judge Emmet G. Sullivan put a stop to the Department’s attempt to exclude victims of domestic violence and gang violence from asylum protection at the credible fear stage.  In a lengthy, detailed decision whose reasoning the Sixth Circuit recently adopted for full asylum determinations, the court reiterated that Congress, and not the Attorney General, creates our asylum laws, and that Congress intended for those laws to conform to the Protocol’s more expansive view.

It was because of that more expansive view that the Protocol, and its predecessor, the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees, avoided the type of strict definitions the proposed regulations seek to impose.  One renowned scholar explained the drafters’ intent “to introduce a flexible concept which might be applied to circumstances as they might arise; or in other words, that they capitulated before the inventiveness of humanity to think up new ways of persecuting fellow men.”1  It is this built-in flexibility that the latest proposal takes exception to.

Of course, it is still Congress, and not the executive branch, that enacts our asylum laws.  And should the present proposal become a final rule before this administration is done, it will be the reassertion of that reality by the courts that will save those seeking refuge here.

I plan to address the different sections of the proposals in installments.  I begin with the proposal to redefine “political opinion.”

The last few months have taught us that, under the Trump Administration, everything is political.  Even the decision to wear a mask and self-isolate out of consideration to our neighbors has been cast as an expression of political opinion.  The virus itself was first depicted as a Democratic hoax; once its existence could no longer be denied, it had to be given a nationality and portrayed as part of a foreign plot.  This is a virus we are talking about.

The Administration saw political allies in armed and angry mobs who somehow portrayed temporary rules designed to protect us all by slowing the spread of disease as a denial of their basic human rights.  And then the same administration branded as political enemies those protesting the very real and systemically ingrained deprivation of their basic human rights solely because of the color of their skin.  The irony is not lost in this very same government that politicizes everything now imposing a very narrow, strict view of what can be called political opinion for asylum purposes.

Regulations may define or clarify laws, but may not rewrite them.  And the courts need only defer to the Department’s interpretation where the language of the law itself is ambiguous.  Courts may go to great lengths and employ all tools of construction at their disposal before deeming a statute ambiguous.

Looking to the Refugee Act, the courts will find that  in the 40 years since its passage, the only amendment relating to its definition of political opinion expanded the meaning of that term.  In 1996, the Republican-controlled Congress amended the refugee definition to read that coercive abortion and sterilization procedures constitute persecution on account of the victim’s political opinion.  Neither the wording of the statute nor its application by the BIA require any inquiry into the motives or beliefs of the victim of the coercive family planning policy.  In other words, a woman need not declare in an online manifesto that she will become pregnant as a statement of protest against an oppressive government’s policy.  One at risk of abortion for any pregnancy by law fears persecution on account of her political opinion.

The proposed regulations acknowledge this.  However, they fail to reconcile how the rest of the proposed language on this topic, the first attempt ever to restrict by either statute or regulation what may constitute a political opinion, is consistent with Congress’s adoption of such an expansive view of political opinion to allow even an accidental pregnancy to satisfy the term’s definition.

The Department provides a weak justification for interjecting itself into the matter in the first place, claiming that the evolving state of case law makes it just too difficult for immigration judges to apply the law consistently.  Any pretense of providing clarification vanishes upon attempting to decipher the proposed guidance on the topic.  Under the proposed rule, immigration judges, asylum officers, and the BIA will be precluded from granting asylum based on a political opinion “defined solely by generalized disapproval of, disagreement with, or opposition to criminal, terrorist, gang, guerilla, or other non-state organizations absent expressive behavior in furtherance of a cause against such organizations related to efforts by the state to control such organizations or behavior that is antithetical to or otherwise opposes the ruling legal entity of the state or a legal sub-unit of the state.”  What could be clearer than that?

As its sole example of the confusion that purportedly warrants the administration stepping in, the proposal cites two recent decisions.  The first (which we can assume the administration doesn’t like) is the Second Circuit’s recent decision in Hernandez-Chacon v. Barr, holding that in resisting rape by an MS-13 member, the asylum applicant expressed “her opposition to the male-dominated social norms in El Salvador and her taking a stance against a culture that perpetuates female subordination and the brutal treatment of women.”

The other case referenced was a 15 year old Fourth Circuit decision, Saldarriaga v. Gonzales, which the Department describes as holding that “disapproval of a drug cartel is not a political opinion.”  In its attempt to demonstrate that immigration judges sitting in the jurisdictions of the Second and Fourth Circuits might reach different results, the Department conveniently omits a much more recent Fourth Circuit decision, Alvarez Lagos v. Barr, which found unrefuted evidence that the Barrio 18 gang imputed an anti-gang political opinion to the asylum-seeker’s nonpayment of extortion and flight to the U.S.  Including that decision would have cleared up the purported confusion used to justify the new rules, so the proposal simply ignored it.

But even accepting the Department’s view that different circuits might take different views on this topic, and that somehow, it’s the responsibility of someone like Stephen Miller, as opposed to the Supreme Court, to resolve such conflict, would applying that garbled definition cited above (and no, it does not become clearer with repeated reading) change the outcome of Hernandez-Chacon?  Because in the view of the court, the asylum applicant in that case did not simply express a generalized disapproval of a gang.  Her opposition to systemic injustice perpetuating brutality against women, who are viewed as a subordinate class, is an expression of something much larger, in which the government is implicated.

Grasping at additional straws, the Department also pointed to one sentence in a BIA decision from 1996, Matter of S-P-, stating the need in that case to examine whether the persecutors were motivated at least in part by their belief that the asylum applicant held political views “antithetical to the government.”  This, according to the administration, is proof that only views antithetical to the government can be political opinion.  However, in that case, the asylum seeker had been arrested, detained for six months, interrogated, and tortured by the government, specifically, government soldiers.  So in determining whether such persecution was on account of the applicant’s political opinion, in that particular case, the Board obviously focused on whether those soldiers thought the victims views were anti-government.  The sentence in no way intended to state that under all circumstances must political opinion be one that is directly aimed at the government.  By analogy, the BIA didn’t say that only women can be members of particular social groups because in one gender-based case, it analyzed whether the social group elements were “fundamental to the individual identity of a young woman.”  See Matter of Kasinga, 21 I&N Dec. 357, 366 (BIA 1996).  The point is, the Board used the language necessary to decide the case before it, and for the Department to now pretend otherwise is disingenuous.

Note:

  1.  Atle Grahl-Madsen, The Status of Refugees in International Law 193 (1966).

Copyright 2020 Jeffrey S. Chase.  All rights reserved.

Republished with permission.

*****************

A nation’s inhumanity to others, allowing unqualified individuals like Stephen Miller to make policy, and moral cowardice will have severe future consequences. 

PWS

06-24-20