JEFFREY S. CHASE | OPINIONS/ANALYSIS ON IMMIGRATION LAW
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Asylum in the Time of M-R-M-S-
Introduction
In 2017, while Matter of L-E-A-1 was pending before the BIA, I attended an immigration law conference at which Professor Jon Bauer posed the following “thought experiment”:
A Nazi official threatens to kill all the Jews in a town unless a Jewish criminal, who has committed several robberies and murders and is suspected to be hiding in the area, is turned over to the authorities or turns himself in.
Is this persecution on account of religion?
The answer is obviously yes. Those in the town find themselves at risk of persecution on account of their religion. It would seem impossible for anyone possessing knowledge of our asylum laws (or just plain common sense) not to understand this.
However, with its decision in Matter of M-R-M-S-,2 the Board of Immigration Appeals has managed to create a test for nexus that would lead to the opposite conclusion.
One reaction to this decision would have involved explaining that the Board’s illogical holding was reached not by error but by design, in furtherance of a restrictionist agenda; asking why the current administration hasn’t changed the makeup of a BIA specifically constructed to do exactly that; bemoaning the fact that regulations that are more than two years overdue could have prevented this; and suggesting that the correct course of action for the Attorney General to take at this point would be to vacate this decision in anticipation of said forthcoming rulemaking.
But such talk would be of no practical help. What those representing asylum applicants and those in government deciding those claims need now is a path to negotiate this latest obstacle and still reach the correct result. I hope that some of what follows will prove helpful, and that it will encourage further thought and conversation on this topic.
Legal Strategies in light of M-R-M-S-
- Distinguish your case based on the facts
In M-R-M-S-, the Board chose for its precedent a case surprisingly devoid of facts. The entire factual summary consists of three sentences. A criminal cartel forced the respondents off of their land “because the cartel wanted the land for its own purpose. The cartel killed the lead respondent’s grandson for unknown reasons, although the respondents believe it was related to the cartel’s efforts to obtain their land. The cartel also forced other families off of land in the same area.”
This summary makes no mention of how family membership might have been a factor; it only says the cartel wanted the land for its own unstated purpose. It can be argued that the decision simply establishes that cases asserting mixed motives need to present more than one motive.
Instead, the Board leaped to a much broader and more damaging conclusion that wasn’t even suggested by the above facts, namely, that targeting members of a family for purposes of achieving another non-protected ground renders the family membership “incidental or subordinate,” and thus lacking the nexus required for asylum or withholding of removal protection.
Tip: Distinguish your facts from those in M-R-M-S-.
Emphasize how family or another protected ground played a significant role in the applicant being targeted for persecution. Note that merely mentioning that other family members were also harmed does not in itself establish a nexus on account of family membership.
Tip: Employ the Board’s test in Matter of S-P- when applicable.
In Matter of S-P-,3, the BIA looked at when government prosecution might actually be persecution on account of political opinion. And one of the warning signs it mentioned occurs when the punishment is clearly out of proportion to the conduct in question. So under S-P-’s test, if someone charged with jaywalking is detained at length and beaten by the police, the reasonable conclusion is that the punishment wasn’t actually about the jaywalking.
One can transpose this approach to the particular social group consisting of family by arguing that the same logic applies to gang punishment for failing to pay extortion. Particularly where the amount being sought by the gang or cartel isn’t that much, when the response to the failure to pay is to threaten to severely harm or kill a family member of the target of extortion, a reasonable conclusion under S-P- would be that this isn’t simply about the money. A gang or cartel can seek a financial goal, but at the same time can develop an animosity against a family resistant to its demands.
Moving on, the use of the word “subordinate” in the Board’s most recent holding is of interest, for the following reasons.
- The fall and rise of the Board’s “subordination” criteria for nexus
In its first attempt to define the “one central reason” language adopted by Congress in 2005, the BIA in Matter of J-B-N- & S-M-4 recognized in the last paragraph of page 212 of that decision that the standard did not require a central reason to be “dominant” in relation to other reasons for persecution. In fact, in a footnote, the Board further explained: “The problem in classifying one motive as “dominant” or “central” is that it renders all other motives, regardless of their significance to the case, secondary and therefore ultimately irrelevant.”
Yet two pages after rejecting a hierarchical approach to nexus, the Board defined the new standard as a reason that “cannot be incidental, tangential, superficial, or subordinate to another reason for harm.”
The problem with the inclusion of the word “subordinate” is obvious. It means that once an adjudicator finds a reason they consider to be the dominant one, their inquiry is over, and, as the Board itself warned, all other motives become irrelevant.
The Third Circuit, in Ndayshimiye v. Attorney General of U.S.5 rejected the Board’s standard for precisely this reason: its use of the word “subordinate” was found by the court to be no different from the “dominance” test that the Board purported to reject. To quote the Third Circuit:
This plain language indicates that a persecutor may have more than one central motivation for his or her actions; whether one of those central reasons is more or less important than another is irrelevant. The BIA acknowledged this in refusing to define a central reason within the meaning of § 208 as a “dominant” motivation. Id. at 212. The same logic forbids an interpretation that would impose a mirror image of the rejected “dominance” test: the requirement that a protected ground, even if a “central” reason for persecution, not be subordinate to any other reason.
Interestingly, following this rejection of its standard, the BIA reacted by dropping the word “subordinate” from its stated legal standard. For example, in a subsequent (2011) precedent, Matter of N-M-, 6 the Board cited its earlier decision in J-B-N & S-M-, but made no mention of that case’s incidental/tangential/superficial/subordinate language at all. Rather, the Board said:
In cases arising under the REAL ID Act, the “protected ground cannot play a minor role in the alien’s past mistreatment or fears of future mistreatment.” Matter of J-B-N- & S-M-, 24 I&N Dec. at 214. Instead, a [noncitizen] must demonstrate that the persecutor would not have harmed the applicant if the protected trait did not exist.7
The italicized sentence states a “but for” causation standard which we will discuss further below. In fact, it seems to be an identical standard to that employed by the Fourth Circuit, whose approach the Board criticized in M-R-M-S-.
Years later, in the aforementioned Matter of L-E-A- (decided in 2017), the Board amended its earlier language in J-B-N- & S-N- as follows:
The protected trait, in this case membership in the respondent’s father’s family, “cannot play a minor role”—that is, “it cannot be incidental [or] tangential . . . to another reason for harm.”8
Notice how an ellipsis is used to drop the word “subordinate” from the definition. So the Board seemed to understand for quite some time that the legal standard it enunciated could not include a dominance test (although it would then proceed to apply a dominance test in practice, as numerous circuit court reversals have demonstrated)
But now, without explaining the reason for its sudden reversal, the Board has in M-R-M-S- reverted to its original flawed standard. Here’s the quote:
A protected ground that is “incidental, tangential, superficial, or subordinate to another reason for harm” does not satisfy this standard. Matter of J-B-N- & S-M-, 24 I&N Dec. at 214. 9
Furthermore, the Board chose to reassert its dominance requirement in a case in which the facts mention only one reason, and a vague one at that – that “the cartel wanted the land for its own purpose.” A dominance test is meaningless where there is only one reason asserted for the persecution.
But what if the revived dominance test were to be applied to Prof. Bauer’s hypothetical? Presumably, the Board would find the dominant reason for the threatened persecution to be the Nazi authorities’ desire to bring a criminal to justice. The targeting of the suspect’s coreligionists as a means to achieve that primary objective would, under the Board’s test, become “subordinate” to that goal, and would thus render the murdering of the town’s Jews “irrelevant.” Applying the Board’s “logic,” religion would not be one central reason for the murders.
As the above example demonstrates, the Board’s test will lead to truly absurd results. It is therefore not surprising that the Board’s standard is at odds with the approach of most circuits.
- The reinstituted dominance test conflicts with most circuit case law
Tip: Argue the inapplicability of M-R-M-S- where it conflicts with prevailing circuit law.
While not exhaustive, the following selection of circuit court case law should provide a basis for arguing that the Board’s standard for determining nexus is inapplicable in many courts located within the jurisdiction of those circuits
Third Circuit
It should certainly be argued in cases arising within the jurisdiction of the Third Circuit that the new decision’s reiteration of the exact legal standard that was rejected in Ndayshimiye (as discussed above) means that M-R-M-S- cannot be followed. The BIA actually recognized the conflict in footnote 6 of its decision, stating:
Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit generally agrees with the Board’s interpretation of the “one central reason” standard, it has rejected the requirement that a protected ground not be subordinate to another reason for harm. See Ndayshimiye v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 557 F.3d 124, 130–31 (3d Cir. 2009).
The Board thus seemed to acknowledge by way of this footnote the inapplicability of its decision in the Third Circuit.
Fourth Circuit
The BIA in M-R-M-S- does not contest that its requirement for nexus is at odds with the long-established “but for” standard employed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
In Hernandez-Avalos v. Lynch,10 the Fourth Circuit explained that even though a gang threatened the petitioner for the purpose of recruiting her son, the applicant was nevertheless targeted “on account of” her family ties because her “relationship to her son is why she, and not another person, was threatened….” The court has repeated the “why she, and not another person” test in other decisions.11
The Fourth Circuit has more recently pointed to an oft-repeated error of the Board in “incorrectly focusing on why the gang targeted Petitioner’s family, rather than on why they targeted Petitioner herself.”12 In another published decision, the Fourth Circuit stated that “‘once the right question is asked’ — that is, why was Petitioner being targeted — the conclusion is quite clear: ‘whatever [the gang]’s motives for targeting [her] family, [Petitioner herself] was targeted because of [her] membership in that family.’”13
The fact that the Board in M-R-M-S- states that it prefers the approach of the Tenth Circuit, which “does not agree with the Fourth Circuit’s approach,”14 does not change the fact that the standard enunciated in the above-captioned Fourth Circuit decisions remains the standard for nexus applicable in Immigration Courts and Asylum Offices located within that circuit’s jurisdiction.
Cases being heard remotely by an IJ located within the Fourth Circuit
A decision of the Fourth Circuit issued last year provides a strong argument for applying that court’s nexus standard in lieu of the M-R-M-S- approach in cases geographically outside of the circuit’s jurisdiction which are heard remotely by Immigration Judges sitting in Virginia, Maryland, or North Carolina.
In Herrera-Alcala v. Garland 15, the Fourth Circuit held that under a plain reading of the statute, jurisdiction is determined by the geographic location of the immigration judge at the time the judge completed the proceedings.
The BIA subsequently issued a conflicting precedential opinion, Matter of Garcia.16 But as the Fourth Circuit’s ruling in Herrera-Alcala was based on its clear reading of the statutory language, the lack of a finding of statutory ambiguity would preclude deference to the Board’s view under either Chevron or Brand X.
In cases in which the Immigration Judge is sitting within the Fourth Circuit while the respondent is appearing in an immigration court elsewhere, the argument should be made that Fourth Circuit case law should apply. Claims constructed using Fourth Circuit precedent should be presented below, as in case the claim is denied by the agency, the applicant will ultimately be able to seek review before the Fourth Circuit.
Cases arising under the jurisdiction of other circuits
Fifth Circuit
Outside of the obvious examples of the Third and Fourth Circuits, be highly aware of the case law of the prevailing circuit regarding nexus. Most circuits have rejected the Board’s approach to some degree. Furthermore, the BIA misrepresented the holdings in some of the circuit decisions it cited in M-R-M-S-, a point that should be brought to the attention of judges or asylum officers.
The Fifth Circuit provides us with an example. In M-R-M-S-, the BIA cited the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Guevara-Fabian v. Garland17 as an example of a court employing an analysis of nexus consistent with its own approach.18 However, the court in Guevara-Fabian simply found that there was substantial evidence that the petitioner was targeted “because she owned a profitable business,” and not due to her family membership. This is quite different from the Board’s holding that being targeted due to one’s family membership is insufficient to establish a nexus where such family-based targeting is used as a means to achieving another non-protected goal.
Furthermore, four days after the issuance of M-R-M-S-, the Fifth Circuit published its decision in Argueta-Hernandez v. Garland.19 The facts in that case did not involve a family-based particular social group, but in addressing the subject of nexus, the court’s opinion rejected the agency’s general approach of rejecting all but the dominant reason for persecution.
Specifically, the Fifth Circuit found that in concluding threats by MS-13 were motivated “by criminal intent, personal vendettas, or monetary gain, which do not establish the required nexus,” the BIA disregarded that the petitioner “needed only to present ‘some particularized connection between the feared persecution’ and the protected ground in which his application for relief relies.” The court then referenced an earlier decision in which it had rejected the Board’s employment of an “either-or” approach to nexus in a mixed motive case, and said that the Board had acted similarly here by suggesting that Argueta was targeted for economic reasons “instead” of for a protected ground.20
So in cases arising in the Fifth Circuit, it should be argued that Guevara-Fabian did not support the Board’s approach in M-R-M-S-, as it was distinguishable on its facts, and that the court’s subsequent rejection in Argueta-Hernandez of the type of dominance approach and “either-or” test employed in M-R-M-S- puts the Board’s view of nexus in conflict with circuit law.
Sixth Circuit
On December 8 (i.e. 7 days after the publication of M-R-M-S-), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit issued its decision in Sebastian-Sebastian v. Garland 21. In that case, the petitioner, who suffered domestic violence at the hands of her husband, and, following his death, at the hands of his mother, claimed persecution on account of particular social groups which included “Guatemalan Chuj [w]omen in domestic relationships who are unable to leave,” and “Guatemalan Chuj [w]omen who are viewed as property by virtue of their positions within a domestic relationship.” But the IJ found, and the Board affirmed, that the abuser acted based on a personal vendetta, and therefore found no nexus to a particular social group.
As the record contained ample evidence that “cultural expectations dictated that a Guatemalan Chuj woman in her position—both viewed as property and unable to leave by virtue of her domestic relationship—must stay with her in-laws and have nowhere else to go,” the Sixth Circuit determined there was “sufficient evidence for the BIA to conclude that Sebastian-Sebastian’s membership in these groups ‘underlay[s] all of [her persecutors’] actions.’”22 The court thus concluded that the Board’s failure to consider whether, in light of the above, the personal motives and particular social group membership were “inextricably intertwined” constituted reversible error.
The Sixth Circuit thus held (post-M-R-M-S-) that even where the primary reason for the persecution is a non-protected one (in this case, personal animosity), the fact that membership in a particular social group put and kept the asylum applicant in harm’s way is sufficient to render it sufficiently intertwined to satisfy the “one central reason” test. I believe a strong argument can be made that applying this approach to a family-based PSG would require a finding that even if the ultimate motive is extortion, if family membership is what put and kept the asylum applicant in harm’s way, there is sufficient nexus.
Seventh Circuit
In Gonzalez Ruano v. Barr,23 the Seventh Circuit explicitly rejected an approach essentially the same to that underlying the Board’s decision in M-R-M-S-. The petitioner suffered persecution by a criminal cartel whose leader viewed the petitioner’s wife as “property” that he sought to “possess.” The petitioner thus argued that his familial relationship to his wife was at least one central reason for his persecution.
On review, the Seventh Circuit specifically rejected the government’s argument that the persecution of the petitioner “was simply a ‘means to an end,’ making [the petitioner]’s relationship to his wife incidental.”24 The court found support in the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Hernandez-Avalos v. Lynch, adopting the Fourth Circuit’s test under which a nexus exists because the petitioner’s “relationship to his wife was the reason he, and not someone else, was targeted.”25
As the Seventh Circuit is in accord with the Fourth Circuit’s test that specifically rejects the Board’s approach to nexus (a conflict readily admitted by the Board in M-R-M-S-), the Board’s nexus standard is necessarily inapplicable in cases in which Seventh Circuit case law applies. It should be emphasized that the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Hernandez-Avalos which the Seventh Circuit positively cites is the specific decision mentioned by the Board in M-R-M-S- as an example of how the Fourth Circuit’s approach differs from its own.26
Eleventh Circuit
The Eleventh Circuit in Perez-Sanchez v. U.S. Att’y Gen.27 also applied a “but for” approach to nexus in a case involving family, determining that the persecutor’s monetary motivation did not render the petitioner’s family membership merely incidental where a criminal cartel targeted the petitioner because his father-in-law owed the cartel money. This is the exact scenario the Board rejected in M-R-M-S-, in which a family member is targeted as a means to a monetary end.
However, exactly as the Fourth Circuit had done in Hernandez-Avalos, the Eleventh Circuit stated that “In Mr. Perez-Sanchez’s case, it is impossible to disentangle his relationship to his father-in-law from the Gulf Cartel’s pecuniary motives: they are two sides of the same coin.” The court concluded that “the family relationship was one central reason, if not the central reason, for the harm.”28
Thus, the M-R-M-S- standard is at odds with Eleventh Circuit case law as well.
Ninth and Second Circuits
The approach of these two circuits relates to the “but-for” standard. The Ninth Circuit applies a “but-for cause” test in determining nexus. As that court recently noted, to satisfy that standard, an asylum applicant “must first show that ‘the persecutor would not have harmed [her] if such motive did not exist,’… that is, but-for cause, see But-for Cause, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (“The cause without which the event could not have occurred.”).29
Interestingly, in M-R-M-S-, the BIA quoted this but-for cause language from Parussimova without mentioning that the standard was in conflict with its own.30
It should therefore be argued in cases arising in the Ninth Circuit that applying that court’s “but-for cause” test would lead to a quite different result than the standard enunciated in M-R-M-S-.
The Second Circuit’s standard is less clear, but the court seems to view the “one central reason” requirement an even lower bar for establishing nexus than a but-for cause test. In Quituizaca v. Garland,31 the court noted the need to predict future persecution in withholding of removal claims, as opposed to other areas of law that employ a but-for causation test to past actions only. The court noted that where an adverse action has already occurred, there is an implication that “whatever evidence to establish but-for causation or refute it exists too.”
By contrast, the court noted that because of the predictive nature of future persecution in withholding claims, “[a] but-for standard in this context would seemingly require the applicant have insight into the motivations of the hypothetical future persecutor that sufficiently removes any doubt that the persecutor would be motivated by anything else,” adding that “[a]t a minimum, the proof that can be marshalled to rectify past conduct appears to us distinct from that which would be needed to establish a persecutor’s potential future conduct.”
While the Quituizaca decision is not even mentioned in M-R-M-S-, the Board does reference another Second Circuit case, Garcia-Aranda v. Garland,32 but essentially misrepresents that decision’s holding. In Garcia-Aranda, the facts established that although family members had also been harmed, the petitioners were targeted for persecution because of their own perceived wealth. Whether or not they were related to others who suffered harm would not change the outcome. Thus, in Garcia-Aranda, the court did not address, much less reject, the proposition that no nexus is established under a Hernandez-Avalos type of fact pattern.
A quick note regarding the Tenth Circuit
M-R-M-S- arose within the jurisdiction of the Tenth Circuit, and the Board lauded that court’s decision in Orellana-Recinos v. Garland33 as setting forth its preferred standard for nexus.34
It is worth noting that in Orellana-Recinos, “Petitioners did not challenge, or even cite, Matter of L-E-A- in their brief to this court. And at oral argument they cited it as authority. As previously noted, they dispute only the BIA’s factual findings in their case, not the legal framework it applied.”35
- What about the standard applied in discrimination cases?
The Supreme Court recently addressed the question of nexus outside of the asylum context in Bostock v. Clayton County,36 a case involving employment discrimination under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The Court explained in Bostock that the statutory term in question, “because of,” carries the same legal meaning as “on account of,” (i.e. the standard used in asylum cases).
The Court continued that the standard requires a court to apply the “simple” and “traditional” “but-for” test. As the Court explained, “a but-for test directs us to change one thing at a time and see if the outcome changes. If it does, we have found a but-for cause.”37
The Court recognized that the “but-for” standard is a “sweeping” one, acknowledging that “[o]ften, events have multiple but-for causes.” The Court further observed that “[w]hen it comes to Title VII, the adoption of the traditional but-for causation standard means a defendant cannot avoid liability just by citing some other factor that contributed to its challenged employment decision.”38
This leads to the following question: if “on account of” is not a term specific to asylum, and if the Supreme Court has told us that there is a simple and traditional test for “on account of” that is none other than the “but-for” test being applied by several circuits as described above, can the BIA simply ignore this in creating its own definition for the term “on account of” applicable to asylum claims? M-R-M-S- makes no mention of Bostock. If the Board doesn’t believe that case to be applicable, why not explain its reasoning for reaching that conclusion?
Tip: There is thus an argument to be made in all jurisdictions that the Supreme Court’s standard in Bostock should be the prevailing one.
I have discussed Bostock and offered my views on its applicability to asylum in more detail here.
- Emphasize other BIA precedents
Even in the absence of conflicting circuit or Supreme Court case law, an Immigration Judge or asylum officer is left to sort through the several BIA precedents mentioned above. Matter of S-P- (which has not been overruled) did not conclude that because an asylum applicant faced criminal prosecution, there was nothing further to consider. Instead, the Board in that case set forth a test requiring adjudicators to continue their inquiry, taking into account circumstantial evidence and applying common sense to see if another motive for the persecution might be inferred from the facts of record.
As noted above, Matter of N-M- set out a “but-for” standard that seems identical to the one employed by the Fourth Circuit. And even Matter of L-E-A- dropped the word “subordinate,” and thus the application of the dominance test, from its stated legal standard.
Tip: Note that these other BIA precedents remain binding as precedent.
These other cases should therefore be cited and explained, and the degree to which they conflict with M-R-M-S- should be emphasized. It can be argued that M-R-M-S-’s applicability should be limited to cases in which family members are merely mentioned in passing, without further elucidation from the record as to why family membership might have served as a reason for past or future persecution.
Conclusion
As the above hopefully demonstrates, there are plenty of bases to challenge the Board’s recent decision. In M-R-M-S-, the Board presented an approach to nexus that is at odds with the case law of the majority of circuits. The Board mischaracterized the holdings in a number of circuit court decisions, championed a decision of the Tenth Circuit in which the Board’s standard was conceded and thus not in dispute before that court, and completely ignored the Supreme Court’s analysis of the “on account of” standard without explaining why what the Court termed the traditional standard for nexus was distinguishable in the asylum context.
To reiterate, the proper thing for the Attorney General to do at this point is to certify the decision to himself, and vacate it pending anticipated rulemaking. In the meantime, it is hoped that some of the above points will receive serious consideration from asylum officers, Immigration Judges, ICE attorneys, and federal appellate courts.
Copyright Jeffrey S. Chase 2023. All rights reserved.
Notes:
- 27 I&N Dec. 40 (BIA 2017).
- 28 I&N Dec. 757 (BIA 2023).
- 21 I&N Dec. 486 (BIA 1996).
- 25 I&N Dec. 208 (BIA 2007).
- 557 F.3d 124, 129-30 (3rd Cir., 2009).
- 25 I&N Dec. 526 (BIA 2011).
- Id. at 531 (emphasis added).
- Matter of L-E-A-, supra at 44.
- Matter of M-R-M-S-, supra at 759 (emphasis added).
- 784 F.3d 944, 950 (4th Cir. 2015).
- See, e.g., Alvarez-Lagos v. Barr, 927 F.3d 236, 250 (4th Cir. 2019); Cruz v. Sessions, 853 F.3d 122, 129 (4th Cir. 2017).
- Perez Vasquez v. Garland, 4 F.4th 213 , 222 (4th Cir. 2021).
- Hernandez-Cartagena v. Barr, 977 F.3d 316, 322 (4th Cir. 2020) (citing Salgado-Sosa v. Sessions, 882 F.3d 451, 459 (4th Cir. 2018)).
- M-R-M-S-, supra at 761.
- 39 F.4th 233 (4th Cir. 2022).
- 28 I&N Dec. 693 (BIA 2023).
- 51 F.4th 647, 648 (5th Cir. 2022) (per curiam).
- M-R-M-S-, supra at 760.
- No. 22-60307 (5th Cir. Dec. 5, 2023).
- Id., slip op. at 16-17 (citing Rivas-Martinez v. I.N.S., 997 F.2d 1143, 1145, 1147-48 (5th Cir. 1993) (remanding to BIA for consideration of mixed motives).
- No. 23-3059 (6th Cir. Dec. 8, 2023).
- Id., slip op. at 22 (quoting Al-Ghorbani v. Holder, 585 F.3d 980, 998 (6th Cir. 2009).
- 922 F.3d 346 (7th Cir. 2019).
- Id. at 355-56.
- Id. at 356.
- See M-R-M-S-, supra at 761 (stating that the Tenth Circuit does not agree with the Fourth Circuit’s approach in Hernandez-Avalos, and adding its opinion that the Tenth Circuit’s is the proper approach).
- 935 F.3d 1148 (11th Cir. 2019).
- Id. at 1158-59.
- Rodriguez Tornes v. Garland, 993 F.3d 743, 751 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Parussimova v. Mukasey, 555 F.3d 734, 741 (9th Cir. 2009).
- See M-R-M-S-, supra at 762.
- 52 F.4th 103, 112-13 (2d Cir. 2022).
- 53 F.4th 752, 758 (2d Cir. 2022).
- 993 F.3d 851 (10th Cir. 2021).
- M-R-M-S-, supra at 761 (stating “In our view, the Tenth Circuit’s approach is the proper way to analyze whether membership in a family-based particular social group is one central reason for harm.
- Id. at 857.
- 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
- Id. at 1739.
- Id.
DECEMBER 24, 2023
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Jeffrey S. Chase is an immigration lawyer in New York City. Jeffrey is a former Immigration Judge and Senior Legal Advisor at the Board of Immigration Appeals.He is the founder of the Round Table of Former Immigration Judges, which was awarded AILA’s 2019 Advocacy Award.Jeffrey is also a past recipient of AILA’s Pro Bono Award.He sits on the Board of Directors of the Association of Deportation Defense Attorneys, and Central American Legal Assistance.
Reprinted by permission.
This approach is far more consistent with the Supreme Court’s generous guidance in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca and the BIA’s own initial implementation of that standard in Matter of Mogharrabi, both of which are routinely ignored at EOIR today. (Indeed, if someone with the exact same facts as Mogharrabi applied today, it’s highly likely that the BIA would invent a host of bogus reasons to send him packing!) It’s also a much more practical approach that can actually “streamline” the granting of more “first instance” cases by the Asylum Office, greater consistency, and lessening the need for petitions for review and “Circuit specific” strategies.
