UNITED STATES ET AL. v. TEXAS ET AL. CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 22–58. Argued November 29, 2022—Decided June 23, 2023
In 2021, the Secretary of Homeland Security promulgated new immigra- tion-enforcement guidelines (Guidelines for the Enforcement of Civil Immigration Law) that prioritize the arrest and removal from the United States of noncitizens who are suspected terrorists or dangerous criminals or who have unlawfully entered the country only recently, for example. The States of Texas and Louisiana claim that the Guide- lines contravene two federal statutes that they read to require the ar- rest of certain noncitizens upon their release from prison (8 U. S. C. §1226(c)) or entry of a final order of removal (§1231(a)(2)). The District Court found that the States would incur costs due to the Executive’s failure to comply with those alleged statutory mandates, and that the States had standing to sue based on those costs. On the merits, the District Court found the Guidelines unlawful and vacated them. The Fifth Circuit declined to stay the District Court’s judgment, and this Court granted certiorari before judgment.
Held: Texas and Louisiana lack Article III standing to challenge the Guidelines. Pp. 3–14.
(a) Under Article III, a plaintiff must have standing to sue. This bedrock constitutional requirement has its roots in the separation of powers. So the threshold question here is whether the States have standing to maintain this suit. Based on this Court’s precedents and longstanding historical practice, the answer is no.
To establish standing, a plaintiff must show an injury in fact caused by the defendant and redressable by a court order. The District Court found that the States would incur additional costs due to the chal- lenged arrest policy. And monetary costs are an injury. But this Court has stressed that the alleged injury must also “be legally and judicially cognizable.” Raines v. Byrd, 521 U. S. 811, 819. That requires that
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UNITED STATES v. TEXAS Syllabus
the dispute is “traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through the judicial process.” Ibid. Here, the States cite no precedent, history, or tradition of federal courts entertaining lawsuits of this kind. On the contrary, this Court has previously ruled that a plaintiff lacks standing to bring such a suit “when he himself is neither prosecuted nor threatened with prosecution.” See Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U. S. 614, 619. The Linda R. S. Article III standing principle remains the law today, and the States have pointed to no case or historical prac- tice holding otherwise. Pp. 3–6.
(b) There are good reasons why federal courts have not traditionally entertained lawsuits of this kind. For one, when the Executive Branch elects not to arrest or prosecute, it does not exercise coercive power over an individual’s liberty or property, and thus does not infringe upon interests that courts often are called upon to protect. Moreover, such lawsuits run up against the Executive’s Article II authority to decide “how to prioritize and how aggressively to pursue legal actions against defendants who violate the law.” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U. S. ___, ___. The principle of Executive Branch enforcement dis- cretion over arrests and prosecutions extends to the immigration con- text. Courts also generally lack meaningful standards for assessing the propriety of enforcement choices in this area, which are invariably affected by resource constraints and regularly changing public-safety and public-welfare needs. That is why this Court has recognized that federal courts are generally not the proper forum for resolving claims that the Executive Branch should make more arrests or bring more prosecutions. Pp. 6–9.
(c) This holding does not suggest that federal courts may never en- tertain cases involving the Executive Branch’s alleged failure to make more arrests or bring more prosecutions. First, the Court has adjudi- cated selective-prosecution claims under the Equal Protection Clause in which a plaintiff typically seeks to prevent his or her own prosecu- tion. Second, the standing analysis might differ when Congress ele- vates de facto injuries to the status of legally cognizable injuries re- dressable by a federal court. Third, the standing calculus might change if the Executive Branch wholly abandoned its statutory respon- sibilities to make arrests or bring prosecutions. Fourth, a challenge to an Executive Branch policy that involves both arrest or prosecution priorities and the provision of legal benefits or legal status could lead to a different standing analysis. Fifth, policies governing the contin- ued detention of noncitizens who have already been arrested arguably might raise a different standing question than arrest or prosecution policies. But this case presents none of those scenarios. Pp. 9–12.
(d) The discrete standing question raised by this case rarely arises because federal statutes that purport to require the Executive Branch
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to make arrests or bring prosecutions are rare. This case is different from those in which the Federal Judiciary decides justiciable cases in- volving statutory requirements or prohibitions on the Executive, be- cause it implicates the Executive Branch’s enforcement discretion and raises the distinct question of whether the Federal Judiciary may in effect order the Executive Branch to take enforcement actions. The Court’s decision does not indicate any view on whether the Executive is complying with its statutory obligations. Nor does the Court’s nar- row holding signal any change in the balance of powers between Con- gress and the Executive. Pp. 12–14.
606 F. Supp. 3d 437, reversed.
KAVANAUGH, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, and JACKSON, JJ., joined. GORSUCH, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which THOMAS and BAR- RETT, JJ., joined. BARRETT, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judg- ment, in which GORSUCH, J., joined. ALITO, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
In short, this Court’s precedents and longstanding
historical practice establish that the States’ suit here is not the kind redressable by a federal court.
B
Several good reasons explain why, as Linda R. S. held, federal courts have not traditionally entertained lawsuits of this kind.
To begin with, when the Executive Branch elects not to arrest or prosecute, it does not exercise coercive power over an individual’s liberty or property, and thus does not infringe upon interests that courts often are called upon to protect. See Lujan, 504 U. S., at 561–562. And for standing purposes, the absence of coercive power over the plaintiff makes a difference: When “a plaintiff’s asserted injury arises from the government’s allegedly unlawful regulation (or lack of regulation) of someone else, much more is needed” to establish standing. Id., at 562 (emphasis deleted).2
Moreover, lawsuits alleging that the Executive Branch has made an insufficient number of arrests or brought an insufficient number of prosecutions run up against the Executive’s Article II authority to enforce federal law. Article II of the Constitution assigns the “executive Power” to the President and provides that the President “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” U. S. Const., Art. II, §1, cl. 1; §3. Under Article II, the Executive Branch possesses authority to decide “how to prioritize and how aggressively to pursue legal actions against defendants who violate the law.” TransUnion LLC, 594 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 13); see Lujan, 504 U. S., at 576–578; Allen, 468
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2 By contrast, when “the plaintiff is himself an object of the action (or
forgone action) at issue,” “there is ordinarily little question that the action or inaction has caused him injury, and that a judgment preventing or requiring the action will redress it.” Lujan, 504 U. S., at 561–562.
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Opinion of the Court
U.S., at 760–761. The Executive Branch—not the Judiciary—makes arrests and prosecutes offenses on behalf of the United States. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 693 (1974) (“the Executive Branch has exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case”); Printz v. United States, 521 U. S. 898, 922–923 (1997) (Brady Act provisions held unconstitutional because, among other things, they transferred power to execute federal law to state officials); United States v. Armstrong, 517 U. S. 456, 464 (1996) (decisions about enforcement of “the Nation’s criminal laws” lie within the “special province of the Executive” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 138 (1976) (“A lawsuit is the ultimate remedy for a breach of the law, and it is to the President, and not to the Congress, that the Constitution entrusts the responsibility to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed’” (quoting U.S. Const., Art. II, §3)); see also United States v. Cox, 342 F. 2d 167, 171 (CA5 1965).
That principle of enforcement discretion over arrests and prosecutions extends to the immigration context, where the Court has stressed that the Executive’s enforcement discretion implicates not only “normal domestic law enforcement priorities” but also “foreign-policy objectives.” Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U. S. 471, 490–491 (1999). In line with those principles, this Court has declared that the Executive Branch also retains discretion over whether to remove a noncitizen from the United States. Arizona v. United States, 567 U. S. 387, 396 (2012) (“Federal officials, as an initial matter, must decide whether it makes sense to pursue removal at all”).
In addition to the Article II problems raised by judicial review of the Executive Branch’s arrest and prosecution policies, courts generally lack meaningful standards for assessing the propriety of enforcement choices in this area. After all, the Executive Branch must prioritize its
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enforcement efforts. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U. S. 598, 607–608 (1985). That is because the Executive Branch (i) invariably lacks the resources to arrest and prosecute every violator of every law and (ii) must constantly react and adjust to the ever-shifting public-safety and public- welfare needs of the American people.
This case illustrates the point. As the District Court found, the Executive Branch does not possess the resources necessary to arrest or remove all of the noncitizens covered by §1226(c) and §1231(a)(2). That reality is not an anomaly—it is a constant. For the last 27 years since §1226(c) and §1231(a)(2) were enacted in their current form, all five Presidential administrations have determined that resource constraints necessitated prioritization in making immigration arrests.
In light of inevitable resource constraints and regularly changing public-safety and public-welfare needs, the Executive Branch must balance many factors when devising arrest and prosecution policies. That complicated balancing process in turn leaves courts without meaningful standards for assessing those policies. Cf. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U. S. 821, 830–832 (1985); Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U. S. 182, 190–192 (1993). Therefore, in both Article III cases and Administrative Procedure Act cases, this Court has consistently recognized that federal courts are generally not the proper forum for resolving claims that the Executive Branch should make more arrests or bring more prosecutions. See Linda R. S., 410 U. S., at 619; cf. Heckler, 470 U. S., at 831 (recognizing the “general unsuitability for judicial review of agency decisions to refuse enforcement”); ICC v. Locomotive Engineers, 482 U. S. 270, 283 (1987) (“it is entirely clear that the refusal to prosecute cannot be the subject of judicial review”).3
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3 Also, the plaintiffs here are States, and federal courts must remain
mindful of bedrock Article III constraints in cases brought by States
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Opinion of the Court
All of those considerations help explain why federal courts have not traditionally entertained lawsuits of this kind. By concluding that Texas and Louisiana lack standing here, we abide by and reinforce the proper role of the Federal Judiciary under Article III. The States’ novel standing argument, if accepted, would entail expansive judicial direction of the Department’s arrest policies. If the Court green-lighted this suit, we could anticipate complaints in future years about alleged Executive Branch under-enforcement of any similarly worded laws—whether they be drug laws, gun laws, obstruction of justice laws, or the like. We decline to start the Federal Judiciary down that uncharted path. Our constitutional system of separation of powers “contemplates a more restricted role for Article III courts.” Raines, 521 U. S., at 828.
C
In holding that Texas and Louisiana lack standing, we do not suggest that federal courts may never entertain cases involving the Executive Branch’s alleged failure to make more arrests or bring more prosecutions.
First, the Court has adjudicated selective-prosecution claims under the Equal Protection Clause. In those cases, however, a party typically seeks to prevent his or her own prosecution, not to mandate additional prosecutions
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against an executive agency or officer. To be sure, States sometimes have standing to sue the United States or an executive agency or officer. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U. S. 144 (1992). But in our system of dual federal and state sovereignty, federal policies frequently generate indirect effects on state revenues or state spending. And when a State asserts, for example, that a federal law has produced only those kinds of indirect effects, the State’s claim for standing can become more attenuated. See Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U. S. 886 (1970); Florida v. Mellon, 273 U. S. 12, 16–18 (1927); cf. Lujan, 504 U. S., at 561–562. In short, none of the various theories of standing asserted by the States in this case overcomes the fundamental Article III problem with this lawsuit.
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against other possible defendants. See, e.g., Wayte, 470 U. S., at 604; Armstrong, 517 U. S., at 459, 463.
Second, as the Solicitor General points out, the standing analysis might differ when Congress elevates defacto injuries to the status of legally cognizable injuries redressable by a federal court. See Brief for Petitioners 20, n. 3; cf. TransUnion LLC, 594 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 10–11); Federal Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U. S. 11, 20 (1998); Raines, 521 U. S., at 820, n. 3; Lujan, 504 U. S., at 578; Linda R. S., 410 U. S., at 617, n. 3. For example, Congress might (i) specifically authorize suits against the Executive Branch by a defined set of plaintiffs who have suffered concrete harms from executive under-enforcement and (ii) specifically authorize the Judiciary to enter appropriate orders requiring additional arrests or prosecutions by the Executive Branch.
Here, however, the relevant statutes do not supply such specific authorization. The statutes, even under the States’ own reading, simply say that the Department “shall” arrest certain noncitizens. Given the “deep-rooted nature of law- enforcement discretion,” a purported statutory arrest mandate, without more, does not entitle any particular plaintiff to enforce that mandate in federal court. Castle Rock, 545 U. S., at 761, 764–765, 767, n. 13; cf. Heckler, 470 U. S., at 835. For an arrest mandate to be enforceable in federal court, we would need at least a “stronger indication” from Congress that judicial review of enforcement discretion is appropriate—for example, specific authorization for particular plaintiffs to sue and for federal courts to order more arrests or prosecutions by the Executive. Castle Rock, 545 U. S., at 761. We do not take a position on whether such a statute would suffice for Article III purposes; our only point is that no such statute is present in this case.4
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4 As the Solicitor General noted, those kinds of statutes, by infringing
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Third, the standing calculus might change if the Executive Branch wholly abandoned its statutory responsibilities to make arrests or bring prosecutions. Under the Administrative Procedure Act, a plaintiff arguably could obtain review of agency non-enforcement if an agency “has consciously and expressly adopted a general policy that is so extreme as to amount to an abdication of its statutory responsibilities.” Heckler, 470 U. S., at 833, n. 4 (internal quotation marks omitted); see id., at 839 (Brennan, J., concurring); cf. 5 U. S. C. §706(1). So too, an extreme case of non-enforcement arguably could exceed the bounds of enforcement discretion and support Article III standing. But the States have not advanced a Heckler-style “abdication” argument in this case or argued that the Executive has entirely ceased enforcing the relevant statutes. Therefore, we do not analyze the standing ramifications of such a hypothetical scenario.
Fourth, a challenge to an Executive Branch policy that involves both the Executive Branch’s arrest or prosecution priorities and the Executive Branch’s provision of legal benefits or legal status could lead to a different standing analysis. That is because the challenged policy might implicate more than simply the Executive’s traditional enforcement discretion. Cf. Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 591 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2020) (slip op., at 11–12) (benefits such as work authorization and Medicare eligibility accompanied by non- enforcement meant that the policy was “more than simply a non-enforcement policy”); Texas v. United States, 809 F. 3d 134, 154 (CA5 2015) (Linda R. S. “concerned only nonprosecution,” which is distinct from “both nonprosecution and the conferral of benefits”), aff ’d by an equally divided Court, 579 U. S. 547 (2016). Again, we need
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on the Executive’s enforcement discretion, could also raise Article II issues. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 24–25.
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not resolve the Article III consequences of such a policy. Fifth, policies governing the continued detention of noncitizens who have already been arrested arguably might raise a different standing question than arrest or prosecution policies. Cf. Biden v. Texas, 597 U. S. ___ (2022). But this case does not concern a detention policy, so
we do not address the issue here.5
Given the narrow resolution on standing grounds, and the reservations set forth in Section C of Justice Kavanaugh’s opinion, in addition to the somewhat different approach of the three concurring Justices, Gorsuch, Thomas, and Barrett, it’s unpredictable what this decision might mean if the DACA challenge now pending before U.S. District Judge Hanen eventually reaches the Supremes. In “point four” of “Section C,” Justice Kavanaugh goes to some length to distinguish a situation “that involves both the Executive Branch’s arrest or prosecution priorities and the Executive Branch’s provision of legal benefits or legal status,” citing the Court’s earlier decision in DHS v. Regents, involving a DACA challenge that was decided on APA technical grounds.
Still, this is a strong statement rejecting the attempt of GOP States and GOP lower Federal Court Judges to take over Federal immigration enforcement! And, with Immigration Courts overwhelmed with a largely artificially-inflated 2 million case backlog, many consisting of cases in which relief should be granted elsewhere (like at USCIS) or where removal would actually be detrimental to the interests of the U.S., a reaffirmation of the Executive’s historical authority to set reasonable, practical immigration enforcement priorities could not come soon enough.
In that light, it’s curious why in a case where the ultimate result was lopsided, the Court DENIED the Administration’s motion for a stay pending review of the Fifth Circuit’s and USDC’s wrong orders! This unnecessarily created months of “enforcement chaos” which has been damaging both to individuals and to our national interests.
“While expected, today’s court ruling is devastating. It impacts hundreds of thousands of immigrant youth and their loved ones, who have already endured years of uncertainty stemming from politicized attacks on DACA,” Kica Matos, president of the National Immigration Law Center said in a statement.
