"The Voice of the New Due Process Army" ————– Musings on Events in U.S. Immigration Court, Immigration Law, Sports, Music, Politics, and Other Random Topics by Retired United States Immigration Judge (Arlington, Virginia) and former Chairman of the Board of Immigration Appeals Paul Wickham Schmidt and Dr. Alicia Triche, expert brief writer, practical scholar, emeritus Editor-in-Chief of The Green Card (FBA), and 2022 Federal Bar Association Immigration Section Lawyer of the Year. She is a/k/a “Delta Ondine,” a blues-based alt-rock singer-songwriter, who performs regularly in Memphis, where she hosts her own Blues Brunch series, and will soon be recording her first full, professional album. Stay tuned! 🎶 To see our complete professional bios, just click on the link below.
The 1924 Immigration Act vilified, dehumanized, and barred many of those immigrants who have made America great, like Italian Americans being demeaned in this cartoon. Yet, some descendants of those unfairly targeted appear oblivious to the mistakes of the past and willing to inflict the same immoral lies, harm, and suffering on today’s migrants. IMAGE: Public RealmEduardo Porter Columnist and Editorial Board Member Washington Post PHOTO: WashPost
“I think that we have sufficient stock in America now for us to shut the door.”
That sounds like Donald Trump, right? Maybe on one of his campaign stops? It certainly fits the mood of the country. This year, immigration became voters’ “most important problem” in Gallup polling for the first time since Central Americans flocked to the border in 2019. More than half of Americans perceive immigrants crossing the border illegally as a “critical threat.”
Yet the sentiment expressed above is almost exactly 100 years old. It was uttered by Sen. Ellison DuRant Smith, a South Carolina Democrat, on April 9, 1924. And it helped set the stage for a historic change in U.S. immigration law, which imposed strict national quotas for newcomers that would shape the United States’ ethnic makeup for decades to come.
. . . .
The renewed backlash against immigration has little to offer the American project, though. Closing the door to new Americans would be hardly desirable, a blow to one of the nation’s greatest sources of dynamism. Raw data confirms how immigrants are adding to the nation’s economic growth, even while helping keep a lid on inflation.
Anyway, that horse left the stable. The United States is full of immigrants from, in Trump’s memorable words, “s—hole countries.” The project to set this in reverse is a fool’s errand. The 1924 Johnson-Reed immigration law might have succeeded in curtailing immigration. But the restrictions did not hold. From Presidents Johnson to Trump, efforts to circle the wagons around some ancestral White American identity failed.
We are extremely lucky it did. Contra Sen. Ellison DuRant Smith’s 100-year old prescriptions, the nation owes what greatness it has to the many different women and men it has drawn from around the world to build their futures. This requires a different conversation — one that doesn’t feature mass expulsions and concentration camps but focuses on constructing a new shared American identity that fits everyone, including the many more immigrants who will arrive from the Global South for years to come.
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Gordon F. Sander Journalist and Historian PHOTO: www.gordonsander.com
Gordon F. Sander, journalist and historian, also writes in WashPost, perhaps somewhat less optimistically, but with the same historical truth in the face of current political lies and gross misrepresentations:
Johnson and Reed were in a triumphant mood on the eve of their bill’s enactment. “America of the melting pot will no longer be necessary,” Reed wrote in the Times. He remarked on the new law’s impact: “It will mean a more homogenous nation, more self-reliant, more independent and more closely knit by common properties and common faith.”
The law immediately had its intended effect. In 1921, more than 200,000 Italians arrived at Ellis Island. In 1925, following the bill’s enactment, barely 6,000 Italians were permitted entry.
But there were less intended consequences, too, including on U.S. foreign relations. Although Reed insisted there was nothing personal about the act’s exclusion of Japanese people, the Japanese government took strong exception, leading to an increase in tensions between the two countries. There were riots in Tokyo. The road to Pearl Harbor was laid.
During the 1930s, after the eugenics-driven Nazis seized control of Germany, the quotas established by the act helped close the door to European Jews and others fleeing fascism.
At the same time, the law also inspired a small but determined group of opponents led by Rep. Emanuel Celler (D-N.Y.), who were committed to overturning it. Celler’s half-century-long campaign finally paid off in 1965 at the Statue of Liberty when, as Celler looked on, President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the Immigration and Nationality Act, which ended national origin quotas.
But with anti-immigration sentiment on the rise and quotas once again on the table, it’s clear that a century after its enactment, the ghost of Johnson-Reed isn’t completely gone.
Gordon F. Sander is a journalist and historian based in Riga, Latvia. He is the author of “The Frank Family That Survived: A 20th Century Odyssey” and other books
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Many thanks to my friend and immigration maven Deb Sanders for alerting me to the Sander article. I strongly urge everyone to read both pieces at the links above.
Perhaps the most poignant comment I’ve received about these articles is from American educator, expert, author, and “practical scholar” Susan Gzesh:
And because of the 1924 Act, my grandparents lost dozens of their siblings, parents, aunts, uncles, nieces, and nephews to the Holocaust in the 1940s because Eastern European Jewish immigration to the US had been cut off. They would have been capable of sponsoring more family to come to the US in the late 1920s and 30s, but there was no quota for them.
I have no words to describe my feelings about so-called experts who would praise the 1924 Act. I know that Asian Americans must feel similarly to my sentiments.
Well said, Susan!
Susan Gzesh American scholar, educator, expert, author PHOTO: U. Of Chicago
I’ll leave it at that, for you to ponder the next time you hear Trump, DeSantis, Abbott, and the like fear-monger about the bogus “invasion,” spout “replacement theory,” and extoll the virtues of extralegal cruelties and dehumanization inflicted upon “the other” — typically the most vulnerable who areseeking our legal protection and appealing to our senses of justice and human dignity! And, also you can consider this when the so called “mainstream media” pander to these lies by uncritically presenting them as “the other side,” thereby echoing “alternative facts!”
It’s also worth remembering this when you hear Biden, Harris, Schumer, Murphy, and other weak-kneed Dem politicos who should know better adopt Trumpist White Nationalist proposals and falsely present them as “realistic compromises” — as opposed to what they really are —tragic acts of political and moral cowardice!
Eventually, as both of the above articles point out, America largely persevered and prospered over its demons of racism, anti-Catholicism, and anti-immigrant nationalism. But, it would be wrong to view this “long arc” analysis as “zeroing out” the sins and horrors of our past.
Susan Gzesh’s relatives died, some horribly and painfully, before their time. That can’t be changed by future progress. Nor can the children they might have had or the achievements they never got to make to our nation and the world be resurrected.
As Susan mentions, the 1924 Act also reinforced long-standing racism and xenophobia against Asian Americans that led to the irreversible harm inflicted by the internment of Japanese American citizens, continuing Chinese Exclusion, and a host of state laws targeting the Asian population and making their lives miserable. Belated recognition of the wrongfulness and immorality of these reprehensible laws and actions does nothing for their past victims.
Many Irish, Italian, and other Catholics and their cherished institutions died, lost property, or were permanently displaced by widespread anti-Catholic riots brought on and fanned by the very type of biased and ignorant thinking that undergirded Johnson-Reed. They can’t be brought back to life and their property restored just by a “magic wave of the historical wand.”
U.S. citizens of Mexican-American heritage were deported and dispossessed, some from property their ancestors had owned long before there was even a United States. Apologizing to their descendants and acknowledging our mistakes as a nation won’t eliminate the injustices done them — ones that they took to their graves!
Despite the “lessons of the Holocaust,” America continues to struggle with anti-Semitism and anti-Islamic phobias and indifference to human suffering beyond our borders.
And, of course, the poisonous adverse impacts of slavery on our nation and our African-American compatriots continue to haunt and influence us despite disingenuous claims to the contrary.
Dan Kowalski Online Editor of the LexisNexis Immigration Law Community (ILC)Hon. Jeffrey S. Chase Jeffrey S. Chase Blog Coordinator & Chief Spokesperson, Round Table of Former Immigration Judges
My friends immigration experts Dan Kowalski and Hon. Jeffrey Chase also had some “choice words” for the “false scholars” who extol the fabricated “benefits” of White Nationalism and racism embodied in “laws” that contravened the very meaning of “with liberty and justice for all” — something to reflect upon this Memorial Day. See https://dankowalski.substack.com/p/true-colors.
Thank you, Dan! In memory of my Gzesh, Wolfson, Kronenberg, and Kissilove relatives who were victims of the Holocaust – after their U.S.-based relatives failed to get visas for them.
Heed the lessons of history, enshrine tolerance, honor diversity, and “improve on past performance!”We have a choice as to whether or not to repeat the mistakes of the past — to regress to a darker age or move forward to a brighter future for all!Make the right one!
Proposed Asylum Bar Regs Are At Odds With International Law (And Why That Matters)
In 2003, the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees published Guidelines for applying the bars to asylum known internationally as the “exclusion clauses” (because they exclude an applicant from being recognized as a refugee under international law). Addressing the proper procedure for applying these bars, the UNHCR Guidelines state:
Given the grave consequences of exclusion, it is essential that rigorous procedural safeguards are built into the exclusion determination procedure. Exclusion decisions should in principle be dealt with in the context of the regular refugee status determination procedure and not in either admissibility or accelerated procedures, so that a full factual and legal assessment of the case can be made.1
This week, the Biden Administration published a proposed rule seeking to do precisely the opposite of what UNHCR advises.2 The rule would empower USCIS asylum officers to apply certain bars to asylum eligibility up front, at the border, as part of a preliminary admissibility determination. The goal is to effect the immediate deportation of certain asylum seekers, foreclosing their ability to have their eligibility for asylum decided by an Immigration Judge pursuant to a full-fledged hearing.
Advocates have already pointed out the dangers of the proposed approach, which will require quick decisions on highly complex issues at a point at which applicants very rarely have access to lawyers or evidence; their responses should be read.3 However, I would like to focus here on the rule’s conflict with international law, and why this is problematic.
Since 1804, the Supreme Court’s decision in Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy 4 has required domestic statutes to be interpreted consistently with international law whenever possible.5
This general requirement carries a particular urgency in its application to refugee law. The purpose of the 1951 Refugee Convention (which applied to those made refugees by World War II), and the 1967 Protocol (which extended the 1951 Convention’s definitions and protections to all) was to create a single, universal refugee standard to replace the patchwork of protections that reflected individual states’ own political preferences and biases.
This is not a small matter. International refugee law scholars James C. Hathaway and Michelle Foster have warned that “[i]nconsistency and divergence in interpretation of the Convention definition would clearly undermine the principled goal of ensuring a single, universal standard for access to refugee protection.”6 They further quote a decision of the Australian Administrative Appeals Tribunal in support of this contention: “[i]nconsistency is not merely inelegant; it brings the process of deciding into disrepute, suggesting an arbitrariness which is incompatible with commonly accepted notions of justice.”7
Congress apparently agreed with this approach when enacting the 1980 Refugee Act. In its landmark 1987 decision in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, the Supreme Court pointed this out:
If one thing is clear from the legislative history of the new definition of “refugee,” and indeed the entire 1980 Act, it is that one of Congress’ primary purposes was to bring United States refugee law into conformance with the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, to which the United States acceded in 1968.8
And in adhering to Congress’s clear intent, the Supreme Court in Cardoza-Fonseca looked for guidance in interpreting the 1980 Refugee Act to UNHCR, citing its Handbook first issued in 1979 as an important tool for interpreting the Convention’s provisions. In a footnote, the Court found that while it was not binding, “the Handbook provides significant guidance in construing the Protocol, to which Congress sought to conform. It has been widely considered useful in giving content to the obligations that the Protocol establishes.”9
As leading scholar Deborah E. Anker has noted, “One of the most important developments in U.S. asylum law is the weight that U.S. authorities – including the USCIS Asylum Office, the Board, and the federal courts – give to the UNHCR’s interpretation of the refugee definition contained in its 1979 Handbook….” Anker noted that UNHCR has issued other interpretive documents since 1979 that “complement and expand on the Handbook.”10 I would argue that those other documents (which include the 2003 guidelines addressing the exclusion clauses that is quoted above) are deserving of the same interpretive weight.
So given (1) the Supreme Court’s Charming Betsy doctrine mandating conformity with international law whenever possible; (2) the stated intent of Congress to bring U.S. asylum law into conformity with international refugee law (as recognized in Cardoza-Fonseca); and (3) the purpose of the 1951 Convention to “ensure a single, universal standard” for refugee status, according great weight to UNHCR guidance in interpreting the Convention provides the best means of adhering to all of the above requirements.
However, another leading scholar, Karen Musalo, provided a recent reminder of how far U.S. law has strayed from international law standards for determining nexus (i.e. when persecution is “on account of” a statutorily protected ground), and in determining the validity of particular social groups. Musalo posits that realignment with international standards would resolve the erroneous interpretations that have arisen under present case law, and would remove unwarranted barriers to protection that presently exist.11 But with its new proposed regulations, the government instead seeks to veer even further off course in its procedures for determining bars to asylum eligibility.
In December 2020, I presented in a blog post a “wish list” for the incoming Biden Administration. One of the items on my list was to create a “Charming Betsy” regulation requiring adherence to international law refugee standards. It included the hope “that the Biden Administration would codify the Charming Betsy doctrine in regulations, which should further require the BIA, Immigration Judges, and Asylum Officers to consider UNHCR interpretations of the various asylum provisions, and require adjudicators to provide compelling reasons for rejecting its guidance.”12
I am not so naive to expect that a regulation like this will be proposed anytime soon. But I do believe that the direct contradiction of the proposed regs with international law guidance should be included in comments and talking points by those both inside and outside of government. Through these rules, the Biden Administration seeks to engage in the type of politically-motivated action that the Refugee Convention and 1980 Refugee Act sought to eliminate. For the above reasons, such action would violate the intent of Congress, our treaty obligations, and over two centuries of U.S. case law.
Moving forward, whether an asylum-related law, rule, policy, or case holding conforms with international law should instinctively be the first question asked by all of us. When refugee protection is viewed in such neutral, legal terms, the urge to politicize decisions will be lessened.
As those scholars referenced above have been saying far longer and more articulately than myself, it is only when international law becomes normalized in the process that our asylum law will function as it should.
Copyright 2024 Jeffrey S. Chase. All rights reserved.
See Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982) (noting that construing federal statutes to avoid violating international law has “been a maxim of statutory construction since the decision” in Charming Betsy).
James C. Hathaway and Michelle Foster, The Law of Refugee Status (Second Ed.), (Cambridge, 2014) at 4.
Hathaway and Foster, supra at n.18 (quoting Brennan, J., in Re Drake and Minister of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No. 2) (1979) 2 ALD 634 (Aus. AAT, Nov. 21, 1979) at 639.
480 U.S. 421, 436-37 (1987).
Id. at 439.
Deborah E. Anker, Law of Asylum in the United States (2023 Ed.) (Thomson Reuters) at 20-21.
Karen Musalo, “Aligning United States With International Norms Would Remove Major Barriers to Protection in Gender Claims,” International Journal of Refugee Law (2024).
The schooner Charming Betsy sailed into Supreme Court history. Hon. Jeffrey Chase and other legal experts aren’t “charmed” by AG Merrick Garland’s approach to binding international standards for asylum! PHOTO: The Constitutional Law Reporter
Thanks, “Sir Jeffrey” for a great and timely analysis!
For the second successive Administration, we have an Attorney General who does not take seriously his oath of office to uphold the Constitution and laws of the United States when it comes to those seeking asylum.
Garland has too often signed off on regulations and policies that are clearly at odds with domestic and international law as well as our Constitution. The current abominable proposed regulations, referenced by Jeffrey and opposed by all experts on asylum law and human rights, are just the latest example. Those politicos behind these toxic policies won’t confront in person or acknowledge the well-documented unnecessary human trauma and degradation caused by scofflaw actions and policies that intentionally fail to make fair, humane, safe, and timely asylum processing available to all who come to legal ports of entry as required by law (not to mention human decency)!
Professor Karen Musalo Director, Center for Gender & Refugee Studies, Hastings Law
Read Karen’s newly-released article “Aligning United States Law with International Norms Would Remove Major Barriers to Protection in Gender Claims” in the 2024 Edition of the International Journal of Refugee Law. Here’s the abstract:
A B ST R A CT
The protection of women and girls fleeing gender-based harms has been controversial in the United States (US), with advances followed by setbacks. The US interpretation of particular social group and its nexus analysis, both of which diverge from guidance by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), is the most significant barrier to protection. It has become almost impossible for women and girls to rely upon the particular social group ground because of current requirements that social groups not only be defined by immutable or fundamental characteristics, but also be socially distinct and have particularity. Establishing nexus is also a significant obstacle, with the US requirement of proof of the persecutor’s intent. In the first month of his administration, President Biden issued an executive order on migration, which raised hopes that these obstacles to protection would be removed. The order committed to protecting survivors of domestic violence and to issuing regulations that would make the US interpretation of particular social group consistent with international standards. The target date for the regulations was November 2021, but they have yet to issue. This article examines how the evolution of the US interpretation of particular social group and nexus has diverged from UNHCR recommendations. It shows how protection has been denied in gender cases involving the most egregious of harms. The article concludes by providing recommendations for realignment with international standards, which set a benchmark for evaluating the promised Biden administration regulations on the issue.
Karen’s highly readable “spot on” article prompted this additional thoughtful comment from my friend and Round Table colleague Hon. “Sir Jefferey” Chase:
Hi Karen: Wonderful article! So clear, so logical, and just so correct! Thanks as always for this. (And I’m extremely honored to find myself in several of your footnotes – thank you!)
Create a “Charming Betsy” Reg Requiring Adherence to International Law:Since 1804, the Supreme Court’s decision in Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy has required domestic statutes to be interpreted consistently with international law whenever possible.As the Supreme Court in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca observed that in enacting the 1980 Refugee Act, “one of Congress’ primary purposes was to bring United States refugee law into conformance with the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,” it would seem that interpreters of our asylum laws should look to international law interpretations of that treaty for guidance.Recent examples in which this has not been the case include the just-published “death to asylum” regulations that will completely gut the 1980 Refugee Act of any meaning; as well as regulations that bar asylum for conduct falling far, far short of the severity required to bar refugee protection under international law (which a federal district court blocked in Pangea v. Barr).
As the Board seems disinclined to listen to the Supreme Court on this point, it is hoped that the Biden Administration would codify the Charming Betsy doctrine in regulations, which should further require the BIA, Immigration Judges, and Asylum Officers to consider UNHCR interpretations of the various asylum provisions, and require adjudicators to provide compelling reasons for rejecting its guidance.
Do you think there is a way to use Karen’s article to make this into a talking point across the advocacy community? I think there’s merit to trying to normalize an idea over time. Just a thought.
Hon. Jeffrey S. Chase Jeffrey S. Chase Blog Coordinator & Chief Spokesperson, Round Table of Former Immigration Judges
I agree, Jeffrey! Ironically, as Karen shows, “normalizing” refugee and asylum processing to bring it into alignment with the Convention was one of the driving forces behind enactment of the Refugee Act of 1980. Indeed, it’s reflected in a key early interpretation of the Act by the Supremes in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca (successfully argued by our friend and Round Table colleague Hon. Dana Marks, a “Founding Mother of U.S. Refugee Law”). In rejecting the USG’s restrictive interpretation, the Court consulted the U.N. Handbook while making the point that the refugee definition was to be applied generously so that even those with only a 10% chance of persecution could qualify.
I also note that the abandonment of the “Acosta test,” which I relied on in Kasinga, in favor of a more convoluted, restrictive, and ultimately intellectually dishonest approach, went “into high gear” after the “Ashcroft purge” had removed the core of BIA Judges who spoke up for asylum rights and protection, even when in dissent!
Unfortunately, Administrations of both parties have feared honest and robust implementation of the Refugee Act that truly follows the “spirit of Cardoza and its BIA progeny, Matter of Mogharrabi.” They all have had their “favored” and “feared” groups of refugees and asylees, some more than others.
This, of course, breeds huge inconsistencies and arbitrary adjudications, a problem exposed well over a decade ago by Professors Schoenholtz, Schrag, and Ramji-Nogales in their critical seminal work Refugee Roulette describing the largely unprincipled and politicized operation of our system for adjudicating protection claims.
At some level, all Administrations have given in to the false idea that protection of refugees is politically perilous and that consequently the law should be interpreted and manipulated to “deter” the current “politically disfavored” groups of refugees. Not surprisingly, the latter are usually those of color, non-Christian religions, or from poorer countries where the mis-characterization of groups of legitimate refugees as “mere economic migrants” has become routine. Too often, the so-called “mainstream media” accepts such negative characterizations without critical analysis.
Unfortunately, the Biden Administration has regressed from a somewhat enlightened beginning with the never-promulgated “gender based regulation” mentioned by Karen to a position of fear, desperation, and ultimately “false deterrence.” Apparently, they perceive that GOP nativist lies and shamless fear-mongering combined with their own failure to boldly reform and materially improve the asylum processing system under their control are “scoring points” with the electorate.
The latest misguided proposal being considered in the White House would grotesquely miss the mark of addressing the real glaring problems with our asylum system at the border and beyond. That is the overly restrictive interpretations and applications of the refugee definition, too many poorly-qualified and poorly-trained adjudicators, over-denial leading to protracted litigation and inconsistent results, uninspiring leadership, and a stubborn unwillingness to set up the system in compliance with international rules so that significant numbers of qualified refugees applying at the border can be timely and properly admitted to the U.S. where, incidentally, their skills and determination can contribute greatly to our economy and our society.
The latest bad idea is truncating the already overly-summary and poorly run asylum process in apparent hopes of more quickly denying more potentially valid claims with less consideration. See, e.g.,https://www.politico.com/news/2024/05/08/biden-migrants-asylum-changes-00156865. Far from being a panacea for the much-feared and highly distorted “border issue,” it eventually will aggravate all of the problems highlighted by Karen.
One thing it won’t do, however, is stop forced migrants from coming to the United States, even if they must abandon our broken legal system to do so. That’s what forced migrants do! Pretending otherwise and misusing our legal protection system for rejection won’t “deter” the reality of forced migration.
Nevertheless, Cruz argues correctly that Isidro-Zamorano, 25 I. & N. Dec. 829, leaves open the possibility for adjudication of the merits of a cancellation application where the qualifying relative aged out of qualifying status because of undue procedural delays. As explained below, the facts are unclear as to why briefing and decision were delayed. As such, we remand for the BIA to address in the first instance whether the delays on appeal in this case were undue and attributable to the agency, and if they were, for the BIA to review the IJ’s denial of cancellation of removal in the first instance.
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This is yet another in a long list of examples of how the Circuit actually did a better job than the BIA of locating, understanding, and following binding BIA precedent potentially favorable to the respondent!
I wouldn’t bet on today’s BIA adopting on remand an interpretation favoring the applicant, even though, as pointed out by the Second Circuit, such an interpretation would be legally possible. Perhaps, this is a case where amici need to “weigh in” before the BIA on remand.
In my mind, it also raises questions of whether the numerous unnecessary delays, backlogs, and confusion caused by the BIA’s failure to follow the statutory language on the “stop time rule” for 42B cancellation, as twice found by the Supremes, could be categorized as “unnecessary — and totally foreseeable — delay?” Both courts and advocates warned the BIA — in vain — that ignoring the clear language of the statute was a huge mistake that would create more unnecessary disorder in the already dysfunctional EOIR system! But, in their haste to rule in favor of DHS Enforcement, the BIA once again ignored the experts.
🇺🇸 Due Process Forever!
PWS
04-07-24
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ADDENDUM FROM “SIR JEFFREY:”
“Thanks, Paul (and hi to everyone!), but credit to Ray Fasano for flagging this.
Best, Jeff”
Thanks, Ray!
H. Raymond Fasano, Esquire PHOTO: Super Lawyers Profile
“Singh experienced multiple physical attacks and death threats over an eight-month period, from November of 2014 to June of 2015. No reasonable factfinder would conclude that Singh did not experience serious harm rising to the level of persecution. … For all these reasons we find that the record compels a finding that Singh suffered harm rising to the level of persecution. … [T]he BIA did not independently analyze relocation and determine that the government met its burden. Rather, the BIA expressly adopted the IJ’s reasons for finding that internal relocation was safe and reasonable. In doing so, the BIA adopted the IJ’s flawed relocation analysis, which did not afford Singh the presumption of past persecution or shift the burden to the government to prove that Singh can safely and reasonably relocate within India. … In sum, because the BIA erred in its relocation analysis, we grant Singh’s petition to review his claim for asylum and remand to the BIA for consideration in light of Singh v. Whitaker, 914 F.3d 654. … For the reasons set forth above, we GRANT Singh’s petition in part and REMAND to the BIA to consider (1) whether Singh is eligible for asylum because he suffered past persecution on account of statutorily protected grounds by the government or individuals whom the government was unable or unwilling to control; (2) if so, whether the DHS rebutted the presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution; and (3) whether Singh is entitled to withholding of removal.”
“The agency entirely overlooked evidence material to the hardship determination in this case: evidence regarding Mendez’s serious back injury and its implications for his ability to support his qualifying relatives through work in El Salvador. … The BIA’s decision is VACATED and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this order.”
H. Raymond Fasano, Esquire PHOTO: Super Lawyers Profile
—Daniel M. KowalskiEditor-in-ChiefBender’s Immigration Bulletin (LexisNexis)
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What if a brain surgeon or a heart surgeon were routinely engaging in “surgical malpractice?” Wouldn’t it be a cause for grave concern?🤯
Almost every week, sometimes multiple times, the BIA mishandles the basics in potential “life or death” cases. Yet, Garland somehow shrugs it off! This not only adds to the “dehumanization” of migrants (their lives don’t count), but also badly skews the statistical profile that undergirds much of the misguided immigration (non) dialogue.
If the anti-immigrant, anti-asylum, huge “over-denial” problem at EOIR were addressed with better qualified judges and adjudicators, it would become apparent that many more, probably a majority, of those caught up in the dysfunction at EOIR and the Asylum Office are qualified to remain in the U.S. in some status. And, proper positive precedents would guide practitioners, ICE Counsel, Immigration Judges, and Asylum Officers to correct results without protracted litigation that eventually burdens the Courts of Appeals, causes avoidable remands, fuels “Aimless Docket Reshuffling,” and contributes mightily to the mushrooming EOIR backlog!
As a result, these cases could be prepared, prioritized, granted, and individuals could get on with their lives and maximize their human potential to help our nation — just as generations before them have done including the ancestors of almost all Americans! How soon some of us forget!
The real, largely self-created, “immigration crisis,” is NOT insufficient “deterrence, detention, and cruelty” at the border! It’s the grotesque failure of all three branches of Government to insist on a fair, timely, well-staffed, professionally-managed, due-process-compliant adjudication, review, and resettlement system for asylum seekers and other immigrants. It’s also the ongoing attempt to “cover up” and minimize our Government’s mistreatment of asylum seekers, particularly those asserting their legal right to apply at our borders and in the interior regardless of status!
The racially-driven “targeting” of asylum seekers at the border is a ruse designed to deflect attention from the realities of human migration, what drives it, and the failure of governments across the board to come to grips with them and to fulfill their legal responsibilities to treat all persons fairly, humanely, and in accordance with correct interpretations and applications of the law!
Hon. Jeffrey S. Chase Jeffrey S. Chase Blog Coordinator & Chief Spokesperson, Round Table of Former Immigration Judges
Here’s additional commentary on Singh from my Round Table ⚖️⚔️ colleague “Sir Jeffrey” Chase:
The IJ was really determined to deny on this one. And I guess Vandyke had filled his quota of once in a lifetime for finding fault with the government, and thus had no choice but to dissent.
How would YOU like to face a system “determined to deny” with your life on the line? How would Garland like it?
Actually, under the generous “well-founded fear” standard applicable to asylum (Cardoza-Fonseca/Mogharrabi) and the authoritative guidance in the U.N. Handbook on adjudication, applicants like Singh who testify credibly are supposed to be given “the benefit of the doubt.” Garland has, quite improperly, like his immediate predecessors, allowed this key humanitarian legal principle to be mocked at EOIR! Instead, as cogently pointed out by “Sir Jeffrey,” here the IJ and the BIA actually went the “extra mile” to think of “any reason to deny” — even totally specious ones!
Also, half-baked, legally deficient “reasonably available internal relocation analysis”is a long-standing, chronic problem at EOIR, despite a regulation setting forth analytical factors that should be evaluated. Few, if any, such legitimate opportunities are “reasonably available” in most countries sending asylum applicants!
Moreover, once past persecution is established, the DHS has the burden of showing that there is a reasonably available internal relocation alternative, something that they almost never can prove by a preponderance of the evidence! Indeed, in my experience, the DHS almost never put in such evidence beyond rote citations to generalized language in DOS Country Reports!
The “judicial competency/bias” problems plaguing EOIR are large and well documented. Yet, Garland pretends like they don’t exist!
Has Alfred E. Neumann been “reborn” as Judge Merrick Garland? “Not my friends or relatives whose lives as being destroyed by my ‘Kangaroo Courts.’ Just ‘the others’ and their immigration lawyers, so who cares, why worry about professionalism, ethics, and due process in Immigration Court?” PHOTO: Wikipedia Commons
The Round Table of Former Immigration Judges Statement on EOIR’s Prior Restraint on NAIJ Speech
As former Immigration Judges and BIA Board Members we strongly protest the unconstitutional prior restraint imposed by the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) which effectively silences the officers of the National Association of Immigration Judges (NAIJ) and prohibits them from providing information or engaging in advocacy involving the complex workings of our nation’s Immigration Court system. We call for immediate reversal of this misguided policy.
In late February 2024 EOIR advised NAIJ officers that they could not speak publicly without obtaining advance permission through the agency’s “”SET” (Speaking Engagement Team) process, a requirement which was never imposed before. This is a cumbersome, multistep process which requires Immigration Judges to seek permission from their supervisors, the SET unit, and sometimes even EOIR’s Ethics team and the Office of Policy. It provides no time frames for decisions nor any opportunity for review of adverse determinations. It is a process which is wildly incompatible with the practical realities involved in responding to media or congressional inquiries which often involve extremely short deadlines, sometimes mere hours or days. Mandating union officers use this process is a thinly disguised gag order.
This step is a dramatic departure from a precedent of more than 50 years, since NAIJ was established in 1973 and was never previously mandated to seek prior approval for appearances or speech. It ignores the uncontroverted fact that NAIJ officials scrupulously provide disclaimers indicating that they are not speaking on behalf of EOIR [or its parent, the Department of Justice (DOJ)] or articulating any position except that held by NAIJ members. It unfairly penalizes NAIJ officers who risk personal discipline for insubordination should they fail to comply but are then hampered in the duties owed to their union members when they remain silent.
NAIJ has played a pivotal role fostering the independence and increased professionalism of the Immigration Courts. It brought home to Congress the crucial function that IJs serve in the deportation and removal process, not as prosecutors but rather as neutral arbiters. This resulted in a change in job title from Special Inquiry Officer to Immigration Judge in 1996, with a concomitant enhanced special pay rate intended to broaden and improve the candidate pool for new judges. NAIJ was a crucial player in efforts to protect the independence of the Immigration
Courts in 2002 by leading the successful effort to keep the court independent from the newly created Department of Homeland Security despite strong opposition to that end by the administration and DOJ. At that time, NAIJ argued presciently that the establishment of an Article I Court was the only enduring way to safeguard the sanctity of these courts which hear “death penalty cases in a traffic court setting.” While NAIJ did not succeed in achieving that lofty goal then, legislation to do just that is currently pending in Congress, largely due to NAIJ’s tireless advocacy and coalition building. NAIJ’s voice in the media often stands alone explaining the practical implications of the complex workings of our immigration removal laws since DOJ eschews comments despite the American standard in jurisprudence which emphasizes transparency in its tribunals. NAIJ is the only spokesperson for IJs in the field, who have the first-hand view of court operations. Without NAIJ speech, no views from these benches in the trenches will be heard.
Perhaps worst of all, this policy deprives the American public of the views of an important, informed group which can shed light on the realities of the implementation of immigration laws and policy at a time when public scrutiny is at an all-time high and accurate factual information scarce. Under this new policy, NAIJ officers cannot even speak at educational or professional seminars or other public events without DOJ approval and instruction as to precisely what they can or cannot say.
Government employees do not surrender their First Amendment rights when they take office. To the contrary, their duty to educate the public is heightened and their voice enhanced by their informed opinions and expertise.
We urge EOIR to restore NAIJ’s important voice and revoke this new policy. ###
The Round Table of Former Immigration Judges is composed of 56 former Immigration Judges and Appellate Immigration Judges of the Board of Immigration Appeals. We were appointed and served under both Republican and Democratic administrations. Members of our group have served in training and management roles at EOIR. Several of our members were officers and leaders in NAIJ and were instrumental in guiding NAIJ to accomplish the achievements described above. Combined we have decades of experience and unique expertise in the immigration court system and the field of immigration law.
For media inquiries, please contact Hon. Dana Leigh Marks (ret.) at danamarks@pobox.com or (415) 577-9831
3/25/24
Hon. Dana Leigh Marks U.S. Immigration Judge (Retired) San Francisco Immigration Court Past President, National Association of Immigration Judges, Member Round Table of Former Immigration JudgesKnightess of the Round Table
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Hon. Jeffrey S. Chase Jeffrey S. Chase Blog Coordinator & Chief Spokesperson, Round Table of Former Immigration Judges
MINI-ESSAY: NAIJ IS AN ESSENTIAL FORCE FOR JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
By Judge (Ret.) Jeffrey S. Chase
March 25, 2024
In Matter of A-R-C-G-, the BIA at footnote 16 recognized that AILA, UNHCR, and CGRS in their amicus briefs had all argued that gender alone should be sufficient to constitute a valid PSG in the matter. However, the Board chickened out, stating that because they were recognizing the narrower group stipulated to by DHS, “we need not reach this issue.”
I think the real proof of the validity of gender per se as a PSG is found in what happened after Sessions issued Matter of A-B-. With A-R-C-G- vacated, IJs all around the country began issuing detailed written decisions recognizing gender plus nationality, and explaining why such group met all of the legal requirements. This was done by IJs with very different grant rates, across different circuits, and included at least one ACIJ. And remember, this was done under an AG that clearly didn’t want IJs to reach that conclusion.
Which allows me to segue into our next issue: a major reason that IJs felt empowered to issue those decisions that were clearly not to the AG’s liking was due to the decades of effort by the NAIJ on behalf of judicial independence. Our public statement, prepared by our esteemed colleague Judge Dana Marks with input from others in our group, criticizing EOIR’s recent gag order on NAIJ officers, who for the first time will now be required to request agency permission to speak publicly, is a powerful reminder of the essential role played by NAIJ in protecting judicial independence, promoting due process and fundamental fairness, and, ultimately, saving lives of those seeking justice from our nation.
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Thanks to Dana, “Sir Jeffrey,” and all our other wonderful Round Table colleagues for speaking out so forcefully in favor of due process for all and judicial independence!
Under Garland, the BIA’s approach to gender-based asylum has too often remained tethered to the past. Woman Being “Tried By Ordeal” 17th Century Woodcut Public Realm Source: Ancient Origins Website https://www.ancient-origins.net/history/trial-ordeal-life-or-death-method-judgement-004160
Hon. “Sir Jeffrey” S. Chase reports to the Round Table⚔️🛡️:
Hi all: Another win to report, in a First Circuit case in which we filed a joint amicus brief with immigration law professors (and some in our group actually fit within both categories!).
However, the court declined to address our argument regarding the correct nexus standard for withholding claims (as opposed to asylum claims). The reason is that the court found that the BIA misstated one of the petitioner’s particular social groups, such that (according to the circuit court):
In sum, the BIA rejected a PSG of its own devising and not the social group Ferreira advanced. Its characterization substantively altered the meaning of Ferreira’s proffered PSG and amounts to legal error.
The court directed:
On remand, the BIA should carefully consider Ferreira’s gender-based PSG in light of our decisions in De Pena-Paniagua and Espinoza-Ochoa.
Both of those cited decisions were quite favorable to the petitioners.
Hon. Jeffrey S. Chase Jeffrey S. Chase Blog Coordinator & Chief Spokesperson, Round Table of Former Immigration Judges
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Fear mongering and myth making by politicos of both parties, with the connivance of the media, deflect attention from the real problem: a dysfunctional U.S. asylum adjudication system that hugely and disingenuously over-rejects and under-protects, in addition to being too slow and unconstitutionally inconsistent. Thus, both parties intentionally skew the statistics against asylum seekers and feed racially-driven nativist “talking points” about the border!
The BIA/OIL claim that the gender-based psg is not recognizable is utterly preposterous!It took me fewer than 5 minutes of internet research to find this very recent Trinidad government report recognizing that gender-based violence is an endemic and well-documented problem that disproportionately affects women and girls in Trinidad. While the report sets forth an “aspirational multi-year plan” to address the problem (“willing to protect”), there is no indication that the plan is reasonably effective at present (“but unable to do so at present”).
Here is some other “choice commentary” from Round Table members:
“A win is a win–again ‘calling’ the BIA on doing the wrong thing!”
“Great job, Team!! Let’s keep up this winning streak.”
“Wow – great! As Paul would say, another bad Garland/BIA Fiasco. Making up a psg and then denying relief because of it. Funny if it were not so tragic!“
“Yes, especially when they are telling IJs they can’t even determine what PSG fits the facts of the case unless the Respondent gets it just right! Yet they can make up whatever they want and then say it doesn’t fit the facts or isn’t cognizable!”
“When we were at the International Judges conference that [Paul] organized at Georgetown, all of the international judges said that gender was a recognized psg in their countries—even the countries where women are discriminated against and/or persecuted!”
“Like most of you, I am at a loss to understand how gender, alone, does not meet every requirement of PSG. The BIA position on this is inexplicable, and IMO, at minimum, borders on frivolous.“
Roger that! Intentionally ignoring the obvious and failing in the duty to consistently recognize and prioritize many easy grants of asylum and other protection is the “elephant in the room” for the U.S. justice system!
No wonder spineless politicos, judges, and the media want to shift attention away from their shared responsibility for a glaringly unjust and inept asylum system to blame the hapless victims of their collective failure — whose lives and futures are on the line!
Hon. Jeffrey S. Chase Jeffrey S. Chase Blog Coordinator & Chief Spokesperson, Round Table of Former Immigration Judges
Hon. “Sir Jeffrey” Chase reports:
Hi all: The Supreme Court just issued its opinion in Wilkinson v. Garland, in which our group filed an amicus brief. The Court held that the exceptional and extremely unusual hardship determination in cancellation B cases (involving non-LPRs) is a mixed question of fact and law, and is thus reviewable by circuit courts on appeal. The Court thus reversed the Third Circuit’s determination that it lacked jurisdiction.
The decision was 6-3. Sotomayor wrote the majority opinion; Jackson wrote a concurring opinion, and Roberts and Alito wrote dissenting opinions.
Our amicus brief argued:
In amici’s experience, whether the facts of a particular case satisfy the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” eligibility criteria for cancellation is a mixed question of law and fact.
This decision will have a major impact on cancellation B cases, as the Board’s hardship determinations will now be subject to wide circuit court review.
This case makes a huge difference! Circuit review will ratchet up the pressure on the BIA to cut the “any reason to deny” BS 💩 and start doing a quality review in every case! If not, given the number of cancellation cases in the system, there are going to be lots more Circuit remands that will jack the backlog even higher!
As put by one “Round Tabler,” this will “impact the scholarship and often times lack of analytical rigor by the Board, knowing that it is no longer completely insulated from review of its hardship determinations.” You betcha!
And don’t ever underestimate the adverse impact on due process and justice that occurs when, knowing that its decisions are “immune” from judicial review, the BIA is “pushed by the political powers that be” to cut corners, “crank the numbers,” and “keep the removal assembly line moving!” That’s why political control over the BIA’s decision-making has such an outsized adverse impact on justice for immigrants and undermines the key constitutional due process principle of “fair and impartial justice for all.”
Hon. Jeffrey S. Chase Jeffrey S. Chase Blog Coordinator & Chief Spokesperson, Round Table of Former Immigration Judges
A Victory before the BIA!
Hi All: I hope you are not getting tired of all the winning. Today, the BIA issued a precedent decision on the whole Pereira and Niz-Chavez jurisdictional issue involving service of a defective NTA (link attached) in which our Round Table submitted an amicus brief drafted for us by our own Sue Roy.And the BIA actually agreed with us!!!
The holding:
The Department of Homeland Security cannot remedy a notice to appear that lacks the date and time of the initial hearing before the Immigration Judge by filing a Form I-261 because this remedy is contrary to the plain text of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.30 and inconsistentwith the Supreme Court’s decision in Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 593 U.S. 155 (2021).
Of course, our brief was not acknowledged in the Board’s decision.
A thousand thanks to Sue and to all in this group who have repeatedly signed on in support of due process.
As a reminder, we still await a decision from the Supreme Court on whether Pereira and Niz-Chavez extend to in absentia orders of removal. Oral arguments in that case were heard earlier this month, and our brief was mentioned in response to a question by Chief Justice Roberts.
Best, Jeff
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“Our Hero” 🦸♂️ Hon. Susan G. Roy Law Office of Susan G. Roy, LLC Princeton Junction, NJ Member, Round Table of Former Immigration JudgesKnightess of the Round Table
Want to meet Judge Sue Roy in person and learn from her in a small group setting? You’re in luck! (HINT: She’s not only a very talented lawyer and teacher, but she’s also very entertaining and down to earth in her “Jersey Girl Persona!”)
“Don’t mess with Jersey Girls! They’ll roll right over you — in or out of court.” Creative Commons License
The Round Table 🛡️ will be well-represented by Judge Roy, Judge Lory Diana Rosenberg, and me at the upcoming Sharma-Crawford Clinic 7th Annual Immigration Court Trial Advocacy College in Kansas City, MO, April 24-26, 2024! We’ll be part of afaculty of all-star 🌟 NDPA litigators who are there to help every attendee sharpen skills and reach their full potential as a fearless litigator in Immigration Court — and beyond!
I am featured in the attached “20 Stories for 20 Years” video for Waterwell’s 20th anniversary with Kristin Villanueva, the star of the play and film versions of “The Courtroom.”
Waterwell is the theater company co-founded by the actor Arian Moayed that has been a great advocate on behalf of immigrants.
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Congrats, my friend and Round Table colleague, to you and to Waterwell!👏
Come to think of it, “Sir Jeffrey” is a pretty good moniker for an actor, as well as a leading warrior of the Round Table!🛡️⚔️
And, certainly, Immigration Court is a continuing human drama. Some would say “Repertory Theater of the Absurd!”🎭🤯
One day in 2003, I got a call from an acquaintance — the mother of one of my daughter’s middle school classmates — who happened to be the Vice Dean of Cardozo Law School, part of Yeshiva University in New York City. She knew that I was a practicing immigration lawyer with a major immigration law firm, so she was wondering: would I be interested in teaching a course in Immigration Law at Cardozo?
It turned out that Leon Wildes, founder of the esteemed immigration law firm Wildes & Weinberg, PC, and most famous for his representation of John Lennon, had been teaching Immigration Law at Cardozo for many years. But at the age of 70, he was ready to slow down a bit, and teach only one semester per year instead of two semesters. I was asked if I would be willing to teach the class during the spring semester. Leon would continue to teach the fall semester course, as well as oversee an externship program through which he placed students for a semester with nonprofit legal services organizations representing immigrant clients.
I eagerly said yes, and was given the freedom to design my own syllabus and curriculum. I taught the basic doctrinal course in Immigration Law at Cardozo from 2004 through 2011. Then Leon decided to step down from teaching completely. His son, Michael Wildes, an esteemed immigration attorney in his own right, took over the class, and I segued into running the externship program, which I turned into a full-fledged field clinic with a weekly seminar where we did case rounds and focused on different substantive topics each week — both legal topics such as deportation or different visa types, and practice-oriented issues such as how to interview clients who have suffered severe trauma. I continued to run the Immigration Law Field Clinic at Cardozo Law School until 2015.
Now Leon Wildes has passed on, at the age of 90. He leaves behind an incredible legacy as one of the grand old men of the immigration bar. And that story about John Lennon? It’s worth reading.
Photo from the Wildes & Weinberg, PC website.
Because of Lennon’s affiliation with the Left and his ability to rally young people (during the first presidential election when 18- to 20-year-olds could vote), Richard Nixon considered Lennon to be a threat to his reelection in 1972 and wanted him deported. In defending Lennon against deportation, Leon Wildes — who was so conventional that he purportedly didn’t even know who John Lennon was before he took him on as a client — managed to uncover the then-secret practice (then called the “non-priority program”) within the then-Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) of exercising prosecutorial discretion not to deport certain otherwise deportable individuals.
Wildes’ advocacy led John Lennon and Yoko Ono to succeed in their fight against deportation and enabled them to obtain permanent residence. Moreover, Wildes’ unmasking of the INS’s ability to exercise prosecutorial discretion paved the way for the Obama Administration to later create a policy allowing young people brought to the United States as children — the so-called “Dreamers” — to remain in the United States under the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program.
Read the story of Leon Wildes’ representation of John Lennon in his first-person account, “Not Just Any Immigration Case,” reprinted on the Wildes & Weinberg website from the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law Alumni Review.
RIP Leon Wildes. May his memory be a blessing
Careen Shannon Senior Counsel (formerly Partner) Fragomen, Del Rey, Bernsen & Loewy, LLP Executive Producer “Las Abogadas: Attorneys on the Front Lines of the Migrant Crisis.” Photo: Think Immigration
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Thanks, Careen! Lot’s of “good historical stuff” on the Lennon case on the Wildes & Weinberg PC website: https://www.wildeslaw.com/
I drafted the BIA decision in Lennon that was reversed by the late Chief Judge Irving Kaufman and the 2d Circuit. Leon argued the case before the BIA.
Another legend, the late Vinnie Schiano (who, according to my Round Table colleague and immigration historian Hon. “Sir Jeffrey” Chase, claimed to have been a co-inventor of the “Master Calendar”) argued for the “Legacy” INS.At that time, the BIA counted immigration “gurus” Chairman Maury Roberts and Louisa Wilson among its five members.
I ran into Leon at a number of AILA functions over the years. I think he was friendly with Maury Roberts and the late Sam Bernsen, two of my “mentors.”
Leon was a gentleman, scholar, and educator, widely respected by those in Government and private practice.
Turning this group loose on asylum seekers is an act of gross legal, judicial, and political malpractice by the Biden Administration and Merrick Garland! https://www.flickr.com/photos/rasputin243/ Creative Commons License
Dan Kowalski reports for LexisNexis Immigration Community:
“Here, the IJ and BIA found, and the government does not dispute, that Espinoza-Ochoa credibly testified that he experienced harm and threats of harm in Guatemala that “constitute[d] persecution.” But the agency concluded that Espinoza-Ochoa was still ineligible for asylum for two reasons. First, it held that Espinoza-Ochoa had failed to identify a valid PSG because the social group he delineated, “land-owning farmer, who was persecuted for simply holding [the] position of farmer and owning a farm, by both the police and gangs in concert,” was impermissibly circular. Second, the IJ and BIA each held that, regardless of whether his asserted PSG was valid, the harm Espinoza-Ochoa experienced was “generalized criminal activity” and therefore was not on account of his social group. We conclude that the BIA committed legal error in both its PSG and nexus analyses. We first explain why Espinoza-Ochoa’s PSG was not circular and then evaluate whether his PSG was “at least one central reason” for the harm he suffered. Ultimately, we remand to the agency to reconsider both issues consistent with this opinion. … For all these reasons, we agree with Espinoza-Ochoa that legal error infected both the PSG and nexus analyses below. Accordingly, we GRANT the petition, VACATE the decision below, and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
[Hats way off to Randy Olen!]
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You’ve been reading about this damaging, deadly legal travesty going on during Garland’s watch:
How outrageous, illegal, and “anti-historical” are the Garland BIA’s antics? The classic example of Marxist-Leninist revolutionary persecutions involve targeting property owners, particularly landowners. Indeed, in an earlier time, the BIA acknowledged that “landowners” were a PSG. See, e.g., Matter of Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. 211 (BIA 1985).
But, now in intellectually dishonest decisions, the BIA pretzels itself, ignores precedent, and tortures history in scurrilous attempts to deny obvious protection. These bad decisions, anti-asylum bias, and deficient scholarship infect the entire system.
It makes cases like this — which couldand should have easily been granted in a competent system shortly after the respondent’s arrival in 2016 — hang around for seven years, waste resources, and still be on the docket.
This is a highly — perhaps intentionally — unrecognized reason why the U.S. asylum asylum system is failing today. It’s also a continuing indictment of the deficient performance of Merrick Garland as Attorney General.
Obviously, these deadly, festering problems infecting the entire U.S. justice system are NOT going to be solved by taking more extreme enforcement actions against those whose quest for fair and correct asylum determinations are now being systematically stymied and mishandled by the incompetent actions of the USG, starting with the DOJ!
“Sir Jeffrey” tells us how to use “the law as a sword” to defend against the BIA’s anti-asylum precedent in M-R-M-S-. Don’t let yourself and your clients be “shredded and trampled” by BIA panels wielding deadly, hyper-technical, counterintuitive, overly restrictive asylum precedents designed to promote and support “any reason to deny!” Albrecht Dürer, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons
In 2017, while Matter of L-E-A-1 was pending before the BIA, I attended an immigration law conference at which Professor Jon Bauer posed the following “thought experiment”:
A Nazi official threatens to kill all the Jews in a town unless a Jewish criminal, who has committed several robberies and murders and is suspected to be hiding in the area, is turned over to the authorities or turns himself in.
Is this persecution on account of religion?
The answer is obviously yes. Those in the town find themselves at risk of persecution on account of their religion. It would seem impossible for anyone possessing knowledge of our asylum laws (or just plain common sense) not to understand this.
However, with its decision in Matter of M-R-M-S-,2 the Board of Immigration Appeals has managed to create a test for nexus that would lead to the opposite conclusion.
One reaction to this decision would have involved explaining that the Board’s illogical holding was reached not by error but by design, in furtherance of a restrictionist agenda; asking why the current administration hasn’t changed the makeup of a BIA specifically constructed to do exactly that; bemoaning the fact that regulations that are more than two years overdue could have prevented this; and suggesting that the correct course of action for the Attorney General to take at this point would be to vacate this decision in anticipation of said forthcoming rulemaking.
But such talk would be of no practical help. What those representing asylum applicants and those in government deciding those claims need now is a path to negotiate this latest obstacle and still reach the correct result. I hope that some of what follows will prove helpful, and that it will encourage further thought and conversation on this topic.
Legal Strategies in light of M-R-M-S-
Distinguish your case based on the facts
In M-R-M-S-, the Board chose for its precedent a case surprisingly devoid of facts. The entire factual summary consists of three sentences. A criminal cartel forced the respondents off of their land “because the cartel wanted the land for its own purpose. The cartel killed the lead respondent’s grandson for unknown reasons, although the respondents believe it was related to the cartel’s efforts to obtain their land. The cartel also forced other families off of land in the same area.”
This summary makes no mention of how family membership might have been a factor; it only says the cartel wanted the land for its own unstated purpose. It can be argued that the decision simply establishes that cases asserting mixed motives need to present more than one motive.
Instead, the Board leaped to a much broader and more damaging conclusion that wasn’t even suggested by the above facts, namely, that targeting members of a family for purposes of achieving another non-protected ground renders the family membership “incidental or subordinate,” and thus lacking the nexus required for asylum or withholding of removal protection.
Tip: Distinguish your facts from those in M-R-M-S-.
Emphasize how family or another protected ground played a significant role in the applicant being targeted for persecution. Note that merely mentioning that other family members were also harmed does not in itself establish a nexus on account of family membership.
Tip: Employ the Board’s test in Matter of S-P- when applicable.
In Matter of S-P-,3, the BIA looked at when government prosecution might actually be persecution on account of political opinion. And one of the warning signs it mentioned occurs when the punishment is clearly out of proportion to the conduct in question. So under S-P-’s test, if someone charged with jaywalking is detained at length and beaten by the police, the reasonable conclusion is that the punishment wasn’t actually about the jaywalking.
One can transpose this approach to the particular social group consisting of family by arguing that the same logic applies to gang punishment for failing to pay extortion. Particularly where the amount being sought by the gang or cartel isn’t that much, when the response to the failure to pay is to threaten to severely harm or kill a family member of the target of extortion, a reasonable conclusion under S-P- would be that this isn’t simply about the money. A gang or cartel can seek a financial goal, but at the same time can develop an animosity against a family resistant to its demands.
Moving on, the use of the word “subordinate” in the Board’s most recent holding is of interest, for the following reasons.
The fall and rise of the Board’s “subordination” criteria for nexus
In its first attempt to define the “one central reason” language adopted by Congress in 2005, the BIA in Matter of J-B-N- & S-M-4 recognized in the last paragraph of page 212 of that decision that the standard did not require a central reason to be “dominant” in relation to other reasons for persecution. In fact, in a footnote, the Board further explained: “The problem in classifying one motive as “dominant” or “central” is that it renders all other motives, regardless of their significance to the case, secondary and therefore ultimately irrelevant.”
Yet two pages after rejecting a hierarchical approach to nexus, the Board defined the new standard as a reason that “cannot be incidental, tangential, superficial, or subordinate to another reason for harm.”
The problem with the inclusion of the word “subordinate” is obvious. It means that once an adjudicator finds a reason they consider to be the dominant one, their inquiry is over, and, as the Board itself warned, all other motives become irrelevant.
The Third Circuit, in Ndayshimiye v. Attorney General of U.S.5 rejected the Board’s standard for precisely this reason: its use of the word “subordinate” was found by the court to be no different from the “dominance” test that the Board purported to reject. To quote the Third Circuit:
This plain language indicates that a persecutor may have more than one central motivation for his or her actions; whether one of those central reasons is more or less important than another is irrelevant. The BIA acknowledged this in refusing to define a central reason within the meaning of § 208 as a “dominant” motivation. Id. at 212. The same logic forbids an interpretation that would impose a mirror image of the rejected “dominance” test: the requirement that a protected ground, even if a “central” reason for persecution, not be subordinate to any other reason.
Interestingly, following this rejection of its standard, the BIA reacted by dropping the word “subordinate” from its stated legal standard. For example, in a subsequent (2011) precedent, Matter of N-M-, 6 the Board cited its earlier decision in J-B-N & S-M-, but made no mention of that case’s incidental/tangential/superficial/subordinate language at all. Rather, the Board said:
In cases arising under the REAL ID Act, the “protected ground cannot play a minor role in the alien’s past mistreatment or fears of future mistreatment.” Matter of J-B-N- & S-M-, 24 I&N Dec. at 214. Instead, a [noncitizen] must demonstrate that the persecutor would not have harmed the applicant if the protected trait did not exist.7
The italicized sentence states a “but for” causation standard which we will discuss further below. In fact, it seems to be an identical standard to that employed by the Fourth Circuit, whose approach the Board criticized in M-R-M-S-.
Years later, in the aforementioned Matter of L-E-A- (decided in 2017), the Board amended its earlier language in J-B-N- & S-N- as follows:
The protected trait, in this case membership in the respondent’s father’s family, “cannot play a minor role”—that is, “it cannot be incidental [or] tangential . . . to another reason for harm.”8
Notice how an ellipsis is used to drop the word “subordinate” from the definition. So the Board seemed to understand for quite some time that the legal standard it enunciated could not include a dominance test (although it would then proceed to apply a dominance test in practice, as numerous circuit court reversals have demonstrated)
But now, without explaining the reason for its sudden reversal, the Board has in M-R-M-S- reverted to its original flawed standard. Here’s the quote:
A protected ground that is “incidental, tangential, superficial, or subordinate to another reason for harm” does not satisfy this standard. Matter of J-B-N- & S-M-, 24 I&N Dec. at 214. 9
Furthermore, the Board chose to reassert its dominance requirement in a case in which the facts mention only one reason, and a vague one at that – that “the cartel wanted the land for its own purpose.” A dominance test is meaningless where there is only one reason asserted for the persecution.
But what if the revived dominance test were to be applied to Prof. Bauer’s hypothetical? Presumably, the Board would find the dominant reason for the threatened persecution to be the Nazi authorities’ desire to bring a criminal to justice. The targeting of the suspect’s coreligionists as a means to achieve that primary objective would, under the Board’s test, become “subordinate” to that goal, and would thus render the murdering of the town’s Jews “irrelevant.” Applying the Board’s “logic,” religion would not be one central reason for the murders.
As the above example demonstrates, the Board’s test will lead to truly absurd results. It is therefore not surprising that the Board’s standard is at odds with the approach of most circuits.
The reinstituted dominance test conflicts with most circuit case law
Tip: Argue the inapplicability of M-R-M-S- where it conflicts with prevailing circuit law.
While not exhaustive, the following selection of circuit court case law should provide a basis for arguing that the Board’s standard for determining nexus is inapplicable in many courts located within the jurisdiction of those circuits
Third Circuit
It should certainly be argued in cases arising within the jurisdiction of the Third Circuit that the new decision’s reiteration of the exact legal standard that was rejected in Ndayshimiye (as discussed above) means that M-R-M-S- cannot be followed. The BIA actually recognized the conflict in footnote 6 of its decision, stating:
Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit generally agrees with the Board’s interpretation of the “one central reason” standard, it has rejected the requirement that a protected ground not be subordinate to another reason for harm. See Ndayshimiye v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 557 F.3d 124, 130–31 (3d Cir. 2009).
The Board thus seemed to acknowledge by way of this footnote the inapplicability of its decision in the Third Circuit.
Fourth Circuit
The BIA in M-R-M-S- does not contest that its requirement for nexus is at odds with the long-established “but for” standard employed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
In Hernandez-Avalos v. Lynch,10 the Fourth Circuit explained that even though a gang threatened the petitioner for the purpose of recruiting her son, the applicant was nevertheless targeted “on account of” her family ties because her “relationship to her son is why she, and not another person, was threatened….” The court has repeated the “why she, and not another person” test in other decisions.11
The Fourth Circuit has more recently pointed to an oft-repeated error of the Board in “incorrectly focusing on why the gang targeted Petitioner’s family, rather than on why they targeted Petitioner herself.”12 In another published decision, the Fourth Circuit stated that “‘once the right question is asked’ — that is, why was Petitioner being targeted — the conclusion is quite clear: ‘whatever [the gang]’s motives for targeting [her] family, [Petitioner herself] was targeted because of [her] membership in that family.’”13
The fact that the Board in M-R-M-S- states that it prefers the approach of the Tenth Circuit, which “does not agree with the Fourth Circuit’s approach,”14 does not change the fact that the standard enunciated in the above-captioned Fourth Circuit decisions remains the standard for nexus applicable in Immigration Courts and Asylum Offices located within that circuit’s jurisdiction.
Cases being heard remotely by an IJ located within the Fourth Circuit
A decision of the Fourth Circuit issued last year provides a strong argument for applying that court’s nexus standard in lieu of the M-R-M-S- approach in cases geographically outside of the circuit’s jurisdiction which are heard remotely by Immigration Judges sitting in Virginia, Maryland, or North Carolina.
In Herrera-Alcala v. Garland 15, the Fourth Circuit held that under a plain reading of the statute, jurisdiction is determined by the geographic location of the immigration judge at the time the judge completed the proceedings.
The BIA subsequently issued a conflicting precedential opinion, Matter of Garcia.16 But as the Fourth Circuit’s ruling in Herrera-Alcala was based on its clear reading of the statutory language, the lack of a finding of statutory ambiguity would preclude deference to the Board’s view under either Chevron or Brand X.
In cases in which the Immigration Judge is sitting within the Fourth Circuit while the respondent is appearing in an immigration court elsewhere, the argument should be made that Fourth Circuit case law should apply. Claims constructed using Fourth Circuit precedent should be presented below, as in case the claim is denied by the agency, the applicant will ultimately be able to seek review before the Fourth Circuit.
Cases arising under the jurisdiction of other circuits
Fifth Circuit
Outside of the obvious examples of the Third and Fourth Circuits, be highly aware of the case law of the prevailing circuit regarding nexus. Most circuits have rejected the Board’s approach to some degree. Furthermore, the BIA misrepresented the holdings in some of the circuit decisions it cited in M-R-M-S-, a point that should be brought to the attention of judges or asylum officers.
The Fifth Circuit provides us with an example. In M-R-M-S-, the BIA cited the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Guevara-Fabian v. Garland17 as an example of a court employing an analysis of nexus consistent with its own approach.18 However, the court in Guevara-Fabian simply found that there was substantial evidence that the petitioner was targeted “because she owned a profitable business,” and not due to her family membership. This is quite different from the Board’s holding that being targeted due to one’s family membership is insufficient to establish a nexus where such family-based targeting is used as a means to achieving another non-protected goal.
Furthermore, four days after the issuance of M-R-M-S-, the Fifth Circuit published its decision in Argueta-Hernandez v. Garland.19 The facts in that case did not involve a family-based particular social group, but in addressing the subject of nexus, the court’s opinion rejected the agency’s general approach of rejecting all but the dominant reason for persecution.
Specifically, the Fifth Circuit found that in concluding threats by MS-13 were motivated “by criminal intent, personal vendettas, or monetary gain, which do not establish the required nexus,” the BIA disregarded that the petitioner “needed only to present ‘some particularized connection between the feared persecution’ and the protected ground in which his application for relief relies.” The court then referenced an earlier decision in which it had rejected the Board’s employment of an “either-or” approach to nexus in a mixed motive case, and said that the Board had acted similarly here by suggesting that Argueta was targeted for economic reasons “instead” of for a protected ground.20
So in cases arising in the Fifth Circuit, it should be argued that Guevara-Fabian did not support the Board’s approach in M-R-M-S-, as it was distinguishable on its facts, and that the court’s subsequent rejection in Argueta-Hernandez of the type of dominance approach and “either-or” test employed in M-R-M-S- puts the Board’s view of nexus in conflict with circuit law.
Sixth Circuit
On December 8 (i.e. 7 days after the publication of M-R-M-S-), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit issued its decision in Sebastian-Sebastian v. Garland 21. In that case, the petitioner, who suffered domestic violence at the hands of her husband, and, following his death, at the hands of his mother, claimed persecution on account of particular social groups which included “Guatemalan Chuj [w]omen in domestic relationships who are unable to leave,” and “Guatemalan Chuj [w]omen who are viewed as property by virtue of their positions within a domestic relationship.” But the IJ found, and the Board affirmed, that the abuser acted based on a personal vendetta, and therefore found no nexus to a particular social group.
As the record contained ample evidence that “cultural expectations dictated that a Guatemalan Chuj woman in her position—both viewed as property and unable to leave by virtue of her domestic relationship—must stay with her in-laws and have nowhere else to go,” the Sixth Circuit determined there was “sufficient evidence for the BIA to conclude that Sebastian-Sebastian’s membership in these groups ‘underlay[s] all of [her persecutors’] actions.’”22 The court thus concluded that the Board’s failure to consider whether, in light of the above, the personal motives and particular social group membership were “inextricably intertwined” constituted reversible error.
The Sixth Circuit thus held (post-M-R-M-S-) that even where the primary reason for the persecution is a non-protected one (in this case, personal animosity), the fact that membership in a particular social group put and kept the asylum applicant in harm’s way is sufficient to render it sufficiently intertwined to satisfy the “one central reason” test. I believe a strong argument can be made that applying this approach to a family-based PSG would require a finding that even if the ultimate motive is extortion, if family membership is what put and kept the asylum applicant in harm’s way, there is sufficient nexus.
Seventh Circuit
In Gonzalez Ruano v. Barr,23 the Seventh Circuit explicitly rejected an approach essentially the same to that underlying the Board’s decision in M-R-M-S-. The petitioner suffered persecution by a criminal cartel whose leader viewed the petitioner’s wife as “property” that he sought to “possess.” The petitioner thus argued that his familial relationship to his wife was at least one central reason for his persecution.
On review, the Seventh Circuit specifically rejected the government’s argument that the persecution of the petitioner “was simply a ‘means to an end,’ making [the petitioner]’s relationship to his wife incidental.”24 The court found support in the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Hernandez-Avalos v. Lynch, adopting the Fourth Circuit’s test under which a nexus exists because the petitioner’s “relationship to his wife was the reason he, and not someone else, was targeted.”25
As the Seventh Circuit is in accord with the Fourth Circuit’s test that specifically rejects the Board’s approach to nexus (a conflict readily admitted by the Board in M-R-M-S-), the Board’s nexus standard is necessarily inapplicable in cases in which Seventh Circuit case law applies. It should be emphasized that the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Hernandez-Avalos which the Seventh Circuit positively cites is the specific decision mentioned by the Board in M-R-M-S- as an example of how the Fourth Circuit’s approach differs from its own.26
Eleventh Circuit
The Eleventh Circuit in Perez-Sanchez v. U.S. Att’y Gen.27 also applied a “but for” approach to nexus in a case involving family, determining that the persecutor’s monetary motivation did not render the petitioner’s family membership merely incidental where a criminal cartel targeted the petitioner because his father-in-law owed the cartel money. This is the exact scenario the Board rejected in M-R-M-S-, in which a family member is targeted as a means to a monetary end.
However, exactly as the Fourth Circuit had done in Hernandez-Avalos, the Eleventh Circuit stated that “In Mr. Perez-Sanchez’s case, it is impossible to disentangle his relationship to his father-in-law from the Gulf Cartel’s pecuniary motives: they are two sides of the same coin.” The court concluded that “the family relationship was one central reason, if not the central reason, for the harm.”28
Thus, the M-R-M-S- standard is at odds with Eleventh Circuit case law as well.
Ninth and Second Circuits
The approach of these two circuits relates to the “but-for” standard. The Ninth Circuit applies a “but-for cause” test in determining nexus. As that court recently noted, to satisfy that standard, an asylum applicant “must first show that ‘the persecutor would not have harmed [her] if such motive did not exist,’… that is, but-for cause, see But-for Cause, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (“The cause without which the event could not have occurred.”).29
Interestingly, in M-R-M-S-, the BIA quoted this but-for cause language from Parussimova without mentioning that the standard was in conflict with its own.30
It should therefore be argued in cases arising in the Ninth Circuit that applying that court’s “but-for cause” test would lead to a quite different result than the standard enunciated in M-R-M-S-.
The Second Circuit’s standard is less clear, but the court seems to view the “one central reason” requirement an even lower bar for establishing nexus than a but-for cause test. In Quituizaca v. Garland,31 the court noted the need to predict future persecution in withholding of removal claims, as opposed to other areas of law that employ a but-for causation test to past actions only. The court noted that where an adverse action has already occurred, there is an implication that “whatever evidence to establish but-for causation or refute it exists too.”
By contrast, the court noted that because of the predictive nature of future persecution in withholding claims, “[a] but-for standard in this context would seemingly require the applicant have insight into the motivations of the hypothetical future persecutor that sufficiently removes any doubt that the persecutor would be motivated by anything else,” adding that “[a]t a minimum, the proof that can be marshalled to rectify past conduct appears to us distinct from that which would be needed to establish a persecutor’s potential future conduct.”
While the Quituizaca decision is not even mentioned in M-R-M-S-, the Board does reference another Second Circuit case, Garcia-Aranda v. Garland,32 but essentially misrepresents that decision’s holding. In Garcia-Aranda, the facts established that although family members had also been harmed, the petitioners were targeted for persecution because of their own perceived wealth. Whether or not they were related to others who suffered harm would not change the outcome. Thus, in Garcia-Aranda, the court did not address, much less reject, the proposition that no nexus is established under a Hernandez-Avalos type of fact pattern.
A quick note regarding the Tenth Circuit
M-R-M-S- arose within the jurisdiction of the Tenth Circuit, and the Board lauded that court’s decision in Orellana-Recinos v. Garland33 as setting forth its preferred standard for nexus.34
It is worth noting that in Orellana-Recinos, “Petitioners did not challenge, or even cite, Matter of L-E-A- in their brief to this court. And at oral argument they cited it as authority. As previously noted, they dispute only the BIA’s factual findings in their case, not the legal framework it applied.”35
What about the standard applied in discrimination cases?
The Supreme Court recently addressed the question of nexus outside of the asylum context in Bostock v. Clayton County,36 a case involving employment discrimination under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The Court explained in Bostock that the statutory term in question, “because of,” carries the same legal meaning as “on account of,” (i.e. the standard used in asylum cases).
The Court continued that the standard requires a court to apply the “simple” and “traditional” “but-for” test. As the Court explained, “a but-for test directs us to change one thing at a time and see if the outcome changes. If it does, we have found a but-for cause.”37
The Court recognized that the “but-for” standard is a “sweeping” one, acknowledging that “[o]ften, events have multiple but-for causes.” The Court further observed that “[w]hen it comes to Title VII, the adoption of the traditional but-for causation standard means a defendant cannot avoid liability just by citing some other factor that contributed to its challenged employment decision.”38
This leads to the following question: if “on account of” is not a term specific to asylum, and if the Supreme Court has told us that there is a simple and traditional test for “on account of” that is none other than the “but-for” test being applied by several circuits as described above, can the BIA simply ignore this in creating its own definition for the term “on account of” applicable to asylum claims? M-R-M-S- makes no mention of Bostock. If the Board doesn’t believe that case to be applicable, why not explain its reasoning for reaching that conclusion?
Tip: There is thus an argument to be made in all jurisdictions that the Supreme Court’s standard in Bostock should be the prevailing one.
I have discussed Bostock and offered my views on its applicability to asylum in more detail here.
Emphasize other BIA precedents
Even in the absence of conflicting circuit or Supreme Court case law, an Immigration Judge or asylum officer is left to sort through the several BIA precedents mentioned above. Matter of S-P- (which has not been overruled) did not conclude that because an asylum applicant faced criminal prosecution, there was nothing further to consider. Instead, the Board in that case set forth a test requiring adjudicators to continue their inquiry, taking into account circumstantial evidence and applying common sense to see if another motive for the persecution might be inferred from the facts of record.
As noted above, Matter of N-M- set out a “but-for” standard that seems identical to the one employed by the Fourth Circuit. And even Matter of L-E-A- dropped the word “subordinate,” and thus the application of the dominance test, from its stated legal standard.
Tip: Note that these other BIA precedents remain binding as precedent.
These other cases should therefore be cited and explained, and the degree to which they conflict with M-R-M-S- should be emphasized. It can be argued that M-R-M-S-’s applicability should be limited to cases in which family members are merely mentioned in passing, without further elucidation from the record as to why family membership might have served as a reason for past or future persecution.
Conclusion
As the above hopefully demonstrates, there are plenty of bases to challenge the Board’s recent decision. In M-R-M-S-, the Board presented an approach to nexus that is at odds with the case law of the majority of circuits. The Board mischaracterized the holdings in a number of circuit court decisions, championed a decision of the Tenth Circuit in which the Board’s standard was conceded and thus not in dispute before that court, and completely ignored the Supreme Court’s analysis of the “on account of” standard without explaining why what the Court termed the traditional standard for nexus was distinguishable in the asylum context.
To reiterate, the proper thing for the Attorney General to do at this point is to certify the decision to himself, and vacate it pending anticipated rulemaking. In the meantime, it is hoped that some of the above points will receive serious consideration from asylum officers, Immigration Judges, ICE attorneys, and federal appellate courts.
Copyright Jeffrey S. Chase 2023. All rights reserved.
Notes:
27 I&N Dec. 40 (BIA 2017).
28 I&N Dec. 757 (BIA 2023).
21 I&N Dec. 486 (BIA 1996).
25 I&N Dec. 208 (BIA 2007).
557 F.3d 124, 129-30 (3rd Cir., 2009).
25 I&N Dec. 526 (BIA 2011).
Id. at 531 (emphasis added).
Matter of L-E-A-, supra at 44.
Matter of M-R-M-S-, supra at 759 (emphasis added).
784 F.3d 944, 950 (4th Cir. 2015).
See, e.g., Alvarez-Lagos v. Barr, 927 F.3d 236, 250 (4th Cir. 2019); Cruz v. Sessions, 853 F.3d 122, 129 (4th Cir. 2017).
Id., slip op. at 16-17 (citing Rivas-Martinez v. I.N.S., 997 F.2d 1143, 1145, 1147-48 (5th Cir. 1993) (remanding to BIA for consideration of mixed motives).
No. 23-3059 (6th Cir. Dec. 8, 2023).
Id., slip op. at 22 (quoting Al-Ghorbani v. Holder, 585 F.3d 980, 998 (6th Cir. 2009).
922 F.3d 346 (7th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 355-56.
Id. at 356.
See M-R-M-S-, supra at 761 (stating that the Tenth Circuit does not agree with the Fourth Circuit’s approach in Hernandez-Avalos, and adding its opinion that the Tenth Circuit’s is the proper approach).
M-R-M-S-, supra at 761 (stating “In our view, the Tenth Circuit’s approach is the proper way to analyze whether membership in a family-based particular social group is one central reason for harm.
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Jeffrey S. Chase is an immigration lawyer in New York City. Jeffrey is a former Immigration Judge and Senior Legal Advisor at the Board of Immigration Appeals.He is the founder of the Round Table of Former Immigration Judges, which was awarded AILA’s 2019 Advocacy Award.Jeffrey is also a past recipient of AILA’s Pro Bono Award.He sits on the Board of Directors of the Association of Deportation Defense Attorneys, and Central American Legal Assistance.
Reprinted by permission.
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It’s very satisfying to see Jeffrey’s positive use of Matter of S-P-, a “Schmidt era” precedent in which I joined and which remains good law despite the current BIA’s often ignoring or misapplying it. It’s also a great example of the useful guidance flowing from “positive precedents” — those illustrating and promoting proper asylum grants — as opposed to the overwhelmingly negative tenor of today’s unduly restrictive BIA asylum precedents.
This approach is far more consistent with the Supreme Court’s generous guidance in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca and the BIA’s own initial implementation of that standard in Matter of Mogharrabi, both of which are routinely ignored at EOIR today. (Indeed, if someone with the exact same facts as Mogharrabi applied today, it’s highly likely that the BIA would invent a host of bogus reasons to send him packing!)It’s also a much more practical approach that can actually “streamline” the granting of more “first instance” cases by the Asylum Office, greater consistency, and lessening the need for petitions for review and “Circuit specific” strategies.
While there is no “silver bullet” that will eliminate overnight a backlog built over years of neglect, active mismanagement, and poor performance at EOIR and DOJ, a new, functional, well-respected BIA of asylum expert judges unswervingly committed to due process, fundamental fairness, and best practices is an absolutely necessary first step toward regaining control over our asylum system without sacrificing the legal rights of asylum seekers. The system can’t start eliminating backlog until it ceases doing those things that build unnecessary backlog in the first place.
In the meantime, this example of “law you can use” from “Sir Jeffrey” promises to be the “gift that keeps on giving” during what is sure to be a difficult upcoming year for refugees, asylum seekers, migrants, and their dedicated attorneys and representatives!
Rekha Sharma-Crawford ESQUIRE Partner and Co-Founder Sharma-Crawford Law Kansas City, KS
Rekha writes on LinkedIn:
A major step towards acknowledging that the best interest of the child must play a critical role in immigration cases. This was an idea I raised over 10 years ago with my friend and colleague, the brilliant Lory Rosenberg. Later the idea again was put forward with two additional brilliant colleagues, Paul Schmidt and Susan Roy. Sometimes it takes a very long time, but the right approach can’t be hidden forever.So pleased to see it is finally seeing some daylight.
Here’s the Memorandum from EOIR Director David L. Neal:
As noted by my Round Table colleague “Sir Jeffrey” Chase, our Round Table has spoken out about the need for a separate Immigration Court system for children:
As you know, our Round Table signed on to a letter of support for proposed legislation to create a Children’s Immigration Court.
[Director Neal’s statement is] a positive administrative development.
Here’s my take:
While progress is always welcome, this statement shrouds the concept of “best interest of the child” (“BIC”) with legal gobbledygook and bureaucratic doublespeak. (P. 3 of Neal Memo under “Legal Standards”).
Here’s what a clear, correct statement on BIC would look like:
BIC, regardless of whether or not presented by a “Child Advocate” or incorporated in a “Best Interests Determination” (“BID”), can be directly relevant to issues of removability. For example, evidence of removability obtained by methods that clearly conflict with the BIC could be found unreliable or the result of “egregious misconduct” for the purposes of determining removability.
The BIC can also be highly relevant to issues of eligibility for relief. For example, a government or society that deprives certain children of all meaningful educational oportunities might well be engaging in persecution.
In addition, in NLPR cancellation cases, the BIC could be persuasive, even determinative, evidence that removal of a parent will result in “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to a USC or LPR child or children.
3) Finally, since the EOIR Director is an administrator, not a quasi-judicial official, his or her policies have a distinct “you can take it or leave it” effect in Immigration Court. Therefore ameliorative statements from the Director, no matter how well-intended, are only effective if the BIA is willing and able to insist on and enforce “best practices” on Immigration Judges, preferably through precedent decisions and reassigning cases away from those IJs who show repeated contempt for due process and best practices.
Unfortunately, the current version of the BIA has, as a body, shown neither much sympathy nor concern for the substantive and due process rights of asylum seekers and other immigrants in Immigration Court. Unless and until Garland “cleans house” and appoints a BIA where all Appellate Judges are immigration/human rights experts laser focused on due process and best practices in Immigration Court — and not afraid of enforcing them uniformly in individual cases and incorporating them in binding precedents — the Director’s latest somewhat ameliorative statement is likely to be as toothless in practice as past efforts.
To a large extent, that’s a “nutshell” of why Garland’s Immigration Courts are in dire failure that threatens our entire democracy.
Unfortunately, that we are three years into this Administration and Garland is still bumbling along with a BIA that largely represents the mistakes and shortcomings of his predecessors suggests that waiting for him to “get religion” on the need for expertise, due process, fundamental fairness, and best practices at EOIR will continue to be an exercise in “Waiting for Godot!”
Immigration practitioners waiting for Garland to institute “due process, fundamental fairness, and best practices” as the sole mission of his EOIR “courts.” It could be a long wait. Very long! Too long! Naseer’s Motley Group in The Rose Bowl Merlaysamuel Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Waiting for Godot in Doon School.jpg Copy [[File:Waiting for Godot in Doon School.jpg|Waiting_for_Godot_in_Doon_School]] Copy December 8, 2011
