"The Voice of the New Due Process Army" ————– Musings on Events in U.S. Immigration Court, Immigration Law, Sports, Music, Politics, and Other Random Topics by Retired United States Immigration Judge (Arlington, Virginia) and former Chairman of the Board of Immigration Appeals Paul Wickham Schmidt and Dr. Alicia Triche, expert brief writer, practical scholar, emeritus Editor-in-Chief of The Green Card (FBA), and 2022 Federal Bar Association Immigration Section Lawyer of the Year. She is a/k/a “Delta Ondine,” a blues-based alt-rock singer-songwriter, who performs regularly in Memphis, where she hosts her own Blues Brunch series, and will soon be recording her first full, professional album. Stay tuned! 🎶 To see our complete professional bios, just click on the link below.
“Dagoberto Luna petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ dismissal of his appeal of an immigration judge’s denial of his motion to rescind an in absentia removal order. Luna contends he received a defective Notice to Appear that renders the in absentia removal order invalid. We agree. We GRANT Luna’s petition, VACATE, and REMAND for further proceedings.”
[Hats off yet again to superlitigator Raed Gonzalez!]
When will they learn, when will they ever learn? The ultra-conservative 5th Circuit pays attention when Raed litigates in behalf of individuals seeking due process and fundamental fairness at EOIR. Why doesn’t Garland?
“This appeal arises from the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) denial of Karla Yadira Lara Canales’s motion to reopen her removal proceedings. The BIA denied her motion to reopen as untimely, leaving the order of removal in place. We now VACATE the BIA’s denial of Lara Canales’s motion to reopen and REMAND so that the BIA may properly consider whether Lara Canales is entitled to equitable tolling. … [E]ach of the BIA’s bases for determining that Lara Canales had not accrued the continuous physical presence required for eligibility of cancellation of removal was legal error. We now hold that Lara Canales is statutorily eligible to seek cancellation of removal. However, this holding does not automatically entitle Lara Canales to have her motion to reopen heard on the merits. The BIA must, upon remand, engage in the fact-intensive determination of whether the 90-day deadline on motions to reopen should be tolled because of the extraordinary circumstance presented by Pereira. If the BIA determines Lara Canales satisfies the requirements for equitable tolling, she may then present her motion for a determination on its merits. We therefore VACATE the BIA’s denial of Lara Canales’s motion to reopen and REMAND this case for further consideration not inconsistent with this opinion.”
[Hats off once again to superlitigator Raed Gonzalez!]
Thanks Raed for continuing to lead the fight for justice in “America’s worst ‘court’ system” in America’s most right-wing Circuit!
THIS “any reason to deny mentality” at EOIR, still being promoted by Garland’s BIA, combined with incredibly inept and unprofessional “administration” of EOIR by DOJ, is why the Immigration Court is broken and being crushed by unending backlogs, daily chaos, and a travesties of justice and sound government!
The Biden Administration pretends like the problem doesn’t exist and/or isn’t important enough to fix. But, I can assure you that they are WRONG! “Dead wrong” in some cases!
In addition to the public manifestations of dysfunction and unprofessionalism like this case, I get regular e-mails from NDPA members relating their own EOIR horror stories and venting their frustrations with the arrogant “above the fray/what me worry about humanity and those defending it” attitude of Garland and the rest of the Biden Administration responsible for the ongoing EOIR catastrophe!
I strongly doubt that Garland, Monaco, Gupta, Prelogar, and the rest of the DOJ “clueless crew” responsible for this indelible blot on American justice would last 60 days if required to practice exclusively before EOIR under the unfathomably horrible, due-process-denying conditions they have promoted and enabled over their past two years of horrible legal “leadership!” As aptly stated by one practitioner who recently contacted me:
“Things in Immigration Court will never be the same, but I at least expected attention to due process. Nope, IJ’s are more interested in getting the cases done.”
How is this appropriate conduct from a Dem Administration that claims to value human lives, racial justice, and the rule of law, but whose actions at EOIR (and elsewhere in immigration and human rights) say the exact opposite? Poorly functioning as EOIR was when I retired in 2016, the “anecdotal consensus” from practitioners seems to be that it’s measurably worse now under Garland’s inept leadership! “Come on man,” this just isn’t right!
After all this time (17 years since the BIA’s supposedly “final” order), this case is still not complete! It’s back at the BIA for yet another chance for them to deny on specious, legally incorrect grounds. One possibility is to misapply the “equitable tolling” concept mentioned by the 5th Circuit. The BIA has a long, disgraceful record of resisting and mis-applying equitable tolling.
Or, perhaps they will attempt to invoke their recent precedent in Matter of Chen, 28 I&N Dec. 676 (BIA 2023) https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1561876/download to deny reopening for “failing to make out a prima facie case for relief on the merits.”
Chen is a case where the the respondent moved to reopen to apply for NLP cancellation having attained the required 10 years of physical presence by reason of the BIA’s two wrong-headed precedents overruled by the Supremes in Pereira v. Sessions and Niz-Chavez v. Garland. Having twice screwed up in a way that created tens of thousands of potential remands and reopenings, someone not familiar with the BIA might have expected them to set forth clear, practical, generous criteria that would encourage IJ’s to consistently reopen cases where the respondent now had the qualifying time and relative(s) in light of the problems caused by the BIA itself. After all, that’s basically the direction in the BIA’s long-standing precedent Matter of L-O-G-, 21 I&N Dec. 413 (BIA 1996) (reopening where the record“indicate[s] a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits, so as to make it worthwhile to develop the issues at a hearing”). https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwjWzY36pdn8AhVgF1kFHTcxChEQFnoECBkQAQ&url=https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2014/07/25/3281.pdf&usg=AOvVaw2Ntzlp4MuxfupmjaDIn7i6
Since “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” is inherently a fact-bound issue requiring a hearing to develop those facts, one might expect most cases to be routinely reopened.
But, the BIA took a different tack in Chen. While acknowledging that the hardship asserted by the respondent fell within the zone of those “recognized” by the BIA, they found “she has not identified and documented heightened hardship beyond that which would normally be expected to occur in such circumstances.”
While the BIA claimed to be “following” Matter of L-O-G-, they actually appear to have violated the teaching of that case that: “In considering a motion to reopen, the Board should not prejudge the merits of a case before the [respondent] has had an opportunity to prove the case.”(21 I&N Dec. at 419). That should particularly be true when the BIA itself has had a major role in creating the situation where reopening is sought.
By providing only a negative precedent (they didn’t even botherto “bookend” this with a precedential example of a grantable motion) to a system already suffering from a “culture of denial,” the BIA aggravated an long-festering problem. One can expect many IJ’s to view Chen as an “invitation to deny” the many Pereira/Niz Chavez motions to reopen in the offing for specious reasons or indeed for “any reason at all.” I expect talented NDPA warriors like Raed to make mincemeat out of the BIA’s wrong-headed attempt to minimize the “Pereira-induced damage” they have generated.
Like most of the misguided efforts of the 21st Century BIA, this attempt to cut corners, summarily deny, and NOT provide full due process and real hearings is likely to take more time and waste more resources than simply giving respondents the fair merits hearings to which they are legally entitled in the first place.But, that’s exactly what this Dem Administration has wrought at EOIR. “More of the same, instead of the promised change!”
This is what we immigration lawyers have to deal with. A court notice for a case mailed 12/27/2022 telling me that the trial scheduled for 5/18/2021 has been cancelled.
“Late Notice”
***************************
Notably the one thing this incredibly belated notice DOESN’T do: Provide an actual date and time for the “rescheduled” hearing! That will probably come only after an in absentia has been issued!
A great public research project: What are the backlog and fiscal consequences of DHS’s & EOIR’s joint intentional failure to comply with statutory notice requirements in Non-LPR cancellation cases? (a/k/a “The Pereira Debacle” — for which there has been absolutely NO official accountability).
NO MORE Attorneys General who lack actual experience representing individuals before EOIR!
One of America’s largest, most important, most backlogged, and completely FUBAR Federal “Court” Systems would likely run much better if the person in charge (U.S. Attorney General) had actually been subjected to the indignities and incredible stresses of attempting to get justice for a real-life person at EOIR! Enough of the “What Me Worry” approach of Garland and other tone-deaf, “above the fray” Dem politicos! PHOTO: Wikipedia Commons.
It’s easy guys, we just do what DHS Enforcement and our political bosses want and we can keep hopping around forever! Backlogs! Ha, the bigger the bigger they get, the more “secure” our jobs! https://www.flickr.com/photos/rasputin243/ Creative Commons License
Dan Kowalski reports for LexisNexis Immigration Community:
CA10 Stop-Time Victory: Estrada-Cardona v. Garland
“The Attorney General may allow otherwise-removable aliens to remain in the country if, among other things, they have accrued 10 years of continuous physical presence in the United States. We call this form of discretionary relief “cancellation of removal.” Under the statutory “stop-time rule,” the period of continuous physical presence ends (A) when the alien is served with a notice to appear, or (B) when the alien has committed certain criminal offenses. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1). Nothing more, nothing less. In the latest installment of “What Triggers the Stop-Time Rule?” the Government asks us to hold that the issuance of a final order of removal is a third, extra-statutory event sufficient to stop the clock. The plain language of the statute supports no such conclusion. Declining to read ambiguity into a statute where none exists, we hold a final order of removal does not stop the accrual of continuous physical presence. … This petition for review represents the latest chapter in the Government’s ongoing efforts to dig itself out of a hole it placed itself in. … After years of statutory short-circuiting, the Government finds itself in the uncomfortable position of being wrong. … Because Congress unambiguously replaced the final-order rule with the stop-time rule, the BIA’s application of the final-order rule was legal error. Petitioner continued to accrue continuous physical presence after the immigration judge issued the order to voluntarily depart. … [W]e hold that because the BIA seems to have considered change-in-the-law equitable tolling arguments before, the BIA abused its discretion in this case by failing to “announce its decision in terms sufficient to enable a reviewing court to perceive that it has heard and thought and not merely reacted.” … We cannot discern why the BIA found no extraordinary circumstance which would warrant equitable tolling, so the BIA abused its discretion. … On remand, the Government is free to argue that Petitioner should not be granted sua sponte reopening or equitable tolling. This opinion is expressly limited to two conclusions. First, the BIA’s application of the final-order rule was legal error. Second, the BIA’s explanations for denying sua sponte reopening and equitable tolling constituted, as a procedural matter, an abuse of discretion. For the reasons stated herein, we GRANT the petition for review and REMAND to the BIA for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.”
“For years, if not decades, the Government sent aliens “notices to appear” which failed to include all the information required by § 1229(a)—like the “time and place at which the proceedings will be held.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(G)(i). For countless aliens, the only obstacle to being eligible for cancellation of removal was the Government’s position that a time-and-place-to-be-set notice to appear still triggers the stop-time rule. In Pereira, the Supreme Court rejected the Government’s atextual interpretation and held a “putative notice to appear that fails to designate the specific time or place of the [alien]’s removal proceedings is not a ‘notice to appear under section 1229(a),’ and so does not trigger the stop-time rule.” 138 S. Ct. at 2113–14. In one fell swoop, the Supreme Court cleared the way for many aliens, like Petitioner, to seek cancellation of removal.
But the Government quickly erected a new hurdle.”
The BIA could and should have prevented this debacle by insisting from the git go that the statute (“the law”) be followed by DHS and EOIR. Instead, at the behest of DHS, and perhaps to prevent tens of thousands of long-term residents who had received statutorily defective notices from seeking relief, the BIA misinterpreted the statute time after time.
The real stupidity here is that the requirement the BIA was pretzeling itself to avoid was hardly “rocket science” or burdensome: Serve a notice containing the actual date, time, and place of the hearing! One might ask what purpose is served by a so-called “Notice to Appear” that doesn’t notify the individual of where and when to appear?
Moreover, when the BIA started issuing their incorrect precedents, DHS and EOIR had a then-existing system — called “interactive scheduling” — that would have complied with the statute. The problem was that the “powers that be” at DOJ, EOIR, and DHS consciously decided NOT to use that system.
The apparent reason was the belief that complying with the law might have interfered with DHS arbitrarily filling the Immigration Courts with large “numbers” of cases to meet various enforcement “priorities” set from “on high.” Rather than doing its job, the BIA chose time and again to “go along to get along” with this nonsense!
Over and over, EOIR lets bogus DHS or Administration “enforcement priorities” or “improperly using the legal system as a deterrent” subvert due process, fundamental fairness, best interpretations, and practical solutions!
And, although Biden and Harris campaigned on a platform of bringing the rule of law and rationality back to immigration, the absurdity and illegality continues under Garland. He even sent OIL in to waste the time of the Article IIIs by mounting essentially frivolous defenses to the BIA’s malfeasance.
Perhaps worst of all, in addition to being denied timely justice, individuals and their lawyers dealing with Garland’s dysfunctional EOIR often are falsely blamed for causing the backlogs that are the primary result of DHS/EOIR incompetence and political meddling by unqualified bureaucrats. The latter don’t understand what really happens in Immigration Court and how to properly, fairly, and efficiently administer such a large and important court system.
The backlogs will continue to grow and the US justice system will crater because of bad immigration decisions generating skyrocketing litigation. Garland must replace the BIA with real expert appellate judges committed to fair, humane, and reasonable interpretations of immigration and human rights laws — without regard to whether those correct interpretations will be “career enhancing” or “career preserving.” In other words, judges who put justice before personal or institutional “survival.” Competent, expert, independent-minded judicial administrators with the guts to keep DOJ and DHS bureaucratic meddlers “at arm’s length” are also required.
Folks who could do the job are out here. But, that’s the problem! They belong in the key judicial judicial and administrative positions at EOIR where they can put any end to the due-process denying, backlog building dysfunction.
“EOIR Clown Show Must Go” T-Shirt Custom Design Concept
Everyone committed to the future of American justice should be asking themselves why Garland hasn’t recruited and hired the right “Team Due Process” for EOIR! American justice can’t afford more of Garland’s inept, “go along to get along,” “afraid to say no to DHS enforcement” BIA and the rest of the EOIR “Deadly Clown Show” largely left over from past, failed Administrations!
Elizabeth Gibson Managing Attorney National Immigrant Justice Center Publisher of “The Gibson Report”
Weekly Briefing
Note: The briefing is back after a short hiatus while I transitioned to a new position at NIJC. It will be coming from my gmail for a few weeks while I set up a more long-term distribution system. In the meantime, please add egibson@heartlandalliance.org to your trusted contact list so that any future messages do not go to spam.
CONTENTS (click to jump to section)
PRACTICE ALERTS
NEWS
LITIGATION & AGENCY UPDATES
RESOURCES
EVENTS
PRACTICE ALERTS
eROPs: EOIR has begun digitizing some paper records of proceedings (ROPs). Once an ROP is an eROP, only ECAS electronic filing will be permitted on that case. However, this will be a lengthy process and it sounds like EOIR is prioritizing conversion of smaller records first.
DHS: Individuals eligible for TPS under this designation must have continuously resided in the United States since March 1, 2022. Individuals who attempt to travel to the United States after March 1, 2022 will not be eligible for TPS.
USCIS: U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services today announced that it is updating the USCIS Policy Manual to consider deferred action and related employment authorization for noncitizens who have an approved Form I-360, Petition for Amerasian, Widow(er), or Special Immigrant, for Special Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ) classification but who cannot apply to adjust status to become a lawful permanent resident (LPR) because a visa number is not available.
AP: A federal appeals court on Friday upheld sweeping asylum restrictions to prevent spread of COVID-19 but restored protections to keep migrant families from being expelled to their home countries without a chance to plead their cases. Almost simultaneously, a federal judge in another case ruled that the Biden administration wrongly exempted unaccompanied children from the restrictions and ordered that they be subject to them in a week, allowing time for an emergency appeal.
Bloomberg: The estimated wait time for a work permit has risen to eight to 12 months, up from about three months in 2020, according to data from U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services.
Law360: Texas’ Operation Lone Star border security initiative has expanded over the past year despite courtroom setbacks revealing cracks in its legal foundation, and it appears poised to grow further unless the federal government steps in to confront it.
SCOTUS: “Wooden committed his burglaries on a single night, in a single uninterrupted course of conduct. The crimes all took place at one location, a one-building storage facility with one address. Each offense was essentially identical, and all were intertwined with the others. The burglaries were part and parcel of the same scheme, actuated by the same motive, and accomplished by the same means.”
SCOTUSblog: The Supreme Court on Wednesday [in oral arguments] returned to the scope of the right to sue federal officers for damages under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, in a case arising from events surrounding an (unfairly) disparaged inn and suspicious characters near the U.S.-Canada border.
Lexis: As we noted above, while (b)(4) requires “changed country conditions,” (b)(3) does not. Thus, the BIA’s reference to a “material change in country conditions” and the analysis that followed shows that the BIA applied § 1003.23(b)(4). In applying the standard of § 1003.23(b)(4) to a timely filed motion, the BIA acted contrary to law.
Lexis: . After he pled guilty to first-degree home invasion, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal. But the removal didn’t go as planned: DHS failed to show that Jasso was in fact removable, and the immigration judge terminated the proceeding. So DHS tried again. It started a second removal proceeding based on a new legal theory but the same underlying facts. The problem? The doctrine of claim preclusion prevents parties from litigating matters they failed to raise in an earlier case. Because claim preclusion barred the second removal proceeding, we grant the petition for review, vacate, and remand.
Reuters: A federal appeals court on Monday declined to dismiss an “unprecedented” criminal case filed during the Trump administration against a Massachusetts judge accused of impeding a federal immigration arrest of a defendant in her courtroom.
Law360: Sixteen attorneys general of Democratic-led states, including the District of Columbia, are defending a new Illinois law phasing out immigrant detention contracts and urging the Seventh Circuit to dismiss a challenge by two Illinois counties, saying the policy does not interfere with federal enforcement of immigration law.
NYT: People with health conditions that place them at high risk from Covid-19 have been denied access to coronavirus vaccine booster shots while in federal immigration detention, the American Civil Liberties Union said in a lawsuit filed on Tuesday.
Reuters: The U.S. Embassy in Havana announced on Thursday it would increase staffing and resume some visa processing in Cuba several years after the Trump administration slashed personnel at the facility following a spate of unexplained health incidents.
AILA: EOIR will open immigration courts in Hyattsville, Maryland, and Laredo, Texas, today, February 28, 2022. The Hyattsville and Laredo immigration courts will have 16 and 8 immigration judges, respectively. Both courts will hear transferred cases; EOIR is notifying parties whose locations have changed.
AILA: Due to conflict in both regions, DHS will extend and redesignate South Sudan for TPS for 18 months, and designate Sudan for TPS for 18 months. The extension and redesignation of South Sudan is in effect from 5/3/2022, through 11/3/2023. The memo details eligibility guidelines.
AILA: USCIS announced that its website will now feature a Lockbox Filing Location Updates page, where customers can track when lockbox form filing locations are updated. Updates will also be emailed and announced on social media.
USCIS: USCIS has clarified Form I-9 guidance related to Native American tribal documents. We also published new guidance regarding T nonimmigrants (victims of human trafficking) and U nonimmigrants (victims of certain other crimes) in the M-274, Handbook for Employers. USCIS has provided these updates to respond to customer needs.
Thanks for all you do for due process and fundamental fairness in America, Liz! And congrats again to both you and NIJC/Heartland Alliance on your new position!
My good friend Heidi Altman, Director of Policy at NIJC, should be delighted, as Liz is a “distinguished alum” of both the CALS Asylum Clinic at Georgetown Law (where Heidi was a Fellow) and my Refugee Law & Policy class. Liz also served as an Arlington Intern and a Judicial Law Clerk at the NY Immigration Court. Liz has been a “powerful force for due process, clear, analytical writing, and best practices” wherever she has been! So, I’m sure that will continue at NIJC! Clearly, Liz is someone who eventually belongs on the Federal Bench at some level.
Heidi Altman Director of Policy National Immigrant Justice Center PHOTO: fcnl.org
Liz’s mention under “Litigation” of the Supremes’ decision in Wooden v U.S., where Justice Kagan for a unanimous Court interpreted the term “single occasion” broadly in favor of a criminal defendant, raises an interesting immigration issue.
Two decades ago, in Matter of Adetiba, 20 I&N Dec. 506 (BIA 1992), the BIA basically “nullified” the INA’s statutory exemption from deportation for multiple crimes “arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct.” Rejecting the 9th Circuit’s contrary ruling, the BIA essentially read the exception out of the statute by effectively limiting it to lesser included offenses.
How narrow was this interpretation? Well, in 21 years on the immigration appellate and trial benches, I can’t recall a single case where the “scheme” did not result in deportation under Adetiba. Taking advantage of the outrageous “doctrine of judicial task avoidance” established by the Supremes in the notorious “Brand X,”the BIA eventually took the “super arrogant” step of nullifying all Circuit interpretations that conflicted with Adetiba! Matter of Islam, 25 I&N Dec. 637 (BIA 2011).
Surprisingly, in my view, in his concurring opinion in Wooden, Justice Gorsuch actually applied the “rule of lenity” — something else the “21st Century BIA” has basically “read out of the law” in their haste to deport! Here’s what Justice Gorsuch said:
Today, the Court does not consult lenity’s rule, but neither does it forbid lower courts from doing so in doubtful cases. That course is the sound course. Under our rule of law, punishments should never be products of judicial conjecture about this factor or that one. They should come only with the assent of the people’s elected representatives and in laws clear enough to supply “fair warning . . . to the world.” McBoyle, 283 U. S., at 27.7
Hon. Jeffrey S. Chase Jeffrey S. Chase Blog Coordinator & Chief Spokesperson, Round Table of Former Immigration Judges
As the ongoing (“backlog enhancing”) “Pereira fiasco” shows, the BIA has had little problem “blowing off” or distinguishing the Supremes to deport or deny when asked by DHS Enforcement to do so. Today’s BIA “rule” for interpreting supposedly “ambiguous” statutes is actually straightforward, if one-sided: Adopt whatever interpretation DHS Enforcement offers even if that means “taking a pass” on a better interpretation offered by the respondent. So, I’m sure that Garland’s current “Miller Lite” BIA will simply distinguish Wooden as dealing with statutory language different from the INA and ignore its broader implications if asked to do so by “their partners” at DHS Enforcement.
But, whether all Circuits will see it that way, and/or allow themselves to continue to be humiliated by “Brand X,” or whether the issue will reach the Supremes, are different questions. In any event, immigration advocates should pay attention to Wooden, even if the BIA is likely to blow it off.
The current Supremes don’t seem to have much difficulty jettisoning their own precedents when motivated to do so! Why they would continue to feel bound by the bogus “Chevron doctrine” or its “steroid laden progeny Brand X” to follow the interpretations of Executive Branch administrative judges on questions of law is beyond me! Somewhere Chief Justice John Marshall must be turning over in his grave!
The first three lessons learned from the BIA’s recent decision in Matter of Laparra1 are: (1) the Board knows only one tune; (2) that tune is the “Falls Church Two-Step,” and (3) the tune does not improve with repeated listening.
As background, Congress in 1996 passed a statute creating a document called a Notice to Appear, or “NTA” for short, which is used to commence removal proceedings before the Immigration Court. Congress defined an NTA to require that it include the time and place of the first hearing; the document is, after all, called a “notice to appear.”
However, for many years, the Department of Homeland Security cut a corner by leaving that crucial information out of hundreds of thousands of NTAs. The courts (which are not part of DHS, the entity issuing the NTA) would later send a different document telling the person when and where to appear. That second document might be sent weeks, months, or even years later.
As an aside, in other areas of immigration law, EOIR has applied a literal approach to interpreting statutory terms. An unfortunate example is found in the asylum context, where the BIA felt a strong need to add “particularity” and “social distinction” requirements for particular social group recognition, creating significant obstacles for asylum seekers. Yet the government’s defense of those terms has been based on the argument that every word in the term “particular social group” must be accorded a very literal meaning.
However, when it comes to the term “Notice to Appear,” the Board inexplicably doesn’t seem to think meaning should matter. According to the online version of the Cambridge English Dictionary, “notice” is defined as “(a board, piece of paper, etc. containing) information or instructions.” A “Notice to Appear” would therefore be a piece of paper containing information or instructions about when and where to appear. However, that is exactly the information or instructions that DHS saw fit to leave out of this particular document. The BIA nevertheless long stood firm in its conviction that a document which provides as much information or instruction about an upcoming hearing as a take-out menu from L&B Spumoni Gardens meets the legal definition of a “Notice to Appear.”
Not surprisingly, this government shortcut was successfully challenged by noncitizens wishing to seek a path to legal status in this country called cancellation of removal. One can’t apply for cancellation of removal unless they’ve been present in the U.S. for ten years,2 but once one is served with a Notice to Appear, the accrual of time towards that ten years stops.3 So whether or not what ICE was handing out met the definition of an NTA would determine whether hundreds of thousands of people would be eligible to apply for legal status. In a case called Pereira v. Sessions,4 the Supreme Court resoundingly held that an NTA without the time and place of hearing was not an NTA, and therefore did not stop the noncitizen from accruing time to reach the 10 years of presence necessary to apply for cancellation of removal.
The BIA’s response was to issue a precedent decision, Matter of Mendoza-Hernandez,5 in which it held that in spite of the Supreme Court’s clear view to the contrary, the combination of the non-NTA and a later-sent document that is also not an NTA containing the missing information together form a valid NTA, which stops the noncitizen from continuing to accrue time towards the ten years.
The matter again reached the Supreme Court, where, at oral argument, Justice Gorsuch referred to the case as “Pereira groundhog day,” and actually asked counsel for the government why it was pursuing the case in light of the Court’s 8-1 decision in Pereira.6 In its 2021 decision in that case, Niz-Chavez v. Garland,7 the Court held that an NTA must be a single document containing all of the required information, and that the two-step method endorsed by the Board does not constitute one valid NTA, and thus will not stop the accrual of time.
Although Pereira and Niz-Chavez involved what is known as the “stop-time rule” described above, the question of proper service of an NTA also arises in other contexts. For those who missed their initial removal hearing and were ordered removed as a result, the Supreme Court decisions seemed to offer a new opportunity.
The reason is because the statute provides for in absentia removal orders only where the noncitizen failed to appear for their hearing “after written notice required under paragraph (1) or (2) of section 1229(a) of this title has been provided” to the noncitizen or their lawyer.8 Section 1229(a) is the section of the law that lists the requirements for an NTA to actually be an NTA; it was the specific section interpreted by the Supreme Court in Pereira and Niz-Chavez. Pursuant to those decisions, no one who was issued an NTA lacking a time and place of hearing received proper notice under section 1229(a) of the Act, which specifically requires that the time and place information be provided in a single document. Where notice was not proper, the law allows the filing of a motion to rescind an in absentia order, and further permits the motion to be filed at any time.9
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit addressed this issue of proper notice in a published decision issued in September, Rodriguez v. Garland.10 The decision cited the Supreme Court’s holding in Niz-Chavez, and determined that a single document containing all of the required information (including the time and place) is required in the in absentia context as well. The Fifth Circuit made clear that where the NTA did not contain the time and place, it could not be cured by the mailing of a subsequent notice for in absentia purposes.
Anyone unable to guess the BIA’s response has not been paying attention. The BIA issued Matter of Laparra in order to say that the recipient of an in absentia removal order did in fact receive proper notice pursuant to section 1229(a) even if their NTA lacked a time and place of hearing, as long as the court subsequently sent an entirely different paper days, months, or years later containing the missing information.
How did the BIA believe it could reach this same conclusion yet again in spite of the Supreme Court decisions to the contrary? Please try to follow along as we review the Board’s explanation.
First, the Board emphasized that the statute governing in absentia orders (8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(5)(A)) states that such order may be entered “after written notice required under paragraph (1) or (2) of section 239(a) has been provided.” The Board emphasized the words “written notice,” which it distinguished from “a written notice,” which the Supreme Court interpreted to indicate a single document.11 The Board’s position seems to be seriously undermined by the fact that “written notice under paragraphs (1) or (2) of section 239(a)” is subsequently referred to twice more in the same section of the law as “the written notice.”
The Board employed a novel approach here. It dropped a footnote in which it admitted to the two subsequent mentions of “the written notice.” But the Board then said that it reads those two subsequent uses of “the” as simply referring back to the initial “written notice” (without the definite article).12 And apparently, because they are referring to the first mention of “written notice,” the definite article “the” can just be ignored in those other two usages. Why is that? To explain, the Board cited a Supreme Court decision in a non-immigration case decided in 2015, Yates v. U.S.13
Yates involved a fisherman apprehended at sea with a catch containing a large number of undersized fish. However, by the time the ship reached shore, only fish of legal size remained on board. After a long delay, Yates was charged and convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1519, prohibiting tampering with a “tangible object” in order to impede a federal investigation.
Fish would meet the dictionary definition of “tangible objects.” However, in a decision authored by the late Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Supreme Court employed a canon of statutory interpretation called noscitur a sociis, under which aid in determining a term’s meaning can derive from the meaning of surrounding terms used in the same section of law.14 As the term “tangible object” in 18 U.S.C. § 1519 is preceded by “makes a false entry in any record, document…,” the Court determined that “tangible object” was meant to refer to items containing records or documents. So tampering with an external hard drive would be covered by the statute; tampering with a fish would not.
This approach has been employed by the BIA (using the closely-related concept of ejusdem generis) in its 1985 decision in Matter of Acosta15 to determine that the term “particular social group” should be defined by an immutable characteristic, the same common denominator found in the surrounding terms of race, religion, nationality, and political opinion. It bears noting that what the Board did in Laparra bears no similarity to the manner in which the canon was applied in either the Board’s earlier usage in Acosta or by the Supreme Court in Yates. In Laparra, there was no comparison to the meaning of surrounding terms; instead, the Board seemed to make a random decision to ignore two usages of the definite article. The only similarity I can see to Yates is that what the Board did seems fishy.
However, even if we do as the Board would like and look only at the first usage of “written notice” contained in section 1229(a)(1), there is still a fatal flaw in the remainder of the Board’s argument. As noted above, the statute in that first usage requires not just any written notice, but specifically, written notice under paragraph (1) or (2) of section 1229(a), i.e., the section titled “Notice to appear.” Paragraph (1) of that section begins: “In removal proceedings under section 1229a of this title, written notice (in this section referred to as a “notice to appear”)…” A notice to appear! Paragraph (1) thus clearly refers to a single document, which as the Supreme Court has now told us twice, must contain the time and place of hearing.
Paragraph (2) of that same section says that “in the case of any change or postponement in the time and place of such proceedings,” then a written notice shall be provided specifying the new time and place of the proceeding, and the consequences of a failure to appear.
The meaning of paragraph (2) was by no means a matter of first impression for the Board to interpret in Laparra as it saw fit. In its decision in Pereira, the Supreme Court said:
If anything, paragraph (2) of § 1229(a) actually bolsters the Court’s interpretation of the statute. Paragraph (2) provides that, “in the case of any change or postponement in the time and place of [removal] proceedings,” the Government shall give the noncitizen “written notice . . . specifying . . . the new time or place of the proceedings.” § 1229(a)(2)(A)(i). By allowing for a “change or postponement” of the proceedings to a “new time or place,” paragraph (2) presumes that the Government has already served a “notice to appear under section 1229(a)” that specified a time and place as required by § 1229(a)(1)(G)(i). Otherwise, there would be no time or place to “change or postpon[e].”16
We know that the BIA is well aware of this; the above language from Pereira was specifically quoted in the six-judge dissenting opinion in Matter of Mendoza-Hernandez, under the heading “Plain Language.”17
Also, in its later decision in Niz-Chavez, the Court stated that “the government could have responded to Pereira by issuing notices to appear with all the information §1229(a)(1) requires—and then amending the time or place information if circumstances required it. After all, in the very next statutory subsection, §1229(a)(2), Congress expressly contemplated that possibility.”18
Thus, the Supreme Court left no doubt in its two decisions that paragraph (2) involves a change in the time and place of hearing that was previously included in the NTA, as the statute requires. Paragraph (2) in no way, shape, or form allows ICE to serve the noncitizen with the L&B Spumoni Gardens menu and then have the immigration court send a second paper that provides a time and place for the first time.
Somehow, the Board chose to ignore this clear and obvious reading twice affirmed by the highest court in the land. Instead, it focused on only one word – the “or” in “paragraph (1) or (2) of section 1229(a).”19 The Board then pretended (can we find a more appropriate word than this?) not only that the “or” somehow allowed paragraph (2) to be read as if paragraph (1) didn’t exist, but also as if the words “any change or postponement in the time and place of such proceedings” could somehow be read as “change or postponement? What a poor choice of words! What we really meant to say was, ‘the absolutely very first time and place ever set.’ Wasn’t that obvious? We feel so foolish. Please just interpret this any way you see fit.”
The Board did acknowledge the Fifth Circuit’s contrary view in Rodriguez, but attributed it to that court’s failure to focus on the “paragraph (1) or (2)” language.20 Apparently, in the Board’s view, had the Fifth Circuit also focused on that word “or,” it would have reached the same twisted conclusion as the Board. Perhaps realizing how unrealistic this might seem, the Board quickly pointed out that “[i]n any event, Rodriguez does not apply here because this case arises in the First Circuit.”21
Speaking of other circuits, it bears noting that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently stated for the second time in a published decision that the BIA’s analysis was “more akin to the argument of an advocate than the impartial analysis of a quasi-judicial agency.”21 I believe that the same can be said of the Board’s decision in Laparra. It will be interesting to see if this issue reaches the Supreme Court for a third time. If so, one should wonder why the Board might expect a different result.
Notes:
28 I&N Dec. 425 (BIA Jan. 18, 2022).
8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A).
8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1), often referred to as the “stop-time rule.”
To be clear, the government is capable of providing all required information in a single NTA. EOIR had provided DHS access to schedule Master Calendar hearings through the agency’s Interactive Scheduling System (ISS), which was employed between those agencies until May 2014. And in a memo issued shortly after the Supreme Court’s Pereira decision, then EOIR Director James McHenry stated that EOIR had begun providing hearing dates to DHS in detailed cases, and was working to again provide it access to ISS for scheduling non-detained cases.
Matter of Laparra, supra at 430.
Id. at 436: “The court reasoned that section 240(b)(5)(C)(ii) requires ‘notice’ under ‘section 239(a),’ which Niz-Chavez held must be a single document in the form of a notice to appear. However, the court based this reasoning on a recitation of section 240(b)(5)(C)(ii) that omitted the disjunctive phrase ‘paragraph (1) or (2)’ from the statute and relied solely on a reference to ‘section 239(a).’”
Id.
Nsimba v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., No. 20-3565, ___ F.4th ___ (3d Cir. Dec. 22, 2021) (slip. op. at 10).
Copyright 2022 Jeffrey S. Chase. All rights reserved.
Republished by permission.
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As Jeffrey points out, the legal and practical problems with notice at EOIR and DHS are chronic, well-documented, and consequential! Yet, given a golden opportunity to make a new start while complying with due process and establishing “best practices” Garland has miserably failed!
Instead of appointing a BIA consisting of “practical scholar expert judges” and competent, professional judicial administrators to clean up this awful mess it’s “same old, same old” under Garland’s poor leadership. Indeed, not only has Garland chosen to retain the very folks who created and aggravated the notice problems, he has actually made it worse! How many times do I have to say it: EOIR is supposed to be a “court of law,” not a highly bureaucratic, “headquarters bloated,” “agency” modeled on and “operating” (a term I use lightly with EOIR) like the very worst aspects of the “Legacy INS.” For Pete’s sake, even DHS has done a somewhat better job of automating files than EOIR!
Tal Kopan Washington Reporter, SF Chronicle. She exposes Garland’s mismanagement of EOIR!
At best, these bogus orders require burdensome motions to reopen, rescheduling, and “restarts” that unnecessarily build backlog. They also generate more bogus statistics and false narratives, more endemic problems at EOIR that Garland has ignored or aggravated.
At worst, improper in absentia orders generate improper arrests, detention, and illegal removals of individuals who were clueless about their actual hearing dates!
Having “supervisors and managers” supposedly in charge of operating a fair hearing system engineer and then “cheer” the absence of any hearings at all shows the depths to which EOIR has plunged under Garland’s poor leadership. But, perhaps that shouldn’t surprise us! It comes from an AG who has failed after nearly a year to re-establish a fair hearing system for asylum applicants at the border and who mounts ethically-challenged defenses of Stephen Miller’s complete eradication of asylum at the border based on a bogus, pretextual rationale rejected by almost all migration and public health experts! Why is this acceptable performance from an alleged Democratic Administration?
Judge Merrick B. Garland, U.S. Attorney General Official White House Photo Public Realm. Appointed by a Democrat, he runs the DOJ largely with Trump holdovers, no accountability, and as if Stephen Miller were still looking over his shoulder. The result corrodes the “retail level” of justice in our Immigration Courts and threatens to de-stabilize our entire legal system!
No wonder Garland is building the already incredible 1.6 million case EOIR backlog at a ”new record” pace!
The speculation on Biden’s Supreme Court pick is “sucking all the air out of the room.” But, Garland’s disgraceful failure to counter the Trump AGs’ “packing” of the BIA with unsuitable judges and filling EOIR “senior management” with unqualified individuals who lack the requisite expertise and consistently tilt in favor of DHS Enforcement and against Due Process, fundamental fairness, immigrants’ rights, and best practices will have more immediate corrosive effects on racial justice in America and individual human lives than any court in America outside the Supremes!
And, unlike the Supremes, Garland “owns” all the picks for the “Supreme Court of Immigration!” Rather than standing up for progressive reforms, and giving new progressive judicial talent a chance to shine, he has chosen to enable and empower regressive forces and to frustrate progressive experts, further undermine the rule of law, and thwart best practices!
But, even these somewhat “understated” critics of Garland don’t fully grasp the catastrophic consequences for our entire justice system and our democracy of Garland’s unwillingness and/or inability to prioritize the creation of a progressive due-process/equal-justice-oriented judiciary of experts to replace his regressive, oppressive, deadly, and beyond dysfunctional immigration judiciary at DOJ!
As Jeffrey cogently relates, “same old, same old” failed approaches by “holdover judges” doesn’t “cut it!” Sessions and Barr recognized the cosmic importance of the immigration judiciary and the imperative to “weaponize it for evil” and to use their limited time in office to maximize and further a White Nationalist agenda developed and promoted by Stephen Miller. It’s a pity that Garland has failed to act on the legal and moral imperatives to “mine and realize EOIR’s ‘counter-potential’ for good!”
That potential was memorialized in the long-forgotten “EOIR vision of yore:” “Through teamwork and innovation, be the world’s best administrative tribunals guaranteeing fairness and due process for all!” Remarkably, that “noble due process vision” was once displayed in bold letters on EOIR’s internal website. Now, folks like Garland are too embarrassed and spineless to even admit that such a goal ever existed.
Funny how right-leaning supposed “textualists” and “strict constructionists” have difficulty following clear statutory commands when the result might favor the individual while holding the Government accountable for intentionally violating the law. Also, strange how an Administration that got into office in no small measure by promoting its competence and strong commitment to humane values and equal justice for all, particularly racial justice, continues to fail on all counts! Go figure!
Obviously, THESE are the practical scholar/immigration experts who belong on the BIA:
Kit Johnson Associate Professor of Law University of Oklahoma Law SchoolProfessor Geoffrey Hoffman Immigraton Clinic Director University of Houston Law Center
The Board of Immigration Appeals has issued a decision in Matter of Arambula-Bravo, 28 I&N Dec. 388 (BIA 2021). Here is the summary:
(1) A Notice to Appear that does not specify the time and place of a respondent’s initial removal hearing does not deprive the Immigration Judge of jurisdiction over the respondent’s removal proceedings. Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018), and Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 141 S. Ct. 1474 (2021), distinguished; Matter of Bermudez-Cota, 27 I&N Dec. 441 (BIA 2018), and Matter of Rosales Vargas and Rosales Rosales, 27 I&N Dec. 745 (BIA 2020), followed.
(2) A Notice to Appear that lacks the time and place of a respondent’s initial removal hearing constitutes a “charging document” as defined in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.13 (2021), and is sufficient to terminate a noncitizen’s grant of parole under 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i) (2021).
I am hardly the only one to argue that such an NTA should deprive the court of jurisdiction. Immprof Geoffrey Hoffman (Houston), frequent contributor to this blog, submitted an amicus brief to the BIA on this case arguing that an NTA without time or place information is “defective” under Niz-Chavez and cannot be cured by the later issuance of a Notice of Hearing.
Now the waiting game for SCOTUS intervention begins again. I’m hoping for another scathing opinion by Justice Gorsuch. His Niz-Chavez decision was fire.
-KitJ
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INA section 239(a) defines a Notice to Appear, the document used to initiate a removal proceeding in Immigration Court, as including, among other statutory requirements: “G)(i) The time and place at which the proceedings will be held.” Could not be clearer!
The requirements of section 239(a) are hardly onerous. Indeed, several decades ago, the Government had developed an “interactive scheduling system” that allowed DHS to specify the exact time, place, and date of a respondent’s initial Master Calendar hearing in Immigration Court.
However, rather than expanding and improving that system, DHS and EOIR decided to cut corners to accommodate the “uber enforcement” agendas pushed by Administrations of both parties over the past two decades. Their “haste makes waste, good enough for Government work approach” led them to ignore the requirements for a proper NTA and instead issue “piecemeal notices.”
This, of course, increased the unnecessary workload for already-stressed, overwhelmed EOIR Immigration Court clerks, resulted in many more defective notices, more unnecessary bogus “failures to appear,” more improper “in absentia removal orders,” more Motions to Reopen those wrongfully issued orders, and more appeals from improper failures to grant such motions. It also sent more of these preliminary matters into the Circuit Courts for judicial review.
Basically, it’s a microcosm of how an unconstitutional, non-independent “wholly owned court system” “pretzels itself” to accommodate DHS enforcement, misconstrues the law, and attempts to legitimize “worst practices” to please its political overlords, thereby creating endless and largely avoidable case backlogs — now at an astounding 1.4 million cases!
Even worse, when the backlogs finally capture public attention and “hit the fan,” EOIR, DHS, and DOJ disingenuously attempt to shift the blame and the consequences for their failures onto the VICTIMS: respondents and their long-suffering, often pro bono, attorneys! The incompetents at EOIR then cut even more corners and issue more bad precedents misconstruing the law in an attempt to cover up their own wrongdoing and that of their political masters. The latter’s understanding of how to run an efficient, due-process oriented, fair and impartial court system could be put in a thimble with space left over!
The vicious cycle of unfairness, injustice, and incompetence at EOIR continues endlessly, toward oblivion.
As Kit cogently points out, better interpretations, ones that complied with the statute and could be tailored to achieve practical solutions were available and actually submitted to the BIA. The BIA, as usual, brushed them off in favor of trying to please DHS and avoid both the statutory language and the Supremes’ clear direction.
So, something that a properly comprised BIA, composed of true progressive immigration experts and practical scholars, could have solved in a legal and practical manner, will undoubtedly head to the Supremes for a third time. We might not know the result for years, during which the BIA’s bad interpretation will generate additional potential backlog as well as unjust removals.
U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Board of Immigration Appeals
(1) The offense of aggravated statutory rape under section 39-13-506(c) of the Tennessee Code Annotated is categorically a “crime of child abuse” within the meaning of section 237(a)(2)(E)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) (2018).
(2) The Supreme Court’s holding that a statutory rape offense does not qualify as “sexual abuse of a minor” based solely on the age of the participants, unless it involves a victim under 16, does not affect our definition of a “crime of child abuse” in Matter of Velazquez-Herrera, 24 I&N Dec. 503 (BIA 2008), nor does it control whether the respondent’s statutory rape offense falls within this definition. Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1562 (2017), distinguished.
FOR RESPONDENT: Sean Lewis, Esquire, Nashville, Tennessee
FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Peter Gannon, Associate Legal Advisor
The Supreme Court has held that the generic age of consent is 16. Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1562, 1572 (2017). Accordingly, absent aggravating circumstances, consensual sexual activity between an adult and a minor over 16 is not categorically “abusive.” If a statutory rape statute sweeps more broadly than the generic definition (in other words, if it sets the age of consent above 16) it cannot form the predicate offense for removability under section 237(a)(2)(E)(i) of the Act for having been convicted of a crime of child abuse. There can be no categorical “child abuse” where the criminalized conduct is not categorically abusive. Here, the respondent was convicted of violating a statute that sets the age of consent at 18. Because the Supreme Court has left us no other option, I would dismiss the DHS’s appeal and terminate the respondent’s removal proceedings.
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In the Pereira fiasco, the BIA’s unwillingness to follow the Supremes’ lead when it conflicted with their “mission” of helping out DHS enforcement (a stated objective of Jeff “Gonzo Apocalypto” Sessions) created big time practical problems that could and should have been avoided.
“The NTA sent to Villegas de Mendez does not contain the information required to trigger the stop-time rule. See id. at 1478-79, 1485; see also § 1229(a)(1)(A)-(G). Neither does the subsequent notice of hearing sent to her. Thus, she did not receive the “single compliant document” required by statute. Niz-Chavez, 141 S. Ct. at 1485. The BIA consequently abused its discretion by committing an error of law. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996); Ramos-Portillo v. Barr, 919 F.3d 955, 958 (5th Cir. 2019); Milat v. Holder, 755 F.3d 354, 365 (5th Cir. 2014). Therefore, the petition for review is GRANTED and the case is REMANDED to the BIA for further consideration in light of Niz-Chavez, 141 S. Ct. 1474, and consistent with this judgment.”
One major problem with constantly going with DHS interpretations is that many are both legally wrong and practical disasters. After the initial Pereira v. Sessions debacle the BIA had a chance to solve the problem. Instead, undoubtedly spurred on by the “deny everything culture” promoted by the Trump regime’s White Nationalist agenda, the BIA chose the worst possible legal interpretation with disruptive practical implications. Any real immigration expert could have seen this coming!
When was the last time in a potential “Chevron-type” situation that the BIA or the AG adopted the migrant’s proffered interpretation rather than DHS’s? Yet even with all the (in my view highly inappropriate) advantages conferred on the Government by the Supremes’ intellectual indolence in Chevron and its absurdist companion “Brand X,” Article III Courts, including the Supremes, reject BIA/AG interpretations on a regular basis. Pereira and Niz-Chavez are just two of the most prominent recent examples.
Moreover, because neither the AGs nor the BIA are respected experts in immigration and human rights, and, shockingly, none have significant experience representing individuals in Immigration Court, the mis-interpretations that they choose are often impractical and unworkable. This, in turn leads to confusion, unnecessary remands, and unmanageable backlogs, not to mention patent injustice and deadly results for the mere humanscaught up in this ongoing disaster! This is what “Dred Scottifcation” is all about!
The case highlighted above should have been reopened in 2017. In a “real” court system, with qualified judges, professional administration, and no political interference, it could have been completed by now. Instead, it’s no closer to completion than it was four years ago!
But, lots of time and resources have been wasted in defending the BIA’s wrong attempt to deny reopening! This nonsense by the Government, NOT dilatory tactics by migrants and their attorneys trying to navigate this intentionally user-unfriendly and often illegal and illogical system, is what “builds backlog!”
Indeed, a wiser system would have turned preliminary adjudication of these cases over to USCIS so that only those that could not be granted and were not appropriate for prosecutorial discretion (“PD”) would have been sent to Immigration Court. Virtually none of the “non-LPR cancellation” cases are legitimate enforcement priorities. A similar approach was used with the NACARA program under better overall management.
Instead, as a result of poor BIA decision-making and even worse “leadership” at the Trump DOJ, this case is no closer to a final resolution than it was in 2017. And, DHS and EOIR still haven’t systemically corrected the completely fixable practical problems that generated Pereira and Niz-Chavez in the first place. Nor have Garland and Mayorkas announced systemic plans for removing the unnecessary “cancellation backlog” from Immigration Court dockets even though they would be “low priorities” for ICE under the criteria announced by OPLA’s John Trasvina!
That’s why we have unmanageable backlogs! And they will continue until Garland cleans house at EOIR, brings in a diverse group of qualified expert judges, and empowers them to act independently, stand up to the frequent nonsense pushed by DHS, and “laser focus” on due process for individuals and instituting and enforcing best practices!
One of the most obvious of those “best practices,” totally missing from Garland’s mismanaged Immigration Courts to date, would be returning “docket control” to local Immigration Courts and ending the “Aimless Docket Reshuffling” by EOIR Headquarters and DOJ politicos that has helped generate the out of control backlog.
Many cancellation of removal cases could and should be “administratively closed.” But, inexplicably, Garland has yet to revoke Sessions’s ridiculously wrong Matter of Castro-Tum, and restore to Immigration Judges their power to administratively close cases. That’s notwithstanding that Castro-Tum has been rejected in whole or in part by every Circuit Court of Appeals to consider it.
How long is Garland going to continue to “sponsor” inferior, non-independent, pro-DHS “judging” and amateurish, politicized mismanagement that is destroying our entire legal system?
A fascinating twist on the factual scenario in Niz-Chavez is what to do if your client had an NTA with a so-called “fake date.” The “fake date” problem is one you will remember well if you practice immigration law before EOIR, and it garnered national attention in 2019 when ICE issued these fake dates for thousands of immigrants, many of whom showed up in court only to find that there was nothing on any judge’s docket to indicate they were scheduled for a hearing that day. Reports of fake dates were prevalent in Dallas, Orlando, Miami, Seattle, and I am sure other places as well. See news articles such as this one. In addition, and as a separate matter, there was a well-known so-called “parking date” (November 29) issued on thousands of NTAs and that was also never a “real date” as everyone knew.
There is an interesting theory about why the “fake dates” were issued in the first place: that the government was trying to respond to Pereira v. Sessions itself. Despite its argument in federal court to try to restrict Pereira as much as possible, in practice ICE tacitly was affirming, so the argument goes, that in Pereira the Supreme Court had defined, as we have argued all along, what is and what is not a proper and valid NTA. In an effort to immunize itself from responsibility for defective NTAs without any time or place of hearing, ICE thought it might make sense to input “fake dates” in their NTAs, thus (at least superficially it would seem) immunizing itself from the argument that the NTAs were defective for “lack” of a real date and place. Then the “real date” – according to the argument – could be issued as a follow-up in the form of a notice of hearing by EOIR.
The question now arises whether clients with fake-date NTAs can utilize Pereira and now Niz-Chavez to defeat the “stop-time” effect for cancellation of removal, where such fake NTAs existed, even where there is a subsequent notice of hearing with a “real date” from EOIR. The short answer is “Yes” – and I will discuss in the rest of this article why this should be the case and why it should not come as a surprise for several reasons.
It is arguably a much stronger case for the application of Niz-Chavez because the issuance of a “fake date” that was never intended to be used by EOIR in any way is affirmatively wrong. It is not just mere negligence by leaving “TBA” with a blank date and place of hearing on the NTA. ICE should not be able to hide behind an NTA where the information is filled in on the NTA but the information is patently false and made up or fabricated. Just as an asylum seeker who fabricates a date or other information on their forms cannot benefit from such information in applying for relief before the court, the government should get no benefit either from their incorrect and misleading actions. The counter-argument from the government will be that the NTA was valid “on its face” since it had some “date and place” in the document and therefore (a) stopped time for cancellation purposes and (b) conferred jurisdiction because it was “facially” valid.
This counter-argument is flawed. To embrace such a rationale would exalt form over substance. It also would allow an agency to game the system. It would also defeat the very mechanism that the Supreme Court set out in Pereira and now Niz-Chavez. Respondent should be entitled to reopen their proceedings in all “fake date” cases since a valid NTA was not filed in the immigration court. The only remaining issue will be proof. The respondent and his or her attorney will have to prove there was no hearing that was actually held on that day. If no hearing existed at all, then the stop time rule should not apply and the fake NTA cannot be “cured” by a subsequently issued notice by a different agency, that is EOIR, as per Niz-Chavez.
Finally, in reopening a client’s case it would be helpful if there were a showing of some effort on the part the respondent to check. Proof may be difficult and EOIR FOIA and other investigation will be important. Ideally, the client or the their attorney or both went to court but no hearing was on the docket that day, and there was an effort to check that was documented in some way. If there never was receipt of the NTA at all, whether containing a fake date or not, and an in absentia order was issued, then the question becomes whether jurisdiction could have vested at all in such a case. As I have argued, if the NTA is defective it cannot result in the vesting of jurisdiction. A fake date and place arguably cannot confer jurisdiction, even if the NTA was filed with the court. Since there was no hearing actually scheduled the NTA should be found defective under Pereira and Niz-Chavez.
K[evin] J[ohnson]
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Sure sounds to me like ‘affirmative misconduct” by the USG that should stop them from relying on the “fake dates. In the “old days,” INS actually used to settle potential “affirmative misconduct” cases, rather than litigate.
By contrast, today’s DOJ seems perfectly willing shamelessly to defend a wide range of legally and ethically questionable conduct and then “blow off” criticism from the Article III Judiciary. Recently, a frustrated U.S. District Judge referred to Bureau of Prisons officials as “idiots.”
One might have thought that would have spurred some type of apology and corrective action from the DOJ. But, that doesn’t seem to have registered with Garland. He just keeps rolling along with Barr’s “Miller Lite” appointments while dissing advice from progressives who actually helped put him in his current job. About the only thing you can count on from Dems is that when it comes to progressive immigraton reforms and EOIR, they’ll blow it!
Thanks, Geoffrey, for your timely and creative “practical scholarship.” Of course with better leadership, the Biden Administration could solve this problem without protracted litigation that often takes years and produces inconsistent results before the Supremes or Congress can resolve them. In the meantime, lives unnecessarily are ruined and the system becomes more inefficient and unfair.
Garland should appoint progressive practical scholars like Geoffrey to the BIA and senior management at EOIR, OIL, OLP, and the SG’s Office and let them “lead from above” — rather than having to fight bad interpretations and worst practices from the outside.
In this case, the DHS/EOIR “fake date policy” was both fraudulent and unethical. Remember that some folks actually showed up at Immigration Court buildings, often with families in tow, after having traveled hundreds of miles, @ 3:00 AM on Sunday mornings (or on a Federal Holiday or some other bogus date) only to find out that the “joke” was on them.
And, let’s not forget folks, that thanks to the BIA’s permissive attitude (when it comes to the Government, but not with individual rights), under the now “being phased out” “Remain in Mexico Program” (a/k/a “let “em Die In Mexico”), folks basically got NTAs with the equivalent of this: “Maria Gomez, somewhere on some Calle in Tijuana, Mexico.” But, the BIA said that this was basically “good enough for Government work.”
We should also remember that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause guarantees the individual’s rights against the Government, not the other way around! But, you sure wouldn’t know that from reading BIA and AG precedents issued under the Trump kakistocracy.
Meanwhile, IJs and the BIA under Garland continue to “in absentia” folks for being a few minutes late for a hearing or misreading an NTA in a language they can’t understand. Anybody had a problem with their U.S. Mail lately? We have, in our “upper middle class neighborhood” in Alexandria, VA. Yet, EOIR and some Article IIIs continue to promote the “legal fiction” of a “presumption of proper (and timely) delivery” of notices sent by regular U.S. Mail.
Until, Garland has the backbone to restore ethics and the rule of law at EOIR and the rest of the DOJ, particularly by reassigning or otherwise removing those who “went along to get along” and replacing them with ethical, qualified, experts from the NDPA who will speak truth to power and hold immigration enforcement bureaucrats accountable, our justice system will continue its tailspin!
This morning the Supreme Court issued orders from the justices’ private conference last week. The court added one new case to its merits docket for the term that begins in October. The justices once again did not act on two groups of high-profile petitions – one involving gun rights and the other involving qualified immunity – that they considered last week.
With the grant in Niz-Chavez v. Barr, the justices added another immigration case to their docket for next term. At issue in the case is the kind of notice that the government must provide to trigger the “stop-time rule,” which stops noncitizens from accruing the time in the United States that they need to become eligible for discretionary relief from deportation. Congress passed the “stop-time rule” to keep noncitizens from taking advantage of lengthy delays in deportation proceedings to continue to accrue time. Under the rule, a noncitizen’s time in the United States, for purposes of relief from deportation, ends when the government sends him a “notice to appear” containing specific information about a scheduled removal proceeding. The question that the justices agreed to decide today is whether all the necessary information must be provided in a single document in order to trigger the stop-time rule, as Agusto Niz-Chavez, who came to the United States from Guatemala in 2005, contends, or whether the government can trigger the rule by providing the information in multiple documents.
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Our Round Table has filed amicus briefs on this issue in a number of similar cases, although not in this particular case, which originated in the 6th Circuit.
At issue here is the BIA’s precedent in Matter of Mendoza-Hernandez, 27 I. & N. Dec. 520 (BIA 2019). There, in a now-rare en banc decision, the BIA majority basically “flicked off” the Supremes’ decision in Pereira v. INS, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018) and allowed the DHS to remedy a defective statutory Notice to Appear (“NTA”) with a later-issued EOIR notice of hearing providing the missing information to “fill in the blanks” from the original defective notice.
In an even more unusual and potentially career-shortening move, six of the BIA’s then 15 Appellate Immigration Judges filed a strongly-worded dissent accusing their majority colleagues of ignoring both the words of the statute and the Court’s Pereira decision. Perhaps not surprisingly, three of the dissenting judges have since retired from the BIA and a fourth, the Vice Chair, was passed over for Acting Chair in a highly unusual personnel move by the DOJ, which controls the BIA. (One of the primary reasons for having a designated “Vice Chair” is to be the “Acting Chair” in the absence of the Chairman.) In their places, Barr has appointed some of the most notorious hard-line asylum denying Immigration Judges in the nation.
The Supremes have thus far tiptoed around the glaring unconstitutionality of a so-called “appellate tribunal” that is appointed, wholly controlled by, and answers to the chief prosecutor, the Attorney General. Not surprisingly, upon discovering the Constitution-nullifying power of a “captive court system,” that is not a court at all under any common understanding of the term, the Administration has leveraged it to the max as a tool for their White Nationalist anti-immigrant agenda. Indeed, all the recent BIA and Attorney General precedents have ruled in favor of the DHS position, even where statutory language, Article III court rulings, prior precedents, and common sense strongly supported the opposite results.
And, many Courts of Appeals have continued to fictionalize that the highly politicized and “weaponized” BIA is an “expert tribunal” entitled to “Chevron deference.” Any true immigration law expert would say that proposition is absurd. Yet, it conveniently furthers the causes ofboth “judicial task avoidance” and the White Nationalist agenda of the Administration.
Because the BIA now occupies itself not with fair and impartial, expert decision-making, but mostly with keeping the “deportation express” running and insuring that DHS prevails over the legal claims of migrants and asylum seekers to fair and humane treatment under the law, the Supremes are finding themselves in the middle of the “statutory and regulatory nitty gritty” of immigration law that was supposed to be the province of a competent and impartial BIA.
While that has occasionally, as in Pereira, worked to the advantage of individuals seeking justice, for the most part, the Supremes have been willing enforcers of the Administration’s abrogation of immigration laws without Congressional participation and “Dred Scottification” of “the other” in violation of our Constitution, and indeed, in violation of both international conventions and fundamental human decency.
Think of how much better and more efficiently the immigration system could run with a constitutionally-required independent Immigration Court utilizing fair and impartial judges selected on the basis of expertise and reputation for fairness and scholarship rather than commitment to DHS enforcement goals.Think of how much better off our society would be if the Supremes stood up for equal justice for all, rather than enabling a far-right would-be authoritarian scofflaw regime following aracially-biased agenda of dehumanization, degradation, and deportation.
Richard W. Mark, Esquire Partner Gibson Dunn New YorkAmer S. Ahmed, Esquire Partner Gibson Dunn New YorkHon. Jeffrey S. Chase Jeffrey S. Chase Blog Coordinator & Chief Spokesperson, Round Table of Retired Immigration JudgesKnightess of the Round Table
It is an axiom of due process that a party charged to defend against a legal proceeding must receive notice of the time and place of the proceeding and an opportunity to be heard. This Court’s ruling in Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018), reflects that axiom in the context of initiating removal proceedings by “notice to appear.”
This petition presents a straightforward question of enormous practical significance that has divided the five courts of appeals to have considered the issue: Must the initial written notice served on noncitizens to commence their removal proceedings provide—in
1 All parties have consented to the filing of this brief. Amici state that this brief was not authored in whole or in part by counsel for any party, and that no person or entity other than amici or their counsel made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief.
2 The appendix provides a complete list of signatories.
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one document—the “time and place at which the proceedings will be held” (along with charges and other specified information) in order to satisfy the require- ments of 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a), or does the statute allow the government to cobble together the required elements of a “notice to appear” from multiple documents, issued at different times, none of which alone contain all of the statutorily required information?
Resolution of this issue will affect thousands of people in the immigration system. For noncitizens applying for cancellation of removal, service of a valid “notice to appear” triggers the so-called “stop-time” rule, which terminates the period of continuous pres- ence required for cancellation eligibility. For noncitizens ordered removed in absentia, whether that se- vere penalty is proper depends on whether the notice served on the noncitizen satisfied the requirements of § 1229(a).
This Court should grant review to resolve the accelerating circuit split over this issue. The Fifth Circuit, agreeing with the Sixth Circuit, held that a defective “notice to appear” lacking the statutorily required time-and-place information could be “cured” by a subsequent “notice of hearing” containing that information, such that the separate documents considered together become “a notice to appear,” with the stop- time rule being triggered upon later service of the “curative” notice of hearing. See Yanez-Pena v. Barr, 952 F.3d 239 (5th Cir. 2020); Garcia-Romo v. Barr, 940 F.3d 192 (6th Cir. 2019). The Third and Tenth Circuits, based on the plain language of § 1229(a) and this Court’s decision in Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2105, have reached the opposite conclusion. See Guadalupe v. Atty. Gen., 951 F.3d 161 (3d Cir. 2020); Banuelos v. Barr, 953 F.3d 1176 (10th Cir. 2020). A divided panel
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of the Ninth Circuit was in accord with the Third and Tenth Circuits, before that court granted rehearing en banc. See Lopez v. Barr, 925 F.3d 396, 405 (9th Cir. 2019), vacated and reh’g en banc granted, 948 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2020).
This Court should bring harmony to federal law by granting certiorari, reversing the Fifth Circuit, and restoring the common-sense interpretation of § 1229(a) as requiring one document that satisfies the statute’s requirements.
I. The question presented affects many thousands of people across the country. As the government told this Court in 2018, “almost 100 percent” of putative notices to appear omit the required time-and-place in- formation. Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2111. Hundreds of thousands of notices to appear are served each year; a dispute about validity is embedded in every proceed- ing initiated with a notice that lacks time-and-place information. Indeed, tens of thousands of cancellation applications remain pending, each one requiring an IJ to determine whether the stop-time rule was triggered by § 1229(a) notice. Similarly, tens of thousands of in absentia removal orders are issued every year, each one dependent on whether proceedings began with the noncitizen’s being served a notice to appear that com- plies with § 1229(a).
This case involves the application of § 1229(a) in both the cancellation of removal and in absentia removal contexts, thus presenting an optimal vehicle to address the question presented. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (“Pet.”) at 22-24.
II. Deciding the question presented will also pro- mote uniformity in the nation’s immigration laws. Uniformity in this sphere is a foundational principle
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of American law, with the Constitution explicitly directing Congress “[t]o establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. But there can be no uniform law if basic questions affect- ing the right of an individual to remain in the country get an answer that varies among the circuits. Such a regime would result in divergent outcomes based on geography alone, not the merits of any particular noncitizen’s case.
This unfairness may be exacerbated by the Department of Homeland Security’s (“DHS”) discretion to select the venue for a removal proceeding, and thus the law that governs the case. DHS’s ability to choose the venue, coupled with its ability to transfer detainees wherever it sees fit, opens the door to unfair forum shopping for the circuit law it prefers.
III. Requiring DHS to work with the Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”) to obtain time-and-place information before serving a notice to appear—and including such information in that document, as § 1229(a) and Pereira require—is practical and will reduce administrative inefficiency and error. Doing so will also achieve the legislative purpose of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”), Pub. L. 104-208, Div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546, of which § 1229(a) was a part, by instituting a “single form of notice” to “simplify procedures for initiating removal proceedings.” H.R. Rep. 104-469(I), 1996 WL 168955 at *159.
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Many thanks to our GOOD friends Richard W. Mark and Amer S. Ahmed and their team over at the NY Office of Gibson Dunn for their extraordinary pro bono assistance in drafting our brief.
Banuelos-Galviz v. Barr, 10th Cir. , 03-25-20, published
PANEL: HOLMES, MATHESON, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges.
OPINION BY: Judge Bacharach
KEY QUOTE:
Given the unambiguous language of the pertinent statutes, the stop- time rule is not triggered by the combination of an incomplete notice to appear and a notice of hearing. We thus grant the petition for review and remand to the Board for further proceedings.
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“No ‘Chevron deference’ for you, BIA!”Particularly, where you ignore the clear statutory language as well as the Supreme’s ruling in Pereira. The precedent overruled by the 10th Circuit is Matter of Mendoza-Hernandez, 27 I. & N. Dec. 520, 529 (BIA 2019) (en banc), a rare (these days) en banc ruling that generated a feisty and correct dissent (also rare following the “Ashcroft purge of ‘03”). But, because of the arcane rules governing the BIA, the overruled precedent in Mendoza-Hernandez will continue to apply everywhere except the 3rd & 10th Circuits.
Not Rocket Science: Notwithstanding the BIA’s “smokescreens,” and that the Fifth and Sixth Circuits have managed to get it wrong, this is a very straightforward reading of the statute that any first-year law student should get right on an exam. We now have three Circuits that have gotten it right, the 3rd, 10th, and 9th, and two that have bobbled it. But, as noted by the 10th Circuit, the 9th Circuit opinion has been vacated pending rehearing en banc. Lopez v. Barr, 925 F.3d 396, 410 (Callahan, J., dissenting), reh’g en banc granted, 948 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2020) (Thomas, C.J.).
More “ADR” on the horizon: In any event, the DHS’s choice to serve clearly defective notices combined with the BIA’s “straining to get to deportation” to satisfy their political handlers in the DOJ is continuing to create an awful mess in the Immigration Courts. That, in turn, should continue to “artificially jack up the backlog” and create even more “Aimless Docket Reshuffling” (“ADR”) until it’s finally resolved.
Guadalupe v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 3rd Cir., 02-26-20, published
PANEL: RESTREPO, ROTH and FISHER, Circuit Judges
OPINION BY: Judge ROTH
KEY QUOTE:
It is our interpretation of Pereira that it establishes a bright-line rule:
A putative notice to appear that fails to designate the specific time or place of the noncitizen’s removal proceedings is not a “notice to appear under section 1229(a),” and so does not trigger the stop-time rule.”14
The language is clear. Pereira holds that an NTA shall contain all the information set out in section 1229(a)(1). An NTA which omits the time and date of the hearing is defective. To file an effective NTA, the government cannot, in maybe four days or maybe four months, file a second – and possibly third – Notice with the missing information. And it makes sense to have such a bright-line rule: The ability of the noncitizen to receive and to keep track of the date and place of the hearing, along with the legal basis and cited acts to be addressed at the hearing, is infinitely easier if all that information is contained in a single document – as described in
blanks for time and place” but holding that this deficiency was not of jurisdictional significance); Perez-Sanchez v. United States Att’y Gen., 935 F.3d 1148, 1154 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing Ortiz-Santiago, 924 F.3d at 962) (“Under Pereira, . . . a notice of hearing sent later might be relevant to a harmlessness inquiry, but it does not render the original NTA non- deficient.”).
14 Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2113-14.
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Case: 19-2239
Document: 67 Page: 8 Date Filed: 02/26/2020
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Moreover, it seems to us to be no great imposition on the government to require it to communicate all that information to the noncitizen in one document. If a notice is sent to the noncitizen with only a portion of the statutorily required information, a valid NTA can easily be sent later which contains all the required information in one document – at such time as the government has gathered all that information together. The complete NTA would then trigger the stop-time rule.
The government argues, however, that the BIA’s
decision in Matter of Mendoza-Hernandez should be given
Chevron16 deference as a reasonable reading of an ambiguous
statute. There, the BIA relied on Pereira’s position that “the
fundamental purpose of notice is to convey essential
information to the alien, such that the notice creates a
reasonable expectation of the alien’s appearance at the removal
proceeding.” 17 The BIA determined that this purpose can be
served just as well by two or more documents as it could by
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We conclude, however, that Chevron deference is
15 We do note that in Pereira the Court left “for another day whether a putative notice to appear that omits any of the other categories of information enumerated in § 1229(a)(1) triggers the stop-time rule.” 138 S. Ct. at 2113 n. 5.
16 Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
17 Matter of Mendoza-Hernandez, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 531.
18 Id.
the statute.
one.
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Case: 19-2239 Document: 67 Page: 9 Date Filed: 02/26/2020
inapplicable here because we are not merely interpreting the
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whether the Supreme Court’s decision in Pereira forecloses
stop-time rule.
our interpretation of the statute in Orozco-Velasquez.
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What does it mean:
In the 3rd Circuit, undocumented individuals who have been continuously physically present in the U.S. for at least 10 years prior to receiving a “Pereira-compliant” Notice to Appear” (“NTA”) are exempt from the “stop time” rule for non-lawful-permanent resident cancellation of removal.
An “after the fact” Notice of Hearing from EOIR does NOT remedy the “Pereira-defect” in the NTA for purposes of the stop-time rule.
Those whose cancellation of removal applications were improperly denied, or who were not given a chance to apply, because of the stop-time rule should be able to reopen their cases. This should add to the “Aimless Docket Reshuffling” and jack up the backlog some more, at least within the 3rd Cir.
The 3rd Circuit covers Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Delaware.
This mess was largely self-inflicted by DHS & EOIR. They had many chances to remedy the “Pereira problem’ over the years, but chose not to do so.
I would expect the DOJ to find a petition for rehearing in this case, as they did in the Ninth Circuit. That could result in the Third Circuit’s decision being put “on hold.”
This split will eventually have to be resolved by the Supremes. But, that’s unlikely to happen until next year.
Congratulations and much appreciation to the six BIA Appellate Immigration Judges, led by former Judge John Guendelsberger, who courageously dissented from the en banc decision in Mendoza-Hernandez:
Judge John Guendelsberger, author
Judge Charles Adkins-Blanch, Vice Chair
Judge Patricia Cole
Judge Edward Grant
Judge Michael J. Creppy
Judge Molly Kendall Clark
Perhaps not surprisingly, Judges Guendelsberger, Cole, & Kendall Clark have since retired from the BIA.
Dissent remains important, if exceedingly rare at today’s BIA, where DOJ politicos and EOIR bureaucrats actively encourage “go along to get along,” pro-regime jurisprudence. Also, en banc decisions are disfavored at today’s BIA.
I have previously discussed the implications of the Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in Pereira v. Sessionshere and here. There are two aspects to the Pereira decision. The first is the narrow issue presented to the Supreme Court, concerning whether the service of a purported charging document (known as a Notice to Appear, or “NTA”) that is defective in its lack of a time and date as required by statute triggers what is known as the “stop-time rule.” That rule prevents a non-citizen from accruing additional continuous residence towards the 10 years needed to be able to apply for a relief known as Cancellation of Removal. If the time was not stopped by the defective NTA, non-citizens continue to accrue time towards the ten-year requirement, eventually allowing many to apply for that additional form of relief that would have otherwise been closed to them. The second aspect of Pereira (and the one discussed in my prior posts, which has captured the imagination of many immigration practitioners) concerns whether the particular language employed by the Supreme Court in holding that no, the defective document does not trigger the stop-time rule because by virtue of its defect, the document isn’t in fact an NTA, can be interpreted to more broadly undermine the legitimacy of every case, past and present, that was initiated by DHS with such a defective document.
In spite of high hopes regarding the second issue (which were raised by the termination of 9,000 removal cases by immigration judges in just the first two months following the Pereira decision), the tide turned with the issuance of decisions to the contrary, first by the BIA in Matter of Bermudez-Cota, and then by decisions from the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Sixth, Ninth, and Second Circuits affirming the BIA’s ruling.
Although a recent decision of the Seventh Circuit also refused to terminate the petitioner’s proceedings, it did so in a unique way that is worth discussing. In Ortiz-Santiago v. Barr, the court disagreed with the view of its sister circuits that Pereira’s holding was limited to the narrow issue of the stop-time rule, and that the NTA’s requirements are satisfied by the two-step process of the service of a defective NTA followed by the immigration court’s mailing of a notice providing the missing information. The Seventh Circuit found that “Pereira is not a one-way, one-day train ticket,” in that its holding has broader implications than merely the stop-time rule. The court rejected as “absurd” the Government’s argument that the NTA referenced in the statute is a different document from the one referenced in the regulations. (It bears noting that the 6th Circuit adopted this argument in footnote 4 of its decision in Santos-Santos v. Barr). The 7th Cir. was also unpersuaded by the two-step compliance approach of the BIA in Bermudez-Cota (which the other three circuits deferred to). The 7th Circuit stated that Bermudez-Cota “brushed too quickly over the Supreme Court’s rationale in Pereira and tracked the dissenting opinion rather than the majority.” The court added that “Congress itself appears to have rejected the two-step approach” when it passed the legislation that created the NTA.
The Seventh Circuit then turned to the issue of what should result from a finding that an NTA did not comply with the statute. Here the decision takes an interesting turn. The court stated that the fact that the regulation states that “jurisdiction vests” upon the service of an NTA isn’t read as “jurisdiction” “in the same sense that complete diversity or the existence of a federal question is for a district court.” Instead, the court interpreted the question of “jurisdiction” in an agency regulation as what it termed a “claim-processing rule,” which the court defined as a rule “that seeks to promote the orderly progress of litigation by requiring that the parties take certain procedural steps at certain specified times.” The court noted that the failure to comply with a claim-processing rule may result in termination of the case, but only if a timely objection is raised. In the absence of such timely objection, the failure to comply “may…be waived or forfeited by the opposing party.” The court turned to the question of whether the lack of such timely objection in the case before it constituted such forfeiture, or (1) whether the fact that doing so at the time would have been futile under existing circuit case law, and (2) the major legal change that the Pereira decision constituted, allowed for the late raising of such objection. The court answered this last question in the negative, concluding that the petitioner could have gleaned even pre-Pereira that a potential problem existed, as portended from the stand-alone position of the Third Circuit’s 2016 decision in Orozco-Velasquez v. Holder, which created the circuit court split that led the matter to eventually be taken up by the Supreme Court in Pereira.
Although the Ortiz-Santiago decision ultimately denied the motion for termination, it created a new road map for analyzing such claims. Most notably, it rejected the BIA’s analysis of the issue in Bermudez-Cota. It is wondered whether another circuit might be persuaded to adopt the reasoning of this decision (which I liken to a ball that looks like it might be a home run before hooking foul at the last moment) but differ on whether the issuance of the Pereira decision would form a legitimate basis for allowing the raising a late objection.
Not content with its ruling on the jurisdictional issue, the BIA returned to the narrower issue in Pereira in a May 1 precedent, Matter of Mendoza-Hernandez and Capula-Cortez, in which the Board held that the two-step rule rejected in Pereira is not only sufficient for broader jurisdictional purposes, but remarkably, is also sufficient to trigger the stop-time rule. The degree of chutzpah involved in reaching a decision directly at odds with the Supreme Court’s holding was so great that a sharply-divided Board made the case its first en banc decision in 10 years, revealing a 9 to 6 split among its permanent judges.
In the current issue of the American Bar Association’s Judges’ Journal, Richard J. Pierce, Jr., a law professor at George Washington University discusses the right of the president to remove officers within the federal government at will. (The article has been reprinted here on the website of my friend and colleague Paul Schmidt). Using the example of immigration judges, Prof. Pierce argues of the need to protect those performing an adjudicatory function from at-will removal “in order to reduce the risk that they will adjudicatory hearings in ways that reflect pro-government bias in violation of due process.” Prof. Pierce cites the present danger under a president and attorney general who have expressed strong anti-immigrant views “and have applied extraordinary pressure on IJs to deny applications for asylum.” Prof. Pierce opines that it is unrealistic to expect all immigration judges to be able to withstand such pressure. I believe that Mendoza-Hernandez is a perfect example of this. If only two of the nine Board Members in the majority ruled as they did out of fear of repercussions from the Attorney General, such pressure effectively changed the outcome of the decision. I feel strongly that this in fact happened.
The Ninth Circuit took only three weeks to reverse the Board’s decision. The circuit court ruled to the contrary that a subsequent hearing notice does not trigger the stop-time rule. The court also held that it owes no deference to the BIA’s interpretation of Supreme Court decisions; that the BIA ignored the plain text of the statute it claimed to be interpreting; and that the BIA relied on case law that could not be reconciled with the Supreme Court’s decision in Pereira. As the BIA will undoubtedly continue to apply its erroneous decision outside of the Ninth Circuit, it is hoped that the other circuits will quickly follow the Ninth Circuit’s lead. Sadly, the majority of the BIA’s judges have signaled that they will not act as neutral arbiters and afford due process. It is left to the circuit courts to provide the necessary correction.
