Category: Congress

 

Pereida v. Wilkinson, U.S., 03-04-21

Here’s the link to the full decision:

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/20pdf/19-438_j4el.pdf

MAJORITY: Justice Gorsuch (opinion), Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Thomas, Justice Alito, Justice Kavanaugh

DISSENT: Justice Breyer (opinion), Justice Kagtan, Justice Sotomayor

NOT PARTICIPATING: Justice Barrett

SYLLABUS (by Court staff):

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No. 19–438. Argued October 14, 2020—Decided March 4, 2021

Immigration officials initiated removal proceedings against Clemente Avelino Pereida for entering and remaining in the country unlawfully, a charge Mr. Pereida did not contest. Mr. Pereida sought instead to establish his eligibility for cancellation of removal, a discretionary form of relief under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). 8 U. S. C. §§1229a(c)(4), 1229b(b)(1). Eligibility requires certain nonper- manent residents to prove, among other things, that they have not been convicted of specified criminal offenses. §1229b(b)(1)(C). While his proceedings were pending, Mr. Pereida was convicted of a crime under Nebraska state law. See Neb. Rev. Stat. §28–608 (2008). Ana- lyzing whether Mr. Pereida’s conviction constituted a “crime involving moral turpitude” that would bar his eligibility for cancellation of re- moval, §§1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 1227(a)(2)(A)(i), the immigration judge found that the Nebraska statute stated several separate crimes, some of which involved moral turpitude and one—carrying on a business without a required license—which did not. Because Nebraska had charged Mr. Pereida with using a fraudulent social security card to obtain employment, the immigration judge concluded that Mr. Pereida’s conviction was likely not for the crime of operating an unli- censed business, and thus the conviction likely constituted a crime in- volving moral turpitude. The Board of Immigration Appeals and the Eighth Circuit concluded that the record did not establish which crime Mr. Pereida stood convicted of violating. But because Mr. Pereida bore the burden of proving his eligibility for cancellation of removal, the ambiguity in the record meant he had not carried that burden and he was thus ineligible for discretionary relief.

Held: Under the INA, certain nonpermanent residents seeking to cancel

2

PEREIDA v. WILKINSON Syllabus

a lawful removal order bear the burden of showing they have not been convicted of a disqualifying offense. An alien has not carried that bur- den when the record shows he has been convicted under a statute list- ing multiple offenses, some of which are disqualifying, and the record is ambiguous as to which crime formed the basis of his conviction. Pp. 5–17.

(a) The INA squarely places the burden of proof on the alien to prove eligibility for relief from removal. §1229a(c)(4)(A). Mr. Pereida accepts his burden to prove three of four statutory eligibility requirements but claims a different rule should apply to the final requirement at issue here—whether he was convicted of a disqualifying offense. Mr. Pereida identifies nothing in the statutory text that singles out that lone requirement for special treatment. The plain reading of the text is confirmed by the context of three nearby provisions. First, the INA specifies particular forms of evidence that “shall constitute proof of a criminal conviction” in “any proceeding under this chapter,” regardless of whether the proceedings involve efforts by the government to re- move an alien or efforts by the alien to establish eligibility for relief. §1229a(c)(3)(B). Next, Congress knows how to impose the burden on the government to show that an alien has committed a crime of moral turpitude, see §§1229a(c)(3), 1227(a)(2)(A)(i), and yet it chose to flip the burden when it comes to applications for relief from removal. Fi- nally, the INA often requires an alien seeking admission to show “clearly and beyond doubt” that he is “entitled to be admitted and is not inadmissible,” §1229a(c)(2), which in turn requires the alien to demonstrate that he has not committed a crime involving moral turpi- tude, §1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). Mr. Pereida offers no account why a rational Congress would have placed this burden on an alien who is seeking admission, but lift it from an alien who has entered the country ille- gally and faces a lawful removal order. Pp. 5–7.

(b) Even so, Mr. Pereida contends that he can carry the burden of showing his crime did not involve moral turpitude using the so-called “categorical approach.” Applying the categorical approach, a court considers not the facts of an individual’s conduct, but rather whether the offense of conviction necessarily or categorically triggers a conse- quence under federal law. Under Mr. Pereida’s view, because a person could hypothetically violate the Nebraska statute without committing fraud—i.e., by carrying on a business without a license—the statute does not qualify as a crime of moral turpitude. But application of the categorical approach implicates two inquiries—one factual (what was Mr. Pereida’s crime of conviction?), the other hypothetical (could some- one commit that crime of conviction without fraud?). And the Ne- braska statute is divisible, setting forth multiple crimes, some of which the parties agree are crimes of moral turpitude. In cases involving

Cite as: 592 U. S. ____ (2021) 3 Syllabus

divisible statutes, the Court has told judges to determine which of the offenses an individual committed by employing a “modified” categori- cal approach, “review[ing] the record materials to discover which of the enumerated alternatives played a part in the defendant’s prior convic- tion.” Mathis v. United States, 579 U. S. ___, ___. This determination, like many issues surrounding the who, what, when, and where of a prior conviction, involves questions of historical fact. The party who bears the burden of proving these facts bears the risks associated with failing to do so. This point is confirmed by the INA’s terms and the logic undergirding them. A different conclusion would disregard many precedents. See, e.g., Taylor v. United States, 495 U. S. 575, 600. Just as evidentiary gaps work against the government in criminal cases where it bears the burden, see, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 559 U. S. 133, they work against the alien seeking relief from a lawful removal order. Congress can, and has, allocated the burden differently. Pp. 7– 15.

(c) It is not this Court’s place to choose among competing policy arguments. Congress was entitled to conclude that uncertainty about an alien’s prior conviction should not redound to his benefit. And Mr. Pereida fails to acknowledge some of the tools Congress seemingly did afford aliens faced with record-keeping challenges. See, e.g., §1229a(c)(3)(B). Pp. 15–17.

916 F. 3d 1128, affirmed.

GORSUCH, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C.J.,andTHOMAS,ALITO,andKAVANAUGH,JJ.,joined. BREYER,J.,filed a dissenting opinion, in which SOTOMAYOR and KAGAN, JJ., joined. BARRETT, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

KEY QUOTE FROM DISSENT:

Finally, it makes particularly little sense to disregard this core feature of the categorical approach here. See id., at 203–204. As already noted, cancellation of removal is discretionary. Thus, when a conviction is not disqualifying under the categorical approach, the Government may still deny the noncitizen relief. If it turns out that an individual with a record like the one here in fact violated the statute in a reprehensible manner, that can be accounted for during the discretionary phase of the proceedings, when the categorical approach does not apply.

***

In my view, the Court should follow Congress’ statute. Congress has long provided that immigration courts apply- ing the INA provision here, like sentencing courts applying ACCA, must follow the categorical approach. See Mellouli, 575 U. S., at 805–806. Our cases make clear how that approach applies in a case like this one. We should follow our earlier decisions, particularly Taylor, Shepard, and John- son. And, were we to do so, ineluctably they would lead us to determine that the statutory offense of which Mr. Pereida was “convicted” is not “necessarily” a “crime involving moral turpitude.”

Because the Court comes to a different conclusion, with respect, I dissent.

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“When in doubt, throw ‘em out,” seems to be the majority’s refrain. As pointed out by Justice Breyer, a decision that allowed Mr. Pereida, who has lived in the U.S. for a quarter of a century, to apply for cancellation of removal because of the uncertainty as to whether his 2010 conviction for “attempted criminal impersonation” under Nebraska law involved “moral turpitude,” would not have guaranteed him relief. It merely would have allowed the Immigration Judge to weigh the substantial equities that Mr. Pereida and his family had developed against his decade-old criminal conviction. 

The Immigration Judge could then have decided, on the basis of a fully developed record, in the exercise of discretion whether or not Mr. Pereida merited a “second chance” in the U.S. And, of course, if the application were granted, ICE would still have the ability to appeal to the BIA, which exercises “de novo” review on questions of discretion.  

There is lots that needs to be changed about our current immigration system. It’s too bad that Congress appears too deadlocked to get the job done.

PWS

03-04-21

UPDATE:

”Sir Jeffrey” Chase just reminded me that our Round Table 🛡⚔️filed an amicus brief in support of the respondent’s position in this case. Sadly, we didn’t carry the day, here! ☹️

But, we’ll be heard from again on the “categorical approach.” I guarantee it!

🇺🇸⚖️🗽Due Process Forever!

PWS

03-04-21