⚖️👏😎 BREAKING: SUPREME RELIEF: Court Reaffirms Executive’s Authority To Set Sane Immigration Enforcement Policies! — “Standing” Key! — Baseless Attacks By GOP In Texas & Louisiana Thwarted (For Now)  — 8-1 Win For Administration, Opinion by Justice Kavanaugh, 3 Concurring, Alito Lone Dissenter! — U.S. v. Texas

Here’s a copy of the full decision:

 https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/22-58_i425.pdf

Here’s the syllabus (NOT part of the decision):

UNITED STATES ET AL. v. TEXAS ET AL. CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 22–58. Argued November 29, 2022—Decided June 23, 2023

In 2021, the Secretary of Homeland Security promulgated new immigra- tion-enforcement guidelines (Guidelines for the Enforcement of Civil Immigration Law) that prioritize the arrest and removal from the United States of noncitizens who are suspected terrorists or dangerous criminals or who have unlawfully entered the country only recently, for example. The States of Texas and Louisiana claim that the Guide- lines contravene two federal statutes that they read to require the ar- rest of certain noncitizens upon their release from prison (8 U. S. C. §1226(c)) or entry of a final order of removal (§1231(a)(2)). The District Court found that the States would incur costs due to the Executive’s failure to comply with those alleged statutory mandates, and that the States had standing to sue based on those costs. On the merits, the District Court found the Guidelines unlawful and vacated them. The Fifth Circuit declined to stay the District Court’s judgment, and this Court granted certiorari before judgment.

Held: Texas and Louisiana lack Article III standing to challenge the Guidelines. Pp. 3–14.

(a) Under Article III, a plaintiff must have standing to sue. This bedrock constitutional requirement has its roots in the separation of powers. So the threshold question here is whether the States have standing to maintain this suit. Based on this Court’s precedents and longstanding historical practice, the answer is no.

To establish standing, a plaintiff must show an injury in fact caused by the defendant and redressable by a court order. The District Court found that the States would incur additional costs due to the chal- lenged arrest policy. And monetary costs are an injury. But this Court has stressed that the alleged injury must also “be legally and judicially cognizable.” Raines v. Byrd, 521 U. S. 811, 819. That requires that

2

UNITED STATES v. TEXAS Syllabus

the dispute is “traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through the judicial process.” Ibid. Here, the States cite no precedent, history, or tradition of federal courts entertaining lawsuits of this kind. On the contrary, this Court has previously ruled that a plaintiff lacks standing to bring such a suit “when he himself is neither prosecuted nor threatened with prosecution.” See Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U. S. 614, 619. The Linda R. S. Article III standing principle remains the law today, and the States have pointed to no case or historical prac- tice holding otherwise. Pp. 3–6.

(b) There are good reasons why federal courts have not traditionally entertained lawsuits of this kind. For one, when the Executive Branch elects not to arrest or prosecute, it does not exercise coercive power over an individual’s liberty or property, and thus does not infringe upon interests that courts often are called upon to protect. Moreover, such lawsuits run up against the Executive’s Article II authority to decide “how to prioritize and how aggressively to pursue legal actions against defendants who violate the law.” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U. S. ___, ___. The principle of Executive Branch enforcement dis- cretion over arrests and prosecutions extends to the immigration con- text. Courts also generally lack meaningful standards for assessing the propriety of enforcement choices in this area, which are invariably affected by resource constraints and regularly changing public-safety and public-welfare needs. That is why this Court has recognized that federal courts are generally not the proper forum for resolving claims that the Executive Branch should make more arrests or bring more prosecutions. Pp. 6–9.

(c) This holding does not suggest that federal courts may never en- tertain cases involving the Executive Branch’s alleged failure to make more arrests or bring more prosecutions. First, the Court has adjudi- cated selective-prosecution claims under the Equal Protection Clause in which a plaintiff typically seeks to prevent his or her own prosecu- tion. Second, the standing analysis might differ when Congress ele- vates de facto injuries to the status of legally cognizable injuries re- dressable by a federal court. Third, the standing calculus might change if the Executive Branch wholly abandoned its statutory respon- sibilities to make arrests or bring prosecutions. Fourth, a challenge to an Executive Branch policy that involves both arrest or prosecution priorities and the provision of legal benefits or legal status could lead to a different standing analysis. Fifth, policies governing the contin- ued detention of noncitizens who have already been arrested arguably might raise a different standing question than arrest or prosecution policies. But this case presents none of those scenarios. Pp. 9–12.

(d) The discrete standing question raised by this case rarely arises because federal statutes that purport to require the Executive Branch

Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023) 3 Syllabus

to make arrests or bring prosecutions are rare. This case is different from those in which the Federal Judiciary decides justiciable cases in- volving statutory requirements or prohibitions on the Executive, be- cause it implicates the Executive Branch’s enforcement discretion and raises the distinct question of whether the Federal Judiciary may in effect order the Executive Branch to take enforcement actions. The Court’s decision does not indicate any view on whether the Executive is complying with its statutory obligations. Nor does the Court’s nar- row holding signal any change in the balance of powers between Con- gress and the Executive. Pp. 12–14.

606 F. Supp. 3d 437, reversed.

KAVANAUGH, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, and JACKSON, JJ., joined. GORSUCH, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which THOMAS and BAR- RETT, JJ., joined. BARRETT, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judg- ment, in which GORSUCH, J., joined. ALITO, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

Key quotes from Justice Kavanaugh’s majority opinion:

In short, this Court’s precedents and longstanding

historical practice establish that the States’ suit here is not the kind redressable by a federal court.

B

Several good reasons explain why, as Linda R. S. held, federal courts have not traditionally entertained lawsuits of this kind.

To begin with, when the Executive Branch elects not to arrest or prosecute, it does not exercise coercive power over an individual’s liberty or property, and thus does not infringe upon interests that courts often are called upon to protect. See Lujan, 504 U. S., at 561–562. And for standing purposes, the absence of coercive power over the plaintiff makes a difference: When “a plaintiff’s asserted injury arises from the government’s allegedly unlawful regulation (or lack of regulation) of someone else, much more is needed” to establish standing. Id., at 562 (emphasis deleted).2

Moreover, lawsuits alleging that the Executive Branch has made an insufficient number of arrests or brought an insufficient number of prosecutions run up against the Executive’s Article II authority to enforce federal law. Article II of the Constitution assigns the “executive Power” to the President and provides that the President “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” U. S. Const., Art. II, §1, cl. 1; §3. Under Article II, the Executive Branch possesses authority to decide “how to prioritize and how aggressively to pursue legal actions against defendants who violate the law.” TransUnion LLC, 594 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 13); see Lujan, 504 U. S., at 576–578; Allen, 468

——————

2 By contrast, when “the plaintiff is himself an object of the action (or

forgone action) at issue,” “there is ordinarily little question that the action or inaction has caused him injury, and that a judgment preventing or requiring the action will redress it.” Lujan, 504 U. S., at 561–562.

Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023) 7

Opinion of the Court

U.S., at 760–761. The Executive Branch—not the Judiciary—makes arrests and prosecutes offenses on behalf of the United States. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 693 (1974) (“the Executive Branch has exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case”); Printz v. United States, 521 U. S. 898, 922–923 (1997) (Brady Act provisions held unconstitutional because, among other things, they transferred power to execute federal law to state officials); United States v. Armstrong, 517 U. S. 456, 464 (1996) (decisions about enforcement of “the Nation’s criminal laws” lie within the “special province of the Executive” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 138 (1976) (“A lawsuit is the ultimate remedy for a breach of the law, and it is to the President, and not to the Congress, that the Constitution entrusts the responsibility to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed’” (quoting U.S. Const., Art. II, §3)); see also United States v. Cox, 342 F. 2d 167, 171 (CA5 1965).

That principle of enforcement discretion over arrests and prosecutions extends to the immigration context, where the Court has stressed that the Executive’s enforcement discretion implicates not only “normal domestic law enforcement priorities” but also “foreign-policy objectives.” Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U. S. 471, 490–491 (1999). In line with those principles, this Court has declared that the Executive Branch also retains discretion over whether to remove a noncitizen from the United States. Arizona v. United States, 567 U. S. 387, 396 (2012) (“Federal officials, as an initial matter, must decide whether it makes sense to pursue removal at all”).

In addition to the Article II problems raised by judicial review of the Executive Branch’s arrest and prosecution policies, courts generally lack meaningful standards for assessing the propriety of enforcement choices in this area. After all, the Executive Branch must prioritize its

8 UNITED STATES v. TEXAS Opinion of the Court

enforcement efforts. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U. S. 598, 607–608 (1985). That is because the Executive Branch (i) invariably lacks the resources to arrest and prosecute every violator of every law and (ii) must constantly react and adjust to the ever-shifting public-safety and public- welfare needs of the American people.

This case illustrates the point. As the District Court found, the Executive Branch does not possess the resources necessary to arrest or remove all of the noncitizens covered by §1226(c) and §1231(a)(2). That reality is not an anomaly—it is a constant. For the last 27 years since §1226(c) and §1231(a)(2) were enacted in their current form, all five Presidential administrations have determined that resource constraints necessitated prioritization in making immigration arrests.

In light of inevitable resource constraints and regularly changing public-safety and public-welfare needs, the Executive Branch must balance many factors when devising arrest and prosecution policies. That complicated balancing process in turn leaves courts without meaningful standards for assessing those policies. Cf. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U. S. 821, 830–832 (1985); Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U. S. 182, 190–192 (1993). Therefore, in both Article III cases and Administrative Procedure Act cases, this Court has consistently recognized that federal courts are generally not the proper forum for resolving claims that the Executive Branch should make more arrests or bring more prosecutions. See Linda R. S., 410 U. S., at 619; cf. Heckler, 470 U. S., at 831 (recognizing the “general unsuitability for judicial review of agency decisions to refuse enforcement”); ICC v. Locomotive Engineers, 482 U. S. 270, 283 (1987) (“it is entirely clear that the refusal to prosecute cannot be the subject of judicial review”).3

——————

3 Also, the plaintiffs here are States, and federal courts must remain

mindful of bedrock Article III constraints in cases brought by States

Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023) 9

Opinion of the Court

All of those considerations help explain why federal courts have not traditionally entertained lawsuits of this kind. By concluding that Texas and Louisiana lack standing here, we abide by and reinforce the proper role of the Federal Judiciary under Article III. The States’ novel standing argument, if accepted, would entail expansive judicial direction of the Department’s arrest policies. If the Court green-lighted this suit, we could anticipate complaints in future years about alleged Executive Branch under-enforcement of any similarly worded laws—whether they be drug laws, gun laws, obstruction of justice laws, or the like. We decline to start the Federal Judiciary down that uncharted path. Our constitutional system of separation of powers “contemplates a more restricted role for Article III courts.” Raines, 521 U. S., at 828.

C

In holding that Texas and Louisiana lack standing, we do not suggest that federal courts may never entertain cases involving the Executive Branch’s alleged failure to make more arrests or bring more prosecutions.

First, the Court has adjudicated selective-prosecution claims under the Equal Protection Clause. In those cases, however, a party typically seeks to prevent his or her own prosecution, not to mandate additional prosecutions

——————

against an executive agency or officer. To be sure, States sometimes have standing to sue the United States or an executive agency or officer. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U. S. 144 (1992). But in our system of dual federal and state sovereignty, federal policies frequently generate indirect effects on state revenues or state spending. And when a State asserts, for example, that a federal law has produced only those kinds of indirect effects, the State’s claim for standing can become more attenuated. See Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U. S. 886 (1970); Florida v. Mellon, 273 U. S. 12, 16–18 (1927); cf. Lujan, 504 U. S., at 561–562. In short, none of the various theories of standing asserted by the States in this case overcomes the fundamental Article III problem with this lawsuit.

10 UNITED STATES v. TEXAS Opinion of the Court

against other possible defendants. See, e.g., Wayte, 470 U. S., at 604; Armstrong, 517 U. S., at 459, 463.

Second, as the Solicitor General points out, the standing analysis might differ when Congress elevates defacto injuries to the status of legally cognizable injuries redressable by a federal court. See Brief for Petitioners 20, n. 3; cf. TransUnion LLC, 594 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 10–11); Federal Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U. S. 11, 20 (1998); Raines, 521 U. S., at 820, n. 3; Lujan, 504 U. S., at 578; Linda R. S., 410 U. S., at 617, n. 3. For example, Congress might (i) specifically authorize suits against the Executive Branch by a defined set of plaintiffs who have suffered concrete harms from executive under-enforcement and (ii) specifically authorize the Judiciary to enter appropriate orders requiring additional arrests or prosecutions by the Executive Branch.

Here, however, the relevant statutes do not supply such specific authorization. The statutes, even under the States’ own reading, simply say that the Department “shall” arrest certain noncitizens. Given the “deep-rooted nature of law- enforcement discretion,” a purported statutory arrest mandate, without more, does not entitle any particular plaintiff to enforce that mandate in federal court. Castle Rock, 545 U. S., at 761, 764–765, 767, n. 13; cf. Heckler, 470 U. S., at 835. For an arrest mandate to be enforceable in federal court, we would need at least a “stronger indication” from Congress that judicial review of enforcement discretion is appropriate—for example, specific authorization for particular plaintiffs to sue and for federal courts to order more arrests or prosecutions by the Executive. Castle Rock, 545 U. S., at 761. We do not take a position on whether such a statute would suffice for Article III purposes; our only point is that no such statute is present in this case.4

——————

4 As the Solicitor General noted, those kinds of statutes, by infringing

Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023) 11 Opinion of the Court

Third, the standing calculus might change if the Executive Branch wholly abandoned its statutory responsibilities to make arrests or bring prosecutions. Under the Administrative Procedure Act, a plaintiff arguably could obtain review of agency non-enforcement if an agency “has consciously and expressly adopted a general policy that is so extreme as to amount to an abdication of its statutory responsibilities.” Heckler, 470 U. S., at 833, n. 4 (internal quotation marks omitted); see id., at 839 (Brennan, J., concurring); cf. 5 U. S. C. §706(1). So too, an extreme case of non-enforcement arguably could exceed the bounds of enforcement discretion and support Article III standing. But the States have not advanced a Heckler-style “abdication” argument in this case or argued that the Executive has entirely ceased enforcing the relevant statutes. Therefore, we do not analyze the standing ramifications of such a hypothetical scenario.

Fourth, a challenge to an Executive Branch policy that involves both the Executive Branch’s arrest or prosecution priorities and the Executive Branch’s provision of legal benefits or legal status could lead to a different standing analysis. That is because the challenged policy might implicate more than simply the Executive’s traditional enforcement discretion. Cf. Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 591 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2020) (slip op., at 11–12) (benefits such as work authorization and Medicare eligibility accompanied by non- enforcement meant that the policy was “more than simply a non-enforcement policy”); Texas v. United States, 809 F. 3d 134, 154 (CA5 2015) (Linda R. S. “concerned only nonprosecution,” which is distinct from “both nonprosecution and the conferral of benefits”), aff ’d by an equally divided Court, 579 U. S. 547 (2016). Again, we need

——————

on the Executive’s enforcement discretion, could also raise Article II issues. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 24–25.

12 UNITED STATES v. TEXAS Opinion of the Court

not resolve the Article III consequences of such a policy. Fifth, policies governing the continued detention of noncitizens who have already been arrested arguably might raise a different standing question than arrest or prosecution policies. Cf. Biden v. Texas, 597 U. S. ___ (2022). But this case does not concern a detention policy, so

we do not address the issue here.5

***************************************

Given the narrow resolution on standing grounds, and the reservations set forth in Section C of Justice Kavanaugh’s opinion, in addition to the somewhat different approach of the three concurring Justices, Gorsuch, Thomas, and Barrett, it’s unpredictable what this decision might mean if the DACA challenge now pending before U.S. District Judge Hanen eventually reaches the Supremes. In “point four” of “Section C,” Justice Kavanaugh goes to some length to distinguish a situation “that involves both the Executive Branch’s arrest or prosecution priorities and the Executive Branch’s provision of legal benefits or legal status,” citing the Court’s earlier decision in DHS v. Regents, involving a DACA challenge that was decided on APA technical grounds.

Still, this is a strong statement rejecting the attempt of GOP States and GOP lower Federal Court Judges to take over Federal immigration enforcement! And, with Immigration Courts overwhelmed with a largely artificially-inflated 2 million case backlog, many consisting of cases in which relief should be granted elsewhere (like at USCIS) or where removal would actually be detrimental to the interests of the U.S., a reaffirmation of the Executive’s historical authority to set reasonable, practical immigration enforcement priorities could not come soon enough. 

In that light, it’s curious why in a case where the ultimate result was lopsided, the Court DENIED the Administration’s motion for a stay pending review of the Fifth Circuit’s and USDC’s wrong orders! This unnecessarily created months of “enforcement chaos” which has been damaging both to individuals and to our national interests.

I also find it interesting that Justice Kavanaugh cited and in part relied upon the Executive’s Article II authority to enforce the law. This was also part of the rationale I used in a 1976 legal opinion written for then General Counsel Sam Bernsen reaffirming the “Legacy” INS’s authority to exercise prosecutorial discretion in designating some cases as “non priority.” 

That memo stated:

The ultimate source for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in the Federal Government is the power of the President. Under Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution, the executive power is vested in the President. Article II, Section 3, states that the President “shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”

. . . .

The reasons for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion are both practical and humanitarian. There simply are not enough resources to enforce all of the laws and regulations presently on the books. As a practical matter, therefore, law enforcement officials have to make policy choices as to the most effective and desirable way in which to deploy their limited resources. Thus, for example, police and prosecutors may choose to concentrate on apprehension and prosecution of perpetrators of violent crimes, while choosing not to proceed against those committing so-called “victimless crimes,” such as certain consensual sex acts and possession of small amounts of marihuana. In addition, there are times when defects in the quality, quantity, or method of gathering evidence will make it difficult to prove the matter before a court.

Aside from purely practical considerations, it is also obvious that in enacting a statute the legislature cannot possibly contemplate all of the possible circumstances in which the statute may be applied. In some situations, application of the literal letter of the law would simply be unconscionable and would serve no useful purpose. For instance, a prosecutor may well decide not to proceed against a terminally ill individual, even in the presence of overwhelming evidence of guilt.

You can find a copy of that legal opinion here: https://wp.me/p8eeJm-260. Still relevant, after nearly half a century!

🇺🇸 Due Process Forever!

PWS

06-23-23

🤯 CAIR COALITION COGENTLY CONCLUDES: CANNED CLAPTRAP CAN’T CHANGE CRATERING CLOWN COURTS! 🤡

 

Kangaroos
“We don’t need immigration expertise to be hired, and now we don’t need it to deny cases either. Just have to slap any old attachment on it! EOIR is the ‘paint by numbers’ of judging!”
https://www.flickr.com/photos/rasputin243/
Creative Commons License

https://www.caircoalition.org/2023/06/12/breaking-attorneys-advocate-better-due-process-response-immigration-judges-making

BREAKING: Attorneys advocate for better due process in response to immigration judges making conveyor-belt deportation decisions

June 12, 2023

Immigration attorneys nationwide have witnessed a concerning increase in immigration judges issuing deportation decisions without individualized analysis. Instead, these barebones decisions often rely on boilerplate “form addenda,” which are standardized summaries of immigration law not specific to any noncitizen’s case.

This week, in response to these concerning practices, Capital Area Immigrants’ Rights (CAIR) Coalition and pro bono counsel O’Melveny & Myers, along with over 50 partner organizations, have submitted a letter advocating that the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) reform its policies governing the use of form addenda.

Because they are not specific to a person’s individual case and are instead just stapled to a deportation order as legal justification, the addenda usually include irrelevant issues and sometimes incorrect statements of the law. Plus, the noncitizen and their attorney often never see a copy of the addenda.

The sign-on letter urges EOIR to take multiple, concrete steps to change its policies governing the use of form addenda. These measures include increased training on addenda usage for immigration judges, making form addenda publicly accessible, and appointing an ombudsman to investigate addenda misuse.

“Due to the drastic consequences for immigrants in deportation cases—including family separation and possible persecution and death in people’s home countries—the law requires U.S. immigration judges to conduct an individualized analysis of each noncitizen’s case when deciding on their removal proceedings,” said Peter Alfredson, Senior Attorney at CAIR Coalition. “When the stakes are that high, noncitizens deserve to know that judges are taking their claims seriously—or even looking at their claims at all—and issuing decisions that reflect that responsibility.”  

“Immigration judges merely staple these form addenda to a removal order instead of doing their job to analyze each person’s case.” said Adina Appelbaum, Program Director of the Immigration Impact Lab at CAIR Coalition. “We need clearer policies from EOIR so that if judges use these addenda, they will do so in a way that is fair and respectful to the noncitizens whose lives are in their hands.” 

Adina Appelbaum
Adina Appelbaum
Director, Immigration Impact Lab
CAIR Coalition
Charter Member, NDPA
PHOTO: “30 Under 30” from Forbes

————-

Contact

Erin Barnaby, CAIR Coalition   |   erin@caircoalition.org

————-

About Capital Area Immigrants’ Rights Coalition

Through free legal, social, and litigation services, Capital Area Immigrants’ Rights (CAIR) works to ensure equal justice for immigrants in the Capital region who are at risk of detention and deportation.

****************************

Crazy catastrophic courts can’t continue!

🇺🇸 Due Process Forever!

PWS

06-14-23

🏴‍☠️ EOIR DENIES DUE PROCESS TO ASYLUM SEEKER, SAYS SLIT 9TH! — Dysfunctional Agency Renowned For “Aimless Docket Reshuffling” Of Scheduled, “Ready to Try” Cases Can’t Spare Time For Same-Day Filing By Newly Retained Counsel In “Life Or Death Matter!” — Arizmendi-Medina v. Garland

Kangaroos
“Deny, deny, deny, deter, deter, deter! ‘Fake efficiency’ over justice! Expediency over due process! Gee, it’s fun to be a ‘Deportation Judge’ @ EOIR! Much better than having to practice before this awful mess we’ve created! “
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Creative Commons License

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2023/06/07/21-298.pdfw

KEY QUOTE FROM CIRCUIT JUDGE RONALD LEE GILMAN’S MAJORITY OPINION:

. . . .

Third, the IJ was hardly inconvenienced at all. Arizmendi-Medina’s counsel offered to submit the application while the IJ was still on the bench. Although this might have required the IJ to recall Arizmendi-Medina’s case at the end of the IJ’s docket, this inconvenience was truly minimal. Cf. Jerezano, 169 F.3d at 615 (“While an IJ need not linger in the courtroom awaiting tardy litigants, so long as he is there on other business and the delay is short[,] …it is an abuse of discretion to treat a slightly late appearance as a nonappearance.”). Further, as discussed above, the December 18, 2018 hearing was a Master Calendar hearing, not a merits hearing. This means that the proceedings were ultimately not delayed at all.

And fourth, we consider the total number of continuances previously granted to Arizmendi-Medina. He received two very short continuances (only two weeks each) to find an attorney at the beginning of his immigration proceedings on July 31, 2018 and August 15, 2018. See Cruz Rendon, 603 F.3d at 1106–07, 1110 (finding that two one- month continuances were both “exceedingly short”). The proceedings were then reset at the hearing on August 29, 2018 because Arizmendi-Medina requested, and the IJ granted, a change of venue. The next hearing was scheduled for October 24, 2018 before a new IJ. Although this certainly gave Arizmendi-Medina more time to find an attorney, this delay was primarily due to the change of venue and getting the case calendared in a new court.

Finally, after Arizmendi-Medina was required to proceed pro se and was found removable at the hearing on October 24, 2018, the IJ granted another continuance so that Arizmendi-Medina could continue to look for an attorney and work on his relief application (which was presented to him for the first time at the October 24, 2018 hearing).

20 ARIZMENDI-MEDINA V. GARLAND

Arizmendi-Medina thus received only one continuance after he was found removable and presented with a relief application, and he received zero continuances after he finally secured an attorney. From start to finish, the proceedings against Arizmendi-Medina were delayed for less than five months, with nearly two months of that delay due to the change of venue.

Ultimately, all of the Ahmed factors weigh in favor of finding that the IJ abused his discretion in not granting a continuance so that Arizmendi-Medina’s recently-retained counsel could complete and submit the relief application on December 18, 2018. The abuse is especially apparent given the offer of Arizmendi-Medina’s counsel to submit the application later that same day. Such an abuse by the IJ counsels in favor of finding that Arizmendi-Medina was denied fundamental fairness. See id. at 1110 (finding that the IJ abused her discretion in part because the merits hearing was “less than one month after Cruz Rendon first appeared with counsel,” which contributed to the noncitizen’s difficulty in marshalling evidence in such a short time frame (emphasis in original)). This “prevented [Arizmendi-Medina] from reasonably presenting his case.” See Zetino, 622 F.3d at 1013 (quoting Ibarra-Flores, 439 F.3d 620-21).

. . . .

*******************************

This faux “court” system has lost sight of its sole function: To provide due process hearings to individuals whose lives and futures are on the line!

In this case, the DOJ was obviously willing to spend more time and resources on denying the respondent his day in court than it would have taken to hold a merits asylum hearing! No wonder they have built an astounding, ever-growing 2 million case backlog! Don’t let Garland & company get away with blaming the private bar or respondents (that is, “the victims”) for DOJ’s continuing screw-ups at EOIR!

No real inconvenience or delay to the IJ! Life or death for the respondent! Attorney kept on a treadmill by EOIR’s unreasonable conduct! Who would take cases, particularly pro bono, under this type of tone-deaf “double standard.” (Would Trump-appointed dissenting Judge Danielle J. Forrest, who probably never has represented an individual in Immigration Court, REALLY practice law under these abusive circumstances?)

How many of you out there in “Courtside Land” have arrived on time for a scheduled merits hearing, with respondent and witnesses in tow, only to find out that your case had been “orbited” further out on the docket, with no or inadequate notice? How many have had long-prepared cases arbitrarily shuffled to a future year while having other cases where you were recently retained mindlessly “moved up” on the docket to satisfy EOIR’s latest “priority of the day?” Pretending like “every minute counts” in this hopelessly inefficient and bolloxed system is EOIR’s and DOJ’s way of deflecting attention and shifting the blame for their own, largely self-created failures!

In the “topsy turvy” fantasy world of EOIR, the dockets are overwhelming and totally screwed up! So much, that DHS recently took the unprecedented step of unilaterally declaring that (except for a small subset of “mandatory appearances”) THEY would decide which EOIR cases to staff with an Assistant Chief Counsel. See,  https://immigrationcourtside.com/2023/05/31/🤯-wacko-world-of-eoir-dhs-prosecutors-deliver-the-big-middle-finger-bmf-🖕to-garlands-feckless-immigration-courts-unilate/. Implicit in this “in your face” action is the assumption that Immigration Judges will also act as prosecutors in these cases (even though Immigration Judges clearly lack some of the authority of prosecutors, including the exercise of prosecutorial discretion and stipulation to issues or relief).

On the other hand, private attorneys are systemically jerked around by EOIR and subjected to the threat of discipline for even relatively minor transgressions. Talk about an “uneven playing field!” In a system where lack of representation and under-representation are daily threats to due process and fundamental fairness, how does EOIR’s one-sided, anti-attorney, anti-immigrant conduct encourage new generations to chip in their time pro bono or low bono to bridge the ever-present “representation gap?”

In short, it does just the opposite! Some experienced practitioners have “had enough” and reduced or eliminated their Immigration Court presence while others have changed to other areas of practice because of EOIR’s continuing dysfunction under Garland. This should be a “solvable” problem — particularly in a Dem Administration! Why isn’t it?

Why is Garland getting away with this nonsense? How can we “change the playing field” and demand that Garland finally bring the due process reforms and expert judicial and professional, common-sense administrative personnel to America’s worst and most life-threatening courts?

Thanks to attorney Shannon Englert of San Diego for taking on Garland’s dysfunctional DOJ immigration bureaucracy!

Shannon Englert, ESQ Founder DYADlaw Vista, CA PHOTO: Linkedin
Shannon Englert, ESQ Founder DYADlaw Vista, CA                  PHOTO: Linkedin

 

🇺🇸 Due Process Forever!

PWS

06-13-23

“`

🛡⚔️ THE ONGOING QUEST FOR THE “HOLY GRAIL OF JUSTICE” — Round Table Files Brief In Support Of Due Process, Rule of Law In East Bay Sanctuary v. Biden!

Knightess
Knightess of the Round Table

KEY EXCERPT:

INTRODUCTION

As former immigration judges and former members of the Board, we submit this amicus brief to ask the Northern District of California to strike down the Circumvention of Lawful Pathways Rule, 88 Fed. Reg. 31314 (May 11, 2023). The Rule, which came into effect in the immediate aftermath of Title 42s sunset and which applies to non-Mexican asylum-seekers at the U.S.-Mexico border, automatically forecloses a migrants asylum claim unless the person (i) arrives at an official port of entry having secured an immigration appointment through a complex mobile application, (ii) receives advance permission to travel to the U.S., or (iii) comes to the U.S. after applying for and being denied asylum in a transit country. Absent proof one of these narrow exceptions or a medical or other emergency, asylum-seekers will be unable to seek asylum regardless of whether they have compelling claims to relief.

Immigration judges serve an important role in the Congressionally-mandated process for reviewing the claims of asylum-seekers at or near the U.S.-Mexico border. This decades-old process, known as Expedited Removal, has its own flaws, but it does provide a credible fear review system that provides important protections for those seeking asylum. Specifically, and as explained in more detail below, the Expedited Removal statute requires that asylum-seekers, regardless of how they entered the United States, be interviewed by asylum officers to determine whether they have a credible fear of persecution and therefore can proceed to a full asylum hearing under Section 240 of the INA. The statute further mandates that immigration judges provide de novo review of asylum officersnegative credible fear determinations, and thus make the final decision about whether an asylum-seeker at the U.S.-Mexico border has shown a credible fear of persecution and will have the opportunity to progress to a full asylum hearing.

The Rule unlawfully undermines this statutory scheme. First, the Rule creates clear bars to asylum for most migrants, disingenuously labeling these as rebuttable presumptions.” As a result, almost all claims for asylum are pretermitted without the full asylum credible fear interviews required by the statutory Expedited Removal process. Rather, the credible fear interview will be turned into a reasonable fear” interview to determine whether the migrant can proceed to claim withholding of

removal or protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT”), lesser forms of relief compared to asylum. Asylum-seekers are thus denied the opportunity to obtain full review of their asylum credible fear claims, including the de novo review by an immigration judge as required by Section 235 of the INA, 8 C.F.R. § 235.3. Instead, asylum-seekers may only seek review from an immigration judge as to the application of the narrow exceptions under the Rule or the lesser claims for relief. Accordingly, the Rule significantly and unlawfully curtails the role of immigration judges in asylum adjudication as set forth in the INA.

Moreover, the idea that the Rule heightens efficiency in the asylum adjudication process is an illusion. When an asylum-seeker is denied the ability to provide a credible fear of persecution, Expedited Removal still requires a review of potentially more complicated claims for withholding of removal and protection under the CAT. Thus, immigration judges on the one hand find their hands tied, unable to review the claims of bona fide asylum-seekers, but on the other hand are required to delve into the standards of withholding and CAT. Thus, the Rule turns a straightforward (and efficient) asylum credible fear review into a three-part analysis: the Rule exceptions, withholding, and CAT.

Finally, by creating exclusions that deny asylum to refugees who appear at the U.S.-Mexico border, the Rule violates U.S. obligations under the 1951 Refugee Convention. Longstanding canons of statutory and regulatory construction require consideration of international law; in this case, the Rule violates both the INA and international law.

. . . .

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Read the complete brief skillfully prepared by our friend Ashley Vinson Crawford and her team at Akin Gump!

Ashley Vinson Crawford
Ashley Vinson Crawford, ESQ
Partner Akin Gump
San Francisco, CA
“Honorary Knightess of the Round Table”
PHOTO: Akin Gump

Our brief basically reiterates, expands, and applies points we made in our recent comments opposing the Biden Administration’s “Death to Asylum,” regulations! See https://immigrationcourtside.com/2023/03/27/⚔%EF%B8%8F🛡-round-table-joins-chorus-of-human-rights-experts-slamming-biden-administrations-abominable-death-to-asylum-seekers-☠%EF%B8%8F-proposed/

Rather than heeding our comments and those of many other experts, the Administration proceeded with its wrong-headed changes, rammed through a farcically truncated “comment period” that showed that process was little but a sham. This is the exact kind of mockery of justice and prejudgement that one might have expected from the Trump Administration. It’s also one of the many things concerning immigration that Biden and Harris “ran against” in 2020 but lacked the will and integrity to achieve in practice.

Notably, we’re not the only group of “concerned experts” weighing in against the Biden Administration’s ill-advised rules. The union representing the USCIS Asylum Officers were among the many expert organizations and individuals filing in support of the plaintiffs in East Bay Santuary. See, e.g., Asylum Officers, Ex-Judges Back Suit On Biden Asylum Rule – Law360.

Among other choice commentary, the Asylum Officers argue that the rule “effectively eliminates asylum” at the southern border! What on earth is a Dem Administration doing betraying  due process and the rule of law in favor of the most scurrilous type of nativist anti-asylum pandering — stuff right out of the “Stephen Miller playbook?” Who would have thought that we would get rid of Miller & company in 2020, yet still have to deal with his ghost in a Biden/Harris Administration that clearly and beyond any reasonable doubt has “lost its way” on immigration, human rights, racial justice, and the rule of  law?

As Round Table spokesperson “Sir Jeffrey” Chase says, “We are in very good company!” Too bad that the Biden Administration has wandered off course into the morally vacant, disingenuous “never-never land” of anti-asylum, racially-driven nativism! It certainly did not have to be this way had effective, principled, expert leadership taken hold at the beginning.

🇺🇸  Due Process Forever!

PWS

06-09-23

☹️ WRONG AGAIN: 1st Cir. KO’s 🥊 BIA On Firearms! — Portillo v. DHS

Dan Kowalski
Dan Kowalski
Online Editor of the LexisNexis Immigration Law Community (ILC)

Dan Kowalski reports for LexisNexis immigration:

https://www.lexisnexis.com/community/insights/legal/immigration/b/insidenews/posts/ca1-on-realistic-probability-portillo-v-dhs#

CA1 on Realistic Probability: Portillo v. DHS

May 31, 2023

(1 min read)

Portillo v. DHS

“Gerardo A. Portillo petitions for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming his order of removal and denying his application for adjustment of status. Because we find that a conviction under Massachusetts General Laws (“MGL”) ch. 269, § 11C is not categorically a firearm offense as defined by 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(C), we grant the petition for review, vacate the decision below, and remand for further proceedings. … Accordingly, without resorting to “legal imagination,” we conclude that MGL ch. 269, § 11C sweeps more broadly than the federal offense, and Portillo need not produce an actual case to demonstrate that overbreadth. … For the reasons stated above, we grant the petition for review, vacate the BIA’s opinion, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this decision.”

[Hats off to Jennifer Klein, Susan Brooks Church and Kathleen Marie Gillespie!  Audio of the oral argument here.]

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Congrats to the NDPA “litigation team” of Klein, Church, & Gillespie!

Notably, the unanimous 1st Circuit did a detailed 24-page analysis to get this one right. This is the type of scholarship and effort one might expect, but doesn’t consistently get, from the BIA.

Remarkably, this case has now been pending for more than six years at EOIR. Now, largely as a consequence of EOIR’s, toxic “how can we get to no” bias, present over the past several Administrations, it’s back to “square one” with no end in sight.

THAT’S how a system builds uncontrollable backlog! Maybe pruning out the “deadwood” and bringing in “practical scholar-experts” as judges at the appellate and trial levels wouldn’t solve all the problems that have been building up for decades at EOIR. But, it sure would be a great start on a better future!

🇺🇸 Due Process Forever!

PWS

06-05-23

⚖️ EMILY GARCIA @ BLOOMBERG: TORTURED LAW: Official Negativity, Captive Courts, Unduly Restrictive Criteria, Subjective Standards Combine To Deny Mandatory Protection In A World Where Torture Is Widespread ☠️— “It’s sort of in the mind of the beholder,” Say I!

EMILY GARCIA
Emily Garcia
Litigation Reporter
Bloomberg Law
PHOTO: talkingbiznews.com
Torture
This phase of the Inquisition is over. But, torture is still widely practiced worldwide. US Officialdom has shown little enthusiasm for carrying out its mandatory protection responsibilities under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).
PHOTO: Public Realm

 

The Supreme Court recently removed one procedural hurdle for noncitizens seeking humanitarian relief but the high courts ruling clears up no substantial issues about a law theyll make their claims under, immigration attorneys say—allowing some relief seekers to be sent back to torturous conditions.

Estrella Santos-Zacaria, a Guatemalan transgender woman, asked for federal review of the Board of Immigration Appealss decision denying her protection under the Convention Against Torture. In a unanimous decision, the justices said federal judges can weigh in on BIAs decisions before discretionary administrative remedies are exhausted. In Santos-Zacarias case, her petition may be sent back to BIA for further review but that doesnt guarantee relief.

While lawyers are hopeful that earlier review by a federal court will facilitate a smoother process for their clients, they express concerns that immigration judges and the BIA too readily dismiss the risk of torture, and say it shouldnt be so difficult to get humanitarian relief.

CAT protections, including deferral and withholding of removal, allow noncitizens who arent eligible for asylum to remain in the US. To receive protection, a noncitizen must show an immigration judge that if they are deported, its more likely than not that they will be tortured with government acquiescence or participation. Unlike asylum, protections under the Convention are mandatory and serious criminal convictions cant disqualify a noncitizen. But protections are especially difficult to win, said Eleni Bakst, a lawyer at the Capital Area ImmigrantsRights Coalition.

. . . .

Paul Schmidt, a former immigration judge and chairman of the BIA between and 2001, said the process for evaluating claims under the Convention isnt scientific. Theres no formula to plug in that will tell the odds of someone being tortured. Its sort of in the mind of the beholder,” Schmidt said.

. . . .

As an immigration judge, Schmidt said he and other immigration judges relied heavily on country conditions reports published by the US Department of State. Asked if he believed the reports were an adequate representation of a country, Schmidt said certainly not.”

Bakst said statistics provided by other countries can also be inaccurate. In El Salvador, the government doesnt allow monitoring bodies into its prisons so data on inmate torture is incomplete.

Pushing back against questionable reports and statistics, immigration advocates are aware that immigration judges and the BIA may dismiss their clients risk of torture, and their client may be tortured anyway.

Such was the case for Patrick Julney, a client of CAIR Coalition who was denied deferral under the Convention for failure to show that the likelihood of torture was more than 50% and deported to Haiti. Bakst said that immediately upon his arrival in Haiti, he was imprisoned and tortured.” Julney was denied access to food, water, and medicine.

Estelle McKee, a clinical immigration law professor at Cornell Law School, represented a schizophrenic man from El Salvador who was denied CAT relief. After his deportation, McKee hired a Salvadorean attorney to track down her client.

She said the attorney couldnt even enter her clients village because it was gang-controlled.

I dont have much hope that he survived,” McKee said.

McKee and other immigration attorneys agree that the Supreme Courts decision will speed up the humanitarian claims process, though results may vary. Julneys case was reviewed by the Third Circuit, but his outcome was unchanged.

. . . .

************************

Reads Emily’s full, well-written article at the above link.

A Government colleague once remarked to me that “the U.S. should never have signed the CAT.” Obviously, that private view has permeated and driven USG policy on implementing the CAT, particularly at the DOJ where it was immediately treated as “PNG” because of its lack of exclusionary clauses. Even “bad guys” aren’t supposed to be returned to torture (in terms of legal theory, if not reality).

There is no objective evidence that torture is on the decline worldwide. See, e.g., https://www.amnesty.org/en/what-we-do/torture/. Yet the mandatory protection required by the CAT remains elusive and quite arbitrary within the U.S. legal system.

One of the best examples of how Government officials who should be insuring that the legal protections under CAT are fairly and reasonably applied to achieve the Convention’s purposes are instead promoting an “any reason to deny” culture is former AG John Ashcroft’s precedent decision in Matter of J-F-F-, 23 I&N Dec. 912 (A.G. 2006). There, Ashcroft reversed a CAT grant by the IJ and the BIA to an unrepresented respondent. In the process, Ashcroft established the “enhanced test” that to gain CAT protection, the respondent must “establish that each step in the hypothetical chain of events is more likely than not to happen.”

In other words, this is an official invitation, some might say directive, to IJs to “lengthen the chain of causation until it breaks” (which it inevitably will, in most cases) and protection can be denied.

Moreover, many CAT claims, like this one, involve unrepresented respondents. The chances of an unrepresented respondent understanding the “chain of causation” or what it means to prove “each step is more likely than not to occur” are very slim.

Additionally, even if they did understand, since many of the unrepresented respondents are in detention, they would have little or no realistic chance of obtaining the type of detailed, timely expert testimony and comprehensive documentation, far beyond the DOS Country Reports (which, by the way are only available in English), necessary to overcome Ashcroft’s “de facto presumption of denial” and prove that every step of the “hypothetical chain” is “more likely than not” to happen.

Effectively, every problem mentioned by Emily and expert practitioners in this article is essentially (intentionally) magnified by J-F-F- and other anti-CAT administrative precedents.

CAT relief is mandatory, thus suggesting a high obligation on the part of IJs and other Government officials to insure non-return to torture. Yet, Ashcroft chastises the IJ involved in J-F-F- for essentially insuring that the respondent exercised his legal right to apply for CAT and helping him develop the record. Ashcroft even took the extraordinary step of disqualifying this IJ from any “hypothetical” future proceedings involving this respondent.

At the beginning of the BIA’s quest to interpret CAT (ironically at the same time Bush Administration lawyers at DOJ were secretly searching for legal pretexts to justify torture), I dissented from an unduly restrictive BIA precedent Matter of J-E-, 23 I&N Dec. 291, 304 (BIA  2002), Paul Wickham Schmidt, Board Member, dissenting, joined by Board Members John W. Guendelsberger, Noel Ann Brennan, Cecelia M. Espenoza, and Juan P. Osuna.

There, I stated:

The majority concludes that the extreme mistreatment likely to befall this respondent in Haiti is not “torture,” but merely “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.” The majority further concludes that conduct defined as “torture” occurs in the Haitian detention system, but is not “likely” for this respondent. In short, the majority goes to great lengths to avoid applying the Convention Against Torture to this respondent.

We are in the early stages of the very difficult and thankless task of construing the Convention. Only time will tell whether the majority’s narrow reading of the torture definition and its highly technical approach to the standard of proof will be the long-term benchmarks for our country’s implementation of this international treaty.

Although I am certainly bound to follow and apply the majority’s constructions in all future cases, I do not believe that the majority adequately carries out the language or the purposes of the Convention and the implementing regulations. Therefore, I fear that we are failing to comply with our international obligations.

I conclude that the respondent is more likely than not to face officially sanctioned torture if returned to Haiti. Therefore, I would grant his application for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture and the implementing regulations. Consequently, I respectfully dissent.

More than two decades after J-E-, my fears and predictions of officially-sanctioned non-compliance with CAT unfortunately continue to be proved correct.

I also note with pride that our Round Table of Former Immigration Judges ⚔️🛡 filed an amicus brief before the Supremes in Santos-Zacaria supporting the interpretation that eventually prevailed.

🇺🇸 Due Process Forever!

PWS

06-01-23

 

🤯 WACKO WORLD OF EOIR: DHS PROSECUTORS DELIVER THE BIG MIDDLE FINGER (“BMF”) 🖕TO GARLAND’S FECKLESS IMMIGRATION “COURTS” — Unilaterally Proclaim They Will No Longer Appear In Every Immigration Court Case (“Selective Appearance”), Apparently Relying On Immigration Judges To Prosecute (In Addition To Being Judge & Jury)! — They Have “Better Things To Do” Than Waste Their Valuable Time In Dem AG’s “Clown Courts!”🤡

Cadaver Synod
PROSECUTORIAL HISTORY: In 897, at the “Cadaver Synod,” Pope Stephen VI appointed himself to prosecute the corpse of his dead predecessor, Pope Formosus. (Spoiler alert: He got a conviction.) In 2023, DHS has decreed that prosecuting cases in person before EOIR is no longer worth their valuable time.
PAINTING: Jean-Paul Laurens (1870) —Public Realm

Provided by a veteran immigration practitioner:

DHS No Appear 1
DHS No Appear 1
DHS No Appear 2
DHS No Appear 2

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Notably, the four categories of “mandatory appearance” described by the Deputy Chief Counsel apply to only an infinitesimally small percentage of the roughly 2 million cases currently pending before the Immigration Courts.

Compare this with the treatment of the private bar who experience:

* Aimless reshuffling and rescheduling of their already-prepared cases, often without notice or with inadequate notice of the new hearing date;

* Arbitrary and capricious denials by some Immigration Judges of reasonable motions to continue;

* Possible disciplinary referrals for failure to appear at a scheduled hearing when listed as counsel of record.

Would the DOJ submit a similar missive to U.S. District Court Judges unilaterally announcing that they would only “selectively appear” in criminal and civil cases where the U.S. Government is a party? I doubt it!

So, what’s an Immigration Judge who does not want to perform DHS’s job for them to do? Contempt of court, you say? After all, the IJ’s authority to hold any party or counsel in Immigration Court proceeding in contempt is right there in plain language in the INA. See, INA section 240(b)(1).

Ah, but there is a catch! A big one! Although the contempt provision was added by Congress more than a quarter of  century ago, AGs of both parties have steadfastly refused to promulgate the necessary implementing regulations.

Evidently, the theory is that while IJs might be qualified to issue potential death sentences to migrants in Immigration Court, they can’t be trusted to fairly and reasonably use their contempt authority on lawyers who, after all, are mostly U.S. citizens and whose livelihood might be adversely affected. Essentially, the life of a migrant is worth less than a monetary fine for contempt to a U.S. lawyer.

Additionally, there apparently was a special concern about giving IJ’s authority to regulate the conduct of their “fellow Government attorneys” at INS, and later DHS. After all, that would be interfering with another Government agency’s “sacrosanct” authority to regulate and discipline (or not) its own employees.

In many ways, under Garland, the Immigration Courts are losing what limited public respect the might still have possessed and accelerating the move backwards to an “inquisitorial model” to replace the “adversary model” for decison-making. Ironically, this reverses over a half century of efforts by Congress, reformers, and sometimes the Executive itself to make Immigration Courts function as part of the adversary system — in other words, like “real” courts of law.

As one informed expert commenter stated upon learning of this latest development:

As we have all been saying, (1) EOIR doesn’t view itself as part of an ecosystem which also includes ICE, the private bar, non-profits, law school clinics, interpreters, USCIS, etc.; and (2) EOIR is run at it’s upper level by mindless, gutless people suffering from a complete lack of imagination existing in a bubble.

As a practical matter, I assume ICE is strategically choosing not to appear in hearings before IJs who deny everything? If not, it could actually work in your favor. In truth, the UNHCR model doesn’t envision asylum being heard in adversarial hearings; as Paul has articulately stated, it sees asylum as a collaborative effort between adjudicator and asylum seeker.
For a “practical  application” of the “collaborative effort” model promoted by the UNHCR, see Matter of S-M-J-, 21 I&N Dec. 722 (BIAS 1997).

🇺🇸 Due Process Forever!

PWS
05-31-23

⚖️🗽🌟 NDPA SUPERSTAR RAED GONZALEZ STUFFS GARLAND IN 5TH CIR., AGAIN!

Dan Kowalski reports for LexisNexis Immigration Community:

https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/unpub/21/21-60195.0.pdf

https://www.lexisnexis.com/LegalNewsRoom/immigration/b/insidenews/posts/ca5-on-defective-nta-luna-v-garland#

“Dagoberto Luna petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ dismissal of his appeal of an immigration judge’s denial of his motion to rescind an in absentia removal order. Luna contends he received a defective Notice to Appear that renders the in absentia removal order invalid. We agree. We GRANT Luna’s petition, VACATE, and REMAND for further proceedings.”

[Hats off yet again to superlitigator Raed Gonzalez!]

Raed Gonzalez ESQ
Raed Gonzalez ESQUIRE
Chairman, Gonzalez Olivieri LLP
Houston, TX
PHOTO: best lawyers.com

 

Daniel M. Kowalski

Editor-in-Chief

Bender’s Immigration Bulletin (LexisNexis)

cell/text/Signal (512) 826-0323

@dkbib on Twitter

dan@cenizo.com

Free Daily Blog: www.bibdaily.com

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When will they learn, when will they ever learn? The ultra-conservative 5th Circuit pays attention when Raed litigates in behalf of individuals seeking due process and fundamental fairness at EOIR. Why doesn’t Garland?

Congrats again, Raed!

🇺🇸 Due Process Forever!

PWS

05-28-23

⚖️ DISSENTING OPINION: Temporary Appellate Immigration Judge Denise G. Brown Says “No” To Colleagues “Go Along To Get Along” With DHS Enforcement Approach To Chevron In Latest “Crime of Violence” Precedent:  Matter of POUGATCHEV, 28 I&N Dec. 719 (BIA 2023)

Scales of Justice
The BIA’s approach to statutory interpretation under Chevron tends to be one-sided in favor of DHS Enforcement.
IMAGE: Wikimedia Commons

BIA HEADNOTE:

(1) A conviction for burglary of a building under section 140.25(1)(d) of the New York Penal Law is not categorically an aggravated felony burglary offense under section 101(a)(43)(G) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) (2018), because the statute is overbroad and indivisible with respect to the definition of “building” under New York law.

(2) A conviction for displaying what appears to be a pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun, or other firearm while committing burglary under section 140.25(1)(d) of the New York Penal Law necessarily involves the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another and therefore constitutes an aggravated felony crime of violence under section 101(a)(43)(F) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F).

FOR THE RESPONDENT: Yuriy Pereyaslavskiy, Esquire, Albany, New York

FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Donald W. Cassidy, Associate Legal Advisor

BEFORE: Board Panel: GOODWIN and WILSON, Appellate Immigration Judges. Concurring and Dissenting Opinion: BROWN, Temporary Appellate Immigration Judge.

GOODWIN, Appellate Immigration Judge [majority opinion]

Judge Brown’s Dissent:

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION: Denise G. Brown, Temporary Appellate Immigration Judge

I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion that holds that second degree burglary under section 140.25(1)(d) of the New York Penal Law is categorically an aggravated felony crime of violence under section 101(a)(43)(F) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) (2018). As an initial matter, I have reservations that this case is an appropriate means through which to establish binding precedent on this issue as the Immigration Judge did not reach it. While the parties have had an opportunity to address the issue through supplemental briefing, we lack the benefit of the Immigration Judge’s reasoning. It is our role to “review” questions of law de novo, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii) (2023), but there is no underlying decision regarding whether the respondent was convicted of an aggravated felony crime of violence for us to review here.

Further, I disagree with the majority’s analysis by which it concludes that a violation of section 140.25(1)(d) of the New York Penal Law is categorically a crime of violence. Section 140.25(1)(d) provides that a person is guilty of burglary in the second degree:

when he knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a building with intent to commit a crime therein, and when

. . . [i]n effecting entry or while in the building or in immediate flight therefrom, he or another participant in the crime

. . . [d]isplays what appears to be a pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun or other firearm . . . .

N.Y. Penal Law § 140.25(1)(d) (McKinney 2017). A crime of violence under section 101(a)(43)(F) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F), is “an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.” 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) (2018).

I disagree with the majority that second degree burglary under section 140.25(1)(d) includes as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against another person. In my view, second degree burglary under section 140.25(1)(d) does not include any element that requires the presence of a person other than the defendant. In the absence of an element that requires the presence of a person, the majority’s conclusion that this offense is a crime of violence is unavailing. See Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817, 1825 (2021) (“The phrase ‘against another,’ when modifying the ‘use of force,’ demands that the perpetrator direct his action at, or target, another individual.”).

The majority’s analysis heavily relies on case law involving robbery to support its conclusion that second degree burglary under this subsection is a crime of violence. But under New York law, robbery always involves forcible stealing from a person and burglary does not. In United States v. Ojeda, 951 F.3d 66, 71 (2d Cir. 2020), the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected the defendant’s argument that it was possible to commit New York first degree robbery with the aggravating factor of the display of an

730

Cite as 28 I&N Dec. 719 (BIA 2023) Interim Decision #4063

apparent weapon without the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force. The court held that the defendant’s argument ignored the foundational element being aggravated, i.e., forcible stealing, which is defined in New York to include the use or threatened immediate use of physical force upon another person. Id. at 72. Forcible stealing is an element for every degree of robbery in New York and “that element categorically requires the use of physical force.” Id. Thus, New York robbery always includes as an element the use or threatened use of physical force against another person, regardless of whether an apparent weapon is displayed. Accordingly, the New York robbery statutes are distinguishable from the burglary statute at issue here, and thus the case law relied upon by the majority relating to robbery is not persuasive in this context. For the same reason, the case law cited by the majority relating to assault is likewise unpersuasive.

The majority also relies on the definition of “display” in the New York model jury instructions to conclude that a display of an apparent weapon must be in front of a person. The majority concludes that “display” in the context of section 140.25(1)(d) necessarily means a conscious display of an apparent weapon to a victim. “Display” as described by the model jury instructions does not constitute the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against another person because, as the Supreme Court explained in Borden, “against the person of another” means “in opposition to” and expresses “a kind of directedness or targeting” rather than being akin to “waves crashing against the shore.” Borden, 141 S. Ct. at 1825–26. However, the language of the model jury instructions—i.e., describing display to be “manifest[ing] the presence of an object that can reasonably be perceived” as a weapon—does not require the type of directedness or targeting described in Borden. N.Y. Crim. Jury Instr. & Model Colloquies, Penal Law § 140.25(1)(d) (May 2018). The language instead appears to contemplate that a person be “the mere recipient” of the display. Borden, 141 S. Ct. at 1826.

Even if the majority’s conclusion were correct that display of an apparent weapon necessarily contemplates the presence of a person to perceive it and that it necessarily involved conduct directed at another person as contemplated by Borden—a conclusion not supported by the actual language of section 140.25(1)(d)—there is nothing in the statute that requires the person perceiving the display to be the victim of the crime, rather than a bystander or another defendant.

The majority’s conclusion that an offense under section 140.25(1)(d) is categorically a crime of violence also assumes that the crime a defendant intends to commit is necessarily a “confrontational crime.” But there is nothing in the statute that connects the display of an apparent weapon with

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Cite as 28 I&N Dec. 719 (BIA 2023) Interim Decision #4063

the crime the defendant has “intent to commit [in the building],” and thus nothing in the statute that requires the crime a defendant has “intent to commit [in the building]” to be a confrontational crime, as the majority concludes. N.Y. Penal Law § 140.25.

For these reasons, I am not persuaded by the majority’s conclusion that an offense under section 140.25(1)(d) of the New York Penal Law is categorically a crime of violence. I would instead conclude that it is not and that therefore the respondent is not removable as charged.

******************************

Thanks for speaking out, Judge Brown, against the BIA’s one-sided approach to statutory interpretation that almost always favors DHS over better and more reasonable interpretations offered by individuals. Then, the Article III Courts compound the problem by giving Chevron deference” to the BIA’s one-sided jurisprudence! 

Dissent matters!

Here’s Judge Brown’s official EOIR bio:

Denise G. Brown

Attorney General Merrick B. Garland appointed Denise G. Brown as a temporary Appellate Immigration Judge in July 2021. Judge Brown earned a Bachelor of Arts in 1992 from the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, and a Juris Doctor in 1995 from the Catholic University of America. From July 2007 to July 2021, she has served as an attorney advisor, Board of Immigration Appeals, Executive Office for Immigration Review. During this time, from March to September 2019, she served on detail as a Special Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Eastern District of Virginia, and from January to July 2017, she served on detail as a temporary Immigration Judge at the Headquarters Immigration Court, EOIR. From December 1999 to July 2007, she served as an Associate General Counsel at the Office of General Counsel, Department of the Air Force. Judge Brown is a member of the District of Columbia Bar.

🇺🇸 Due Process Forever!

PWS

05-27-23

🤯☠️ 🤮 👎🏽 WHILE TALKING A “GOOD GAME” ABOUT WOMEN’S RIGHTS, BIDEN ADMINISTRATION ALLOWS MISOGYNY TO RULE @ EOIR — Why Does It Take A Conservative 11th Circuit To Get VAWA Right??? 🤯

Women find “trial by ordeal” can be the order of the day at Garland’s BIA:

Trial By Ordeal
Woman Being “Tried By Ordeal”
17th Century Woodcut
Public Realm
Source: Ancient Origins Website
https://www.ancient-origins.net/history/trial-ordeal-life-or-death-method-judgement-004160
Trial by Ordeal
Woman Being “Tried By Ordeal”
17th Century Woodcut
Public Realm
Source: Ancient Origins Website
https://www.ancient-origins.net/history/trial-ordeal-life-or-death-method-judgement-004160

 

Dan Kowalski reports for LexisNexis Immigration Community:

CA11 on VAWA, “Extreme Cruelty,” Chevron: Ruiz v. Atty Gen.

 

https://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/202210445.pdf

“Esmelda Ruiz, a native and citizen of Peru, appeals the Board of Immigration Appeals’ determination that she is ineligible for relief under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2), a provision whose language was originally adopted as part of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 and that outlines the conditions under which certain “battered spouse[s] or child[ren]” qualify for discretionary cancellation of removal. As relevant here, it requires a petitioning alien to show that she “has been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty” by her spouse or parent. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2)(A)(i). Ruiz contends that the Immigration Judge and the BIA made two errors in refusing her cancellation request. First, she maintains that, as a matter of law, they misinterpreted the statutory term “extreme cruelty” to require proof of physical—as distinguished from mental or emotional—abuse. And second, she asserts that, having misread the law, the IJ and the BIA wrongly concluded that she doesn’t qualify for discretionary relief. We agree with Ruiz that the IJ and the BIA misinterpreted § 1229b(b)(2) and thereby applied an erroneous legal standard in evaluating her request for cancellation of removal. Accordingly, we grant her petition for review and remand to the BIA for further consideration. … For the foregoing reasons, we agree with Ruiz—and hold— that the BIA misinterpreted 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2). The term “extreme cruelty” does not require a petitioning alien to prove that she suffered physical abuse in order to qualify for discretionary cancellation of removal; proof of mental or emotional abuse is sufficient to satisfy the “extreme cruelty” prong of § 1229b(b)(2)’s five-prong standard. We therefore GRANT the petition in part and REMAND to the BIA for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”

[Hats way off to Anabella Trujillo!  And listen to the oral argument here.]

 

Daniel M. Kowalski

Editor-in-Chief
Bender’s Immigration Bulletin (LexisNexis)
cell/text/Signal (512) 826-0323
@dkbib on Twitter
Free Daily Blog: www.bibdaily.com
*****************************

Not only did the supposedly “expert” BIA get the standard completely wrong, but Garland’s OIL continued to throw up specious arguments defending the BIA’s abusive treatment of women!

When you start with “No,” and then “reason” backwards to get there, bad things happen. Frankly, the Biden Administration was elected to “clean house” 🧹 at EOIR and to bring systemic due process, expertise, best practices, and impartiality to our nation’s dysfunctional immigration tribunals — with literally millions of lives and the future of democracy at stake! Why haven’t they done it? How do they continue to get away with it?

🇺🇸 Due Process Forever!

PWS

05-20-23

🤯 BIA’S ANTI-ASYLUM JURISPRUDENCE CONTINUES TO TAKE A BEATING IN CIRCUITS — 1st Cir. Rejects Bogus “Changed Conditions” In Guatemala — 3rd Cir. Says No To BIA’s Bogus Jurisdictional Ruling For Asylee!

Kangaroos
Dems control the composition of one of the most consequential Federal Appellate Tribunals, the BIA. Is THIS really the look that they want to project? 
https://www.flickr.com/photos/rasputin243/
Creative Commons License

Dan Kowalski reports for Lexis Nexis Immigration Community:

CA1 on Changed Country Conditions (Guatemala) – Mendez Esteban v. Garland

http://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/22-1215P-01A.pdf

https://www.lexisnexis.com/LegalNewsRoom/immigration/b/insidenews/posts/ca1-on-changed-country-conditions-guatemala—mendez-esteban-v-garland#

“[T]he 2017 report and the testimony from Mendez do not — together or independently — establish that changes in Guatemala have fundamentally altered the specific conditions that gave rise to Mendez’s substantiated claim of political persecution. Accordingly, the BIA’s conclusion that DHS rebutted Mendez’s presumption of well-founded fear is not supported by substantial evidence. We therefore find Mendez statutorily eligible for asylum. … [W]e grant the petition for review as to Mendez’s claims for asylum and withholding of removal. We deny the petition as to Mendez’s claim for CAT protection. We accordingly affirm the denial of Mendez’s CAT claim, vacate the denials of Mendez’s political opinion-based asylum and withholding of removal claims, and remand to the IJ for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”

[Hats off to Samuel BrennerEmma CorenoPatrick Roath and Rachel Scholz-Bright!]

************************

CA3 on Jurisdiction: Kosh v. Atty. Gen.

https://www.lexisnexis.com/LegalNewsRoom/immigration/b/insidenews/posts/ca3-on-jurisdiction-kosh-v-atty-gen#

“Appellant Ishmael Kosh petitions us to review the order from the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) that terminated his asylum status and denied his applications for withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture. He maintains that the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) improperly sought to terminate his asylum status in asylum-only proceedings because he first entered the United States under the Visa Waiver Program. Per Kosh, that limiting program no longer applies to him, so he is entitled to complete-jurisdiction removal proceedings instead. In such unlimited proceedings, asylees can raise an adjustment-of-status claim as a defense to removal. We conclude that, if Kosh re-entered the country as an asylee without signing a new Visa Waiver Program form limiting his defenses, he is entitled to complete-jurisdiction proceedings. We thus grant his petition for review, vacate the BIA’s decision, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”

[Hats off to Ben Hooper and Jonah Eaton!]

*********************

As many practitioners know, the BIA’s continual bogus “fundamentally changed circumstances” findings for countries where the human rights conditions have remained abysmal for decades, certainly NOT materially improving, and in most cases in the Northern Triangle getting worse, are an endemic problem. Following a finding of past persecution, ICE, not the respondent, bears the burden of proof!

If that burden were honestly and expertly applied, considering individualized fear of harm, ICE would rebut the presumption by a preponderance of the evidence in only a minuscule percentage of cases. Certainly, that was my experience over 21 years on both the trial and appellate benches at EOIR.

Moreover, in this and most other cases of past persecution, even if ICE were able to satisfy its burden of rebutting the presumption of future persecution by a preponderance of the credible evidence, the respondent would be a “slam dunk” for a grant of discretionary asylum on the basis of “other serious harm.” It’s not clear that any of the three judicial entities that considered this case understood and properly applied the “other serious harm” concept.

The BIA’s chronic failure to fulfill its proper role of insuring a fair application of asylum and other protection laws and to provide guidance “shutting down” IJs who routinely manufacture bogus reasons to deny is a systemic denial of due process and failure of judicial professionalism. That it continues to happen under a Dem Administration pledged to restore the rule of law and due process for asylum seekers is astounding, deplorable, and a cause for concern about what today’s Dems really stand for!

This case should have been granted by the IJ years ago. An appeal by ICE on this feeble showing should have been subject to summary dismissal. 

That cases like Mendez Esteban are still aimlessly kicking around Garland’s dysfunctional system in an elusive search for justice is a serious indictment of the Biden Administration’s approach to asylum and to achieving long overdue, life-changing, and readily achievable reforms that are within their power without legislative action. It also helps explain why Garland has neither reduced backlogs nor sufficiently improved professionalism, even with many more IJs on the bench.

Practical tips for fighting against bogus “presumption rebuttals” by IJs under 8 CFR 208.13:

  • Insist that the IJ actually shift the burden to ICE to rebut the presumption of future persecution based on past persecution.
  • Use the regulatory definition of “reasonably available” internal relocation to fight  bogus IJ findings. For example, countries in the Northern Triangle are “postage stamp sized” and plagued by nationwide violence and corruption. The idea of “reasonably available internal location” under all the factors is prima facie absurd! (A “better BIA” would have already pointed this out in a precedent.)
  • Argue for a discretionary grant of asylum even in the absence of a current well founded fear based on 1) “compelling circumstances” arising out of the past persecution (“Chen grant”), and/or “other serious harm” under the regulations — a much broader concept than persecution that does NOT require nexus to a protected ground.

Knowing and using the law aggressively to assert your client’s rights, making the record, and exhausting all appellate options are the best defenses to biased, anti-asylum, often disconnected from reality denials of life-saving relief to your clients!

🇺🇸 Due Process Forever!

PWS

05-13-23

⚖️🗽🛡⚔️ ON A ROLL — ROUND TABLE ON THE WINNING SIDE FOR THE 3RD TIME @ SUPREMES! — Santos-Zacaria v. Garland — Jurisdiction/Exhaustion — 9-0!

Knightess
Knightess of the Round Table — Somebody’s listening to our message! Too bad the Biden Administration doesn’t! It would save lots of time, resources, and lives if they did!

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/21-1436_n6io.pdf

JUSTICE JACKSON delivered the opinion of the Court.

Under 8 U. S. C. §1252(d)(1), a noncitizen who seeks to challenge an order of removal in court must first exhaust certain administrative remedies. This case presents two questions regarding that statutory provision. For the rea- sons explained below, we hold that §1252(d)(1) is not juris- dictional. We hold further that a noncitizen need not re- quest discretionary forms of administrative review, like reconsideration of an unfavorable Board of Immigration Appeals determination, in order to satisfy §1252(d)(1)’s exhaustion requirement.1

. . . .

***********************

Read the full opinion at the link.

So, why is a Dem Administration under AG Garland taking anti-immigrant positions that can’t even garner a single vote on the most far-right Supremes in recent history?

Incredibly, the DOJ made the absurdist argument that, in violation of the statute, an additional unnecessary layer of procedural BS should be inflicted on individuals already dealing with the trauma of a dysfunctional system running a 2 million plus backlog and a BIA with more than 80,000 un-adjudicated appeals at last count! Where’s the common sense? Where’s the competence? Where’s the “better government” that the Biden Administration promised?

Meanwhile, our Round Table continues to put our centuries of collective experience in due process, fundamental fairness, and practical problem solving to use! The Biden Administration might not be paying attention. But, many others, including Article III Judges, are taking advantage and listening.

🇺🇸 Due Process Forever!

PWS

05-12-23

⚖️ SPLIT 6th CR. WHACKS BIA ON LANDOWNERS AS PSG! — Turcios-Flores v. Garland

Four Horsemen
BIA Asylum Panel In Action. Garland’s largely “holdover” BIA continues to align itself with Trump’s extreme right, nativist judges, as the progressives and advocates who actually supported Dems in the last two elections are left to stew, along with their dehumanized asylum seeking clients.
Albrecht Dürer, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons

Dan Kowalski reports for LexisNexis Immigration Community:

CA6 on PSG: Turcios-Flores v. Garland (2-1)

https://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/23a0094p-06.pdf

https://www.lexisnexis.com/LegalNewsRoom/immigration/b/insidenews/posts/ca6-on-psg-turcios-flores-v-garland-2-1#

“Under the correct analysis, the record here compels a conclusion that Honduran rural landownership in this case is a common fundamental characteristic because Turcios-Flores should not be required to change this aspect of her identity to avoid persecution given the demonstrated importance of landownership to her. Therefore, we remand to the Board for further explanation of whether this group meets the social distinction and particularity requirements as well as the remaining asylum considerations.”

[Hats off to Justin S. Fowles and Samuel W. Wardle!]

********************

To reach their wrong  conclusion that “rural landowners” are not a “particular social group,” the BIA ignored its own precedent. See, e.g., Matter of Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985), modified on other grounds. 

The BIA also took an (all too typical) “ahistorical” approach. They ignored the powerful connection between various types of land and property ownership in society and classic historical examples of extermination and persecution. Indeed, millions of dead kulaks persecuted and liquidated by Stalin would be astounded by the BIA’s horribly flawed, “any reason to deny,” analysis. See, e.g., https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwiTv6qnsun-AhWARzABHW3rACUQFnoECC4QAQ&url=https://www.historyplace.com/worldhistory/genocide/stalin.htm&usg=AOvVaw0xlIU36bw6-wmabscwSXT5.

Class warfare and persecution of property owners was at the heart of most Marxist-Leninist Communist dictatorships. 

Remarkably, under Garland, the BIA continues to parrot the same biased, restrictionist nonsense spouted by the Trumpist dissenter in this case, Judge Chad A. Readler. He was roundly criticized as unqualified by Democrats and advocates at the time of his nomination. This opposition had lots to do with his biased, anti-immigrant views flowing from his then “boss,” nativist/racist former AG Jeff “Gonzo Apocalypto” Sessions!

For example, it’s worth reviewing the comments of the Alliance for Justice on Reacher’s nomination:

On June 7, 2018, President Trump announced his intention to nominate a Justice Department official, Chad Readler, to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. This announcement was particularly striking for one notable reason: on that very day, Readler had become a leader in the Trump Administration’s fight to destroy the Affordable Care Act and the protections it offers to millions of Americans. Readler, as acting head of the Civil Division, filed a brief to strike down the ACA, including its protections for people with preexisting conditions. If Readler and the Trump Justice Department are successful, the ACA’s protections for tens of millions of people, including cancer patients, people with diabetes, pregnant women, and many other Americans, would be removed.

As the acting head of the Department of Justice Civil Division under Attorney General Jeff Sessions, Readler defended the Trump Administration’s most odious policies, including separating immigrant children from their parents at the border, while claiming that “[e]verything that the Attorney General does that I’ve been involved with he’s . . . being very respectful of precedent and the text of the statute and proper role of agencies.”

His track record is equally atrocious in other respects. He has tried to undermine public education in Ohio; supported the efforts of Betsy DeVos to protect fraudulent for-profit schools; fought to make it harder for persons of color to vote; advanced the Trump Administration’s anti-LGBTQ and anti-reproductive rights agenda; fought to allow tobacco companies to advertise to children, including outside day care centers; sought to undermine the independence of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau; and advocated for executing minors.

Chad Readler’s record of diehard advocacy for right-wing causes suggests he will be anything but an independent, fair-minded jurist. Alliance for Justice strongly opposes Readler’s confirmation.

https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwjp353GtOn-AhWnjLAFHRjxAKYQFnoECCMQAQ&url=https://www.afj.org/nominee/chad-readler/&usg=AOvVaw1vd0ZxlEMALaM-lfJNn6bq

It’s remarkable and infuriating that once in office, Democrats in the Biden Administration have aligned themselves with the toxic views of extreme, nativist right wing judges whose xenophobic, atrocious views they campaigned against! They have done this in a huge “life or death” Federal Court system that they completely control and have authority to reform without legislation!

🇺🇸 Due Process Forever!

PWS

05-10-23

 

⚖️ AFTER STRING OF CIRCUIT DEFEATS, BIA FINALLY BACKS DOWN ON “EQUITABLE TOLLING” — Sort Of! — Matter of Morales-Morales, 28 I&N Dec. 714 (BIA 2023)

 

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1582681/download

Matter of Morales-Morales, 28 I&N Dec. 714 (BIA 2023)

BIA Headnote:

(1) The Board of Immigration Appeals has authority to accept what are otherwise untimely appeals, and consider them timely, in certain situations because 8 C.F.R. § 1003.38(b) (2022) is a claim-processing rule and not a jurisdictional provision. Matter of Liadov, 23 I&N Dec. 990 (BIA 2006), overruled.

(2) The Board will accept a late-filed appeal where a party can establish that equitable tolling applies, which requires the party to show both diligence in the filing of the notice of appeal and that an extraordinary circumstance prevented timely filing.

FOR THE RESPONDENT: Mario Salgado, Esquire, San Francisco, California

BEFORE: Board Panel: WETMORE, Chief Appellate Immigration Judge; MULLANE and MANN, Appellate Immigration Judges.

MULLANE, Appellate Immigration Judge [Opinion]

********************************

Notably, but perhaps predictably for those who follow the BIA’s generally “respondent/due process unfriendly” jurisprudence, the “good news” that the BIA has belatedly decided to follow the 2d, 5th, and 9th Circuits on equitable tolling is “tempered” by the result in this case — denial of the motion to reconsider and accept the appeal!

Evidently, among its 82,000+ backlog, the BIA was unable to identify a case where correctly applying equitable tolling would actually BENEFIT the respondent, rather than just requiring a different, largely contrived, analysis to “get to no!” This continues a depressing and highly inappropriate long-standing tendency of the BIA to provide negative examples of how to apply potentially remedial rules.

Presumably, after 17 years of the BIA’s wrong-headed precedent Matter of Liadov, everyone understands that the BIA is “programmed to deny.” What’s needed is “reprogramming” to recognize and grant motions based on “equitable tolling.”

It’s also remarkable that the “highest tribunal” of a dysfunctional organization, notorious for losing files; failing to provide timely, correct notice; cancelling hearings without notice on the hearing date; switching Immigration Judges without notice in a system where the identity of the judge is too often “outcome determinative;” and “cutting” DHS and itself almost endless “breaks” and “exceptions” for their sloppy, lazy, and sometimes ethnically questionable practices sees fit to “pontificate” so self-righteously on what’s “due diligence” and “extraordinary circumstances” for the private bar. The “message” is pretty clear: Denial is the “preferred” (or default, or de facto presumed) result!

If either of the foregoing concepts were applied to EOIR and DHS with the same stringency they are to individuals and their representatives, both agencies would have been forced out of business long ago!

This system is totally screwed up! Dems must ask themselves why Garland and his senior leadership have failed to “unscrew it,” and what can be done to deal with their democracy-and-life-threatening indolence and inattention to quality jurisprudence, due process, fundamental fairness, and best practices.

🇺🇸 Due Process Forever!

PWS

05-08-23

⚖️🗽🇺🇸 TRUTH: YOU’VE HEARD THE ALARMIST NATIVIST MYTHS ABOUT ASYLUM FROM THE GOP & (IRONICALLY) THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION & SOME DEMS: NOW, GET THE FACTS ABOUT ASYLUM & THE BORDER FROM ALIANZA AMERICAS!

Fear & Loathing
“Fear & Loathing”
Inept, disingenuous performances on asylum by the White House, DHS, & DOJ have left the Biden Administration grasping at straws and spreading vile nativist myths about asylum seekers at the border.
PHOTO: Creative Commons

Deterrence and increased enforcement have proven to be failed approaches that do not change the multiple factors that force so many people to flee their countries and only result in pushing people into more dangerous routes that allow criminal organizations to thrive, resulting in the smuggling, trafficking, extortion, and kidnapping of migrants and others. 

Download the AA Fact Sheet here:

https://docs.google.com/document/d/1eihlegCrk1Lf-08aDhL8p-fvj_GQGxZ7PYgm-MUcF1s/edit

***********************************

After more than two years of bumbling around, in the process squandering their access to the ideas and problem-solving skills of an un-precedented “brain trust” of immigration experts, the Biden Administration appears to be in “full panic mode” as the inevitable lifting of the Title 42 charade slowly approaches. Notably, a Federal Court ordered the Administration to make good on its (already delayed) promise to end Title 42 back in November 2022. But, the Supremes unethically blocked that order — granting a stay that NO ACTUAL PARTY to the litigation requested, in a simply mind-boggling exercise of politicized, unconstitutional interference with the Executive. 

Instead of using the time to 1) work with NGOs, 2) hire and train more expert asylum officers, 3) replace the BIA and anti-asylum Immigration Judges with qualified human rights/due process experts, and 4) drastically ramp up the refugee admission system outside the U.S. (not substituting an inadequate and “jury rigged” numerically limited “parole” program for legal refugee and asylum admissions), the Administration frittered away the opportunity with obstructionist/restrictionist nonsense. Now, they are “running scared” from desperate refugees merely seeking to exercise their legal rights that have been illegally and immorally denied to them for years — by successive Administrations.

🇺🇸 Due Process Forever!

PWS

05-03-23