U.S. v. Curry

https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/184233A.P.pdf

GREGORY, Chief Judge, concurring:

Our decision today affirms that a central tenet of law nearly as old as this country—

namely, “[t]he right of the people to be secure . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures”—applies equally to all. U.S. Const. amend. IV. I join the majority Opinion in its entirety. However, I must say a few words in response to Judge Wilkinson’s dissent.

When I read the first line of Judge Wilkinson’s dissent I was heartened by the thought: well, at least he acknowledges that there are “two Americas.” But this glint of enlightenment was to serve as a “soap box” for his charge against the majority’s decision. It is understandable that such a pseudo-sociological platform was necessary as his assertions are bereft of any jurisprudential reasoning. More to the point, his recognition of a divided America is merely a preamble to the fallacy-laden exegesis of “predictive policing” that follows. Through his opinion, my colleague contributes to the volumes of work gifted by others who felt obliged to bear their burden to save minority or disadvantaged communities from themselves.

Of course, the story of two Americas of which Judge Wilkinson speaks is an ancient tale to some. See, e.g., Frederick Douglas, “What to the Slave is the Fourth of July?” 1852. There’s a long history of black and brown communities feeling unsafe in police presence. See, e.g., James Baldwin, A Report from Occupied Territory, The Nation, July 11, 1966 (“[T]he police are simply the hired enemies of this population. . . . This is why those pious calls to ‘respect the law,’ always to be heard from prominent citizens each time the ghetto explodes, are so obscene.”). And at least “[s]ince Reconstruction, subordinated

communities have endeavored to harness the criminal justice system toward recognition 33

that their lives have worth.” Deborah Tuerkheimer, Criminal Justice and the Mattering of Lives, 116 Mich. L. Rev. 1145, 1146 (2018). Thus, just a few decades ago, laws designed to decrease violence in these communities were considered “a civil rights triumph.” James Forman, Locking Up our Own: Crime and Punishment in Black America 73 (2017). The thought being that our government had finally “promised to provide police protection to a community so long denied it.” Id. This increased protection, however, led to what has been described as “a central paradox of the African American experience: the simultaneous over- and under-policing of crime.” Id. at 35.

Judge Wilkinson chooses to focus largely on one dimension of this paradox, ignoring the details of the familiar perils of over-policing. See, e.g., Marie Gottschalk, Caught: The Prison State and the Lockdown of American Politics (2015); Michael Tonry, Punishing Race: A Continuing American Dilemma (2011); Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow (2010); Khalil Gibran Muhammad, The Condemnation of Blackness: Race, Crime, and the Making of Modern Urban America (2010); Ruth Wilson Gilmore, Golden Gulag (2007). Describing the hazard of “hot spot policing” as “the danger of overreaction,” Wilkinson Dis. Op. at 68, Judge Wilkinson mitigates the concerns of some that any encounter with an officer could turn fatal. See Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2070 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (describing “the talk” that black and brown parents frequently give to their children “all out of fear of how an officer with a gun will react to them”); see also United States v. Black, 707 F.3d 531, 541 (4th Cir. 2013) (“In certain communities that have been subject to overbearing or harassing police conduct, cautious parents may

counsel their children to be respective, compliant, and accommodating to police officers, 34

to do everything officers instruct them to do.”). In so doing, my dissenting colleague in turn presents a sordid view of under-policing, suggesting that our decision today will lead to “an America where gated communities will be safe enough and dispossessed communities will be left to fend increasingly for themselves.” Wilkinson Dis. Op. at 69.

But we know that many of our fellow citizens already feel insecure regardless of their location. In a society where some are considered dangerous even when they are in their living rooms eating ice cream, asleep in their beds, playing in the park, standing in the pulpit of their church, birdwatching, exercising in public, or walking home from a trip to the store to purchase a bag of Skittles, it is still within their own communities—even those deemed “dispossessed” or “disadvantaged”—that they feel the most secure. Permitting unconstitutional governmental intrusions into these communities in the name of protecting them presents a false dichotomy. My colleague insists on a Hobson’s choice for these communities: decide between their constitutional rights against unwarranted searches and seizures or forgo governmental protection that is readily afforded to other communities. But those inclined to shrug their shoulders at citizens who wave their Constitutions in the air during uncertainty must not forget “[h]istory teaches that grave threats to liberty often come in times of urgency, when constitutional rights seem too extravagant to endure.” Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 635 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting); cf. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). Indeed, it is in moments of insecurity that our constitutional bells ring the loudest.

Why even suppose that checking police power in these circumstances would lead to

some communities falling into a Hobbesian state of nature? It’s unclear. Judge Wilkinson 35

supports this slippery slope argument in a couple of mutually incompatible and individually questionable ways. He mentions Professor Rod K. Brunson’s work on policing to bolster the view that our decision here will further entrench the perception that police fail to serve those in disadvantaged communities. But Professor Brunson has long argued that this perception is largely created by aggressive policing strategies and discourteous treatment of members in their community. See, e.g., Rod K. Brunson, “Police Don’t Like Black People”: African-American Young Men’s Accumulated Police Experiences, 6(1) Criminology & Pub. Pol’y 71 (2007). Indeed, Professor Brunson has noted that “arrests and successful prosecutions are unlikely without cooperating witnesses.” Rod K. Brunson, Protests focus on Over-policing. But under-policing is also Deadly, Wash. Post, June 12, 2020. And those from disadvantaged communities “want a different kind of policing than the aggressive approaches they typically see—one that values their humanity.” Id.; see also Estate of Jones v. City of Martinsburg, W. Va., –– F.3d ––, 2020 WL 3053386, at *7 (4th Cir. 2020) (recognizing a “desperate need” for more and different police training).

From this perspective, the video of the present incident mimics the aggressive, discourteous, and ineffective policing that concern many. As the officers approached the scene seconds after gunshots rang out, the members of this community, including Curry, pointed them in the direction in which the perpetrator was likely to be found. Because, as Judge Diaz notes in his concurrence, it would have been difficult for the officers “to determine whether any firearm (which, of course, are generally lawful to possess) seized in the effort to identify the suspect was the source of the gunfire,” Judge Diaz Op. at 57,

one would think that the officers’ best hope for finding the shooter was to accept the 36

guidance offered by community members. See Black, 707 F.3d at 540 (“Being a felon in possession of a firearm is not the default status.”). That, of course, was not the case here. Cf. Miranda Fricker, Epistemic Injustice 4 (2007) (describing the notion of “testimonial injustice,” where a speaker suffers from deflated credibility owing to an identity prejudice on the hearer’s part). The officers ignored the assistance and the shooter got away. Like most citizens, it is likely that residents of the Creighton Court community do not want police officers to be tough on crime, or weak on crime—they want them to be smart on crime.

No doubt it is beyond the scope of our roles to explain to any institution what it means to be smart on crime. I will leave that to our clever colleagues in the chambers of City Council. But it is “emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). Thus, “[i]n some circumstances . . . we must remind law enforcement that the Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures,” and that those protections extend to all people in all communities. Black, 707 F.3d at 534. This is one of those circumstances.

Contrary to Judge Wilkinson’s suggestion, our decision today does not deliver “a gut-punch to predictive policing.” Wilkinson Dis. Op. at 71. As Judge Wilkinson notes, predictive policing programs “differ in their details,” but generally seek to use “smart policies” to “affirmatively prevent crime from happening, rather than just solve it.” Id. at 65; see also Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Predictive Policing and Reasonable Suspicion, 62 Emory L.J. 259, 265 (2012) (“In simple terms, predictive policing involves computer

models that predict areas of future crime locations from past crime statistics and other 37

data.”). But see id. at 321 (“Predictive policing may well become an effective tool for law enforcement. Yet, the technology will also create tension for police in defending Fourth Amendment challenges by defendants.”); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Policing Predictive Policing, 94 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1113, 1149 (2017) (“More bluntly, the initial predictive policing projects have raised the question of whether this data-driven focus serves merely to enable, or even justify, a high-tech version of racial profiling.”). But, as with all policies, the devil is going to lie in those details. Nothing in the majority Opinion prevents the police from using, in good faith with constitutional principles, smart policies to identify where crimes may occur and accordingly dispatching officers to those neighborhoods. But it is how they, upon arrival, engage with the people in those neighborhoods that is important here. A suspicionless, investigatory stop was not warranted under the circumstances. Affirming our long-standing rules is nothing novel. If merely preventing crime was enough to pass constitutional muster, the authority of the Fourth Amendment would become moot.

Don’t get me wrong—I understand the frustrations and uncertainties that attend most discussions of how to abate crime. As a country, we are in a moment of reckoning. And the unpredictability of the future encourages us to want to hang on to those entities that make us feel secure. Still, “[t]he facts of this case give us cause to pause and ponder the slow systematic erosion of Fourth Amendment protections for a certain demographic.” Black, 707 F.3d at 542. The “lifelines a fragile community retains against physical harm and mental despair,” Wilkinson Dis. Op. at 70, must be the assurance that there truly is equal protection under law. Thus, “[i]n the words of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., we are

[once again] reminded that ‘we are tied together in a single garment of destiny, caught in 38

an inescapable network of mutuality,’ [and] that our individual freedom is inextricably bound to the freedom of others.” Black, 707 F.3d at 542. It is with these truths that I join my colleagues in the majority in ensuring that “the Fourth Amendment rights of all individuals are protected.” Id. (emphasis in original).

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You can read the majority, Judge Wilkinson’s tone-deaf dissent, and all of the other opinions at the above link.

To be honest, Judge Wilkinson’s opinion sounded like Jeff Sessions’s racist blather about how African American communities didn’t really want the DOJ to interfere with police brutality because it protected them from crime. And, according to “Sessions’ theory,” more crime originated in communities of color so they of course disproportionally benefitted from “aggressive” (mostly White) police tactics. That’s how we got to George Floyd and the backlash against police violence directed at communities of color.

Well, at least the 4th Circuit allows spirited dissent. That’s unlike today’s BIA that papers over the festering issues of racism and injustice in today’s bias-driven immigration enforcement and legal perversion of human rights with fake unanimity and mindless “go along to get alongism.”

Institutional racism and “Dred Scottification” of the “other” unfortunately are deeply ingrained in our Federal Court System. It’s very clear in the Supremes’ majority’s enabling of the Trump/Miller race-driven White Nationalist Agenda under various transparent “pretexts,” mainly relating to clearly bogus national emergencies or fabricated national security concerns. It ran throughout the majority’s “greenlighting” of the “Travel (“Muslim”) Ban,” “Remain in Mexico” (“Let “em Die In Mexico”),  “Expedited Removal (“Systematic Dismantling of Due Process For Asylum Applicants”), “The Wall,” “Public Charge” (“Let’s Terrorize Ethnic Communities”), and “Punishing Sanctuary Cities” (“Attacking Those Who Dare Stand Against ICE Abuses”), sometimes without even deigning to provide a rationale. 

Obviously, due process for “persons” in the United States under the Fifth Amendment means little or nothing to Justices who view migrants as sub-human with lives not worth protecting or even caring about. For these unfortunates, “due process” means something that would be totally unacceptable if applied to the Justices themselves, their families, or to those (largely White) folks to whom they are willing to extend constitutional protections. Sound familiar? It should, for anyone who has ever visited the  Holocaust Museum. 

As the vile racism and overt White Nationalism of the Trump regime unfold in full ugliness and irrationality during the final stages of the 2020 campaign, the abject failure of Roberts and his colleagues to recognize and enforce the constitutional rights and humanity of every person in the U.S.(including those actually here or at our borders but “fictionalized” by disingenuous judges into “non-presence”) comes into full focus.

America needs and deserves better Federal Judges at all levels from the Supremes to the Immigration Courts. Judges who will cut through the many layers of historical BS and racism-covering gobbledygook and make equal justice for all a reality in America. 

“Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.” What if we finally had courts comprised of courageous, principled Justices and Judges who believed Dr. King’s words and acted accordingly, rather than merely mouthing them in ceremonies every January?

Due Process Forever! Complicit courts that cover for the Trump/Miller White Nationalist agenda, never!

PWS

07-16-20