Innovation Law Lab v. Wolf, 9th Cir., 02-28-20, published
PANEL: Ferdinand F. Fernandez, William A. Fletcher, and Richard A. Paez, Circuit Judges.
OPINION BY: Judge William A. Fletcher
DISSENTING OPINION: Judge Ferdinand F. Fernandez
KEY QUOTE FROM MAJORITY:
In addition to likelihood of success on the merits, a court must consider the likelihood that the requesting party will
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suffer irreparable harm, the balance of the equities, and the public interest in determining whether a preliminary injunction is justified. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. “When the government is a party, these last two factors merge.” Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 1073, 1092 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009)).
There is a significant likelihood that the individual plaintiffs will suffer irreparable harm if the MPP is not enjoined. Uncontested evidence in the record establishes that non-Mexicans returned to Mexico under the MPP risk substantial harm, even death, while they await adjudication of their applications for asylum.
The balance of equities favors plaintiffs. On one side is the interest of the Government in continuing to follow the directives of the MPP. However, the strength of that interest is diminished by the likelihood, established above, that the MPP is inconsistent with 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b) and 1231(b). On the other side is the interest of the plaintiffs. The individual plaintiffs risk substantial harm, even death, so long as the directives of the MPP are followed, and the organizational plaintiffs are hindered in their ability to carry out their missions.
The public interest similarly favors the plaintiffs. We agree with East Bay Sanctuary Covenant:
On the one hand, the public has a “weighty” interest “in efficient administration of the immigration laws at the border.” Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982). But the public also has an interest in ensuring that “statutes enacted by [their] representatives”
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are not imperiled by executive fiat. Maryland v. King, 567 U.S. 1301, 1301 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., in chambers).
932 F.3d at 779 (alteration in original).
VII. Scope of the Injunction
The district court issued a preliminary injunction setting aside the MPP—that is, enjoining the Government “from continuing to implement or expand the ‘Migrant Protection Protocols’ as announced in the January 25, 2018 DHS policy memorandum and as explicated in further agency memoranda.” Innovation Law Lab, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 1130. Accepting for purposes of argument that some injunction should issue, the Government objects to its scope.
We recognize that nationwide injunctions have become increasingly controversial, but we begin by noting that it is something of a misnomer to call the district court’s order in this case a “nationwide injunction.” The MPP operates only at our southern border and directs the actions of government officials only in the four States along that border. Two of those states (California and Arizona) are in the Ninth Circuit. One of those states (New Mexico) is in the Tenth Circuit. One of those states (Texas) is in the Fifth Circuit. In practical effect, the district court’s injunction, while setting aside the MPP in its entirety, does not operate nationwide.
For two mutually reinforcing reasons, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in setting aside the MPP.
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First, plaintiffs have challenged the MPP under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). Section 706(2)(A) of the APA provides that a “reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action . . . not in accordance with law.” We held, above, that the MPP is “not in accordance with” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). Section 706(2)(A) directs that in a case where, as here, a reviewing court has found the agency action “unlawful,” the court “shall . . . set aside [the] agency action.” That is, in a case where § 706(2)(A) applies, there is a statutory directive—above and beyond the underlying statutory obligation asserted in the litigation—telling a reviewing court that its obligation is to “set aside” any unlawful agency action.
There is a presumption (often unstated) in APA cases that the offending agency action should be set aside in its entirety rather than only in limited geographical areas. “[W]hen a reviewing court determines that agency regulations are unlawful, the ordinary result is that rules are vacated—not that their application to the individual petitioners is proscribed.” Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908 F3d 476, 511 (9th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). “When a court determines that an agency’s action failed to follow Congress’s clear mandate the appropriate remedy is to vacate that action.” Cal. Wilderness Coalition v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 631 F.3d 1072, 1095 (9th Cir. 2011); see also United Steel v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 925 F.3d 1279, 1287 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“The ordinary practice is to vacate unlawful agency action.”); Gen. Chem. Corp. v. United States, 817 F.2d 844, 848 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“The APA requires us to vacate the agency’s decision if it is ‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law . . . .”).
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Second, cases implicating immigration policy have a particularly strong claim for uniform relief. Federal law contemplates a “comprehensive and unified” immigration policy. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 401 (2012). “In immigration matters, we have consistently recognized the authority of district courts to enjoin unlawful policies on a universal basis.” E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 932 F.3d at 779. We wrote in Regents of the University of California, 908 F.3d at 511, “A final principle is also relevant: the need for uniformity in immigration policy. . . . Allowing uneven application of nationwide immigration policy flies in the face of these requirements.” We wrote to the same effect in Hawaii v. Trump, 878 F.3d 662, 701 (9th Cir. 2017), rev’d on other grounds, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018): “Because this case implicates immigration policy, a nationwide injunction was necessary to give Plaintiffs a full expression of their rights.” The Fifth Circuit, one of only two other federal circuits with states along our southern border, has held that nationwide injunctions are appropriate in immigration cases. In sustaining a nationwide injunction in an immigration case, the Fifth Circuit wrote, “[T]he Constitution requires ‘an uniform Rule of Naturalization’; Congress has instructed that ‘the immigration laws of the United States should be enforced vigorously and uniformly’; and the Supreme Court has described immigration policy as ‘a comprehensive and unified system.’” Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 187–88 (5th Cir. 2015) (emphasis in original; citations omitted). In Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017), we relied on the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Texas to sustain the nationwide scope of a temporary restraining order in an immigration case. We wrote, “[W]e decline to limit the geographic scope of the TRO. The Fifth Circuit has held that such a fragmented immigration policy would run afoul of the
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immigration law and policy.” Id. at 1166–67. Conclusion
We conclude that the MPP is inconsistent with 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), and that it is inconsistent in part with 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b). Because the MPP is invalid in its entirety due to its inconsistency with § 1225(b), it should be enjoined in its entirety. Because plaintiffs have successfully challenged the MPP under § 706(2)(A) of the APA, and because the MPP directly affects immigration into this country along our southern border, the issuance of a temporary injunction setting aside the MPP was not an abuse of discretion.
We lift the emergency stay imposed by the motions panel, and we firm the decision of the district court.
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At last, a breath of justice in halting, at least temporarily, an outrageously illegal program that is also a grotesque violation of our national values and humanity. Unfortunately, it has already resulted in thousands of injustices and damaged many lives beyond repair. That’s something that a clueless shill for authoritarianism, wanton cruelty, and abrogation of the rule of law like dissenting Judge Fernandez might want to think about.
But, hold the “victory dance.” The regime will likely seek “rehearing en banc,” appealing to other enablers of human rights atrocities like Fernandez. And, if the regime fails there, they always can “short circuit” the legal system applicable to everyone else by having Solicitor General Francisco ask his GOP buddies on the Supremes, “The JR Five,” to give the regime a free pass. As Justice Sotomayor pointed out, that type of “tilt” has already become more or less “business as usual” as the regime carries out its nativist, White Nationalist immigration agenda. Indeed, Justices Gorsuch and Thomas have already announced their eagerness to carry the regime’s water for them by doing away with nationwide injunctions, even though they are the sole way for doing justice in immigration cases like this.
But, at least for today, we can all celebrate a battle won by the New Due Process Army in the ongoing war to restore our Constitution, the rule of law, and human dignity.
Due Process Forever!
PWS
02-29-20