DOJ Tries to Silence the Voice of the Immigration Judges—Again!
The Second Attempt to Decertify the National Association of Immigration Judges
by Judge Amiena Khan and Judge Dorothy Harbeck
Immigration Law
Judge Amiena Khan is the executive vice president of the National Association of Immigration Judges (NAIJ) and serves as the co-chair of the NAIJ Vulnerable Populations Committee. Judge Khan was appointed by Attorney General Eric Holder in December 2010. She is seated at the New York Immigration Court and is a member of the New York State Bar. Judge Khan is the programs chair of the FBA Immigration Law Section and is also a member of the National Association of Women Judges.
Judge Dorothy Harbeck, an immigration judge in New York City, is the secretary/treasurer of the NAIJ. She is also an adjunct professor of law at Columbia and Rutgers. She
is a fellow of the Federal Bar Foundation, is on the Executive Board of the FBA Immigration Law Section, and is a member of the bar in New Jersey and New York.
The 2019 DOJ Petition for Decertification
In August 2019, the Department of Justice (DOJ), in a veiled attempt to silence the voice of the immigration judges (IJs), filed a petition with the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) to decertify the Nation- al Association of Immigration Judges (NAIJ).1 The NAIJ—origi
The 2019 DOJ Petition for Decertification
In August 2019, the Department of Justice (DOJ), in a veiled attempt to silence the voice of the immigration judges (IJs), filed a petition with the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) to decertify the Nation- al Association of Immigration Judges (NAIJ).1 The NAIJ—originally certified in 1979 as the recognized representative for collective bargaining for all U.S. IJs—is a voluntary association that represents and speaks for the interests of the nation’s 440 IJs. The NAIJ was formed with the objectives of promoting independence and enhancing the professionalism, dignity, and efficiency of the immigration courts. DOJ asserts that IJs should be reclassified as “management officials.” This would mean IJs could no longer union- ize, be part of a collective bargaining unit, or speak independently.
NAIJ serves as the only voice of the IJs who cannot speak out without prior express permission of DOJ’s Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR).2 NAIJ serves to afford transparency and accountability. The immigration courts are not independent courts under Article I or Article III of the Constitution. They are wholly contained within DOJ. Without a union,
IJs have no protection against the politicization of the process and their decisions. Without transparency,
the integrity of the process is in jeopardy. Without a union, the IJs cannot protest policy measures, such as the imposition of quotas and performance measures; the IJs cannot contest the numerous policies enacted by EOIR that encroach upon and undermine the inde- pendent decision-making ability of the IJs; and the IJs will not be able to rally against the effective speedup of the workforce, placing due process and fundamental fairness of the proceedings at risk.
How the Process Works
The burden to show that IJs are management officials is on the moving party (i.e., DOJ). The FLRA regional director (RD) has opened an investigation into the
NAIJ, seeking information about its responsibilities. DOJ can submit factual and legal arguments in support of its petition. The RD can then issue a decision or request a hearing to solicit more information. Either party can appeal the RD’s decision to the full FLRA board.
The Unsuccessful 2000 Attempt to Decertify
the Immigration Judges’ Union
This current effort follows a similar, and unsuccessful, strategy pursued by DOJ to decertify the immigration judges’ union approximately 20 years ago. In Septem- ber 2000, the FLRA’s RD rejected DOJ’s argument, and the full FLRA upheld the RD’s decision on appeal. In that prior decertification attempt,3 the FLRA reject- ed DOJ’s argument that IJs make policy through the issuance of decisions, noting that the trial court level IJs do not set precedent and that their rulings are often appealed and reviewed. The FLRA also said that the immigration court system was established specifically so that IJs do not maintain any management duties to enable them to focus on hearings.
The FLRA also ruled that there is a distinct differ- ence between the trial level IJs and the appellate level Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) members.4 The description of the duties of the IJ were described in the 2000 decertification attempt:
The daily routine of an Immigration Judge involves hearing and deciding cases that arise from the operation of the INS.5 A court’s juris- diction to decide these cases is determined at the time a case is filed. After filing, the cases are randomly assigned by the court administrator to an individual Judge and placed on a Judge’s calendar on his or her master calendar day. At that time, the Judge hears presentations from the parties and their attorneys, identifies the is- sues, and advises individuals as to their right to
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representation. The Judge also sets time frames and briefing schedules, as well as the date for trial.6
The nature of the IJs’ decisions and their position in the hierarchy of binding the EOIR was also set forth:
During a trial, the parties are represented by counsel and the rules of evidence are observed. Thereafter, in arriving at their decisions, Immigration Judges are required to apply immigra- tion statutes, applicable regulations, published decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals and federal appellate courts, and other foreign and state laws. After the trial, the Judge issues his or her decision, almost always orally, and advises the parties of their appeal rights. Oral decisions are not tran- scribed unless they are appealed; are not published; and are final and binding only with respect to the parties to the case. With limited exception, decisions of the Immigration Judges may be appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals and review of their decisions is de novo. Certain cases may also be appealed to the appropriate U.S. circuit court.7
Citing its precedential case on the managerial status of BIA members (hereinafter “the BIA Management Case”),8 the FLRA specifically stated that the BIA appellate judges were management officials within the meaning of section 7103(a)(11) of the statute and, therefore, could not be included in the existing bargaining unit. In particular, it concluded that “the incumbent Board Member directly influences activity policy through his participation in the interpreta- tion of immigration laws and the issuance of decisions and, thereby, meets the definition of a management official set forth in section 7103(a)(11) of the Statute.”9
In the 2000 decertification attempt, the RD applied the BIA Management Case and concluded that “unlike decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals, the decisions of Immigration Judges are
not published, do not constitute precedent, are binding only on the parties to the proceedings, and are subject to de novo review.”10 The RD accordingly concluded that the decisions of the judges do not in- fluence and determine the Agency’s immigration policy, in contrast to the decisions of the BIA.
The FLRA concurred that the RD’s definition of a management official is defined as “an individual employed by an agency in a posi- tion the duties and responsibilities of which require or authorize the individual to formulate, determine, or influence the policies of the agency.”11
Critically, the full FLRA also found that management officials are individuals who: “(1) create, establish or prescribe general princi- ples, plans or courses of action for an agency; (2) decide upon or settle upon general principles, plans or courses of action for an agen- cy; or (3) bring about or obtain a result as to the adoption of general principles, plans or courses of action for an agency.”12
The FLRA distinguished the trial court IJs from the BIA appellate judges by specifically holding that IJs do not “make policy through the issuance of their decisions … that in arriving at their decisions, Immigration Judges are required to apply immigration laws and reg- ulations, that their decisions are not published and do not constitute precedent.” Finally, the RD observed that the decisions are binding only on the parties to the case, are “routinely” appealed, and are subject to de novo review.13 There is no difference in this now.
The FLRA specifically agreed with the RD’s rejection of the EOIR’s claims that “the sheer volume of decisions issued by the [immigration] Judges and the finality of their decisions, unless they are appealed,” affect the EOIR’s policy. This is because “no matter the volume of decisions issued, or number of appeals filed, the fact remains that when an Immigration Judge issues a decision [,] he or she is applying and following established Agency law and policy.”14 Again, there is no difference in this now.
While IJs have some authority to control practice in their own courtrooms, they have no authority to set overall policy as to how the courts as a whole will operate. Nor, critically, do they have the authority to direct or commit the EOIR to any policy or course of action. The IJs are highly trained professionals with the extremely important job of adjudicating cases.15 This organizational structure and supervisory delegation was established specifically so that the IJs are unencumbered by any supervisory and management obligations and are free to concentrate on hearings.16 Aspirationally, this is still the position of the IJs.
. . . .
Read the rest of the article at the link. Many thanks to Judge Khan and Judge Harbeck for courageously speaking out and informing us in such a well-documented and scholarly manner.
